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THESIS ABSTRACT
The Thesis argues the following:
(1) Mainstream Protestant constituencies in the USA in this century have been 
problematically identified with the modem socio-cultural world organized around 
liberal values.
(2) This has been manifested by (A) attempts to integrate Christianity into 
modem society on terms fundamentally in harmony with the principles of modernity; 
(B) attempts to employ Christian values to regulate society -  attempts which are in 
tension with the underlying principles of ethos of modemity.
(3) The thesis discovers the theological and historical roots of these patterns 
and points out the flaws in two movements that emerged in reaction to these pattems.
(4) In a final chapter, the thesis accesses select theoretical resources which 
demonstrate the importance and basis of Christianity sustaining a differentiated 
relationship to society. In the conclusion, the gains derived from this theoretical 
inquiry are retumed to the historical problem analyzed in the body of the dissertation.
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FIXITY AND FREEDOM
This dissertation evolved out of my experiences in Washington, D.C., where I 
was directly confronted with the cultural and political battles between the Religious 
Right and the defenders of the liberal tradition. In 1988, while representing Colgate 
Rochester Divinity School in a conference on the subject of the First Amendment and 
the separation of church and state, and again in 1994 and 1995, while working on 
Capitol Hill as an archivist for the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, I was 
forced to give attention to the heated polemic occurring between right and left 
religious constituencies. The Right argued that America was on the brink of moral 
ruin because it had removed God, the Christian religion and Biblical morality from the 
public domain. They insisted that a liberal interpretation and practice of the First 
Amendment and individual liberties that had no basis in the Constitution, judicial 
prerogative or America’s “Christian” founding, had opened the door to socio-moral 
anomie, runaway pluralism and secularism. So-called liberals from both secular and 
religious origins passionately countered these claims, insisting that individual liberty, 
pluralism and the proper secularization of public life were among the great values and 
contributions of democratic government to modem social development. They accused 
the Religious Right of historical revisionism, moral absolutism, attempting to 
manipulate democratic power and undermining individual liberty. Most importantly, 
the left passionately defended the social value and integrity of American freedom with 
its commitment to equality, pluralism and secularization.
From the beginning, I was convinced that the terms of debate created more 
heat than light. Both parties were locked in a polemic that had led them into a comer. 
The Right’s anxiety over the changing moral complexion of society had led them into 
a campaign which ended up justifying the circumscription of individual and minority 
rights and liberties, inordinately intensifying traditional claims about Biblical 
authority, identifying Christianity with moral absolutism and constming America’s 
Founding Statesmen and the Republic itself as Christian in classical orthodox terms. I 
began to think that these positions resulted more from being too closely identified to 
America as a socio-national entity than faithfulness to Christian beliefs or the 
Founders’ republican premises.
Likewise, the more liberal constituency seemed to me to be blind in the face of
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the facts. They dismissed the idea that the socio-moral fabric of American society was 
under any inordinate stress except for the economic imbalances to which they had 
traditionally drawn attention. They never questioned the social integrity of the liberal 
principles and ethos that underpinned the modem state. Not only the Religious Right, 
but some post-modern theorists and cultural analysts were saying that modemity had 
reached a socio-moral crisis.' I suspected that the Religious Left and Right, both of 
which had their origin and center in mainstream Protestant constituencies, were alike 
too closely identified with an image of the United States as a model leader of societies 
organized around freedom.
The research commenced from these initial reflections and progressed to a 
search for the historical evidence and sources of mainstream Protestantism’s 
identification with America, as it was expressed in these two right-left polarities. The 
work, however, was never intended to be only an inquiry into American mainstream 
Protestantism’s relationship to its world. While I was interested in this specific 
historical question, I was also interested in a more general theoretical question, 
having to do with the nature of Christianity’s relationship to the world. For this, I 
turned to select theological, biblical and sociological sources. The thesis evolved out 
of my interaction with these two references, the theoretical and historical, and slowly 
took on its present form. As the Table of Contents indicates, this form is that of a 
historical description and analysis of mainstream Protestantism’s close identification 
with America, interpreted through a new paradigm - “fixity” and “freedom.” This is 
followed by a theoretical discussion which calls into question relationships which lack 
differentiation. Sociological resources are explored in order to demonstrate that the 
essential key to a proper connection between one body and another is not 
identification, but differentiation and that this is a fundamental truth which is 
generally applicable to all relationships. Biblical and theological studies are employed 
to show how differentiation is the critical challenge in Christianity’s relationship to 
the world.
By moving from the historical to a strictly theoretical enquiry, the intent has 
been to create a framework which would allow mainstream Protestantism in the 
United States to be viewed in the larger context of this challenge of differentiation.
Rather than allow myself to be mired in a highly polarized right-left debate, 1 
have attempted to discover a larger historical and sociological framework for
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understanding this struggle as well as the deeper theological issues at stake. In fact, 
the approach taken in this study goes beyond the above description. The “new” 
framework I believe fundamentally alters the terms of the debate and the scope of the 
parties involved. By identifying the pattems of “fixity” and “freedom,” the aim of the 
study is to open a new understanding of, and appreciation for, the challenge that faces 
American Protestant churches and their relationship to the modem world.
The common approach to the right-left polemic has been over liberal versus 
conservative interpretations of the biblical authority and the Constitution (with the 
Bill of Rights). Included in this polemic were arguments over the American Founders’ 
principles — whether these principles were Christian or secular. The approach taken in 
this study to the Right-Left polemic is different. It is not first and foremost a question 
of the correctness of either the Right’s or the Left’s positions that is the cmcial issue. 
Rather, it is the historic relationship that Protestantism formed with nascent and 
modem America that is primary. It is this relationship and the various forces that have 
influenced it that is the focus of my enquiry. These forces include historical 
developments in the American experience going as far back to the early colonial 
period; the problems, pressures and temptations endemic to the socio-political 
constmction of the United States; the forces behind doctrinal revisions and the effect 
these have had and the social “role” these revisions played in influencing 
Protestantism’s relation to their new world.
By approaching the problem in this manner, the religio-cultural right is viewed 
alongside the left. The two are shown to be variant expressions of a common problem. 
They are siblings of an earlier union between Protestantism and a developing republic. 
No doubt this analysis will be passionately resisted by both parties who would find the 
idea scandalous.
The dissertation argues the following thesis: (1) that mainstream American 
Protestant constituencies in this century have been too closely identified with the 
United States as a socio-cultural entity; (2) that the roots andformation o f this 
identity can be traced back to theological developments and historical precedents in 
the colonial and antebellum periods; (3) that this identification has been primarily 
manifested in two dynamics that are in logical tension, “fixity” and “freedom, ” which 
are endemic to the modern social order; and (4) that this judgement “too closely 
identified, ” while argued from an historical analysis, ultimately rests on positive
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criteria derived from an understanding o f the dialectical character o f the Christian 
gospel [and other sources] which requires and empowers the church *s differentiation 
from its world while remaining connected to it.
The Framework for Understanding “Fixity” & “Freedom”
The relationship of a Christian body with the greater socio-cultural world may 
be characterized as moving in one of three directions. It may move away from the 
world, becoming insular and separate. It may move toward it, so as to become 
increasingly attached and identified with it. Or it may move into a creative tension 
with the world, seeking to remain connected to it, without surrendering its distinct 
character.
My historical research demonstrates that much of mainstream Protestantism in 
America falls into the second category. This has been primarily manifested by the 
presence of two dynamics which may be described as regulative and integrative. The 
regulative dynamic aims at control and relies on “absolute” references of authority 
that are external to the individual and the group. Control is a boundary issue. It betrays 
problematic identification. In a fully developed liberal society, control requires more 
subtle manipulations of power. The integrative dynamic aims at explicit compatibility; 
socio-cultural involvement on terms fimdamentally in harmony with modernity’s 
principles. As will be shown, both strategies have a soteriological aim and both are 
explicitly complementary.
Over the span of North America’s colonial and republican history, there has 
existed within mainstream Protestant constituencies the propensity to control the 
greater social world around them. These Protestant groups refused to suffer the 
presence of religio-moral difference or at least, too great a difference. As a dynamic, 
control is employed to reduce or eliminate another’s difference. Control requires the 
exertion of leverage and coercion to achieve outward unity.
Not surprisingly, Protestant constituencies in America’s colonial and 
republican history, not only exerted efforts to ensure that the greater socio-cultural 
world remain like them, but they also strained to become like the emerging new 
world, increasingly adopting its principles, ethos and vision, so much so that their 
own essential difference began to erode. As will be discussed, at the time of the birth 
of the nation, a fledgling mainstream Protestant coalition explicitly attempted to
integrate its religion into the new social world on terms fundamentally compatible 
with this new world. The use of the term ‘integrate’ approximates Ernst Troeltsch’s 
description of “ascetic Protestantism’s” social philosophy. Summarizing his two 
volume study on the social teaching of the Christian Churches, Troeltsch concludes 
that ascetic Protestantism created the major social strategy for Christianity in the 
modem period. Rather than attempting to establish the mle of Christ over society 
through ecclesiastical prerogative supported by political power or appealing to religio- 
moral absolutes external to the individual or group it employed “...a rational method, 
controlled by the ruling idea of religion.”  ^In principle, Troeltsch notes, Protestantism 
was compatible with democracy, liberalism and freedom of the individual.^ By its 
intrinsic religious make-up and historical activity, Protestantism supported the 
development of these modem values and institutions. But this support was 
accompanied by Protestantism’s social philosophy, which was to integrate into the 
new socio-cultural world their religious moral values so as to... “neutralize the 
ethically dangerous consequences of modem life.”'' This religious provision, Troeltsch 
observed, included the “responsibility of the individual”... “the duty of love” [toward 
individuals and community]... “taboo on luxury, mammon and love of pleasure” and 
“heroism in serving the cause of Christ,..”  ^Despite the achievement of this social 
strategy, Troeltsch’s judgement is that the day of this approach is past. Its force and 
effectiveness is spent.®
While not questioning the good that has come from this social engagement, 
considered from the standpoint of this thesis, there is an inherent problem with this 
strategy. It is explicitly built on Protestantism’s attachment to, and close identity with, 
the new world order. It arises out of a fundamental belief in this order and its 
historical importance. As such, Protestantism most willingly brought its Christian 
jewels to the project of building the new secular temple; treasures such as its 
Christian values, beliefs, morals and ethic of service. Having repented of Erastinian 
and Constantinian monopolistic views, Protestantism envisioned a new kind of 
Christian universalism accomplished through the simple transportation and 
integration of its ethic and values into the new secular order.
Although far more critical in his assessment, H. Richard Niebuhr makes a 
similar claim about American Protestantism’s relation to the developing new world.
In time, Niebuhr writes, Protestantism began to position itself as “the protector of the
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social mores. Its revivals tended to become instruments for the enforcing of the 
prevailing standards.”  ^This relation to society which may rightly be viewed as 
complementary and integral to the new order is seen, for instance, in Protestantism’s 
identification with the temperance cause. Niebuhr perceptively observes “as it became 
increasingly clear how perilous the use of liquor was in democratic and industrial 
society, the revival was used especially to combat this evil.”® The chief concern of 
Protestantism at this stage, Niebuhr noted, was religion. It expended much of its 
energy in efforts to protect the validity of religion in a scientific democratic world and 
it “sought to prove its usefulness in promoting the dominant purposes of the age.” 
“With greater or less success, it [Protestantism] performeid the function which eveiy 
institutional religion must perform in society, transmitting the best of mores... 
improving the morale of men in their hard struggle with themselves and others.”  ^In 
this social engagement of Protestantism, “It was not God who ruled but religion ruled 
a little and religion needed God for its support.”'''
As a result of this integrative social strategy, Protestantism assimilated into 
itself the secular premises and ethos of the modem world. Of course, social entities 
that share common space will always experience levels of mutual assimilation. But 
there is assimilation that threatens and weakens a particular body’s essential 
difference.
During the nineteenth century, the propensity to employ Christian religion to 
regulate the new republic as well as the propensity to integrate the Christian religion 
into the republic’s premises and goals, characterized the same constituencies within 
mainstream Protestantism. Only in the twentieth century did these two divide. On the 
one side, Protestantism’s conformity with its world deepened so that its agreement 
with the underlying premises and ethos of the modem state became substantive. On 
the other side, there was resistance to the full logic and premises of modernity which 
eventually gave rise to a new concerted effort to exert a measure of control over 
modem society.
The preceding discussion of identity manifested in efforts toward integration 
and regulation over against differentiation, points to the underlying stmcture of the 
dissertation. But in order to develop and more finely nuance the meaning inferred in 
the terms regulative and integrative, I have employed two terms to stand in their place: 
“fixity” and “freedom.” The following explains my rationale for this choice.
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Fixity and Freedom Defined
After the Revolution, non-sectarian Protestants participated with other 
Protestant groups that were gaining widespread recognition to reconstruct 
Christianity’s role and relation to the new republican society. “Fixity” and “freedom” 
are organizing terms which embody contrary aspects of this new role and relation to 
society. As will be demonstrated, the terms were chosen because they embody the 
essence of the new points of contact with the modem world which Christianity was 
intended to sustain; a connection which was conceived as complementary and 
necessary, modemity being what it was. It is in this idea of disclosing a point of 
contact, that my purpose in selecting these terms becomes clear.
The employment of any term to describe a particular phenomenon carries with 
it an interpretive bias. As will be discussed, “fixity and freedom” envelop the idea that 
the connection which Christianity is to have with society is tailored to modemity’s 
needs and principles. Christianity is explicitly shaped so as to be relevant and 
complementary to a new kind of social order. As will be discussed, from the 
beginning of the nation, the dominant evangelical Protestant groups became invested 
in the success and integrity of the new social order." As such, their basic relationship 
to society took on an explicit complementary form. This shape reflected the extent of 
their identity with the new social-national project,
“Freedom”
Before defining what is meant by “freedom,” when I use the term in the 
context of the thesis paradigm, it is first necessary to review a common meaning of 
freedom which is germane to American and westem democracies; one from which my 
special usage is drawn. Freedom means to order one’s life according to the dictates of 
one’s own will, interests and conscience. It is “a condition which fulfills a man by fact 
of being the very essence of his existence as himself, not a creature or puppet of 
others.”'^  The historical root of the meaning of freedom in the American experience is 
primarily derived from the liberal ideology that came to prominence in the wake of 
the Revolution. The colonist ultimately concluded that they were at the mercy and will 
of a parliament which exercised power over them, denying them equal representation 
in the matters that pertained to them. Contextually speaking, the idea of freedom in 
America was bom with the interpretation that this power, which controlled the
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colonists’ interests, must be challenged and reformed so as to be placed under their 
own management. Self-determination and autonomy are terms that express the 
essence of the meaning of freedom in this setting.
As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Two, the American 
experience of freedom depended on Enlightenment ideas. Relying on Enlightenment 
thinkers, the Founding Fathers were able to legitimize and interpret their new 
freedom. The following five statements summarize the Founder’s liberal assumptions: 
(1) Freedom is an individual right. It is not the grant of political powers, but an 
endowment of God and nature. (2) A central corollary of freedom is that persons have 
the capacity to guide, restrain and correct themselves using their own faculty of reason 
and experience. Likewise, the collective dividends of rational and empirical 
knowledge are available to guide the community and solve its social problems. Men 
like Jefferson and Madison no doubt subscribed to Kant’s classic definition of 
Enlightenment. “Enlightenment,” Kant said, “is man’s release from his self-incurred 
tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without 
direction from another... Have courage to use your own reason! This is the motto of 
Enlightenment.”'^  Understood in this way, freedom leads to a shift in the locus of 
authority from official, traditional and transcendent sources to sources inherent in the 
human community and individual.
(3) The enjoyment of freedom in society is commensurate with the prevalence 
of virtue. In a republic, all are able to leam and practice virtue; liberal republican 
governance requires it. (4) The concomitant of freedom is a plurality of ideas, 
religions, customs and people. This pluralism, rather than fracturing society’s cultural 
cohesion, is the matrix for a corrective dialectical environment which creates a new 
unity. A democratic fraternity resulting from shared republican citizenship holds 
together the differences endemic to a liberal social structure.
(5) When viewed in light of the preceding philosophical assumptions freedom 
has implied in it a degree of dynamism or movement. People liberated from 
hierarchical arrangements create a new arrangement whereby they are able to exercise 
their freedom using reason, knowledge and conscience. The liberal arrangement 
inevitably comes to be thought of as better and as possessing teleological significance. 
The ideas of freedom and social development are linked. The former becomes the 
grounds for the latter to occur. This will be discussed in greater detail in the course of
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the dissertation. In federal America, freedom was contextual. It was conceived within 
these five assumptions (1) the absoluteness of the individual; (2) the adequacy of 
reason to guide; (3) the simple historical possibility of a virtuous citizenry; (4) the 
compatibility of plurality and community and (5) the probability, if not inevitability of 
progress in a social climate of freedom.
My special usage of freedom interacts with the preceding meanings in the 
following manner. A consensus within mainstream Protestantism formed an 
optimistic attachment to modem freedom, both as a socio-political and human project. 
In their understanding of mission and in their theological ideas, this constituency 
became imbued with the modem liberal values that were regarded as intrinsic to and 
supportive of freedom. In its high water mark, these Protestants lost sight of the 
dialectical importance of the church vis-à-vis society and attempted to invest their 
religion in the future and success of modem society and its principles in a direct way. 
With few exceptions, they were uncritically supportive of the exercises of individual 
liberty in society. Furthermore, they revised their own understanding of authority to 
conform to the Enlightenment shift of reference, i.e., from one outside and above the 
individual to one intrinsic to the individual. In this latter theological endeavor 
(although never fully accomplished), a segment of mainstream Protestantism became 
perilously close to being consistently identified with the premises of modem society.
By the end of the eighteenth century, much of mainstream Protestantism began 
to embrace the challenge of disestablishment, which required Christianity to be placed 
on a voluntary basis where influence replaced coercion. It recognized that if it was to 
have a social public role in the new political order, it must embrace modem freedom. 
By the beginning of this century, it had fully developed the character of its new role. It 
attempted to mainstream its minimal religious-moral values into society on terms 
which modem society, organized around freedom, could accept. The material essence 
of this involved the transformation of its religious authority. Post-establishment 
Protestantism’s new social relevance was bom with their self-conscious realization 
that it was Protestantism’s destiny to provide the inner religio-moral constitution of 
the modem project. Protestants embraced their new post of duty and attempted, and to 
a significant degree succeeded to thoroughly penetrate the culture of the Republic 
with their religio-moral values.In  the nineteenth century, Protestantism believed it 
was the necessary complement to republican government. Openly, Protestantism
paraded its embrace of liberal republican values and its own happy acceptance of its 
new voluntary associational character. Post-establishment Protestantism’s new social 
relevance was bom with its self-conscious realization of this axiom.
Most of mainstream Protestantism in the nineteenth century became deeply 
imbued with the democratic world view and its underlying Enlightenment premises.
As will be discussed, this direction was the seed bed for an eventual reaction and 
polarization within Protestantism giving place to two sides. Both sides remained 
identified with America as a republic of freedom, but only the liberals continued to 
work out that identification on terms tmly compatible with the underlying 
Enlightenment premises of modem freedom. It is for this reason, that my paradigmatic 
use of “freedom” to describe a particular pattern traceable from colonial times into 
this century is proleptic. That is to say, the expressions of “freedom” in the 
seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, contained the seeds but not the full 
fruit of the twentieth century phenomenon. Through the main part of the nineteenth 
century, the impulses of “fixity” and “freedom,” though in logical tension, lived on 
together within mainstream Protestantism.
Fixity
The Random House dictionary defines “fixity” as the state or quality of being 
fixed, stable or permanent.'^ This definition expresses well one of the goals that some 
mainstream Protestants have had for society as it developed in North America. Their 
passion has been to formally connect liberal society [i.e., society organized around 
individual liberty and democratic freedom], to their idea of God, standards of Biblical 
morality and to the religious designation “Christian.” Used in this way, fixity has three 
interrelated nuances. First, it denotes the attempt to connect or affix one entity to 
something else if necessary, using political leverage. Second, it denotes to what 
society is being connected. In this setting, that which is regarded as potentially 
unstable in itself [society organized around freedom], is being connected to something 
that is thought to be stable - God and moral absolutes. Third, fixity denotes what the 
above connection is intended to guarantee [i.e., society’s socio-moral cohesion or 
“fixity”]. Fixity used in this third sense, is identical to Max Lemer’s use of this very 
term when he summarizes Alexis de Tocqueville’s ideas about the effect of shared 
religio-moral values on society.'® Without the presence of these shared values.
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Tocqueville argued that society splinters into idiosyncratic particles. It loses its 
“fixity” or social-moral coherence. “Despotism,” Tocqueville writes, “may be able to 
do without faith, but freedom cannot... How could society escape destruction if when 
political ties are relaxed moral ties are not tightened?”'  ^Commenting on this 
statement, Max Lemer writes, “Thus Tocqueville saw the role of religion as the 
cohesive stuff of a democratic society which has lost the old cement of authority and 
must find a new cement of some sort if it is not to dissolve into atomistic dust.”'® 
Segments of mainstream Protestantism have concurred with this view, with the added 
proviso that when necessary [i.e., when cultural moral consensus breaks down or is 
absent], political leverage must be employed to ensure that these values remain 
definitive and constitutive of society, even if it means circumscribing the liberties of 
individuals.'^ Fixity is not a return to Constantinianism or Erastianism. It is a modem 
phenomenon even in its New England Congregationalist origins but especially in its 
post-revolutionary post-establishment development. It is a modem phenomenon 
because it expresses a desire to connect a free society (or nascent free society) to 
something authoritative and extrinsic to humanity [i.e., the Bible, natural law or 
tradition] not by way of the old ecclesiastical-political union, but a new religio- 
political strategy. Its only break with modemity is that this fixity is referenced to a 
standard outside the self and the collective selves and that it requires some special 
political support.
Whereas “freedom” connects with the idea of developmental societal change, 
“fixity” connects with the idea that society can be so organized to resist corrosive 
effects of time and change. Fixity is in tension with change - that is, change involving 
socio-moral degradation or corruption, so called. As the term denotes, fixity suggests 
a more static view of society, one in which society can be spared the historical aging 
process.
“Fixity” also lends specificity to the charge of control, by showing what is 
being aimed at in Protestantism’s engagement with its world - a more morally stable 
modern society. The close identification with society which underpins control, does 
not arise ex nihilo, but from the vacuum created by the dislocation of the 
establishment model. Religious “fixity” as such, nuances the substance of 
Protestantism’s identification with modernity.
The preceding explications are intended to demonstrate that the terms “fixity”
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and “freedom,” rather than further abstracting the concepts at work in this study, aim 
to make them more concrete. “Freedom” supplies content to the charge that 
Protestantism became too closely identified with modemity. Furthermore, it shines 
light on Protestantism’s motivation in moving in the direction of this substantive 
agreement - integration and complementarity within modem social project.
The Genesis of Fixity and Freedom
In coming to native America, Protestantism came to a perceived virgin 
wilderness world and a new world grew up around it; a world it sponsored, fostered, 
nurtured and guided. By historical accident and design, America's nativity was 
wrapped in Protestant swaddling clothes. From the very start, Protestantism extended 
itself so as to proffer its religion beyond ecclesial boundaries for societal needs and 
goals. It is in this religious-societal expression of American mainstream 
Protestantism that the roots of fixity and freedom are to be traced.
At the inception of the colonial period, the religion of mainstream Protestant 
bodies was enlisted to participate in society in two ways, especially by the Puritans, 
but not exclusively. On the one side, it was explicitly employed for the maintenance 
of social order. On the other side, it explicitly conceived its mission, in part, as one of 
building society toward a new ideal.^" Before the national formation, for 
approximately 200 years, the impulse for these involvements achieved a relatively 
harmonious expression through Puritan Congregationalism, notwithstanding Anglican 
and other establishment efforts. As I will show in chapter one, the Puritans of New 
England set out to be new world artisans of the relationship of religion to society.
They are paradigmatic for understanding America as a religio-social experiment.^'
Under their design, religion was employed for both the ordering and the building of 
society in a unique way, in part discontinuous with Europe. Puritan notions of the 
building of society were fueled by an element of authentic social idealism.^^
During the period of America's national formation, a new set of socio political 
assumptions came into being. While these assumptions succeeded in ending the 
Congregational, Anglican and other establishment systems, they did not extinguish the |
original social impulses of Protestantism. When European Enlightenment ideas were 
imported to fuel a revolutionary movement and build the Republic, the ground work 
was laid to both intensify and transform the two historic social roles of religion.
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Revolutionary liberty contained within it both the seeds for an eventual revenge of 
religio-moral fixity and the idealization of society reorganized on Enlightenment 
premises.
While the original New England Puritan social idealism was carried forward in 
an explicit ecclesial and theocentric framework, the Founding Fathers’ social idealism 
was fundamentally cast in an anthropocentric secular framework. It called religion 
into a supportive relation to the greater national republican challenge. In time, 
Protestantism would progressively become enmeshed in this new world project 
mixing its own mission and values with that of the secular.
The Founding Fathers had laid the groundwork for the original impulses of 
"fixity" and "freedom" to come to maturity. Unwittingly in the nineteenth century, 
Protestantism commenced on a journey precisely toward this end.
The Development and Maturation of Fixity and Freedom
In the historical setting of this study, the phenomenon of Protestantism's 
identification with its world manifested in the pattems of fixity and freedom, can only 
be regarded as coming to maturity in the national period. Only with the emergence of 
the nation does society become an autonomous entity. In this period, roughly 
identified as the time between the Revolution and the Civil War, the relation of 
religion to society was reinvented. Society, organized as a republic, was just 
begiiming to find its feet, emancipated from politically and ecclesiastical hegemonies. 
Because Protestantism, once itself in the position of social control, was still learning 
what it meant to be associational and voluntary, the problem of proper differentiation 
was never fully comprehended. Differentiation was precisely the challenge nineteenth 
century Protestantism was confronted with. Disestablishment had opened up new 
distinctions between society and church, and society organized as it was on idealist 
Enlightenment values was gaining autonomy. The propensity toward control on the 
one hand and the propensity of uncritical identity in a setting of socio-national 
idealism on the other, were endemic to the situation at that time.
But the challenge of achieving proper differentiation goes deeper than these 
factors. Protestantism during this period was going through substantive changes that 
were rendering it more vulnerable to becoming uncritically identified with republican 
values and social goals. In contrast to the Colonial period, dominated by Calvinistic
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ideas that presented a world in which a dramatic intransigent cleavage existed 
between the righteous and the wicked, the nineteenth century shifted toward an 
Arminian world view. Arminianism was more optimistic about the ability of all 
human beings to change. The freedom to participate with God’s saving and 
transforming grace and become an initiator of, and agent in, one’s destiny, came to be 
emphasized. This new religious assessment infected Protestantism and spread through 
revivalism and evangelicalism, emphasizing a unique religious experience as the 
essence of religion. The result was that Protestantism was made more 
anthropocentric, individualistic and positivistic, which came to be seen as more 
"American."
While in the nineteenth century, the pattems of “fixity” and “freedom” 
persisted together within a broad Protestant coalition, in the twentieth century, 
because of the inherent contradiction in these two and changing socio-cultural 
developments, mainstream Protestantism became divided. As already argued, these 
two manifestations are liberalism in the early decades of the century and the 
fundamentalist driven Religious Right in the later decades of this century. Each of 
these display a mature manifestation of the historic propensity for Protestantism to 
become identified with the possibilities and problems of modemity.
On the one side, that of the fundamentalist Religious Right, Protestantism has 
been pulled into identification with cultural forces resisting change, calling for 
continuity of values, roles and morals. With a new social militancy, it put forth the 
claim that America was, and must continue to be, built on a Judeo-Christian 
foundation and that its individual and social liberties are posterior to this foundation. 
This response required Christianity to be reshaped into a heteronomous force, which 
appealed to transcendent moorings for social stasis and order against flux, change, 
anomie, radical pluralism and some expressions of individualism; a relation of 
religion to society that has precedent in colonial and antebellum America.
On the other side, earlier in this century, the impulse for Protestantism's 
participation in the vision of social human development grew to maturity and went to 
seed. Historians point to the period around 1930 through 1946 as the period in which 
the social optimism of both society and liberal Christianity peaked, sobered by the 
depression and two world wars. However, this impulse has lived on, because it is - 
deeper than any set of historical reversals, I argue that mainstream Protestantism in
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America will always be vulnerable to becoming aligned both missionally and 
theologically either in support of freedom, or in tension with freedom. In the former 
case, it is freedom’s inherent promise for change and progress that has attracted 
Protestantism. In the latter case, it is freedom’s risk of creating conditions which 
foster socio-moral relativism, individualism, anomie, radical pluralism (plurality at 
the roots - dividedness) change, flux and shift of status, power and wealth, that has 
tempted Protestantism to fixity.
The above situation may be summarized as follows: modem society, 
organized around individual liberty, in time provoked a cultural perception that 
society needed to be grounded on religio-moral absolutes that existed prior to liberty. 
In this view, human nature was regarded more pessimistically. This cultural 
perception however was not a consensus. It was preceded and countered by another 
more dominant cultural perception that viewed human nature more optimistically and 
regarded society, organized around freedom and individual liberty, as the necessary 
matrix for development. In this view, an absolute set of religio-moral norms existing 
in heteronomous relation to society was viewed as incompatible to full humanness 
and social progress. It has been the presence of these cultural tensions that has 
exerted a force or pull on Protestantism, drawing it into alignment with goals, agendas 
and ideals either in service of social fixity or in service of a society consistently 
organized around Enlightenment ideals of liberty and freedom (cf between fixity and 
freedom). In either direction, the distinct differentiated identity of Protestantism has 
been compromised.
The temptation for the church's involvement in either of these cultural 
polarities is in part due to the scandal of its difference. Explicit relevance to socio­
cultural struggles offers the church a social place and vocation. After all, what social 
entity is able with more authority to address the moral boundaries of life or the 
sanctity and inviolability of the individual than religion - the church? This is what H. 
Richard Niebuhr recognized when he warned that social relevance alone would lead to 
saving the church’s life at the expense of losing itfr
“Corrective” Responses to the Problem of Fixity and Freedom
At the twilight of the Constantinian era, Roger Williams (1603-1683) and the 
Baptists made an important claim, namely, that the co-extension of Christianity and
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society accomplished through political power was harmful both for society and 
Christianity. For the most part, they did not envision two roles for religion, one 
ecclesial and spiritual, another social and heteronomous (i.e., fixity). Chapter five 
reviews this development, focusing on two points of particular interest: One, the basis 
that these "reformers" set out to effect and sustain what they regarded as a proper 
Christianity - world differentiation, and two, the consequences of their way of 
underpinning the church's differentiation; consequences which would only become 
apparent with the passing of time. It is in this discussion that the study implicitly 
begins to reveal (A) that Christianity's proper differentiation with the world in any 
given time and setting is not a simple historical possibility and (B) careful attention is 
required regarding how differentiation is informed.
At the mid-point of the twentieth century (at a time when modemity had come 
to full maturity), Neo-Evangelicalism emerged from fundamentalism in tension with 
liberalism. Between what it deemed as the problematic separatism from the world 
(characteristic of fundamentalism) and assimilation into modernity's values 
(characteristic of liberalism), neo-Evangelicalism auspiciously set out to quarry a new 
(or "renewed") place for American Christianity. With an eye on how 
Neo-Evangelicalism sought to sustain this position, chapter six reviews this 
development. Here, again, the key issue is how differentiation is sustained and the 
consequences involved.
Beyond Fixity and Freedom
Sociological, Theological, Ethical, Historical and Biblical Resources
In Chapter Seven, the dissertation turns from the historical setting of a 
particular phenomenon, to a theoretical discussion about the deeper issue that 
underlies the presence of this phenomenon. The kind of relationship that Christianity 
sustains to the modem world is the key problem. Using select sociological, 
theological, ethical, historical and biblical resources, this chapter attempts to 
demonstrate that the special challenge with which the church is confronted, is to 
discover the basis for, and importance of, formulating a differentiated relation to its 
particular world.
Three of these select resources are Bowen theory, Karl Barth’s dialectical 
constmction of the gospel (in addition to Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s “ethical” reflections
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which were indebted to his seminal work) and the Apostle Paul’s Epistle to the 
Galatians. Murray Bowen, the father of Bowen Systems Theory or “Bowen Theory” 
observed that the behavior of parties within a social system, often did not display 
integrity to who these parties were in themselves (i.e., the motives values and identity 
that were germane to themselves), but corresponded to the expectations and tensions 
that were present within the social field or zone they were in. Broadly speaking, the 
challenge he saw that existed in all social relations was healthy differentiation. 
Differentiation is contrasted by two opposite social movements, one away from the 
other body or bodies (i.e, separatism or dualism) the other toward the other body, 
eliminating difference through uncritical identification (i.e., submersion of identity) or 
control (i.e, external alignment).
Furthermore, he observed that submersion of identity displayed itself in subtle 
forms, most often in the shape of complementarity. Complementarity describes that 
phenomenon in which the “weaker” party or social body finds a role for itself that is 
deemed to be explicitly relevant to the perceived outstanding needs of the greater 
body or order.
The challenge that Bowen clearly perceived was that of relating to a particular 
social system, one shared without sacrificing integrity to one’s self. Differentiation 
was a statement about the particular character of a body’s relationship. It defined a 
particular way of relating, not the absence of engagement.
Barth called into question nineteenth century European cultural Christianity. In 
the setting in which his work emerged, the church's religion had become 
problematically entangled with the emerging values of the Enlightenment. Barth's 
theological implement explicitly crafted to pry these two apart was evangelical. 
Ultimately, Barth exploited Reformation Evangelicalism, placing the weight on the 
covenantal character of the gospel transposed into a doctrine of Revelation, thereby 
creating a dialectic which called the church to the radical difference between 
God/Kingdom of God and the world. As will be demonstrated, Barth's theology laid 
the foundation for an “ecclesial” versus a cultural-religious formulation of 
Christianity. Between Protestantism’s tendency toward absolutism on the right and 
relativism on the left (both of which served to “prove” Christianity’s relevance to 
modem society as both a socially conservative and socially liberal force), Barth 
pointed to an evangelical formulation of Christianity that referred the world to the
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God who had come near in Jesus Christ as Judge, Lord and Saviour. The simple 
abstraction of Biblical and Christian truth made serviceable to social needs and goals 
was foreclosed by evangelical truth which changed both the “ordo salutis ” and the 
idea of truth itself.
The stretch marks of the church's emancipation from the parochialism of its 
place within Jewish sectarianism to one of Gentile catholicity are to be found 
throughout the New Testament, but perhaps nowhere more than in Paul's' letter to the 
Galatians. In this letter, he theologically legitimized this transition by rewriting the 
prevailing ecclesiology to conform to the advent of the messianic period. In order to 
accomplish this, Paul exploited the Apostolic gospel, radicalizing the Evangelical 
universal nature of its faith, effectively thrusting the church into a new openness to its 
world. In essence, what Paul did was to change the character of the boundary which 
had guaranteed the cleavage between the ecclesia and the world. The old boundary, 
which rested on taboo backed by the authority of Torah, created a dramatic cleavage, 
if not a church-world dualism. The new boundary relied on transcendent and spiritual 
categories, which are antithetical to a thorough-going church-world cleavage. The 
ecclesiology that emerges in Galatians supports a differentiation from, but not a 
dualistic posture towards, the world. For this reason, it is of interest to the problem 
under study in this dissertation.
Armed with the constructive insights drawn from Chapter Seven, the 
conclusion re-approaches the historical situation that the dissertation has framed.
Here, the goal is a modest one. Only critical questions are raised, albeit questions 
hopefiilly guided by the benefit of insights derived from a theoretical and historical 
grasp of the complexity of the problem.
Provisos Pertinent to the Development of the Thesis
The dissertation is concerned with a general or pereimial problem examined 
within a specific historical setting. The general or “universal” character of the 
problem might be succinctly described as the propensity of American Protestantism to 
become uncritically identified with it’s world. Clarifying this is important to 
emphasize for two reasons.
First, because it is only well into the body of the study that “fixity and 
freedom” appear to be what the dissertation assumes they are from the beginning.
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namely expressions of Protestantism’s problematic and uncritical identification and 
involvement with its world. The strength of the claim is not first established and then 
historically disclosed. I first recognized these patterns of “fixity” and “Jfreedom” for 
what they were by theological study and then turned to the historical factors and roots 
of these patterns and began to study them by tracing them in their nascent stage. 
Throughout chapters 1-6, there is a search for connections. However this is especially 
true of the early chapters which bring forward information that only much later is 
considered to be pertinent. As such, the method of developing the thesis is less linear 
and more discursive.
Second, the preceding proviso is important because it suggests why the 
indictment against mainstream Protestantism made in this study is not simply 
transferable to other socio-political settings that may outwardly appear to present a 
parallel. The history and thought peculiar to the birth, development and political 
organization of the United States mark the boundaries and context inside of which the 
charge of “fixity” and “freedom” are legitimate and recognizable as such, but outside 
of which they are something else and need not bear that identity.
The analysis of the problem of Protestantism’s perennial propensity to become 
uncritically identified and involved with America, both pessimistically (fixity) and 
optimistically (freedom), is twofold. First, the study aims to be generally attentive to 
what is occurring historically in the world, which would predispose Protestantism 
towards these involvements. Second, it aims to be more specifically attentive to what 
is occurring religiously and theologically within Protestantism which contributes to 
the problem.
As 1 have indicated earlier in this Introduction, “fixity” and “freedom” are 
conceptually laden terms to describe two directions which grew out of a common 
problem described as Protestantism’s close identification with the development of 
modem America. As such, they refer back to a common problem and for this reason 
the patterns of fixity and freedom often overlap. They remain useful, however, in 
nuancing two directions which grow out of Protestantism’s historic attachment to 
America.
A further word is necessary regarding the decision to introduce the term 
differentiation to define the problem of Protestantism’s uncritical identification with 
its world. From one perspective, it may be argued that weak “differentiation”
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describes one half of a deeper problem integral to this study - that of relevance. The 
issue of relevance is addressed in the conclusion. The thesis, as it has been shaped, is 
apparently blind to the question of relevance until the end. It is there that the question 
of how the church is able to sustain its relevance while escaping the perennial 
problem of falling into uncritical identity and alignment with the world, is addressed.
The reason for this “blindness” is due to the way relevance is understood in 
this thesis. If differentiation is properly formed, relevance will be automatically 
achieved. The body of this study (Part I) is fundamentally critical because it is 
formulated on the premise that properly discerning and confronting the problem of 
uncritical identification is the foundation for recovering true relevance. Descriptively 
speaking, the important factor in “relevance” is the presence to a given body 
(individually or corporately) of another body that maintains its differentiation. 
Thereby, two alternative destinies are resisted, that of becoming uncritically fused 
with another body [either in a “strong” position of control or a “weak” position of 
uncritical identification], and that of becoming insular - separatistic, so as to abridge 
contact and involvement.
In an effort to overcome dualism, the church may attempt to be relevant. But 
relevance itself must not be merely determined by engagement with the world but a 
timely engagement sourced from its (the church's) grounds of differentiation. In the 
final analysis, it is not a question of the church's relevance to the world, but relating 
the world and its way to something more final and determinative. In this maimer, 
relevance does not weaken ecclesia and ecclesia does not become insular and 
dualistic. '^*
The term “mainstream Protestantism” is used at various junctures in this study. 
Chapter Three shows in what sense this organizing description is valid. Clearly, 
sectarianism persisted after disestablishment but not to the exclusion of a new 
Protestant fraternity that emerged from two primary forces. First, there was the impact 
of the Great Awakenings, especially the second Great Awakening. Under the 
influence of the revivals, Protestants began to relativize the importance of doctrinal 
differences and focus on the experiential and practical facets of Christianity. Second, 
disestablishment and republican government created a new social “emergency” in the 
minds of many Protestants. Rather than accept the privatization of the church [i.e., the 
relegation of the church from a public role to a private status alongside other sects and
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religious groups] they discovered their religious unity and sought a new way to impact 
the course of society.
Elwyn Smith, in an article entitled “The Voluntary Establishment of Religion,” 
writes “...Insofar as the general term Protestant has acquired historical meaning in the 
United States, it refers to religious groups that learned the lessons of consensus and 
collaboration from Lyman Beecher.”^^
William McLoughlin makes a similar observation. “Evangelical religion, 
despite its increasing fragmentation into denominations during the nineteenth century, 
prided itself on its denominational fratemalism. Which is another way of saying that 
after 1800, America ceased to have any systematic theology or creedalism which 
could be defined as orthodoxy in any denomination. Lyman Beecher’s famous 
statement of ‘The faith once delivered to the saints’ (1832) may be taken as the 
essence of the Evangelical creed so far as it had one: belief in the ‘great Christian 
fundamentals’ of the miraculous birth, death and resurrection of Jesus to save men 
from damnation was the only essential element in Evangelical theology.”^^  
“Christianity and particularly Protestantism in America,” claims H. Richard Niebuhr 
“must be understood as a movement rather than as an institution or series of 
institutions.”^^
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THE SOURCES OF FIXITY AND FREEDOM: EARLY AMERICA
CHAPTER ONE
Religious Sources: The Puritan Fathers
The contemporary patterns of “fixity” and “freedom” discussed in the coming 
Chapters have their historical roots in ideas and policies which took shape in both the 
colonial and revolutionary period in American history. Mainstream Protestants, 
especially Puritan Congregationalist divines and the Founding Fathers, each had a 
vision for a new kind of society and a new relationship which religion was to sustain 
to society. Each shared concerns about the maintenance of order and cultural cohesion 
and each had aspirations to build society toward a new ideal. But the similarity 
between the Puritans and the Founding Fathers ends there.
The Founding Fathers, discussed in the next chapter, started with a political 
need to construct the society of a new nation, and recognized in religion an important 
aid to their social project. Their task and vision was the implementation of a new 
socio-political experiment, one in which religion was given a new role. The Puritan 
Fathers saw in religion a creative social potential, largely untried. Even so, the Puritan 
beginning did not wholly break with the traditional ordering and civilizing role of 
religion so rudimental to the European assumptions in existence at that time. The 
Puritans moved from the religious to a secular frontier seeking to reform and 
transform the latter out of the vision inherent in the former. The Founding Fathers 
began with a new social and human vision and sought to ally religion to it and, if need 
be, submitting religion to radical revision.
This chapter focuses on the early New England Puritans, not because they are 
wholly unique among most of the other English colonies in North America, but 
because of the degree to which they recognized that America represented the potential 
for the beginning of a new relation of religion to society. Nine or ten of the original 
thirteen colonies had some form of religious establishment; Puritans most fully 
entered into the challenge and opportunity that America offered for a new equation of 
these two.
America was thus bom as a religious - social experiment. The Puritans, 
mostly Congregationalists, exerted a potent influence over New England for 200 
years, shaping with other colonial establishments America's self understanding in the 
formative stages of its settlement by Europeans. L It is for this reason that I begin by 
reviewing the sources of the Puritans work and thought. While events would in time
displace the Puritan system, the new relationships between religion, society and 
church they invented, and the theological formulation on which they drew to 
underwrite these relationships have had ongoing significance. It is in those 
relationships that the beginnings o f 'fxity ” and “freedom ” are to be traced.
The chapter is organized as an inquiry into the Puritan church-society-religion 
arrangement. This is followed by a conclusion which demonstrates how this 
arrangement and the ideas behind it contributed to the formation of the patterns of 
“fixity” and “freedom” within mainstream Protestantism.
The body of the chapter looks at this church-society-religion arrangement from 
three points of view. First, it is discussed from the standpoint of the historical 
exigencies from which it arose and in contrast to existing and earlier models. Second, 
there is a discussion of the central theological ideas that informed this arrangement. 
Here again, contrast is employed to achieve insight. Finally, the actual praxis of the 
Puritan Congregational model is reviewed. The insights gained from this discussion, 
provide the basis to disclose the logical connection between the modem pattems of 
“fixity” and “freedom” and the historical ideas and precedents that were formed in 
North America by the Puritans.
The Historical-Ecclesiastical Matrix of the Puritan's 
New Religion-Society Relationship
While Calvinism provided the basic building blocks for New England 
Puritanism, the Puritans cast their Calvinism in a distinct vision of themselves within 
the sequence of historical events and their view of the judgments and providence of 
God. The picture of the New England Puritans coming to America with a bold 
religious zeal on an errand to attempt a realization in history of utopie religio-social 
ideals, is a distortion.^ More recently, studies have shown that the vision behind their 
'errand' was shaped by the defeat and rejection of Puritanism in its endeavor to reform 
the church of England.
Their passion, as Avihu Zakai’s study has demonstrated, was that of a pure 
church. They understood themselves in the setting of the drama found in the 
apocalypse of Revelation 12, where the woman flees into the wildemess. The 
Puritans were the woman, the true church, who was persecuted by the cormpt 
church-state alliance (the "whore" cf. Revelation 18). Leaving a hostile and cormpt
situation, ripe for impending judgment, they were first seeking sanctuary. This then is 
the ideological setting of their ‘errand’. The wildemess, a necessary place of 
sanctuary, was simultaneously a gift of separateness. Separation provided the context 
for the tme church to emerge and achieve its distinct integrity. Purity and wildemess 
were mutually supportive of each other.^ New England Puritans embraced the 
wildemess for what they understood it to be: the unique opportunity, time and place 
for the church to realize the integrity it was refused in England."^  The importance of 
this event in the stream of time was that it assumed special historical significance. Not 
unlike other settings in which Calvinism flourished, the Puritans infused both 
America and the timing of their beginning with unique Christian significance in the 
flow of salvation history. Their America would become a beacon of tme religion, 
fulfilling the destiny inherent within Protestantism but not yet realized.^ Simon 
Schama has shown that around the same time, Calvinistic Hollanders came to 
understand themselves in light of Israel’s calling. Like Israel, they recognized in their 
history the special providence of God, deliverance from bondage and a calling to be in 
a special covenant with God. Were they to stray like Israel of old, they could expect to 
be humbled by their God. In fact, Schama insists that “to a great extent this scriptural 
exhortation was a common idiom o f all Calvinist and Puritan cultures o f the early 
seventeenth century. Abrahams, Isaacs and Jacobs could be found in Rouen, Dundee, 
Norwich and Basel as well as Leiden and Zierikzee.”®
In discussing the Puritan and later republican roots of the United States’ 
conviction of its providential calling. Reinhold Niebuhr has essentially brought out 
the same point, namely that many, if not all, modem nations have in their histories a 
conviction of special election.^ New England Puritanism’s sense of special calling 
must be understood as one expression of this larger phenomenon; a phenomenon that 
may be endemic to the make up of Calvinism and the formation of republican 
governments. Calvinism and Old Testament narrative provided the imagery and 
ideology necessary for them to interpret and impart purpose to their experience. The 
extremity of their experience may be in proportion to the importance they came to 
view their history.
North American Puritanism’s ideas of election, however, have one distinct 
feature, bound up with the argument with Bishop Laud and the Church of England. As 
Sidney Mead point out,
“The emergence of the nations corresponds in time with the 
Reformation, so that concurrent with the fragmentation of the Empire into 
nations came the fragmentation of the universal visible church into many 
particular churches. And in those areas where reformation churches were 
established (Scotland, England, Geneva, Holland, the principalities of North 
Germany, and Scandinavia), the nation assumed its own form of Christianity 
and established ‘a national form of religious organization’ fusing ‘the spiritual 
tradition of the new and secular nation... with the spiritual tradition of the old 
and Christian society....’ Thus the essentially spiritual society of the nation 
was, in effect. Christianized by partially digesting into its spiritual core a 
particularized version of Christianity. For its people the nation became also 
their church, and the church became also their nation -  church and nation 
being merely different perspectives on the one society to which they belonged. 
Such at least, says Ernest Barker, was the vision of Hooker and Laud in 
England where die identification was most complete, although never 
absolute.... This view was being challenged in England by nonconformists 
with a different view of the nature of a church and, consequently, of its 
relation to civil authority. It was the nonconformist view, adapted to the 
American environment, that was to triumph and be incarnated in.... the United 
States.^
New England Puritanism’s historical narrative placed a new distinction 
between church and state by adding a new “player” in the Christianity - nation 
equation: religion. The result of this, as will be argued at several junctures in the 
following chapters, is that Christianity is the loser and nation [in this instance 
autonomous nation minus established church], eventually swallowed up and absorbed 
the idea of providential election.
In order to fully appreciate New England Puritanism’s passion and ‘strategy’ 
for separateness and their appropriations of the Old Testament idioms of calling and 
election, it is necessary to review the presuppositions of the Anglican religion-society 
relationship from which the Puritans' point of departure took its distinctive turn.
It is the formal linkage of church and society in the Erastian model that is the 
significant characteristic in seventeenth century Anglicanism which highlights 
Puritanism’s new direction. The actual location of power which supported this 
connection, whether over the church, under or alongside (all positions tried in the 
histoiy of Constantinianism) is less important in this discussion. The assumption, 
which went back to antiquity, that the religion of Christianity was to be co-extensive 
with society, meant that society was to be “religionized” and that religion would be 
“socialized.” Christianity in this form became an extension of public civil life.
This assumption may be traced to the fourth century CE at the beginning of the 
Constantinian era. At this time, the mass of society was given a public Christian 
identity, culturally guaranteed by a regional policy of infant baptism and socially 
guaranteed by political authority and power. The Church’s dependence on political 
power was reflected in its hierarchical, institutional, authoritarian and pedagogical 
character which created a laity characterized by confession, conformity, dependence, 
passivity and receptivity. Society as such would be ’religionized' but not spiritually 
transformed. In this form, the rites that once marked one's introduction into a separate 
messianic fellowship and the shared communion of that fellowship - baptism and the 
Lord’s Supper - were transmuted and extended so as to ritualize the common passages 
of life. Birth, adolescence, marriage, death, burial, were sacralized as were days and 
events of public import.^ For the church, this meant that Christian life was an 
extension of civil existence. Constantinianism replaced the primitive cohesion of the 
messianic community; faith, hope, and love gave way to an external adhesive unity.
Constantinianism had rehabilitated the state.’® Primitive Christianity's 
antagonism toward the state, reflected in apocalyptic thinking, was replaced. The 
state was viewed along side the church as an instrument of justice and order whose 
legitimation ultimately could be grounded in creation and natural law. Church and 
state cooperated with each other and upheld each other as institutions serving 
common ends.” For the church this cooperation meant it would be enmeshed in a 
source of power that had often been raised against it.
The involvement of the church with civil power, whether in the classic 
Constantinian arrangement or later Erastian arrangement had been a source of conflict 
since at least the fourth century. In the seventeenth century this criticism was taken up 
with renewed vigour.’^
The practical significance of the church’s involvement with political power for 
the state was that it was given access to another source of power and authority to 
assist it in its vocation of keeping the peace, maintaining order and ensuring public 
morality. This meant that the church’s religious power would be looked to by the state 
as a “conservative principle” inevitably enabling it to resist revolution, anarchy and 
reform.”
For the church, the practical significance of having access to civil power was 
that it could coerce universal conformity to its beliefs and practices resist internal
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dissent and calls for reform. In the larger picture, access to political power was a key 
factor, if not the key factor, which enabled the church to create a Christian 
civilization, thereby greatly diminishing, if not eliminating, the tension between the 
church and the world.
From the standpoint of the more radical Puritans, the problem with the Church 
of England was not merely content, but its basic form. Unable to reform the 
Anglo-Erastian system, Puritan efforts in America commenced with a determination 
to reconstruct the church-society relation and provide a witness to England of their 
better way. Armed with both Calvin's ecclesiology and their own experience, they 
called into question the foundation of the Erastian system as an unholy fusion of 
church and world. Formally tying church and state, they argued, had caused the 
integrity and potency of the gospel to be seriously compromised because it had failed 
to create a distinct regenerate community of believers, and as such denied society the 
soteriological benefits of true religion. Both the church and society, they argued, had 
suffered corruption under the Erastian system.
It was the Erastian form of religion that the early Anglicans attempted to 
transplant to America. Society in this model was held together by vertical and 
horizontal authority. Vertically, society was correlated upward through priest, bishop, 
archbishop to the Crown; horizontally, from priest to bishop back through time to the 
Apostles each connected in time to the previous generation. This kind of authority 
provided the foundation of society, at once fixed, stable and cohesive, commensurate 
with the medieval epistemology and cosmology. The Puritans' goal was to introduce 
new distinctions between the ecclesia and society while keeping society correlated to 
religion by relying less on force and more on reason and persuasion.
The Anglican model did not succeed in America, if for no other reason than 
that America functioned as a glass, magnifying both pluralism and individualism. The 
stress of these two forces in the climate of changing attitudes about the nature of 
authority, exacerbated by the colonial perception of the abuse of authority, would 
further spell the demise of this model.” Equally important is the fact that the system 
was often corrupted in America, so much so, that many in society rejected it for its 
moral failure, concluding that its moral laxity was a consequence of the religious 
system itself. Even so, the correlation between social order and religion (the Christian 
Protestant religion) remained etched in the American consciousness.
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The Theological Sources of the Puritan 
Religlon-Society Relationship
In coming to America, the Puritans were on “a grand errand,” as they put it,
“to propagate in this wildemess the blessed Reformed Protestant religion in the purity 
of its order and worship.””
“Their vision can be summarized as the Calvinistic idea of a society ordered in 
worship and in all realms of life by a single religious understanding. This was a hope 
which emerged out of the English scene but became effective only in America.””
Landing on the north eastern shores of North America in the second and third 
decades of the seventeenth century, the Puritans organized society to ensure that it 
would be under the influence of their religion, mediated through two parallel 
institutions: the church, and the civil magistrate (with its councils). The unique form 
that eventually dominated New England and lasted for two hundred years was made 
from source materials they brought with them, primarily Calvin's revision of the 
Constantinian view of the church's relation to society.
Calvinism provided the basis for the persistence of Constantinian goals within 
a revised Protestant framework. As Ernst Troeltsch points out, it is John Calvin who 
makes the Protestant legacy serviceable for nation building.”
Calvin's revision of the Constantinian form and mission of the church is best 
understood in light of his continuity and discontinuity from Luther to whom his 
original theological debt was directly owed. Neither Luther nor Calvin fully 
recovered the Evangelical vocation of the church or its form as a community of 
believers. Luther did, however, lay the foundation for both of these. He conceived 
the church as subservient to the word of the gospel. Where the word of God was 
declared, he insisted, the church came into existence as a community of faith. It was 
an act of creation by the word ("the word of faith which we preach"”).^ ® By making 
justification by faith the foundation of the church, Luther had recovered in principle 
the basis of the primitive congregation. Formally or contextually this was 
compromised by the fact that he relied upon political power to establish the 
Reformation in the territory in which it was to gain dominance. This meant that the 
Reformation spread in Europe in part from the “top down,” not “bottom up” (that is to 
say, through evangelism and conversion). To a significant degree, conformity 
preceded, and therefore compromised, Luther's freedom of faith with its concomitant
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priesthood of believers.^’ This alliance with the ruling magistrate, ensured that the 
form of Christianity would continue to be that of a societal religion, thereby 
effectively eliminating the church - world differentiation, along with the tension that it 
created.
That Luther's congregation remained locked into a greater social stasis is also 
reflected in his view of the Christian life, which in dignifying every vocation, however 
lowly, reinforced the feudal world view.^  ^ At the deepest level of theological critique, 
it may be said that Luther recovered and exploited the extrinsic moorings of faith [i.e., 
the historical objective work of Christ for the believer versus, for instance, the work 
of the spirit in the believer], and polemicized a sacerdotal and authoritarian church.
He thereby recovered and exploited the personal significance of faith, reclaiming the 
importance of the individual.^^ But he failed to fully recapture the eschatological 
thrust of faith which would have reasserted the tension between church and world, 
and rupture the Constantinian synthesis.
While Luther moderated Constantinianism by making religion a study in faith, 
and church a study in preaching and hearing the word of the gospel, Calvin both 
revised and intensified it. He did this by reinventing the church's mission along lines 
both parallel to medieval Constantinianism and at the same time, dramatically 
different. The medieval Constantinian church formed a sacerdotal relation to the 
world uniting the world to itself in sacral dependence and thus creating a dramatic 
cleavage between lay and clerical.
Calvin, on the other hand, was concerned with the spiritual integrity of the 
congregation as an agent of truth and righteousness in a society composed of the 
wicked and the elect. In this, he built on Luther's recovery of the church as the 
congregation/priesthood of believers. But unlike Luther, he emphasized that the 
church was called into a particular relation to society. Society was intended to 
incamationalize the fruits of true religion in every sphere, including education and 
government.^'’ Calvin did not return to the Catholic-stoic use of natural law which 
allowed the medieval church to recognize the state as an institution grounded in the 
natural law.^^  Rather, beginning from his theological presuppositions, he conceived 
both state and church over society as agents of God. The validity of the institutions 
were derived from the idea of the sovereignty of God and the depravity of humanity. 
The two institutions were parallel but different in power and function.^^
 C .i l
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Most importantly, he shifted the basis of the congregation slightly but 
definitively away from the Lutheran emphasis on faith (which focused on the 
righteousness of God), to a faith which found its ultimate reference point in the 
sovereign will of God?^ This changed the self-understanding of the church to that of 
the elect.
This identity shift had several consequences. It intensified the distinction 
between the elect (the church) and the wicked in society. It placed on the church the 
necessity to demonstrate its qualitative difference (i.e. its election) so that a greater 
portion of the weight was moved from the faith - justification equation of Luther to 
that of sanctification. However, it is important to stress that this sanctification is not 
primarily focused on the selfs experience of God.^* Rather, it had a robust extrinsic 
concrete focus. Life was to be devotional (i.e., the turning away from self and living to 
the glory of God) and ethical (i.e., serving others and society).
Ethically, the elect were caught up in the larger vision of a teleological 
calling.^  ^ Over against the wicked, they were the agents through whom society and its 
institutions were to be established on the principles of true religion. This new agentary 
role of the church was due to Calvinism’s “development” of the Reformation idea of 
calling. Luther’s idea, as already noted, interpreted call in such a way as to dignify a 
believer’s mundane vocation and overcome a secular-sacred dualism. All mundane 
tasks were given a new identity - “calling” understood as service to God. This view 
however, did not give to the church and its members a new vision or sense of its 
mission regarding society. Rather, it served to baptize the existing socio-economic 
order of society in a way not dissimilar to the medieval sacerdotal system. The 
medieval system did not require the transformation of the secular realm, only that it be 
mediatorally connected via the mystical power of the church to the sacred. Essentially 
in the medieval view, the church was an instrument of fusion between heaven and 
earth. Neither the Lutheran view or the medieval view yielded a distinct and separate,
i.e., “true church” or a missionized society, only a societal religion or religionized 
society.
Through identifying the church as the elect, Calvin did not fully disconnect 
society from the church. But what he did do is introduce into this equation new 
distinctions which allowed for the integration of a 'true church' (through the 
intensification of identity - i.e. the elect over against the wicked) and the idea of
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secular calling restoring the place of mission. In this, society was not left bereft of 
religion, and the church was given spiritual integrity as a discrete entity.^ ®
In Calvin's thought, "calling" was devotional and ethical. To meet the need to 
inform these, Calvin asked from the Bible more than that of a witness to the 
redemptive significance of Christ. He and the Puritans who studied him, turned to the 
Bible to provide the details of Christian living.^’
The Puritan Church-Society Arrangement and How it Functioned
Beginning with Calvin’s teleological emphasis of the church as that of calling, 
and his view of the state as not over the church (in Erastian form) but alongside it, 
also a servant to God's purposes, the Puritans proceeded to build a society. Their 
model commenced on the principle of distinction. There would be no fusion between 
church and state. In no sense were the Puritans going to perpetuate what they viewed 
was the mistake of incorporating all subjects into the church as its standing 
membership.^^ In the beginning, they emphasized that only individuals who were 
authentic Christians, having been regenerated by the spirit to faith and piety, and who 
espoused their Reformed confession, were to constitute the church.^  ^ Their first 
concern was that this church would itself embody the fruits of its separateness in its 
life, its doctrine, its worship, and in its influence over society. While they did not 
question the premise that society should not be independent from the church, they 
were also sure that the greater mass of society was not part of the church.
The fact that church was to sustain a societal calling, i.e. the building of a 
superior kind of society, was due in part to their debt to Calvin's revision of 
Constantinianism. Calvin was able to effect this theological revision by beginning his 
theology from the universal unconditional significance of the sovereignty of God and 
his will expressed in part in the two tables of the commandments. Within this setting, 
he posited the predicament of humanity as that of both accountability toward, and 
resistance to, that sovereignty. This tension was expressed as, on the one hand, a state 
of sinfulness before God and, on the other, as a state of chaos and disorder within 
human society.
The church and state were two institutions that found their légitimation within 
this greater paradigm of God's universal sovereignty and will which framed all men 
and women. The greater mass of society (those outside the inner elite's society.
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composed of church members/citizens) were not to be left to anarchic elements 
arising out of humanity's condition/'’ This the state was to ensure/^ The will of God 
was the foundation of human law. There was no place in Calvin's logic for a 
bifurcation of that will, that is, between the first and second tables of the ten 
commandments. The role of the state was external. Its task was to confront human 
beings with their accountability to God and his law and 'begin' the process of ordering 
society (using coercion if necessary). The church, on the other hand, provided the 
setting for this will to be formed inwardly through voluntary obedience, faith, 
worship, and profession of the truth (its power being persuasive in character). It was 
for this reason that the rights and freedoms of society were correlated with church 
membership. The social realm was not allowed to be independent from this 
foundation.^®
The church had the following characteristics in relation to the extended 
society. First, it was set apart from the mass of society as a discrete congregation of 
members. Membership was predicated on a genuine Christian experience, with due 
emphasis on the inward and outward evidences of election. Along with this, 
membership was also formed through paedobaptism of members' children. 
Membership brought with it societal privilege. For instance, only members were 
qualified for civil offices. Full rights and privileges of Citizenship within the 
commonwealth were bound to membership. The members, through their elected 
ministers, submitted to the General Court the moral and doctrinal laws that they 
believed should be part of the civil code. When schools were set up, the membership 
(clergy) controlled the selection of teachers and ensured appropriate religious 
instruction.
The General Court guaranteed outward obedience to civil laws, which were 
both religious and social in character, through recourse to coercive measures 
consisting of fines, imprisonment, public shaming, whipping, banishment, and 
hanging. For instance, through its power the General Court suppressed dissent (if 
persuasion failed), punished all infractions of these religious and social laws, levied a 
tax for the support of the church on all residents, and compelled church attendance by 
all.
The system, as William McLoughlin points out, relied on “coordinate” powers 
which functioned autonomously but cooperatively.^’ The autonomy, of course, was
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relative. While no ministers were qualified to serve on the General Court, only godly 
men, members of the church, could serve. And while this court had the final say on 
the interpretation of its laws and judgments it handed down, the church submitted the 
laws. The commonwealth was explicitly designed to be a Christian theocracy, which 
simply meant that the laws by which society was governed were conceived of as the 
law and will of God and administered by Godly men who were in covenant with 
God.^«
Obedience had two reference points. First was the sovereign will of God. 
Disobedience of civil laws was understood in the framework of an offense against the 
God with whom they were in covenant, and upon whom their prosperity and blessing 
depended. Second, obedience to the law ensured the coherence and formal unity of 
the extended society with the church. As such, the foundation of society was 
religious. The possibility that the world which would grow around them (as it rapidly 
did in New England during the seventeenth and eighteenth century) would not be 
firmly anchored to religious fixtures that were understood as the basis of all order was 
never entertained.
Furthermore, the integrity of this Christian commonwealth required 
uniformity. No alien world or competing religious teaching which would divide the 
people was allowed. The commonwealth and the church were to co-exist in formal 
unity. At issue in this configuration, were assumptions about the theocratic basis of 
the extended societySociety  did not properly hold together by itself, but was a 
byproduct of a greater order.'*® Neither was religion viewed simply as an expedient for 
society's ends. Rather, God was the invisible ground of society, so that its visible 
order was a byproduct of the ordering of the individual in obedience to this God and 
his will.
The correlation between pure religion and the integrity of society in this 
system was indirect but substantial. The Puritans, following Calvin, sought to 
succeed where Erastianism had failed. Their plan was, accordingly, threefold: one, 
the promotion of the spiritual integrity of the congregation and its religion; two, the 
building of society, its structures and citizenry out of the congregation and the logic of 
the true religion embodied in the congregation; three, the formal organization of all 
inhabitants in the area around this select, godly society, the church/commonwealth. 
Their logic, or ‘théologie,’ was that the church's mission to society most properly
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consisted of pure religion. They were single minded in their persuasion that pure 
religion bore good fruit. Their task was to provide and build a commonwealth on 
those religious foundations, organizing the greater mass of society around this center.
Over against a “corrupt” church and a disintegrating “Christian”" civilization 
(an inevitable judgment in light of the failure of their reform vis-à-vis England) they 
sought a pure church and a transformed society. Partly due to their ideas of covenant 
and blessing (and partly due to Calvin's ethical focus, which worked to ensure all 
spheres of life would reflect glory to God) building a society to the glory of God was 
their project.
The New England Puritan system lasted for two hundred years, finally being 
completely dismantled in 1833. Its corrosion was both internal and external. From 
the outside it suffered from dissenters, such as the Quakers (four of whom were hung 
in the seventeenth century). Baptists, and so called "Antinomians," such as Anne 
Hutchinson, and others. The growing pluralism in America forced Congregationalism 
both to greater heights in its exposition of the Reformed faith and, ironically, to 
further reliance on the coercive power of the state to achieve conformity. From 
within, it suffered from its policy of paedobaptism, which, as McLoughlin points out, 
undermined the integrity of their plan by progressively leading to a generational elite. 
This elite perpetuated itself from one generation to the next through the half way plan 
that shaped New England Puritanism into a social religious hegemony.'”
Within a few generations, the membership lacked the original passion of faith 
and piety, and increasingly became synonymous with moral rectitude and orthodoxy 
(the social privilege of the righteous). In time, Congregationalism was forced to face 
the full challenge of democratic and evangelical movements which contained 
dissimilar social and religious principles. What persisted, as if indelibly etched on 
America at its birth, was a sense of its special calling as a model Christian people 
among the peoples of Europe, and a correlation between society's governance and the 
religious values and beliefs of Christianity.
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Summary 
The Significance of the New England Puritan Experiment for 
Understanding the Roots of Fixity and Freedom 
“Freedom”
The problem of “freedom” has been defined as Protestantism’s close identity 
with modem America, an identity which progressively led them to attempt to integrate 
their religions values and beliefs directly and consistently into a new liberal social 
order. This problem has its roots in the following:
(1) It grew out of the Puritan’s history of defeat and retreat regarding the 
Church of England. This histoiy gave birth to a new mission. Puritans came to 
America with a passion to prove something about the relationship of Christianity and 
society. Because constructing a better social order was one of their primary objectives, 
there was a risk that this goal would take on a life of its own and that Protestant 
religion would be placed in service to this goal. The fact that building a better society 
was an explicit plan rather than an accidental by-product of other goals, contained 
within it the seeds of an eventual problem. In time it was inevitable that Protestantism 
would conceive of its social obligation in terms of providing religio-moral resources 
for the public order, thereby fulfilling a simple direct and complementary relation to 
its world.
“The migration that Winthrop eventually led to New England,” Cremin writes, 
“went considerably beyond and, in its very nature, represented yet another 
transformation in the theory of colonization. Like the Pilgrims, the Puritans who 
settled Massachusetts came as a community, knit together by ties of family, 
friendship, and common loyalty. Like the Pilgrims, too, they were attempting to 
preserve their religious and cultural integrity. But in addition, and more important 
perhaps, they were seeking to demonstrate to the world at large the nature and 
practicability of a divinely ordered Christian commonwealth. ‘We must consider,’ 
Winthrop wrote in the oft-quoted peroration ‘A Modell of Christian Charity’ (1630), 
‘that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are upon us.’'*^
Equipped with “better” ecclesial and theological ideas, Puritans came to 
America with socio-political designs. This is the ground floor of the close identity that
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formed between Protestantism and the development of America. Equally as important 
is the nature of their design. As pointed out, the distinctions they insisted upon 
eventually eroded . In other words, their interest in keeping the church separate from 
society at large, while insisting that the greater social mass and commonwealth project 
remain connected to the religio-moral consonants of Protestant Christianity, 
eventually bore fruit in the “religionization” of the republic or, to use Mead’s phrase, 
“a nation with the soul of a church.”'*^ The church lost much of its own distinct vision 
to the socio-political realm which it sponsored. The connection between religion and 
society they pioneered, took root and grew while their vision of a separate ecclesial 
body as the “soul” of Christianity and the dialectical source of society’s spiritual- 
moral health diminished.
It is important, however, to remember that the creative vision that the Puritans 
had for society, while idealistic in the teleological sense of Calvin's vision of the 
church's calling, was not utopie. The Puritan design for the future was over against a 
church - state relation considered “corrupt,” and in a climate of burgeoning rights, 
organized around mercantilism and the decline of feudalism. True piety, fostered 
through membership in a regenerate community, and nascent republican freedom were 
the primary building blocks of their New World society in that beginning.
(2) It grew out of the juxtaposition of religion and nascent republican freedom.
Of central importance in understanding this is the context of the Puritans’ 
social designs, namely, that they possessed the freedom to construct societies 
according to their own will. While not exempt from British rule, the New England 
colonies began as mercantile interests of jointly chartered trading companies and were 
not under the direct supervision and design of the king. The explicit, economic 
purpose, combined with the religious goals and leadership of Puritan divines (mostly 
Cambridge graduates), set the original stage for social experiment. Two original 
motivations were the sources of this beginning; to build wealth and to rebuild society 
around a purified church, possessing true piety.'*^  As is well known, these two 
motivations would interpenetrate each other.'*®
On May 18,1631, the church of the Massachusetts Bay colony concurred that 
"no man shall be admitted to the freedom of this body politic, but such as are 
members of some of the churches within... the same."'*® This freedom was the 
freedom to vote, hold office, own property and generally participate in the political
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ordering of society. This linkage of freedom and piety must be understood in light of 
the way Puritans had come to understand the English situation. Their perception was 
that society was breaking down and that the corruption and decay that characterized 
England was a consequence of the corruption of English religion and its resistance to 
reform.'*’
As such, the idea of church was reconceived in America as one involving a 
social mission in a context of increasing individual and economic freedom. As the 
soul was to the body, so reformed religion was to society. "New England," Edward 
Johnson, an early American Puritan wrote, "is the place where the Lord will create a 
new heaven and a new earth, new churches and a new commonwealth."'** The point 
here is that New England Puritanism commenced on one primary assumption. The 
creation of a new prosperous and nascent modem commonwealth was dependent on 
the existence of tme piety nurtured and protected by a discrete church membership 
consisting of tme believers. Their socio-political goals and the ecclesiastical goals 
were explicit and interdependent. And it is not fair to say that the latter merely served 
the interest of the former. They viewed all of life from a theocentric perspective.
That membership in the body politic (civil freedom) and membership in the church 
were connected and ensured the former would develop as planned.
In time however, the link between church, piety and freedom deteriorated. 
Concern for piety was reduced to a concern for morality and the democracy of the 
believers gave way to a more inclusive model of democracy. What would be etched in 
the minds of Americans is the importance of morality to freedom and Protestantism’s 
role in sponsoring both morality and freedom. Mead explains “... this church-state 
[system which the Puritans created] was a democracy of the Saints. Obviously the 
whole structure rested upon the assumption that, within the judgement of charity, they 
could distinguish the Saints from the unregenerate with sufficient accuracy to 
guarantee the perpetuation of the rule of the Saints. And when confidence in that 
assumption was undermined, as it soon was when morality became indistinguishable 
from piety, the democracy of the Saints flowed out to embrace the whole community, 
to include all the people.”'*^ Historically, what Protestantism was bequeathed from this 
history was a conviction that its role was to supply moral resources to liberal society.
The matter goes deeper than this. H.R. Niebuhr, Andrew McLoughlin and de 
Tocqueville all argue that the seminal principle behind modem republican freedom
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originated with Protestantism and not first with the Enlightenment. Protestantism had 
within it a principle which could be critically applied, not only to the medieval church, 
but to all pretensions of authority. Increased human freedom was the inevitable 
consequence of the application of the Protestant principle. New England Puritanism’s 
political construction reflects the Protestant tendency to relativize political and 
ecclesiastical authorities within the proviso that people be related directly to the 
transcendent God and His will. They were pioneers [following Calvin] in 
reconstructing ecclesial and political power in a way that increased individual and 
democratic freedom while ensuring that the new freedom remained integrated to a 
responsible existence under God and toward each other. They had no provision for 
absolute freedom. Absolute freedom, they were sure, would end in chaos. In time 
however, the new freedom would come to function in a less theocentric and ecclesial 
framework and a more democratic and anthropological framework with Protestantism 
providing a moral and religious supplement.
(3) “Freedom” grew out of Calvin’s view of calling.
Intrinsic to this creative impulse for a new society was their understanding of 
election and calling. The elect, over against the wicked, provided the basis for 
distinction between themselves and the greater mass of society. What ensured that 
this distinction did not become a thoroughgoing social and/or geographical 
separatism, was their sense of calling. Calling brought them back to the secular tasks. 
As such, calling tended to strengthen the identity between the church and public life 
and institutions of society. Human life in all its spheres was to be reordered to the 
glory of God. Economics, law, politics and education were all spheres which were 
reordered to that end. The weakness in this concept was that while this reordering of 
society was a creative force to build structural institutions that influenced all, the 
commonwealth proper belonged to the Puritans.
Inherent to their social creation was community. The Puritans understood 
society as a covenantal arrangement. Properly speaking, "society" extended no further 
than the closed community, although the institutions of this society including the 
church building, and the public meeting hall, served and affected all persons in the 
district. Covenant explicitly tied all those within it together for the purposes of 
mutual care and critique around common values, beliefs and goals.
But the covenant was not universal. One by one, individuals entered this
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covenant community under God. Living in this arrangement required a commitment 
to an ethic of social involvement, embracing the needs and cares of others as well as 
allowing one's life to be bounded by community standards. Human life in particular 
and the church as a whole were given a teleological orientation, which directed their 
collective talents and resources toward building a society for the glory of God. Within 
this context, freedom and wealth were not viewed as ends in themselves.®® Society 
itself was a project with purpose.
Beyond mere calling in fidelity to the Calvinist theological understanding of 
church, the Puritans gave additional specificity to the idea of their calling. Rejected in 
England, they would replace England's opportunity and calling with America.
America was infused with eschatological significance—a place where Protestantism 
would at last achieve its destiny. Society itself was the “proof of the pudding.” True 
Protestant religion was finally to be set free to demonstrate its power.
(4) “Freedom” grew out of the Puritans’ rationalization of piety.
The idea of calling is the source of the Puritans’ impulse to “rationalize” piety. 
The Puritans employed Calvin’s revision of the Reformation’s transformation of 
medieval dualistic asceticism. The spirituality that required a select few of the church 
to depart from the world and serve God was countered by a new spirituality (no less 
austere) which required all members of the church to return a new self to the world to 
reshape and mold it to the glory of God. This is the “desacralization of the world” 
which Weber noted about Puritanism.®’ It involved the rationalization of piety, 
“Within... [New England Puritan] society, education would assume utmost 
importance, not merely as an instrument for systematically transmitting an intellectual 
heritage, but as an agency for deliberately pursuing a cultural ideal. Family, church, 
school, university, the community itself - all would be dedicated to the task of 
molding men.”®^ In time, this impulse to institutionalize piety became less connected 
to the church, and more a national cultural phenomenon which Christianity 
sponsored.®®
However, in the period under discussion, this transformation and re­
employment of asceticism was not channeled into the world in a general open way. In 
other words, the church attempted to transform the mundane only within a limited 
sphere over which it enjoyed direct influence and control. The greater mass of society 
was then organized around this “transformation,” bereft of independent and political
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power which if possessed and misused would compromise this transformation. In this 
way, the world was made stable and improved. As such, the church's social vision 
possessed an idealism, that is "ideal", within the limitations of living this side of the 
parousia. Later, it will be demonstrated how the scope of this transformation became 
more general - not linked to a formal ecclesially defined and dominated social space. 
The entire socio-cultural and national sphere became the circumference and goal of 
this “transformation.” The interesting feature about Puritanism is that while the 
Puritans were not naive about the prospect of overcoming the falleness of the human 
condition, they believed in the power of true religion to build a better society even 
though this required a limited use of coercion and a degree of social disparity.
Properly understood, within Puritanism there existed the wisdom to live in the tension 
between a world denying pessimism and a naive optimism while attempting to 
maintain the spiritual integrity of the church.
In time, Protestantism came to embrace the world directly and was penetrated 
by Enlightenment idealistic premises. The point at hand is simply to note that there 
existed a vision and plan for a “free” better society which arose out of the possibilities 
inherent in the transformation and re-employment of ascetic spirituality and Calvin’s 
ecclesiology and that this plan contained within the seeds of “fixity” and “freedom.”
(5) “Freedom” grew out of the Puritans’ view of reason.
Puritanism came to flower in America at the same time that rationalism and 
empiricism were gaining credibility. While the beliefs of the Puritans in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth century were derived from scripture and evangelical 
(i.e.. Reformation) teaching, they became increasingly confident that their positions 
could be verified by empirical and rational methods. From this point it was a short 
step to a view of rationality and empiricism which had their final source of appeal in 
human reason and experience alone.^ "^  But the matter goes deeper than this. Sontag 
and Roth point out that the Puritans “were humanists and believers in classical 
education. They believed in the immutable essences of Plato and in man’s conformity 
to them. Rationality is implicit in man and inherent in the order of the universe. 
Puritanism was Renaissance humanism embodied in a system of Christian belief.”^^
This view of rationality is evident in John Wise’s Vindication o f the 
Government o f the New England Churches 1717. Mead observes that, “While Wise 
used all the traditional arguments from scripture and the practice of the primitive
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church” his arguments are renown for his “Demonstration II, From the Light o f 
Nature. ” “Here Wise insists that governments are derived from ‘man’s reason, of 
human and rational combinations, and not from any direct orders of infinite 
wisdom. The Puritans’ ideas of rationality were very close to those that were 
emerging from Enlightenment sources which the Founding Fathers would appropriate. 
Thus, Puritan Protestantism contained within it ideas about the reliability of reason, 
which would lead into close identification and sympathy with the coming social order 
and project.
“Fixity”
The roots of fixity, understood as Protestantism’s willingness to employ its 
religio-moral values to regulate society’s boundaries, are found in the following 
overlapping factors: (1) Calvin’s theocentric revision of Lutheranism in light of his 
view of human nature; (2) Puritanism’s historical experience with Bishop Laud and 
King Charles 1; (3) Puritanism’s rationalism.
(1) The reputation of the internal unity, order and coherence of Puritan 
societies is proverbial. The sovereignty of God is the central idea behind these 
characteristics. It is the source of the Puritan logic for the binding elements they 
insisted on for their societies. The sovereignty of the one God was the basis of a 
Calvinist Puritan universalism. All humans, without exception, were under this one 
God. Even though some were irredeemably wicked, they were no less accountable.^^ 
All persons were to be correlated to this one center. It was this center that provided 
society its cohesion and unity.
Society did not hold together well or properly on its own; society's unity was 
not vested in itself. The Puritans’ ecclesial and civil passion was directed toward 
facilitating this human-God connection.^^ From the ecclesial side, they were 
determined to avoid all cant, ritual, rhetorical intonation, relying on clear exposition 
of scripture, urging its authority to facilitate this bond. In practice, they were reluctant 
to use power to secure agreement to their religious and moral positions. Reason and 
argument were the implements of choice. Their commitment to persuasion and logic, 
over against recourse to reliance on institutional fiat and power, is often overlooked. 
They wanted their unity and cohesiveness to have internal integrity, going to great 
lengths to expound truth no less to the "wicked" who were required to attend church.
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However, lacking a satisfactory response, they resorted to coercive measures to 
enforce biblical morals and doctrines. The Puritans had followed Calvin who, as H.R. 
Niebuhr writes, "... did not regard restraint as a positive step toward the attainment of 
good; it was rather a device for keeping the individual and society from rushing to 
destruction...”^^
Fundamentally the Puritans had no depth of confidence for the "unifying force 
of Aristotelian 'habituation' or socialization".^® If a person within the greater mass of 
society was not to be a threat to social harmony, that person must be made to 
recognize the fear and authority of God. Civil powers existed to ensure that all in the 
greater mass of society would respect this will in word and act. Like the clergy, the 
civil magistrates were ministers of God, mediating the authority of God expressed in 
the laws of society. Through them, individuals were continually brought back to 
accountability, to the awesome sovereignty and severity of the one God. Without this 
heteronomous "ministry", society would unravel (since human nature and human 
society were not stable in themselves, being in inward tension with the law of God). 
Furthermore, allowance for the multiplicity of opinions and the laxity of morals would 
jeopardize their experiment and undermine their original charge against England.
Even more grave was the fear of forfeiting God's blessing. To allow their 
society to be infected with ways not according to the will of God would be to breach 
their side of their covenant with God and forfeit his blessing, a blessing that was 
measured by their physical and material health and prosperity.
(2) The Puritans boldly sought to reclaim the church from the world. This was 
their prophetic courage as they saw it, to emancipate the ecclesia from its captivity to 
society-at-large and political power. But they were not simultaneously willing to 
allow society emancipation from the religion of the church. They wanted to have 
"their cake and eat it too"; they wanted Christian civilization, a Constantinian 
"accomplishment" and at the same time, a discrete Christian society, the yet 
unfulfilled promise of the Reformation. In order to achieve the latter, the basis of the 
former necessarily required altering.
The church, while insisting on being differentiated from the wider lot of 
society for the sake of purity, was not willing to allow society to be differentiated 
from the church's religious beliefs and values. As such, the Calvinistic - Puritan 
revision of Erastianism required the creation of a new entity — 'public religion'.
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Religion was required to be "universal" via political leverage while church 
membership was parochial. By not permitting the world to become different from 
them, morally and religiously, while at the same time insisting on their own 
qualitative spiritual difference, they created a righteous elite, a historic “moral 
minority.”
The fact that they wanted to manage the religio-moral caliber of the greater 
mass of society from a distance, set in action two precedents which make up the 
character of fixity to the present time -  the bifurcation of Christianity into public 
religion and private church. This split requires that the church (or churches) invent a 
means whereby it can ensure that Christian religio-moral tenets become normative for 
society at large. In the colonial setting, this power was formally coordinated with the 
church. In the post-colonial period, access to this power has been more difficult and 
its pursuit has legitimately incurred hostile reactions.
(3) It is important to recognize that from the start, seventeenth century 
Puritanism was moving toward a rationalism that would bear fruit in time in 
Unitarianism and deistic type sympathies. Its bias toward rationality must be 
understood in light of two historical factors. The first is its original struggle with the 
church of England. English Puritanism had emerged claiming the high ground of 
truth and suffering the weight of the heavy hand of religio-political authority. The 
irony is that it is in part this confidence in the "hard" rationality of its truth that 
underwrites its recourse to coercion to ensure moral - social order. This confidence in 
the rationality of their truth, universal and demonstrative to all, sets up their ultimate 
willingness to revisit coercive power to force unity. Insubordination against 
reasonable argument merited the use of force.
The roots of fixity are to be found in these three factors which were 
theological, historical and rational in origin. As shown, the roots of “freedom,” 
understood in this dissertation as Protestantism's idealistic involvement in liberal 
values and project, are also to be found in this beginning. Both by making the 
building of society its explicit mission and by bringing to that task its “new” (not 
utopie) approach, the groundwork was laid for Protestantism to become too closely 
identified with the creative project of building a “new,” “better” and “free” world. 
Society was their “foster child.”
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CHAPTER TWO
Secular Sources: The Founding Fathers
The patterns of “fixity” and “fireedom” in mainstream Protestantism have 
secular as well as religious origins. The goal of this chapter is to disclose these secular 
origins. The logic which guides the proceeding discussion may be stated as follows. 
Embedded in the modem secular state which emerged firom the Revolution is the 
individual principle. When this principle became a central premise of society and 
when its ethos came to be pervasively embraced, the groundwork was laid for the 
development of social attitudes and conditions which would inevitably attract and 
pressure mainstream Protestant constituencies toward “fixity” and “freedom.”
In order to disclose this connection, it is first necessaiy to discuss the 
individual principle; what it is, its rise to prominence, its social formation and the 
corollary assumptions that the Founding Fathers attached to it. Only after these 
subjects are clarified, is the phenomenon of “fixity” and “freedom” addressed. The 
style of argument employed in this chapter, like the previous one, is more discursive 
than linear. An apparently esoteric inquiry into the iimer dynamics and history of the 
individual principle occurs later to be seen as relevant to the subject of the thesis.
The outline of this chapter may be summarized as follows: First, the individual 
principle is discussed in the variety of relations mentioned above. This sets the stage 
for a discussion for two views of society which are thought to emerge from the 
triumph of the individual principle; one progressivistic, the other atomistic. This 
discussion opens the way for a final discussion to show how these two views of 
society form logical points of contact with segments of mainstream Protestantism. In 
this chapter, only the rationale is introduced. The actual historical development of 
“fixity” and “freedom” are discussed at a later point. The purpose of the chapter is to 
focus on the logic inherent within the Founders’ premise that predict the eventuality 
of the emergence of the patterns: “fixity” and “freedom” in segments of mainstream 
Protestantism.
The Individual Principle Defined
The essence of the individual principle is aptly summarized by Emil Brunner 
as a personality “grounded in itself and self-sufficient... (one which) unites himself
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with other personalities on condition that it is he who determines whether or not the 
union shall exist...” The term “individual,” Brunner reminds the reader, “is a Latin 
translation of atomon; in sociology as in physics, the same atomism came to be the 
basic conception. The structure of society as a combination of atoms is as 
characteristic for our times as physical atomism. Modem and atomism are 
correlatives.”’
From his study of the seventeenth century conceptual foundation of the 
individual principle of government, McPherson provides a similar definition. “What 
makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the wills of others. Freedom 
from dependence on others means freedom from any relations with others except 
those relations which the individual enters voluntarily with a view to his own 
interests.^ Society by this definition is derived from “the interest and will of 
disassociated individuals.’’^ .. It is a human contrivance for the protection of the 
individual(s) [person, property, goods]. It exists “for the maintenance of orderly 
relations of exchange between individuals regarded as proprietors of themselves."’ 
McPherson’s basic premise is that modem society continues to be organized around 
this seventeenth century premise that “to be an individual is to be an owner - in the 
first instance, an owner of one’s own person and capacities.”^
According to Joyce Appleby, the explicit model of the society which the 
Founding Fathers envisioned was one in which “the well-being of the individual 
rather than the mass of society was being promoted, and that the individual was the 
material embodiment of moral virtue.”^
Over against the view that a person’s social location was fixed economically, 
religiously, and as regards their class, the individual principle underwrote the person’s 
right for social and economic mobility. It was the right to be judged on merit and 
achievement, that is to say, on the basis of one's own character, intrinsic nobility, 
virtue and development. It was the right to determine for oneself the level of one's 
own inequality. The initial impulse was not so much about the sanctity of individual 
difference, per se, but the right to be in charge of one's own difference in 
socioeconomic terms. In principle, however, the full range of individual differences, 
including religious and moral views (or lack of them) as well as idiosyncratic ideas 
and behaviors, were to be protected, that is, within the limits of not being 
demonstrably injurious to others.
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Historical Rise of the Individual Principle In The American Experience
Some scholars believe that the view that the free autonomous individual is the 
essence of humaneness and the basic construct of society is a liberal assumption 
which came to be accepted as a factual universal truth by most Americans some time 
after the Revolution/ Americans came to believe that they were largely responsible 
for this truth, had fought the Revolution because of it and that they had come to 
embody it in the society of their new nation. When they looked back at their beginning 
they saw themselves within a clear narrative. On the one side, there existed the British 
power brokers -  Parliament and the King, who were bent on subjugating the colonists 
forcing them to a servile status. As Joyce Appleby points out, “The imagery of 
subjugation, submission and subordination course through the literature that mark the 
way to independence.* On the other side there were the colonists who stepped on to 
the stage of history to do battle with old world tyranny, feudalistic powers set on 
keeping the individual trapped in hierarchal systems. Seeing clearly the universal 
significance and truth that was at stake, the colonists seized the day for themselves 
and humanity and ushered in a new era in which the individual could be emancipated 
from all tyrannies, political, ecclesiastical, hoary traditions and ignorant superstitions.
Many contemporary scholars have come to recognize that this view is an 
“American” social construction of reality which may not have been fully formed until 
after the decisive revolutionary events; a construction which provided the nation with 
a distinct identity and role.  ^The truths which were proclaimed as natural [“We hold 
these truths to be self-evident”], are now recognized by many scholars as assumptions. 
The eighteenth century mind-set viewed the world in universal categories. Human 
nature was everywhere alike. The quest to be autonomous individuals was thought to 
be a universal fact. Freedom, independence and autonomy represented the essence of 
humanness. At the commencement of the nineteenth century, Americans in concert 
baptized these assumptions as empirical truth and understood themselves as the 
chosen stewards of them.’®
The real source of the rise of the individual is far more complex and 
historically drawn out than the above narrative suggests. Centuries of development 
occurred in which feudal powers were abridged so as to establish a basis for the rights 
of subjects” McPherson points out that the roots of the rise of the individual principle 
“may properly be taken to be in the political theory and practice of the seventeenth
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centuiy. It was then in the course of a protracted struggle in Parliament, a civil war, a 
series of republican experiments, a restoration of the monarchy, and a final 
constitutional revolution that the principles which were to become basic liberal 
democracy were all developed.”” Central among these “... was a new belief in the 
value and the rights of the individual.””
While the individual principle which came to be prominent in post 
revolutionary America is not the same as that found in New England Puritanism, there 
is a relationship. “Puritan governments were highly democratic empowering all 
citizens to participate directly in public affairs. Although Puritan townships were 
legally under Great Britain’s jurisdiction, they operated for all practical purposes as 
independent republics. They made their own laws, levied their own taxes, controlled 
their internal affairs and held their magistrates accountable.”’" In their beginning, the 
individual’s experience of faith was given significance by the Puritans. And it is to be 
remembered, as already pointed out, that their societies were formed on the principle 
of individual consent, i.e., covenants.”
This Puritan beginning prepared North America to embrace the more 
consistent individualistic basis of society which would come in the wake of the 
Revolution. The important difference between the Puritan and the revolutionary 
formation of the individual, was that the former had an explicit social and religious 
framework.
In spite of Puritan precedents, scholars now argue that it was not so much the 
colonists’ innate taste for freedom that led them to contend so passionately for 
individual liberty and rights. Colonial life at the end of the seventeenth century and 
early eighteenth century, happily embraced many of the “old world” traditions and 
social fixtures. It is just not historically verifiable that human nature intrinsically 
craves citizen autonomy over the status of subject, with its concomitant overarching 
structures. Social and economic changes progressively began to loosen the grip of 
civil institutions on the individual giving birth to a more independent body of persons. 
It is this condition which prepares the way for a more intentional turn toward an 
explicit organization of social reality around the centrality of the individual.”
What cannot be denied is that Americans codified a liberal understanding of 
themselves in the wake of the Revolution. Authentic humanness, came to be defined 
as free, autonomous, independent - destined for individual transcendence over all
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forms of tyranny. Appleby points out the significance of this social description of 
reality; it contained the power to create that which it had found the language and story 
to state.” The creation of an individualistic ethos in America society was given great 
impetus by this historical narrative.
This way of viewing the past however, is not intended to diminish the 
importance of the Revolution in understanding the rise of the individual principle.
However imperfectly, the Founding Fathers built into their new social order 
the individual premise to which they had appealed in order to legitimize the 
Revolution. Acting out of the frustration of not achieving parliamentary redress of 
their grievances, the colonists reached for the same resources that had underwritten 
the English circumscription of monarchial and feudalistic powers in the Cromwellian 
and Glorious Revolutions. The real problem, as David Lovejoy, J. E. A. Pocock and 
others have emphasized, was equality of rights between American colonists and 
British subjects.” Americans wanted the same recourse to parliamentary or 
representative power. What the colonists ultimately did was to re-appropriate and 
radicalize the existing resources and precedents on the nature of rights and liberties, 
so as to underwrite their independence.
These resources, pressed to a new radicality, changed the status of their 
complaint from that of a grievance presented in the form of a petition to an assertion 
of rights and liberties which were being violated. It is unlikely that this change in how 
the colonists viewed their grievances could have occurred without recourse to existing 
ideas.
With help firom Locke and other European Enlightenment thinkers, they were 
able to talk in the new conceptual language of rights and liberties which existed by 
fact of birth, nature or nature’s God, apart from their colonial status. Locating the 
source of their rights and liberties at this fundamental origin, put a serious, potentially 
revolutionary interpretation on their situation. The appeal to nature carries with it a 
challenge of power. As John Baker writes, appealing to “natural law” affords the 
opportunity to address “what ought to be.” It “.... provides the basis for asserting the 
existence of universal rights for all men which are valid claims against the states, even 
when those states deny that the rights exist.”” “The word natural,” Baker argues, 
“means simply that the law is not the creation of man, and man is incapable of 
changing or repealing the law. Law (i.e., natural law) is part of the universe and is
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beyond man’s influence or control.” ®^ This idea no doubt is derived from Locke who 
argued that “when it became desirable and necessary for man to create the state, man 
gave to the state his right to judge and enforce his judgements. But man’s natural right 
to life, liberty and estate was not surrendered to the state.” ’^
Whether by design or historical accident, essentially what the American 
colonists did was to reject an elitist claim by putting forth a universal one. Over 
against a Whig-aristocratic control of parliamentary power, they did not state that they 
were equal but in principle all were equal. To what degree they had grasped and were 
moved by an idealistic universalism may be questioned. Two answers to this question 
are likely true. As Carl Becker says "the Revolution was about home rule and who 
will rule at home.'”  ^This, in part, is a battle between elites, and by historical accident 
quasi-universalistic resources that were available at the time were appropriated and 
exploited.
But it is equally true that the Founding Fathers were infected by the 
Enlightenment vision awash in anthropocentric idealism. Alexis de Tocqueville 
observed that “the Revolution in the United States was caused by a mature and 
thoughtful taste for freedom and not by some vague undefined instinct for 
independence.”^^  Both pragmatism and idealism are present. The critique that the 
colonists brought against their English homeland was to survive and be transformed 
and become a central principle in the new order.^" The "factual" claim of the 
inviolability of the individual was, in theory, the foundational premise in their 
political construction. From this premise they argued and derived other claims.
The Embedding of the Individual Principle in Social Polity
This well-known principle is negatively embedded in the Bill of Rights 
through placing limits on political powers, and positively asserted in the Declaration 
of Independence phrase: "all men are created equal and endowed by their creator with 
certain inalienable rights...". First and foundational is the claim that the right of life, 
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness is non-derivative or inviolable, which simply 
means that one's person possesses a sanctity that must not be trespassed or violated by 
other individuals or institutions.
The appeal to the Creator (also referred to as nature or nature's God) as the 
source of these rights constitutes a higher source of appeal: a revolutionary move.^^
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Existing unqualified claims and prerogatives to authority over the individual by fact of 
tradition, metaphysical truth or divine office, were by this principle relativized if not 
disallowed. "Inalienable" captures the force of this truth; certain rights are not given 
by and therefore cannot be taken away by the state.
Second, appeal to this "factual" basis of liberty was not only intended to 
challenge and overthrow existing authorities which regarded rights and liberties 
within their provenance to grant. It was also intended to provide the basic logic on 
which a new type of governance was to be constructed. As James Madison said, "in 
Europe charters of liberty have been granted by power. America has set the 
example...of charters of power granted by liberty.'”  ^ Here is the germ of the Hobbes 
and Lockean social contract which the Founding Fathers followed, whereby 
individuals collectively entered into a contract to secure and protect their (natural) 
rights and liberties. The "contract" is the device used by the Founding Fathers for 
critiquing and reconstruing power.^^
In the end, of course, power and liberty must always co-exist if liberty is to 
survive, but in the contract idea, power is placed under the consent and management 
of the people. Power is thereby demythologized. Political power always trespassed 
its boundaries and infringed on legitimate ("natural") rights and liberties. This was 
the way they came to interpret their immediate experience and was the wisdom they 
derived from historical study.^* Their remedy was to clarify its purpose and 
reconstrue its function regarding the individual as citizen.^ ®
Third, just as the political arrangement of government was reformed through 
recourse to the inviolability of the individual, so was its legislative and judicial logic. 
In the strictest sense, rights and liberties could only be defined negatively. Individuals 
have right and liberty de facto, except when it conflicts with another's or the common 
welfare. Judicial and legislative power exists, not to define rights and liberties, per se, 
but to make and enforce laws which safeguard against individual exercises of liberty 
which result in compromising another's liberty.
The study of law as such was not concerned with what were and were not 
liberties, but when and where the exercise of one's liberty trespassed the inviolability 
of another person. This is the original edge of the logic that was asserted, although in 
principle this was not fully grasped or incorporated into the new polity.^ ® Neither did 
it stand on its own as such. In its political incarnation, the individual premise was
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vulnerable to and circumscribed by the democratic principle. Even so, the extent of 
the Founding Fathers' critique of democratic power is often overlooked. The so 
called "Madisonian dilemma" between individual right and democratic rule must in 
principle not be overdrawn. The democratic principle is derived from the claim of the 
inviolability of the individual. While there are always two poles of reference within 
the modem state, theoretically, the priority is to he given to the individual side.^’
The structuring of this principle of the inviolability of the individual into 
political form, however imperfectly, has meant in theory the embedding of a common 
source of leverage to effect change in society. In the federal Constitution with the Bill 
of Rights and state Constitutions, the individual principle was given expression. Even 
though these expressions were less than perfect and limited in their original 
applications, they gave the individual principle form. Eventually, members of society 
would access the individual principle embedded in these expressions and use them to 
challenge new monopolies of power. The claims of elites were often supported by old 
fictions which viewed social reality as fixed and classist. By virtue of embedding the 
individual principle in law, a mechanism is created whereby new ideas, kinds of 
people, religious and moral sensibilities, fi*eedom for pursuit of new interests 
(economic and otherwise) are given a means to gain entrance into society, creating a 
new openness to society in which change is central, at least in theory.
But this “universal principle,” the inviolability of the individual, which is at 
the heart of the freedom contract, is culturally bounded or "parochialized". That is to 
say, its reach is no further than existing culture permits. It is not a self-activating 
dynamic principle. Even between the time it was exploited for liberation fi*om Britain 
and the crafting of the Constitution it was almost lost to merchants, bankers and 
landed gentry who wanted government to be organized to guarantee the persistence of 
their social economic hegemony. The Bill of Rights and Jefferson's presidency 
revived it. "Late in life Jefferson described the election of 1800 as being 'as real a 
revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776".”  This is even more 
clearly evident jfrom the fact that even in the drafting of the Declaration of 
Independence, when the principle of inalienable rights of all men was first stated and 
given application, a compromise was quickly struck with its radicality. By the second 
and final draft, the scope of Jefferson's "all" had been greatly narrowed by virtue of 
Southern economic interests.^^
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What was given to the nation was not an automatic unfolding ideal by which a 
new kind of egalitarian free society was bom. Rather, a precedent and a principle 
was embedded in America's polity and in its collective memory. It was etched on the 
soul of the nation in its infancy. It exists only as a resource through which individuals 
and groups can gain access to effect change, make room for difference and achieve 
their free rights. That this principle exists in the new nation's polity does not mean 
that it automatically transforms the character of society. Such a view fails to come to 
grips with the enormous cost and struggle of those who time and again have pushed 
hack the existing closure of culture to make room for a broader application of this 
principle. The constriction of an existing socio-cultural world is a given. Loosening 
the weave of the cultural fabric sufficiently to allow for new kinds of people, new 
values and rights, new economic and vocational opportunities, is always a struggle. 
This fact scarcely needs supporting, as it is amply evident in history. For instance in 
the Lincoln - Douglas debates, Lincoln began questioning the racial boundaries 
attached to Jefferson's clause “all men are created equal.’”" He questioned the criteria 
used to circumscribe the obvious universalism in Jefferson's clause. But the actual 
extension of the principle within society lay on the other side of an immense and 
costly stmggle. This scenario can be recalled in eveiy social stmggle, where through 
public dissent and litigation, individuals forced society to extend the parameters of its 
inclusivity and the scope of its liberties.*  ^ The price of exploiting the non-derivative 
rights argument against their English parent were two fold: one, the formation of a 
"public conscience" with an "ethic" of individual liberty and right, and two, the 
political stmcturing of a resource for change and difference.
The modem development of the principle of the inviolability of the individual 
in the American experience may be summarized as passing through four stages. First 
is the experience that one's rights are being trespassed or violated. This was likely not 
a natural consequence arising out of the universal character of humanness, but the 
growing awareness of the dissonance between colonial status and landed British 
subjects proper. This experience takes the form of grievance.
Second, an ideology is imported and simultaneously a revolution is bom. The 
ideology, by its very nature, engages universal categories. It allows the present 
situation to be placed under an ideological lens.
The revolution, if it does not fail, requires a further step—the creation of a new
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social polity. In time, the universalist principle of individual liberty/rights, the 
essence of the revolutionary ideology, came to be embedded in state and federal 
constitutions and the Bill of Rights. By instituting the revolutionaiy principle, the 
Founding Fathers made it possible to relativize ruling custom, class and claims to 
hereditary or continuous political power. This is the third stage—law/polity.
The fourth stage follows along with this, and is the actual changing of the 
socio-cultural configuration of the nation—equal access to the law as the ground for 
"benign" revolutions within society. Change is structured, as such, into the very 
nature of modem society, although not without public dissent, protest and stmggle.
Just as important as the "formalization" of individual liberty into social polity, 
is the simultaneous development of a cultural individualistic ethos. By "ethos" is 
meant the predominance within society of a cultural "ethic" that encourages a person 
to transcend customs, traditions, institutions, morals and stations on grounds and 
interests germane to the individual alone. As this ethos matures, society must 
increasingly accommodate an ever-expanding range of idiosyncratic behaviors and 
expressions, as long as no blatant harm to others exists.
The strengthening of this ethos correspondingly weakens sociality. It fosters a 
social climate in which the individual increasingly becomes absolute, and social, 
public, and familial claims, relative. The actual law of the state may or may not 
protect a given individual expression but the ethos empowers the cultural legitimacy 
of what may be described as "I claims". These are claims which need no legitimation 
apart from those which are discrete to the self even though these may be in tension 
with wider social and public standards and interests. The maturation of this "ethos" in 
the late twentieth century is exhibited in an ever-widening range of areas. There has 
been a continual proliferation of "I claims", some gaining legal leverage while others 
make their stand on the strength and pervasiveness of the cultural ethic of individual 
autonomy.”
Basic Assumptions Attached to Individual Liberty
As noted in the introduction, the Founding Fathers’ understanding of freedom 
was connected to several philosophical assumptions. For the purposes of this study, 
these may be reduced to five claims: (1) Individual liberty is a bequest of nature and 
nature’s God; (2) the responsible use of liberty was predicated on the universal
J
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endowment of reason and experience; (3) liberty and virtue (including piety) are not to 
be separated; (4) a pluralistic and secular social sphere, the concomitant of individual 
liberty, are not in tension with harmony (i.e., fraternity) and socio-moral cohesiveness; 
(5) a society organized around the above liberal values is the basis for social change 
and progress.
1.
The Absoluteness of Individual Liberty
The Founding Fathers’ assertion of independence and freedom from Britain
appealed to one fundamental truth which relied on an assumption that could not be
empirically verified. This was that all persons possessed the right to life, liberty and
pursuit of happiness as the bequest of nature and the Creator. Rather than intending to
be arbitrary, the Founding Fathers believed they were appealing to reason. They
believed that reason supported their claim that liberty was not on loan from the state,
but an unalienable right. Just how it was that nature made this evident to reason was
less clear. Those who in past ages had appealed to natural law, had not come to these
precise conclusions. The stoics, for instance, who hegan to develop the idea of a
natural law, concluded from their observations that harmony, order and gradation
were fundamental to nature and called not for revolution, but acquiescence and
integration into the existing socio-political hierarchy.
The malleability and openness of “natural” has been noted by several scholars:
“...in the seventeenth century Robert Boyle listed eight senses in which it [i.e., 
nature] was then used by natural philosophers. Of those, the most interesting 
were (1) the author of nature or God; (2) a semi-deity or personification, 
subordinate to God but often spoken of as the sole immediate cause or 
phenomena and thus often replacing the idea of God as a principle of 
explanation; (3) the established course of things, the settled and unalterable 
order of the universe; (4) the essence or quality of a thing; that which makes it 
what it is...”^^
It is number three that comes closest to the meaning which the Founders had 
in mind when they appealed to nature as the grounds of their actions. They believed 
that
“Nature was divinely rational and man to become godlike must be rational 
too.””
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“The whole deistic movement of the eighteenth century, Basil Willey writes, 
“proceeded on the assumption that nature could supply what a questionable 
revelation no longer could, an assured knowledge of God’s existence, power 
and benevolence.’”®
“Nature... became in the latter Christian centuries (especially from the 
seventeenth century onwards) the handiwork of God proclaiming its divine 
original; a heavenly spectacle which, though not now in all respects what God 
intended it to be, had not lost all its original brightness... It was safe to regard 
nature as a wise guide because it was fresher from the hands of God and less 
affected by human sin and folly.”"®
The historian Edwin Gaustad, commenting on the Founding Fathers’ appeal to
nature, makes a similar observation.
“The other much-honored and much-invoked word of the age. Nature, could, 
like Reason, take many shapes. It could mean that which was primitive and 
original, that which existed before the corrupting influences of civilization and 
metaphysics distorted the pure simplicity of yore. “Nature” could mean that 
which was universal, found in all women and men everywhere, regardless of 
custom and culture and conditioning: that which was natural was that found 
everywhere. Orient and Occident, Aiyan and African, Old World and New. Or, 
with no great concern about the obvious contradiction, “Nature” could mean 
not that which existed everywhere, but that which existed nowhere yet ought 
to exist. The natural was the desirable, the norm to be sought rather than that 
universality to be described. Any word so rich with meaning, so laden with 
ambiguity, could find many uses. Thomas Pained, for example, pointed out 
that in the world of nature never was it the case that the larger body was 
satellite to the smaller: the moon revolved around the earth, not the reverse. 
Therefore (and in the world of Enlightenment thought the “therefore” was 
compelling), how unnatural for a whole continent, America to revolve around 
and be dependent upon that small island called England. But in religion, even 
more than in politics. Nature was teacher, guide, model, and the proper object 
of adoration.”"’
This diversity and openness in the meaning of natural, suggests that natural 
and natural law are not simply definable in and of themselves, but await exploitation 
for and serve a particular social emergency, apart from which their meaning is less 
than accessible. This accords with what Bernard Bailyn has said about the significance 
of ideology. Quoting Appelby’s summation of Bailyn, “Ideas only influence political 
action when they are part of a socially created structure. The Cassandras of the British 
opposition shaped events in America because their opinions organized attitudes 
otherwise too vague to be acted upon, because... they crystallized otherwise inchoate 
discontent. Ideas, to use Bailyns metaphor, compose themselves into intellectual 
switchboards wired so that certain events almost surely will provoke particular
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reactions.”'*^
Deistic ideas of natural design and harmony and Lockean concepts (going
back to Hobbes which posited the human in a state of nature, i.e., a hypothetical state
over against the human in society) provided the language for the Founders to assert
individual liberty as if it was a hard factual scientific and philosophical truth quarried
from the natural order of things. The importance of this point for the larger scope of
this study is that America, not unlike other western nations, commenced its national
history under the spell that individual rights and liberty were an absolute and natural,
therefore ethical fact; as if they were universal anthropological truths and therefore
did not pose a social risk. It is one thing to grant humans the ability to observe the
“laws” in the created order, but it is quite another matter to raise these “laws” to the
realm of ethics. As Niebuhr wrote,
“Eighteenth century rationalism involved itself in confusion when it tried to 
raise the survival impulse to a primary norm of ethical life. That the seeds of 
absolute individualism were sewn into America by the Founding Fathers is 
further evident by contrasting the Puritan versus deist view of God. The 
former is a sovereign God who acts in history in judgement, deliverance, 
providence according to his will and greater purposefulness. The latter is a 
God submerged in natural order and design. Robert Michaelson points out that 
they (the Founding Fathers) were well aware of nature and ‘nature’s god’ but 
their sense of God active in history was not as acute as that of their forefathers 
had been -  or that matter, as that of Abraham Lincoln three generations later... 
This fact gave birth to a common and highly important ideology in American 
history -  an ideology which has stressed the role of the free man in 
determining his own destiny in mastering his own fate. In this view the 
individual is given an impressive place in the founding and governing of the 
state and nation. He is sovereign. Ultimate power rests in the people."*^
2.
Reason
While not providing a model for the modem state, Hobbes laid the foundation 
for viewing society as a collective of disassociated individuals existing in a political 
alliance. Locke, Harrington, Bentham, J.S. Mill and T.H. Green, to name a few, would 
build on this Hobbesean foundation. Hobbes, like Bentham after him, believed that 
the state did not need to look any further than pmdiential ethical motives for the 
maintenance of social order and welfare.'^ The pmdiential ethic was that which 
allowed one’s liberty to be abridged so as to guarantee that it would not overreach its
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proper sphere and violate another’s exercise of liberty. In this way, one’s own as well 
as one’s neighbor’s freedom to pursue their interest were safeguarded. As McPherson 
points out, the political theorists who followed Hobbes can be separated on the 
question of whether this ethic is sufficient or whether there exists the necessity for an 
additional dimension, namely a more “profound” religious moral view of human 
nature; “economic man” or economic man plus “moral rational man.”'*^
The Founding Fathers worked out their philosophy of freedom in conversation 
with this second category. They started with the basic premise that liberty was the 
necessary corollary to self interest which was a law of nature not to be obstructed.'*  ^
The imposition of external controls over the socioeconomic sphere was regarded as 
disturbing a greater created harmony. This, however, was not merely a blind faith but 
one which arose out of a new estimate of reason.'*  ^ Reason, was primarily coercion (as 
Hobbes’ thought), but guaranteed the social orderliness of desire. It did not precede 
desire, i.e., self interests, nor transcend it so as to displace it. Rather, it ensured that 
the course taken to achieve primal ends was accomplished by rational means.
In the strictest sense, laissez faire was not absolute in the founding of the 
American republic.'** Formally, there was an approximate goal of progressively 
organizing society around a relatively consistent laissez faire policy. Informally, this 
was theoretically correlated to a goal of social enlightenment. The Founding Fathers, 
following European ideas, believed in the premise that nature had an inexorable law 
of harmony at work within it and that human beings were caught up in that harmony. 
Because of their dignified position in the hierarchy of nature, it was the destiny of 
humans to participate with this harmony.'*  ^ The flaw of human beings was the 
absence of enlightenment and the baseness (not sinfulness) of nature; a flaw that could 
be overcome because of the human endowment of and courage to use the faculty of 
reason.^ **
Viewed in light of Christian assumptions, this represented an elevated (almost 
divinized) view of nature and an optimistic reading of the human predicament. 
Through reason, leading to enlightenment, human beings could be fitted to live in 
society, subjecting desire to restraint, order, virtue and moral principle. And here, true 
to laissez faire logic, such restraint, virtue and moral principle were not viewed as the 
sacrifice of desire/self interest but the enlightened means to achieve it (i.e. utilitarian 
virtue).^*
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3.
Virtue and Piety
It is in this context, that virtue and piety were appreciated. These were 
essential components of enlightenment and morality. They were regarded as a means 
to good human ends. The Founding Fathers were absolutely sure that the creation of a 
free society went together with the moral elevation of society and they were explicit in 
their promotion of God, piety and virtue for the success of their modem republic.^  ^
Their optimism in human nature was not so much a measurement of what humans 
were but what they could become through education and religion in a climate of 
liberty. They were sufficiently in touch with the baseness of human nature to compel 
them to become advocates of religion. In uncoerced religion, they recognized a force 
which would serve to stimulate and cultivate the moral sensibilities of the people. 
Republican liberty and moral advancement were regarded as axiomatic. To the degree 
the latter failed in society, the former of necessity would be compromised.
Tocqueville observed that “The inhabitants of the United States themselves 
consider religious belief from this angle.” “I do not know,” he stated, “if all 
Americans have faith in their religion... but I am sure that they think it is necessaiy to 
the maintenance of republican institutions.”^^
What social historians have come to name as civil religion has its origin and 
proper explanation in this beginning. God and religion were viewed by the Founders 
from the perspective of the interests of their social project. '^* Practically speaking, 
there were no atheists in the American beginning. Religion as a source of piety was 
regarded as indispensable to their modem project, and for no greater end than virtue.^  ^
Public virtue had its source in private virtues and piety. Under the influence of the 
Enlightenment and the study of the classics, the Founding Fathers had come to 
emphasize individual virtue in its varied forms as the ground of public morality.
Virtue had to do with individual firmness, discipline and development. It signified 
the conscious formation of character, nobility, refinement, learning and moral 
sensibility. Virtue meant self improvement and the maximizing of one’s individual 
potential. As such, virtue was simultaneously involved in the achievement of 
individual interests and a more stabilized society.^ ®
Free enterprise was the paradigmatic expression of this laissez faire postulate. 
More than in any other sphere, success through free enterprise disclosed the essential
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“virtue” of republicanism. Citizens were especially tested and validated by their 
success in using liberty to call forth from within themselves (via their own 
resourcefulness) that which would legitimatize the existence of liberty in the 
generation of wealth. Liberty, guarding and fostering the right to pursue self interest, 
was responsible for the emergence of this kind of man which was recognized as the 
stable center and sentinel of this new society. One's social validity was commensurate 
with one's realization of these particular virtues. Morality and wealth were fused.^^
Thinkers like McPherson in this century and Marx and Nietzsche in the 
nineteenth century, recognized that in the emerging modem world, economics was not 
merely one sphere among others which was also affected by the individual principle.
It was the mainstream of all realms. The social baptism of laissez faire economics as a 
natural and therefore “ethical” law, sanctioned placing humans in a tooth and claw 
competitive relation to each other. It is likely that the Founders had a dim awareness 
that a market capitalistic economy would reconnect humans in this artificial way and 
because of this, they developed an abnormal interest and hope in virtue. Virtue alone 
would ensure that the connection between humans was more than a materialistic one.
4.
Social Idealism
The concomitant of individual liberty was a pluralistic secularized and 
competitive society. These however, to the degree to which they were clearly reflected 
on, were not viewed in a negative light. Plurality and diversity as principles were 
embraced as natural and positive phenomena and secularization of the public domain 
was viewed by the Jefferson-Madison school as conducive of social harmony and 
good. Competition was not regarded as creating a new economic aristocracy.
Pluralization
To speak of the "pluralization of society" is simply another way to look at the 
individual principle which ensures social space for different kinds of people. From 
the beginning of its colonial settlement, America was set on a pluralistic course. The 
story of colonial and republican America is one of progressive religious, ethnic and 
racial diversification. While the new nation was bom at a time when religious and 
classist hegemonies existed, these were losing their grip.
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The socio-cultural reality was that Americans had to make room for difference 
if for no other reasons than pragmatic ones. The strength of formalizing the 
individual principle was that it did not attempt to name the range of difference that 
was acceptable by democratic consensus or common law and custom, but rather 
upheld the right of individuals and groups to define and to be themselves without their 
person’s space being compromised or social space being withdrawn or circumscribed. 
The principle of equality behind pluralism was the equality of right, right of 
opportunity, right for one’s differences to exist and to express themselves in society 
without fear of encroachment or socioeconomic consequences.^*
The liberality of this principle was that it reflected a new courage to break 
from the dogma that society must be uniform (a direction Britain had inaugurated in 
the seventeenth century). Against the historic propensity to extinguish or limit the 
range of social, racial and religious difference, pluralism, grounded in the individual 
principle, invited diversity. The Founding Fathers embraced diversity not only 
because of the pragmatic pressures of their ever changing world or merely from a 
sense that they must maintain integrity to their original individualistic premise, but 
because of a new “faith” in an universal mosaic of truth in which historic differences 
were thought to be ultimately compatible. Henry Steele Commanger writes, “Because 
they (the Founding Fathers) thought morality virtue and truth universal, they rejected 
alike the parochialism of any single church including Christianity... They adored 
wisdom and virtue wherever they found it. They adored China...”^^  In the Federalist 
Papers, Madison argued that the collision of differences and varying interests in 
society would result in a healthy corrective; a dialectic conducive of growth and 
maturity. But it is equally true that most people, in this founding period, had their own 
parameters beyond which they could not or would not envision this principle. It is 
likely that this principle is always anthropologically and socially fragile.
Secularization
Giving the individual principle a central place in the nation’s social polity, 
inevitably meant that the claims of religious institutions to fill normative social, 
public space must be disallowed. No more could a religious institution or convention 
override the individual conscience by virtue of an appeal to transcendent truth claims, 
historic ecclesial prerogative or pragmatic social concerns. This would compromise
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the sovereignty and inviolability of the individual.
By the time of the Revolution and the formation of the nation, two groups of 
people had arrived at the common conclusion that religion must be cleanly severed 
from any relation to civil power. The two groups included those who were under the 
influence of the Enlightenment thought, and those religious groups who had suffered 
at the hands of their countrymen for their beliefs. Especially important among these 
were the Baptists, who will be discussed in chapter five.
The Enlightenment school came to their clarification primarily through their 
new humanistic premises, as well as sharing the general outrage against religious 
persecution and wars. They held that nothing was more fundamental to human 
existence than the correspondence between inner conviction and action. Coercion (in 
this setting, religious coercion) trespassed the fundamental nature of the human 
make-up. Theirs was an anthropological assessment about the dignity and sanctity of 
the human which required a climate of liberty. They appealed to God and nature on 
an almost equivalent basis as references which served to ground human dignity 
outside of refute or appeal. George Mason's Virginia Declaration o f Rights (June 
1776), James Madison's Memorial & Remonstrance (1785), and Jefferson's Statute o f 
Religious Freedom (1786) all explicitly argue from the "fact" of natural right and the 
sanctity of individual conscience, exposed only to influence and argument, free from 
the burden of civil power and involvement.
While it cannot be argued that the Founding Fathers achieved a new social 
polity clearly and consistently on this principle from the beginning, what can be 
claimed is that this principle was central from the beginning and was embedded in 
their constructions on both the state and federal level. Only progressively did it 
replace the remnants of the old pre-revolutionaiy social model. Eventually, the first 
Amendment of the Constitution in the Bill of Rights (which functioned to protect the 
state from federal intrusions), came to function as protection for citizens' rights, rights 
which the States were not to infiinge upon. This is why rights in the Bill of Rights are 
expressed negatively.
The historical context of the problem was one in which organized political 
power continually trespassed its proper bounds. Therefore, explicit limits had to be 
imposed. The process of vacating the social space of overarching religious tenets and 
obligations, a process rightly described as secularization, had been progressive. Even
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into the late twentieth centuiy this has continued through legislative policy and 
judicial review. The aim of this "clearing" was not to create a cultural secularism; it 
simply opened up the socio-cultural space to be filled in a new way "from below". In 
principle, religion's impact on society was placed on a new footing, so that its 
influence in culture was to be commensurate with its intrinsic power and free 
acceptance among the populace. ("Congress will make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise there of.)
There were of course many factors which coalesced to influence the 
restructuring of religion in society in this way: the religious wars, growing pluralism 
in America, the rise of Evangelical pietism, the Baptists (and to a lesser degree the 
Quakers) as well as old fashioned political bargaining. What the Founding Fathers 
contributed, in distinction to these, was a principle which could contribute to a new 
social polity.
Individual liberty and social equality (that is, social equality among citizens) 
were viewed as mutually supportive by those founding statesmen most under the 
influence of Enlightenment idealism. Equality, understood as not simply equality 
under the law or equality of opportunity but the relative socioeconomic equality of the 
citizenship, represented the Founders' vision of the republic. Gross social disparity 
created by wealth, power or education was viewed as in tension with a true republic. 
Virtue, as well as relative prosperity, rather than the prerogative of the noble elite, was 
regarded as arising out of a matrix of liberty and was the proper study of 
accomplishment of all citizens.
Through the inspiration of Jefferson, and in the Jacksonian period, this vision 
seemed to be off to an auspicious start. As Reinhold Niebuhr and Alan Heimert point 
out, this vision of the marriage of liberty and equality did in fact exist and was 
achieving a level of incarnation in the early days of the republic.^® Even so, equality 
as such was not formally structured into the nation’s polity as liberty was. No gross 
concentrations of wealth creating an economic classist citizenry were thought to arise. 
They realized that the success of a republic was dependant on the equal distribution of 
power (including economic power) within the citizenry. Eighteenth century ideas of 
laissez-faire natural law harmony, combined with classical republicanism, lay behind 
this assumption.^*
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5.
Progress
Liberty in a climate of reason and virtue was thought to be the key to realizing 
positive changes. Eighteenth century Enlightenment thinkers were enamoured with 
the power at the disposal of humans when they became unshakled from arbitrary 
traditions, political and ecclesiastical rule and equipped with reason. This is taken up 
in the next section and will be discussed there.
The Individual Principle and the Logic Behind “Fixity” and “Freedom”
What are the implications of the rise of the individual principle for the 
development of the patterns of "fixity" and "freedom" in mainstream Protestantism? 
At various junctures in fixture chapters, this question is answered. The follo’wing 
previews this question, suggesting the logical connections that exist.
Social Atomism and Moral Relativism
Embedding the principle of individual liberty in the social polity, and the 
forming of a corresponding ethos in a new nation, was equivalent to structuring into it 
a mechanism and motive for change. The Founding Fathers countered a particular 
claim, the aristocracy's right to control parliamentary power, not with another 
particular claim, but a universal claim that "all men are created equal". In structuring 
this claim into their polity and into the national psyche, they embedded a universal 
principle that ostensibly could be re-exploited by any group or individual in the new 
society for change.
The implications this has for socio-moral cohesiveness are far reaching. Most 
directly it means that society's coherence is construed differently. In contrast to 
society held together by monarchical unity, sanctioned caste, established state 
religion, or the cultural glue of shared ethnicity, unity was postulated as a contract of 
(ethnically and eventually racially and sexually disparate) individuals. Contractuality 
by nature is fragile. Formally, it contains the potential to release persons and groups 
from overarching traditions and conventions, allowing them to individuate their 
differences and interests. In time, society becomes more dialectical, more 
characterized by autonomous units, more competitive and less beholden to traditional 
institutions. Gordon Wood’s thesis, in his Radicalism o f the American Revolution, is
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that between 1760 and 1800, the period going into and directly after the Revolution, 
the dynamics of American society changed dramatically. He insists that “... social 
relationships changed. The way people were connected one to another changed.” The 
old model of society was characterized by an organic unity held together by graded 
vertical authority which was guaranteed by dependancy, fear, patronage, honour and 
shame. Wood has gone to great lengths to document the persistence in eighteenth 
century America of this old model of society in which “order and stability were 
explicit.”^^  Every person in society was integrated into a particular level of the social 
order which defined the nature of their obligation and submission. Monarchy was a
social system built out of what Hume called “a long train of dependence..... a
gradation of degrees of freedom and servility that linked everyone from king at the 
top to the bonded laborers and black slaves at the bottom.^*
In the Revolutionary change from a monarchy to a republic, it is important to 
recognize that not only political ties but also social connections were being 
reconceived. Wood explains this difference. “In monarchies, each man’s desire to do 
what was right in his own eyes could be restrained by fear or force, by patronage or 
honour. In republics, however, each man must somehow be persuaded to sacrifice his 
personal desires, his luxuries, for the sake of the public good. Monarchies could 
tolerate great degrees of self-interestedness, private gratification, and corruption 
among their subjects. After all, they were based on dependence and subservience and 
all sorts of adhesives and connections besides virtue to hold their societies together. 
Monarchies relied on blood, family, kinship, patronage and ultimately fear... But 
republics could never resort to such force [i.e., brute and capricious force to 
subjugate]. In their purest form, they had no adhesive, no bonds to hold themselves 
together, except their citizens, voluntary patriotism and willingness to obey public 
authority. Without virtue and self-sacrifice, republics would fall apart.” '^* Wood 
concludes, “Republics demand far more morally from their citizens” and are by nature 
“very fragile polities... extremely liable to corruption.”^^ This is the logic which is the 
root of the idea of the eighteenth century republican public virtue.
As shown in the preceding discussions, inevitably, the individual principle and 
ethos were brought to challenge new frontiers. The horizon of the Founders’ vision 
was to emancipate individuals from particular established religious and political 
institutions. But the principle knows no limit. Eventually, all social and cultural
54
conventions are challenged [cf marriage and gender in the contemporary period]. In
the strictest sense, in this arrangement, traditionally fixed social constructions and
moral conventions decrease so that "society" is less an overarching reality, or
culturally integrative reality, and more the potential for contractual co-existence of
"little societies" or even autonomous individuals as the original individual hypothesis
postulated. In this setting, there exists a need for the individuals to bring to their
interpersonal relationships and to the commonweal a moral benevolent self.
Returning to Marx and Nietzche, Marshall Berman draws similar conclusions
about the effects of laissez faire capitalism on socio-moral cohesion and stability.
While Berman is not ultimately pessimistic about the prospects of modernity, he is
unsparing in his argument that it has a corrosive effect on those cultural, moral and
institutional formations that hold society together. Two choice statements, the first
from Nietzsche and the second from Marx, are sufficient to illustrate this connection.
“At these turning points in history there shows itself, juxtaposed and often 
entangled with one another, a magnificent, manifold, jungle-like growing and 
striving, a sort of tropical tempo in rivalry of development, and an enormous 
destruction and self-destruction, thanks to egoisms violently opposed to one 
another, exploding, battling each other for sun and light, unable to find any 
limitation, any check, any considerateness within the morality at their 
disposal... Nothing but new “wherefores,” no longer any communal formulas; 
a new allegiance of misunderstanding and mutual disrespect; decay, vice, and 
the most superior desires gruesomely bound up with one another, the genius of 
the race welling up over the cornucopias of good and ill; a fateful, simultaneity 
of spring and autumn... Again, there is danger, the mother of morality -  great 
danger- but this time displaced onto the individual, onto the nearest and 
dearest, onto the street, onto one’s own child, one’s own heart, one’s own 
innermost secret recesses of wish and will.”®^
“Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all 
social relations, everlasting uncertainty and agitation, distinguish the bourgeois 
epoch fi"om all earlier times. All fixed, fast-firozen relationships, with their 
train of venerable ideas and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones 
become obsolete before they can ossify. All that is solid melts into air, all that 
is holy is profaned, and men at last are forced to face with sober senses the real 
conditions of their lives and their relations with their fellow men.”®’
Lacking an inherent basis for cohesion, the modem state (especially America) 
breeds patriotic nationalism which derives its coercive character from collective 
memories and ideological fictions. “Patriotism and religion are the only things in the 
world which make the whole body of citizens go persistently forward toward the same 
goal.”®* This is akin to Mary Douglas’ insight that if an institution is “going to keep its
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shape,” it “must control the memoiy of its members.®  ^ In this context, historic 
American liberty becomes imaginatively interpreted. But this is to stray into territory 
beyond the scope of this study. With recourse to the principle of individual liberty 
and the growing prevalence of the ethos of individualism, society is made more open 
to change. Old "pre-modem" bases of fixity disappear. In time, it is this phenomenon 
that creates the setting conducive to a cultural interest in authoritative religio-moral 
fixity. This will be discussed at greater length in Chapter Three and Four. The 
modem state, precisely because of this intrinsic element of openness and change 
embedded in it by way of a formal polity that enfranchises individual liberty and the 
presence of a corresponding cultural ethos, creates a potential seedbed for 
socio-cultural forces to arise in reaction to change, flux, anomie and the threat of the 
breakdown of economic, class and religious hegemonies. The loosening of existing 
cultural formations and definitions involving family, sexuality, gender, class, 
economic privilege, religion, ethnic and racial hegemonies, so as to allow for new 
definitions and forinations itself, anticipates a corresponding ground swell of 
resistance (or resistances plural).
Underwriting the autonomy of the individual, legally and "ethically," may be 
fundamentally antithetical to social cohesion and stability. It may be a formula that 
progressively devours the socio-moral fabric of culture. Politically formalized liberty 
always exists as a ready resource to be re-exploited for purposes not in principle 
wholly dissimilar to its original 1776 appropriation.
Ideologically speaking, America is constructed out of Revolutionary 
principles. The formation of the Republic was an attempt to domesticate a 
revolutionary ethic and forge it into a unitive, creative responsible ethic. The principle 
that was used to overthrow power was the same principle employed to reconstmct 
power. There is an obvious optimism in this, one which, at the very least, possesses an 
intrinsic element of risk for social fragmentation. The dogma of non-derivative rights 
functions well for revolutionary purposes, but what law guarantees that it will be 
successful as a socio-cultural principle?’®
Under the impact of the individual principle, over time the socio-cultural basis 
for moral consensus erodes. When the moral burden was shifted to the individual, the 
prerogative for deciding what was right and wrong also was given to the individual. 
While eighteenth century and antebellum America continued to enjoy broad based
56
moral agreement, the foundations to support that in principle had been removed.
The breaking of overarching social definitions and the eventual splintering of 
cultural unities may in fact be part of what may be called the natural aging process of 
modem nations.’* The diversification and pluralism which the Founding Fathers saw 
as the concomitant of individual liberty, was idealized as creating a dialectical social 
context which fostered strength and growth rather than fragmentation and division, a 
conclusion based on their ideological assumptions.’^
Social Progressivism and Idealism’^
Within this discussion, it is important to re-emphasize the way the Founding 
Fathers sought to inform their "experiment of liberty" ( a Madisonian phrase about 
America's international significance). Over against change marked by mere flux, 
anomie, social fragmentation and decay, they posited development and progress. In 
this they established a basis in which the polity and ethos of individual liberty could 
be understood as having social integrity. This required freedom to be idealistically 
interpreted. Their new appraisal of what humans could become through the means of 
reason as well as virtue and religion represented the substance of this idealism.
It is the teleological character of freedom that is of importance here.
Individual propertied males, each progressively building a relative equal ratio of 
moderate wealth (and embodying the virtues of republican liberty), formed the 
citizenry around which society was organized and stabilized. In this there is a 
movement away from a form of tyranny, broadly interpreted, to one in which the "true 
nobility" of the "average man" could and would be realized, made possible by a social 
polity that guaranteed liberty. The "eschatological" or millennial outlook that 
permeated this period in both Europe and America is described by Henry May as 
follows:
Its adherents were sure that they lived in a new age. For them Enlightenment 
was an unsparing sunrise, revealing the wickedness and folly of ancient ideas 
and institutions illuminating also the fimdamental goodness of man. For the 
first time in history they believed it was now possible once and for all to 
destroy Gothic remnants, to plan and create a new society, and thus to achieve 
the happiness for which man was destined".’'*
While this vision did not fully become formed in America to the consistent 
extent it did in France, it was pervasive though mixed with other characteristics. The
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discovery of America as the beginning of a new world order became an important
component in the millennial vision. America came to view itself as the last best hope
- the land and people who would usher the world into the realization of humanity's
true destiny. Crucial to this was a more sober appraisal of human nature (less naively
and baldly optimistic than the French) combined with an emphasis on virtue and
religion. Americans were the prototype of the better humanity that was to mark the
future. Their religion was better and virtues tougher. The religious element of this
view is reflected for instance in Jefferson's inaugural address:
"Kindly separate by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of 
one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to endure the degradations of the 
others; possessing a chosen country. With room enough for entertaining a due 
sense of our equal right to the use of our own faculties, to the acquisitions of 
our industry, to honor and confidence from our fellow citizens, resulting not 
from birth but from our actions and their sense of them; enlightened by a 
benign religion, professed, indeed, and practiced in various forms, yet all of 
them including honesty, truth, temperance, gratitude, and the love of man; 
acknowledging and adoring an overruling Providence..."’®
Liberty or freedom was the centerpiece of the new vision for humanity. And it 
is important to stress that liberty from "tyranny" did not, in their conception, end in a 
new inequality since that would be simply to "liberalize a new tyranny".’® As such, 
the social structuring of individual liberty was idealized as the basis of achieving the 
relative social equality necessary for a true republic - i.e. laissez faire and natural law. 
These cultural presuppositions about the existence of a "natural" law framed the 
outlook of the eighteenth century man.
The basis upon which the Founding Fathers argued for the harmony between 
the stabilizing and creative aspects of their republican experiment are examined by 
considering the presuppositions of the eighteenth century materials. In the formative 
period of America, the socio-cultural vision was framed by an eighteenth century 
republicanism. Their view of "society" suffered from rigid assumptions. Society was 
a by-product of moral-virtuous citizens who through reason and enlightenment had 
integrated themselves into a preexisting fixed order. Their ideas of freedom and 
progress were ultimately contradicted by a cosmic determinism. The presupposition 
of a society improving by virtue of laissez faire harmony, ultimately was called into 
question. Were humans really in charge of history or was the human element being 
subjected to the inexorable movements of natural law?”
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Had the Founding Fathers really broken the back of tyranny? For in elevating
laissez faire to ideological sanctity, what resource existed to critique the emergence of
gross disparities when their script presumed sublime harmony? Ironically then, the
stabilizing element in the Founding Fathers’ experiment may have turned out not so
"new" (i.e. that corresponding to the teleological freedom). Was this society destined
to steadily form itself horizontally toward an increasingly equal and just citizenry,
with an ever widening circle of morality, virtue and individual development? Or was
this a plan which would end in the organization of society around a few successful
republicans; a state of affairs in principle not too different from the aristocratic control
of the society from which they had broken? Pollard’s insight on the eighteenth century
Enlightenment world view reflects this critique.
“Yet in other, and perhaps more significant respects, Voltaire is a 
conservative. His rigid view of human uniformity, of a unique universal moral 
law, applicable to all ages, not only led him to “unhistorical” judgements on 
the past; it also, in his hands, starkly limits the possibilities of the future. In 
part, this rigidity is a reflection of the rigidity of Newtonian science: Voltaire’s 
universe, like that of Newton, is static in total and without development. The 
components are there and will never change, the world has been set in motion 
by a single Maker, the machine is working under strict laws, and the most we 
can do is to understand its working, and use it as intelligently as possible.’*
The Implications of Social Atomism and Moral Relativism on the One Hand and 
Social Progressivism and Idealism on the Other for “Fixity” and “Freedom”
It is the religious implications of the foregoing discussions that are most 
pertinent to this study. The existence of a cultural ethos of individual autonomy, a 
political structure organized so as to protect individual right and liberty, along with 
the prevalence of an Enlightenment-derived fiction which informed liberty, set up 
conditions which fostered the rise of cultural optimism and pessimism regarding the 
creation of society on liberal principles. Because religion played an important role in 
the creation of the modem world, it was destined to be both permeable to, and a 
participant in, this cultural pessimism and optimism. H. Richard Niebuhr said, 
"culture is the foster child of religion".’  ^ The Enlightenment equally contributed to 
the shaping of the social order. A cultural pessimism and a cultural optimism are 
endemic to society organized around individual liberty. The pessimism arises out of 
the inherent risk and change that comes with such freedom. When individual liberty
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becomes a pervasive cultural ethic, moral consensus and social cohesion deteriorate. 
Society is made to accommodate more idiosyncratic ideas and behavior.
Fixity
(1) There is justifiable anxiety that the fi*eedom that is being exercised has no 
informing principle or social-familial integrity. In a setting in which the individual 
principle has matured as in the twentieth century, there exists a corresponding risk that 
religion will be coopted for explicit socio-cultural ends as a conserving principle. A 
cultural attraction to religious absolutes occurs. Religion is looked to by conservative 
cultural forces to provide the moral authority and the electoral constituency to reclaim 
the socio-moral limits to fireedom. By virtue of its appeal to transcendent authority, 
conservative religion is well suited for the particular “needs” of modem society. This 
is developed in a later chapter.
Max Lemer summarizes Tocqueville’s insight that “the role of religion is the 
cohesive stuff of a democratic society which has lost the old cement of authority and 
must find a new cement of some sort if it is not to dissolve into atomistic dust.” *®
The problem is, that unlike nineteenth century America, in the twentieth century, the 
religio-moral cultural consensus has fractured [both intemally and extemally], and a 
Protestant relativism and naked self-autonomy within a secular culture has emerged. 
The social stress created by the arrival of this condition, sets up the climate conducive 
for a renaissance of religio-moral fixity. Cultural forces call conservative religion to 
the aid of society, organized around individual liberty, to remark the boundaries of 
freedom. Christianity possesses an intrinsic moral and theological character that can 
easily be abstracted and exported for such a social emergency. It awaits cultural 
exploitation. (2) The roots of fixity may also be discemed in the Founding Fathers’ 
confidence that pluralism and secularization of the public domain were compatible 
with and conducive to the persistence of a unified moral consensus pervading society. 
They were sure of this because they believed such a moral consensus was the by­
product of reason and Christian revelation, no matter what the particular 
denomination.** They of course could not envision that the universality of both of 
these would fracture. The late eighteenth century American mind set was confident 
that rationality and order were inextricably bound. Rationality was the door to 
harmony with an ordered well designed universe. There was little or no awareness that
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rationality would eat its young - that is to say it would devour consensus and 
unanimity rather than nurture it. As Appleby writes, the point of contact with the 
universe which the Founders thought they had achieved through reason, was one in 
which they presided “as a critical presence outside the socially given.”*^ In fact, they 
were of course very much immersed in their milieu. Their “rational conclusions” were 
eighteenth century deistic dogmas.
All that can be suggested here is that the logic behind the rise of fixity may in 
part be linked to the weakness in the rationalistic assumptions which instead of 
creating unity laid the groundwork for social atomism which is the seedbed for some 
form of heteronomous fixity. If in fact the passing of time reveals that Enlightenment 
rationalism is particularistic rather than universalistic, what remains to prevent social 
atomism? A similar argument may be made for the rise of moral relativism. When the 
Founding Fathers emphasized reason as the final source of appeal, as discussed, they 
assumed that reason ultimately yielded unamanous conclusions. Therefore they did 
not perceive any social danger in dignifying the rational human agent as the formal 
medium of truth. Eventually [especially in the social, moral and religious dimension 
of life] it would become apparent that the Founding Fathers’ universal claims about 
rationality were unfounded, leaving the formal agent to increasingly become an end in 
himself. This is the essence of moral relativism which refers not merely to the 
challenge that there are any absolutely normative morals to life but to the more subtle 
and destructive conclusion that human beings, nations or cultures have total freedom 
to determine their own law.*^  The rational individualism of the Founding Fathers, 
while not postulating such a radical conclusion, contained within it the seeds of 
relativism. Relativism in turn predicts a revenge of moral absolutism.
(3) The roots of fixity in segments of Protestantism and other religious groups 
may also be discemed in the assumption of classical American republicanism that 
society was to be organized around a citizenry that was morally and economically 
developed. McPherson and Appleby point out that republican ideas preceded 
democratic ideas.*  ^Only with time was republican liberty expanded so as to lose its 
original bias that society is held together by an elite citizenry. The consequences of 
this, Appleby writes, is that “the importance of citizenship itself is diminished.”*® This 
corresponds with Chomsky’s reminder that, “After the American Revolution, 
rebellious and independent farmers had to be taught by force that the ideals expressed
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in the pamphlets of 1776 were not to be taken seriously. The common people were not 
to be represented by countrymen like themselves, that know the people’s sores, but by 
gentry, merchants, lawyers and others who hold or serve private power, Jefferson and 
Madison believed that power should be in the hands of the “natural aristocracy.”
Edmond Morgan comments, ‘Men like themselves who could defend property rights 
against Hamilton’s paper aristocracy and the poor: they regarded slaves, paupers and 
destitute laborers as an ever present danger to liberty as well as property.’”*®
This “ever present danger to liberty,” which the disenfranchised class 
presented, no doubt included socio-moral concerns, as well as economic concerns, as 
the Puritan model of “free” elite so vividly illustrates. As Chapter Four will point out, 
the modem equivalent of this model is evident in religio-cultural constituencies such 
as “the moral majority” who claim the prerogative to mark the moral boundaries for
all of society. All that can be suggested at this point in the study is that there is a
!logical relationship between the classical republican model, which is deeply 
embedded in the American consciousness because of its precedents in Puritan and 
Revolutionary America, and the rise of “fixity” in the modem era which may be Î
approaching a state of social atomism and moral relativism. 1
“Freedom”
There was no less a historical and cultural optimism that came with 
enfranchising individuals with freedom and organizing society on liberal human 
values. The claim that society organized in this way would improve, progress and 
advance was part of this beginning and has continued into the present. It was and 
continues to be seen as the necessary social matrix for individual development and the 
maximizing of potential. That Christianity with its view of history, the kingdom of 
God and the values it places on the human person would be vulnerable to becoming 
invested in and identified with this secular optimism is to be expected.
The probability of a cultural attraction to religion as a source to legitimize the 
persistence of socio-moral absolutes over the land, is likely commensurate with the 
extent of cultural change (and is continually fed by the intrinsic rigidity and fixity 
inherent in republicanism from the beginning). In the same way, there is the risk that 
religion would become invested in the idealism of the modem state for the 
possibilities it was thought to hold for the betterment of humanity [religion in support
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of change]. This is especially so in those periods in which socio-cultural change is 
viewed as positive, if not a phenomenal human accomplishment.
The Founding Fathers’ model of society may be summarized as presenting 
three interrelated attractions which tempt mainstream Protestantism. These will only 
be stated briefly here, as they are treated further in the next four chapters.
(1) The project of building a republic on liberal principles becomes charged 
with imaginative historical importance. Reinhold Niebuhr points out that Americans 
came to think of themselves as the "darling of providence..."*’ Here providence is 
referring to that pervasive attitude which understands America as the pioneers and 
paradigm of a society organized around Enlightenment freedom and replete with 
virtue and character. The Old Testament idioms which New England Protestantism 
once used to identify their providential New World beginning, were transmuted and 
secularized. In the wake of 1776, it was the secular republic that was identified by 
these idioms. The risk that mainstream Christianity would be pulled into an orbit 
around this “history making” venture, is commensurate with the imaginative 
significance that came to be given to the new nation. The birth of the nation as a new 
socio-political entity and the simultaneous demoting of church to a private voluntary 
association presented the risk that Protestants might attempt to integrate their mission 
and values with the new order, thereby losing much of their essential difference.
(2) Because the central axis of this social experiment was individualistic, there 
was a danger that Protestantism would tailor its religion to this very principle. In the 
colonial period, especially in Puritan New England, the individual remained deeply 
integrated into social and ecclesiastical structures. While the individual was 
recognized by virtue of the “free” covenants into which he or she could choose to 
enter and the religious experience he or she could validate, there existed no absolute 
idea of individual. In time, these social, theological and ecclesial frameworks for 
understanding individuality would be weakened. Because of this attachment to the 
modem project and its willingness to employ its religious support on behalf of its 
success, mainstream Protestantism risked losing its essential difference - understood 
here as the theocentric and community framework of the individual.
(3) Because the Founders’ philosophy accepted only that authority which was 
compatible to and supportive of individual liberty, there eventually existed a risk that 
Protestantism’s attachment to modernity would lead them to subject their ideas of
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Biblical-theological authority to the primacy of individual reason and experience. This 
was not an immediate threat because eighteenth century reason was linked to a highly 
ordered universe conducive to the conflation of reason and Revelation.
The first of these three deserves further discussion. The implication of the 
Founding Fathers’ socio-political reconstruction has to do with the inversion that 
occurred with disestablishment, the inversion of religion and society. The relation 
that Protestantism was to have to the state after the Revolution was of necessity 
destined to be informal. With disestablishment, society could no more be explicitly 
defined either as more or less Christian or Protestant. The Enlightenment ideas, which 
were most fully in tension with establishment ideas and principles, ostensibly set 
society on neutral ground. But while politically that was the aim, informally society 
became imaginatively freighted with significance. That explicitly Christian 
theocentric goals would be reversed, so as to be in part asked to correspond and be 
adapted to this apparently momentous social project, can only be expected. In this 
situation, Protestantism's critical differentiation from the goals and values of society 
was threatened.
Perhaps the most important point to emerge from this chapter is the simple 
fact that the Founding Fathers submitted freedom to a "human faith," i.e. faith in the 
possibilities inherent in humans using reason and forming virtue. In short, freedom 
was never merely set forth as a principle around which society should and could be 
organized as a matter of course. Rather, the postulate held that the risk of freedom 
could and must be made for the sake of humanity (or humanness). It was safe and 
necessary to take such a risk because the Founding Fathers’ anthropological 
presuppositions assured them of good ends. It is the presence of these presuppositions 
that signal the presence of the "religious" or faith / idealistic factor in the beginning. 
This fact should have put mainstream Protestants on notice to guard their essential 
difference.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Nineteenth Century Development of Fixity and Freedom
After the birth of the nation, a fledgling mainstream Protestant consensus 
began to form in which the patterns of “fixity” (control over the republican 
experiment) and “freedom” (assimilation of and integration into the republican social 
vision) developed. As shown in the previous two chapters, the groundwork had been 
laid in both colonial and revolutionary America for “fixity” and “freedom.” Just as the 
nation was bom through the ideology and stmggle of revolution, Protestantism in the 
nineteenth Century was rebom through evangelical revival in a social ferment of 
liberty and equality. Despite the atomism and sectarianism of this period, a new 
mainstream Protestant consensus was to emerge. This consensus had within it the 
awareness of the new character of Protestantism’s social relevance. It was in the 
historical matrix of Revolution, the second Great Awakening, disestablishment and 
the democratic movement to extend republican liberty, that a new intra- 
denominational evangelical identity began to take shape. Moved by its own 
evangelical reduction of Christianity and the powerful liberal and democratic ethos 
that had captured the imagination of the new nation, a Protestant consensus emerged 
which identified with America. To a greater or lesser degree, disparate Protestant 
groups began to recognize their evangelical unity and to see themselves collectively in 
a special relation to the new social stmcture and the new social stmcture.
This chapter begins by examining the character of mainstream Protestantism’s 
identification with America. It is this identity which ensured that the seeds of “fixity” 
and “freedom” sown in the colonial and Revolutionary periods would grow.
After first reviewing this identity, the evidence and underlying logic of “fixity” 
in the nineteenth century is presented. This comprises Section A. Section B repeats 
this approach, focusing on “freedom.” A conclusion addresses the predicament in 
which Protestantism found itself as a result of its close identity with the republican 
project and this project’s coming of age.
Antebellum Protestantism’s identity with the new America had two points of 
contact. Protestants saw in the premises of republican government, the logic of a new 
relevance for (Protestant) Christianity to their new society. They also thought they saw 
in the development of republican government in America, great significance for
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Christianity.
Protestantism’s Complement to Republicanism
All parties in the period of the founding of the Republic believed that liberty 
and virtue were axiomatic. The former could noi endure without the latter. Unlike the 
French understanding of liberty, the Philadelphia Enlightenment elites, as well as 
Protestant clergy from the North, agreed that piety supported virtue.  ^Protestants 
believed that it was the fount of all virtue and discredited the idea of a republic 
smugly grounded in human reason and virtue alone. Piety, stemming from 
regeneration, enlightened conscience, the fear of God and the idea of a final 
judgement involving reward and punishment along with Biblical faith and practice, 
was the source of virtue and the guarantee of liberty.  ^Republican government was a 
half truth which required (by its very make-up) religion - a special kind of religion.
The late eighteenth and early nineteenth century dogma was that freedom was the 
nerve of morality, while coercion deadened the moral capacity of humans.^ The 
religion of the republic of necessity required attention to republican sensibilities about 
liberty. The evangelicals who belonged to the old line churches, especially the 
Congregationalists, Presbyterians and Episcopalians were moving away from more 
rigid authoritarian, dogmatic and aristocratic patterns. The new evangelicals arising 
from the Baptists, Methodists, Christians and Disciples were moving in the same 
direction as the aforementioned old line evangelicals but at a much faster pace. More 
radically democratic and often fiercely independent and autonomous in their embrace 
of liberty, these evangelicals recreated Protestantism in a new image. It is this revision 
of the old line and the dramatic emergence of a new Protestantism, sharing proximate 
evangelical presuppositions, that formed the backbone of the nineteenth century 
Protestant socio-cultural establishment which saw itself as the complement to the new 
governance.'^
By 1800, an evangelical Protestant coalition began to take shape which 
consciously began to revise and organize itself in response to the new opportunity and 
challenge that revolutionary liberty presented. Theoretically speaking, the challenge 
that Protestantism faced was to reconcile itself with republican liberty and the 
inevitable consequence of the universalization of liberty - equality. As will be 
discussed, materially this would involve Protestants in doctrinal revision, especially in
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their view of history (eschatology), human nature and revelation. Formally, this would 
require a turn toward persuasion and influence over coercion. Freedom of conscience 
involving the right to decide for oneself matters of truth and religious affiliation, 
would be openly embraced as integral to authentic piety. This required a turn away 
from clerical and ecclesiastical dogmatism and toward a new perspective in which the 
Bible and its teachings were thought to be more directly accessible to the lay person. It 
is in this framework that the reasonability of truth gained a deeper hold on the 
imagination of Protestantism. Republicanism conferred so much sanctity upon the 
individual who was being invited to believe, that an enterprise of apologetics 
developed using contemporary empirical, psychological and rational concepts. 
Revivalism also shared this underlying republican-democratic imperative. As will be 
discussed, an Arminian anthropocentric shift was underway.
In part, the origin of nineteenth century Protestantism’s revivalism, prolific 
Christian service work and its central role in the social reform movements, was 
derived from a self-conscious understanding of its complementary role in the new 
republican order.  ^Liberty required virtue, virtue was derived from piety and piety 
originated from evangelical religion. The gospel that called individual Christians to 
repentance and a new life of piety was recognized as the most relevant of all political 
implements. The new Protestantism did not exchange the establishment model of a 
church-state marriage for Jefferson’s and Williams’ separation of church and state. 
Rather, they invented a new kind of union using non-coercive implements. If 
republicanism was not to go the way of the French Revolution, if liberty was not to 
become licentiousness, then the republic must be joined to Christianity - that is 
evangelical Protestantism.^
This new kind of post-establishment arrangement between Protestantism and 
society was nevertheless still a union and it was this that qualified its commitment to 
liberal values. Persuasion, reason, freedom of conscience and voluntarism were all 
means to an end, not absolute principles. Behind these, there existed a more profound 
notion that the new Republic and Christianity were to be closely identified. Precisely 
because of this, attempts to control and their theological justification, did not 
disappear. Full pluralism was resisted because the Republic was thought of as 
Christian, but distinctions had to be made between preference, toleration and 
illegality.
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Almost all evangelical Protestants were to a greater or lesser degree related to 
the new Protestant coalition and the notion of a Christian republic. There were of 
course exceptions. There were those like some of the Baptists who maintained the 
consistent separationism of Roger Williams and John Leland. There were also the 
Lutherans who were less assimilable into mainstream culture because of ethnicity and 
Luther’s view of two kingdoms and there were the followers of William Miller, the 
Adventist, whose apocalyptic pre-millianialism represented a rejection of the 
American dream. Outside Christianity there were also the Mormons who substituted 
the American dream for their own utopie vision.
Republican Complement to Protestantism
If Protestant religion existed as the fortuitous complement to the rise of 
republican government, the same was true in reverse. Protestantism, especially 
Protestantism with Calvinistic roots, had embedded within itself the seeds of a historic 
consciousness.^ Protestantism’s battle with “papal religion” had by some been given 
historicai-eschatological significance. When Puritans settled New England, they had 
brought with them ideas about the historical importance of their venture. They 
believed that planting the pure reformed religion in a “virgin world” would 
yield a great harvest of true piety, even so much as to possess millennial implications.^ 
Ideas of election, vocation and guidance parallel to Israel of old, filled their 
imagination.
When revolutionary changes transformed the colonies, giving them a new 
identity as states within a new nation, the narrative that puritans had nurtured did not 
disappear but rather broadened. The importance of “purified” government, i.e., 
republicanism, was merged with the historic narrative about the importance of 
purified religion, i.e., Protestantism. It was almost a natural and immediate realization 
to many of the new puritan and evangelical leaders that republicanism was integral to 
realizing the Protestant destiny that was especially, but not solely, embedded in the 
historic New England imagination. What Protestant religion required was a stable 
liberal politic. For them, true republicanism was an extension of their religious ideas 
and social beginnings. In the final analysis, they were sure that the new republic did 
not rest on Enlightenment idealism. Even so, with the emergence of the nation, two 
entities, Protestantism and republicanism -  formed a complement. For the new
78
evangelical consensus, especially the progressive Congregationalists, the emergence 
of the republican state was viewed as a further development of that original 
providential drama that their forefathers had envisioned. Republicanism was the 
formal component necessary for realizing Protestantism’s destiny to bring to flower a 
great social spiritual harvest in the New World. It had millennial implications.^
The career of millennialism in colonial and republican America through the 
nineteenth century, may be summarized as follows: Millennialism was endemic to the 
European discovery and settlement of America. That is to say, millennialism (“nascent 
American millennialism”) was first envisioned as the potential that the New World 
provided for the realization of the Protestant destiny. In time, this view was combined 
with republicanism, which was viewed as the socio-political component necessary for 
realizing the millennial vision inherent in Protestant religion. Eventually, the two 
[republican goals and Protestant goals] became thoroughly identified. The secular 
socio-national project became Christianized and the Christian millennium became 
secularized. However, the historization of the millennium was the seed bed for a 
counter movement, predicting the sudden end of time for an evil world.
The period of interest in this chapter finds republicanism viewed as a 
complement to Protestant evangelical views of a millennial dawn. There is a gradual 
merging of the republican national vision and the Protestant millennial vision into the 
idea of manifest destiny.
What is of special attention at this juncture is that this complementaiy relation 
existed and that it was to a significant degree understood by the “new Puritans” and 
those they influenced as one of republicanism complementing Protestantism. This is 
the logical setting in which to understand the emergence of “fixity,” even though its 
manifestation is measured in this period. Because this segment of Protestantism 
viewed republicanism as not an end itself or absolute truth in itself, it had little 
reluctance prioritizing and protecting Protestant religio-moral sensibilities. 
Republicanism existed in their mind within a greater Christian-millennial destiny. 
Equally so, Protestantism’s self-conscious identity with republican premises, even if 
not wholly aligned with these premises, rendered it vulnerable. It was almost 
impossible for Protestantism not to become permeated by the Enlightenment ethos.
Both views of this complementary relation co-existed in the nineteenth century 
because of the fact that two schools of thought on the grounds of the state, formed the
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substrata of eighteenth century America: Enlightenment and Puritan Calvinism. Both 
exerted significant power molding American self-understanding.
In nineteenth century Antebellum America, Protestantism was characterized 
by both "fixity" and "freedom," although neither became a mature and serious 
problem. They remained essentially benign developments. This was mainly because 
society at that time was largely a Protestant creation. Society's institutions, laws and 
values bore the distinct impress of Protestantism. Religious pluralism was limited. 
Culture, to a significant degree, was a byproduct of Protestant service work, witness 
and standards. For this reason, Protestantism’s close identification with America 
during this early period cannot be viewed as alarming. The predisposition by 
Protestantism to align society with its values may only be rightly described as a 
serious problem in the period following the Civil War, when the nation began to find 
its secular feet and pluralism fully blossomed.
Protestantism's close involvement with the advancement of the socio-national 
project and the Enlightenment ideals and values of the republic, while certainly 
displaying a problem of weak differentiation, did not become serious because it did 
not loose its "millennial" posture. Essentially, Protestantism did not fully relinquish its 
own eschatology for the prospect of a realized secular eschatology (although its 
post-millennial view fostered that eventuality). Only in the twentieth centuiy did the 
patterns of “fixity” and “fi'eedom” really reach their full maturity.
Despite the power of the Enlightenment ideas in the nineteenth century, 
evangelical Protestantism held the upper hand in the struggle to define the new 
America. Evangelical Protestantism became the mainstream of American religion. 
Denominationally, this had two sides that progressively came closer together. First 
were those groups that had enjoyed establishment status and/or mainstream 
recognition. These included Presbyterians (especially those affected by the Great 
Awakening), Congregationalists (that is all Congregationalists who were not moving 
toward Unitarianism), and Episcopalians (transformed by the Revolution). Second are 
those who had been on the peripheiy, or who were just coming on the scene. Chief 
among these were the Baptists (who would benefit the most numerically from the 
Great Awakening) and the Methodists. In addition, there were the Stoneites and 
Campbellites, who became the Disciples of Christ. Also not to be excluded (but less 
in number and more isolated), were the Lutherans. The nineteenth century is that
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century when America as a new nation commenced its historical journey, its 
sociopolitical values emerging from the end of the eighteenth century. But as 
discussed, it did not proceed as a bare political-national entity. Protestantism, under 
the transformative influence of evangelicalism, had appointed itself to become a 
primary partner in this journey. Much of it, especially the old mainline groups, 
manifested a determined will that the new America would be formally "Christian" (a 
code word for Protestant), insisting that America remain and become more like it.
At the same time, Protestantism, especially the new evangelical groups as well 
as the once peripheral and persecuted Baptists, would itself become more like the new 
America, absorbing its values, ideals, and the emerging socio-national vision. In its 
efforts to align the new nation to its religio-moral sensibilities, Protestantism existed 
in tension with Enlightenment premises of the Founding Fathers. Further, 
Protestantism became uncritically open and permeable to the new America, both as a 
project and content. Even allowing for this tension within Protestantism, no deep 
cleavage occurred.
Making this judgment about the interpenetration of Protestantism and 
republicanism is not to ignore the fact that religion and society are always acting upon 
and influencing each other. As Peter Berger has argued, humanity is both a social 
creature and creator."
The new nation did not simply stand on its new secular feet and commence its 
journey forward in time. The republic in its first historical epic was both formally and 
culturally dominated by Protestantism. While the secular premises had been 
embedded in this beginning, they did not promptly become the consistent axis for 
organizing society and its laws. Protestantism's initial period of hegemony over the 
republic, roughly stated here as the antebellum period, can be represented as a partial 
fusion with the new nation. Protestantism "triumphed over the secular." It remained 
explicitly invested in tying the republic judicially and politically to Christian beliefs 
and morals. To the degree it succeeded in this effort; to the extent it fostered a 
widespread public opinion as to the factuality of such a relationship, "Protestantism 
triumphed over the secular." Although secular premises were increasingly being 
realized, the period is remarkable for Protestantism's determination to maintain its 
dominance over the new republic.
But it is equally true that Protestantism was in part seduced by the secular. By
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virtue of its explicit involvement in society and its interest in the project of the 
success of the new republic, Protestantism subtly found itself deeply enmeshed in the 
goals of the secular. It was this phenomenon that eventually led to Protestantism's 
loss of identity and marginalization in the modem period.
While these two dimensions cannot be fully separated, being as they are 
expressions of Protestantism's basic problem of insufficient differentiation from its 
world, they can be addressed distinctly because they are polar dynamics. This chapter 
therefore commences with a discussion of Protestantism's extension of its values and 
beliefs as the moral boundaries of society (religion in the form of social fixity). In so 
far as Protestantism succeeded in this, it triumphed over the secular Enlightenment 
principles for a time.
Section “A” begins with a review of Protestantism as it became involved in 
social fixity during this period. Its actual political and judicial expressions are briefly 
summarized in a conclusion to this section. Of more interest are the attitudes, 
visionary outlook and thinking which characterized evangelical Protestantism at this 
time concerning Christianity's social and national place and function in America. A 
review of the positions on this subject held by four preeminent evangelical figures is 
undertaken, each realizing their prominence at slightly different times during this 
period and each speaking from a different tradition within Protestantism.
The first of these is a late eighteenth century evangelical figure, Isaac Backus, 
a formidable opponent of the existing Church-State establishments and advocate of 
the new way of separation. The second figure, Jasper Adams, an Episcopal divine, 
unlike Backus, comes from inside the "mainstream" at the twilight of the 
Jefferson-Madison period. He represents ways in which the old mainstream religious 
bodies were integrating with the new republican system with its change in the 
relationship of religion to society. The third figure is noted Presbyterian historian, 
Robert Baird, whose work fills the middle of the century. Baird's work interpreted 
and represented the new role of evangelical Protestantism vrithin the new 
'republican'-national terms of society. The fourth is Congregationalist Horace 
Bushnell, likely the most prominent American theologian of the antebellum period. 
Bushnell's interpretative statements regarding the civil war, reflecting something of 
his social theory, disclose a serious tension between Protestantism and the emerging 
terms of republican liberty.
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Section B focuses on analyzing Protestantism's involvement in the new project 
and premises which were bom out of the Revolution of 1776, regarding the 
socio-national idealism of its new freedom. This analysis is approached from two 
perspectives. First, viewed in light of the secular sources of the Founding Fathers, 
nineteenth century Protestantism is seen to have been subtly permeated by the 
presuppositions of the Enlightenment. Second, viewed against the Puritan religious 
sourcing of America, Protestantism is seen to have in part shifted the basic axis of its 
religious principles from Calvinism to Arminianism, rendering it more permeable and 
compatible with the new republicanism. After discussing these two perspectives, 
section B summarizes Protestantism's problem of insufficient differentiation from the 
new America and its ethos reflected in three areas: ethics, anthropology and 
eschatology.
This chapter ends by reviewing an incident that occurred in 1848 which 
depicts the conflict situation in which Protestantism had found itself, one which 
foreshadows the Protestantism problem in the modem period.
“Fixity” j
Section A I
Isaac Backus
Isaac Backus, who lived from 1724 toi 806, a period more or less 
corresponding to the period under discussion, is a telling figure. Backus, the most 
articulate and reasoned Baptist exponent of disestablishment (i.e. against the formal 
establishment of church over society) in the Revolutionary period, simultaneously 
argued that society must be based on minimalistic Christian beliefs and its values. 
Experiencing a conversion under the influence of the Great Awakening, he became 
part of the new lights Congregationalism, where he eventually preached, even though 
he lacked formal training. Like many others affected by the Awakening, he moved 
from Congregationalism to become a Baptist, where he espoused believer’s baptism 
and its concomitant believer/converted church and the complete separation of church 
and State.
Backus not only built his view of the independence of church and State out of
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traditional Baptist logic, but drew from the new Edwardian logic on the necessity of 
religion possessing empirical integrity. Considering the social consequences, this 
empiricism led to the same conclusions as Enlightenment premises, concerning the 
sanctity of the human conscience and religious liberty. Over against the standing 
order which existed in several of the New England states, including his own 
Connecticut, he sharpened his polemic calling for complete Church-State separation."
Backus reminds us that even among Baptists, especially Baptists transformed 
by the Great Awakening, religion continued to be viewed for its social importance.
Religion was necessary for the maintenance of order, morality and civility in society.
Certain elements within Backus' position, while peripheral to his much larger
1contribution, disclose a subtext in the nineteenth century development of evangelical j
Protestantism. In calling for a formal role for the Christian religion over society.
Backus' works disclose the existence of a definite cleavage between Protestants and 
the Enlightenment at the very inception of the nation. That cleavage existed even in 
the ranks of those ostensibly sharing the greatest harmony and support with the 
Jefferson-Madison guild.
First, Backus regarded education as one public arena in which the state was to 
ensure both teachers and curriculum to be Christian, i.e. Protestant." Second, he was 
in favor of empowering magistrates to enforce religio-moral sensibilities, such as 
Sabbath observance and proscription of blasphemy." Third, he believed only 
Christians who made a declaration of their faith were to be eligible for public office."
Fourth, while in favor of disestablishment of church/sect over society, he did not 
envision the secularization of the state. Rather, he viewed America as an explicitly 
Christian nation." There is evidence that Backus even regarded prayer as a common i|
duty and responsibility of all citizens." He favored national days of fasting and |
prayer, national support of Bible publication and missionary foundations, in part to I
prepare individuals for "American" citizenship.^® iThe logic undergirding these positions stems from Backus' commitment to ;
fundamental Calvinistic beliefs. As William G. McLoughlin has shown, the 
coherence of Backus' thought is that of Edwardian Calvinism.^  ^ But in Backus' 
thought, contrary to Edwards, the pietistic reinterpretation of religion of the Great I
Awakening laid the groundwork for the separation of church and State. This I
separation did not mean Backus had relinquished Calvin's basic presuppositions about j
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the nature of society. Backus shared the convictions reviewed in Chapter One 
regarding the organization of all human reality under the one God; the Bible as an 
authoritative source of the truth of the will of this one God; and the depravity of 
human nature with its corollary of the elect and damned. His new involvement in the 
pietistic shift of religion, led to his sympathy with the Enlightenment position that 
church and State should be separate. Religious experience was ultimately a matter 
between the soul and God. Religion could not be coerced by political power without 
humans being corrupted.
His early involvement with Calvinism guaranteed that Backus would 
ultimately continue to view all human reality, including society and the church, as a 
unit. No human or sociopolitical entity was conceived as having autonomy and 
independence. And, most important for Backus, human beings were by nature in 
tension with that divine center of reality, the sovereign God who had made his will 
known. It was this that made the political organization of society necessary. This is 
the basis of Backus' view that religion has an explicit although minimalistic role in the 
civil - political realm (not church per se, although religion involves the church, as 
New England Puritanism was forced to make explicit).
Theologically, Backus' Calvinistic premises guaranteed that society must not 
be conceived independently of the sovereignty of God. Anthropologically, his views 
meant that society of necessity depended on the restraint and order provided by 
religious belief and religious morals backed by political coercion. Human nature 
could not simply be righted and optimistically empowered with Enlightenment liberty.
While Backus showed appreciation for Locke and the importance of reason, he 
was first an Edwardian Calvinist. His vision was not for the secularization of the state 
with its risk of a socio-cultural secularism, but of a minimalistic Christian state giving 
unencumbered freedom to religion. Thus he endorsed religious qualifications biased 
against Deists, infidels and papists and for the Christian "orthodox" religion in the 
public schools, national days of prayer and fasting. And he saw no problem with 
enforcing Sabbath observance.
Jasper Adams
The second figure is that of Jasper Adams, 1793-1841. Adams, an Anglican 
minister, college president, and by lineage, a descendant of the prominent John and
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Samuel Adams family of the Founding Fathers, was influential, articulate and well 
educated.
In 1833, Adams delivered a sermon before his professional colleagues on the 
relation of the Christian religion to society. Sometime after the presentation of his 
arguments, he published and distributed them to top political and judicial minds in the 
country, inviting responses. Adams’ mailing list included James Madison, who was 
eighty-three at the time.^  ^ As Daniel L. Dreisbach has pointed out, the position taken 
in this sermon was a subject of lively debate in the early republic.^  ^ Adams merely 
articulated what he and other evangelicals considered to be the new relation of 
religion to society following disestablishment. But he did so with exceptional 
intellectual and polemical rigor.His enemy was Jefferson. Furthermore, Adams 
urged the importance of his position, in contradiction to the alarming direction the 
nation was moving in under President Jackson's leadership.^  ^ His position was clearly 
one which represented that of a significant segment of Protestantism, namely, the 
old-line Protestantism of the eastern seaboard. Unitarians and latitudinarians on the 
one side, and the Baptists, Methodist and new sects on the other, can be less 
consistently included in Adams' position.^^
As Dreisbach suggests, it was the old-line establishment churches that were 
less in step with the democratic impulses of the republic, while new sects exploited 
the personal and individual character of religion. Moreover, the old-line churches had 
always explicitly contended that there was a formal relationship between Christianity 
and society. The Revolution had for them, as well as all others, changed the terms of 
that relationship.
In tension vrith the Jefferson and Madison school, Adams and the Protestants 
interpreted disestablishment as a policy leveled against ecclesiastical establishment 
but in favour of the national recognition of the Christian religion. Adams agreed that 
the policy of the co-extension of church and society was past, since it created strife, 
division, wars, and tyranny. He argued that the new American way, reflected both in 
the Bill of Rights and state constitution, was directed at this problem. No particular 
sect or church could receive government favor and privilege. Disestablishment was 
meant to end the basis upon which structural inequality thrived, which naturally bred 
sectarian strife.
But what was not affected, Adams insisted, was the preeminence of the
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Christian religion in America.^^ He appealed to a chorus of colonial testimony that 
America commenced as a Christian social endeavor. American Protestantism and 
America as a New World development, had grown up together, and Protestantism was 
always to remain in a preferential maternal relation to the New World. To dissolve 
this special place, Adams argued, was never the nation’s intent in the first 
Amendment. Only ecclesiastical establishment was addressed by the first clause.
Here Jefferson and now Jackson did not speak for the nation.^*
It was the second clause of the first amendment of the Bill of Rights that 
Adams contended not only guaranteed, but suggested the new terms of Christianity's 
social role. On the grounds of this clause, which forbids congress "prohibiting the 
free exercise" of religion, Adams argued that the general normative principles, values 
and beliefs of Christianity were to be given unobstructed preeminence in America, a 
preeminence that would ensure Christianity's ongoing influence over society and its 
public institutions.^^ Not all religions qualified for this privilege. "Infidels," 
latitudinarians. Deists, and Unitarians, while not illegal, did. Why? Beyond historic 
precedent, Adams argued for the republic to maintain social integrity and stability.
The ongoing influence of the Christian religion over it must be guaranteed. There 
existed an inextricable, absolute relation between social health and the Christian 
religion's dominance over the people. To fail to ensure this was to commence on a 
course of sheer folly and national ruin. The Christian religion was indispensable to 
social order and harmony.^® Without its power to form piety in individuals, to restrain 
evil and place passions under reason and conscience, to stimulate social concern and 
benevolence, to give to civil law transcendent authority, Adams reasoned that respect 
and obedience would fail. The Christian religion was indispensable to social order 
and harmony. It was this connection between religion and man's sense of duty, his 
moral sensibility, that comprised the heart of his argument. Only Christianity could 
make firm that "conservative element in human character" that was fundamental to 
one's own and others' well-being. If this element weakened or failed, a train of 
disorder was released into society. From the uncontrolled self, havoc and disorder 
spread to others, eventually to society at large and the nation.
Adams therefore argued for the correlation between a government comprised 
of liberal values and the religiousness of the people. Such a government, so 
constructed, could not survive without such a religion, the Christian religion. "We
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must be a Christian nation if we wish to continue a free nation," Adams insisted/^ 
Liberty and religion were to be axiomatic if the former was to prevail. The Christian 
religion had all the right anthropological components. In short, its doctrines, precepts 
and principles alone yielded a socially safe and beneficial citizen.
Adams reasoned that the First Amendment did not guarantee a secularization 
of public life. Rather, it ensured that what already existed in that realm would not be 
trammeled or disturbed by government. Having concluded that America was uniquely 
Christian in its origin, Adams argued that the First Amendment’s intent was 
equivalent to the government taking a vow not to meddle or disturb that historic 
relationship.^^
Specifically, how did Adams conceive Christianity's new role in society? In step 
with the spirit of the times, he played down coercion and emphasized the role of 
persuasion and influence. Only by non-coercive means, that is, by exposing the mind 
to the truth of Christianity, could true religion be effective. The social national 
imperative of achieving the religiousness of the masses necessitated ensuring 
Christianity's place of influence. Public leaders and officials, as representatives of the 
nation, were to espouse the doctrines of Christianity, especially those regarding 
eternal rewards and punishment. Public monies were not to be withheld from 
Christian endeavors. Public laws were to protect and guarantee general Christian 
sensibilities and practices in society.^^
Clearly, Adams was not willing to leave the fortunes of America to a historical 
process of culture. He insisted on creating a political bond between America and 
mainstream Protestant Christianity to guarantee certain social ends. Adams' sanctions 
for his position are drawn from the Calvinistic premise that since God is sovereign 
over all human life, society is to be ordered in such a way to foster the fear of, and 
obedience to, God.
In Adams' view, civil law must be derived from more than a social functional 
necessity. For him, it has an absolute and eternal quality, ultimately disclosing its 
grounding in both creation and God. As such, society is actually built up out of these 
eternal underpinnings, and derives its stability from them. Adams' reasoning reflects 
his Anglican orientation.
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Robert Baird
A third figure who discloses the mind set of antebellum Protestantism 
regarding its understanding of its relationship to the newly-formed American republic 
is that of Robert Baird, who lived from 1798-1863. As a Presbyterian minister, 
graduate of Princeton, and a renowned international speaker, Baird emerged as 
distinguished author and historian of religion in America. In his book. Religion in 
America (or an account o f the origin, relation to the State and present condition o f 
the Evangelical churches in the United States, with notices o f the unevangelical 
denominations), first published in 1842, reprinted and edited numerous times, Baird 
provides a valuable reckoning of the development of America's diverse religious 
beginnings.
Baird's passion, however, was not simply history. He created a historical 
interpretation which defined and defended (from a mainstream Protestant view), the 
new relation of religion to society in the wake of the Revolution. Written first to a 
European audience, it is a historical apologetic for the new American way, which 
argued that disestablishment had vitalized both society and religion. Rather than 
endless splintering and religious factionalism, he argued that disestablishment, under 
the influence of evangelicalism, had brought greater unity. Disestablishment had 
simply been the formal component for a new evangelical ecumenism. Religion, by 
virtue of its Evangelical turn, had discovered its own basis for unity.
In Baird's schematic, Protestantism was organized under the definition 
"Evangelical," which was viewed as the dominant religious force in America, while 
all other sects were "unevangelical" and peripheral. Furthennore, disestablishment 
rather than creating a decline of religion in society, had helped foster a new 
independence. Churches, forced to become volunteer associations, had found within 
themselves new strength and resourcefiilness, he argued. Instead of declining in 
numbers, churches had increased and members multiplied while the parish system had 
bred formalism. Volunteerism had allowed the spontaneity of revivals to emerge, 
breaking geographical limitations and revitalizing religion. In addition, there were 
benefits conferred on society because of the new voluntary associational principle. 
Chief among these was the emergence of para-church groups that had sprung up out 
of the freedom and vitality characteristic of voluntary religion. These groups formed 
themselves as a new force in response to the social ills of the day.
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As for Christian doctrine, he concluded that the new way meant that truth
finally "stands on its own immovable vantage-ground.As for the churches, they are
made to depend as they ought for their support on the vrilling hearts and active hands
of their friends. Quoting with pride the early record of the Hanover Presbyterian
synod in Virginia (whose appeal for religious liberty preceded Jefferson's famous
Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty), Baird pointed to the early evidence that the
Evangelical churches understood, foresaw and embraced the emancipation of religion
from the power of the state so that it could achieve its own strength.
"Neither can it be made to appear that the gospel needs any such civil aid. We 
rather conceive that, when our blessed Saviour declares His kingdom is not of 
this world, He renounces all dependence upon State power, and as His 
weapons are spiritual, and were only designed to have influence on the 
judgment and heart of man, we are persuaded that if mankind were left in the 
quiet possession of their inalienable religious privileges, Christianity, as in the 
days of the Apostles, would continue to prevail and flourish in the greatest 
purity by its own native excellence, and under the all-disposing Providence of 
God.'"^
Equally important, Baird celebrated the fact that the "rights of conscience 
were no more to be interfered with nor the freedom of worship denied to any."^  ^ As 
the Hanover Presbyterians urged, the same premises linked political liberty with 
religious liberty. "In this enlightened age... we hope and expect that our 
representatives will cheerfully concur in removing every species of religious as well 
as civil bondage. Certain it is, that every argument for civil liberty gains additional 
strength when applied to liberty in the concerns of religion.
But Baird's apology did not end with these observations. He was equally 
outspoken about what disestablishment did not mean for America. For instance, it 
does not mean that the government can do nothing to promote religion. The real 
question is "how far any government has a right to interfere in religious matters.
That such a right exists, he does not question. It cannot be otherwise, precisely 
because "religion is necessary for the well-being of society and the stability of 
government itself."^ ®
In short, Baird urges that the government can never be indifferent or neutral to 
Christianity's promotion. "Public and private virtue" is dependent on its "cordial 
reception.
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States have the right to legislate directly in the interest of Christianity; the 
"general government," while forbidden to so legislate, can legislate indirectly to 
promote religion. The general government is only limited when it acts to foster an 
establishment of one group or obstructs/interferes with any.'**
Promoting Christianity in general is not forbidden, but here Baird, as Jasper 
Adams before him reveals his position that the republic was to be a Christian, i.e., 
Protestant republic. The document that defined the polity of the republic, the 
Constitution, presumes that America was Christian. It presupposes, Baird urges, 
America as a Christian entity and the Christian religion as fundamental to its political 
constitution.'*  ^ The First Amendment simply represents a common promise not to 
interfere with that which exists. Similar to Jasper Adams, Baird insisted that the 
Constitution "was not intended for a people that had no religion... it was for a people 
already Christian.'"*  ^The fact that the Constitution does not include acknowledgment 
of either God or Christianity, though an unfortunate omission, need not be taken to 
conclude the Founders' neutrality as to the religious underpinnings of the country.
The authors of the Constitution never dreamed that they were to be regarded as 
treating Christianity with contempt because they did not mention it as the law of the 
land, which it was already, much less that it should be excluded from the 
government.'*'*
From here, Baird proceeded to qualify individual rights. "Rights of conscience 
are religious rights." "Irréligion" knows no such rights. Irréligion does not include 
"opinions contrary to the nature of religion, subversive of the reverence, love and 
service due to God, of virtue, morality and good manners. What rights of conscience 
can atheism, irréligion or licentiousness pretend to? ... They have no right to any law 
in the United States that I am aware of, to come forward and propagate opinions and 
proselytize."'*^
Among several examples of religious-moral laws in the United States, Baird 
lists prohibition of blasphemy, profane swearing, obscenity, and promotion of Sabbath 
observance. He appeals to the validity of religious-civil laws by virtue of their 
proscription in the Protestant source of religious authority, the Bible. Further, these 
are upheld by common law. The existence and precedent of common law proves that 
"Christianity is not merely an inherent, but a constituent part of the United States." 
Disestablishment, he asserts, does not forbid judicial cognizance of such offenses.'*®
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Horace Bushnell
Among the most significant American Protestant thinkers in the pre- and early 
post-antebellum period is Horace Bushnell (1802-1877).'*  ^ Bushnell's stature in this 
period gave his opinions special significance. His antithesis to Jeffersonian premises 
loudly demonstrated the extent of mainstream Protestantism's tension with America 
organized as a secular state and in favour of America constituted as a Christian state. 
In short, Bushnell insisted on an explicit "sacred canopy." His tension with 
Jeffersonian/Enlightenment premises was first brought to light by the Journal o f 
church and State and by Sidney Mead's research in the late 1970's. Equally revealing 
about the nature of Bushnell's thought, is a review of his social theology which 
derived in part from Ritschl. What follows is abroad sketch of Bushnell's thinking 
on these issues.'*®
Bushnell rejected outright both the source of the state's authority and the 
location of rights as conceived in the modem republic. Running roughshod over the 
idea of consent and social contract, Bushnell asserted that it is God, not the people, 
who invests the magistrate with authority.'*® In keeping with the Calvinist and Puritan 
position, he insisted that authority was derived from God, not the people. Bushnell 
frankly dismissed as misguided and fallacious the idea of consent and contractual 
government built out of inalienable rights and state rights. "The Declaration," he says, 
"has always operated destmctively; working as a kind of latent poison against all 
government."®® He implied that Christians surrendered their position and adapted 
without sufficient thought, Jefferson's mere "assertion of in-bom sacred rights and 
liberties."®* For Bushnell, there is a Christian form of govemment and there is the 
Jeffersonian. By foisting the preposterous fiction of individual and states' rights on 
the people, Jefferson set the world in chaos. A social world was brought forth without 
a moral foundation. God in God's moral absoluteness and sovereignty is the ground 
of all govemment.
He reasoned that if rights are conceived of as autonomous, whether they be of 
states or individuals, then conflict and social fragmentation will result, on account of 
unbridled self-interests and contrary autonomous claims. "Every bond of unity and 
dignity shivered by the pretentious usurpations of state rights arguments."®  ^ Rather 
than relativizing hierarchical-institutional power, as did Jefferson, he absolutized it by 
linking it to God, conceived as both sovereign and moral. The result of Jefferson's
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premises was the retribution of civil war (the context of these two sermons) in which 
every ounce of blood spilt witnessed to the truth that all attempts to assert 
non-derivative rights, are anathematized by God. It was not so much the form of 
govemment that was the cmcial factor, whether democracy, monarchy, or aristocracy. 
It was rather that governmental mle be faithful to its foundational purpose as God 
appointed administrator of justice. In the larger picture, the magistrate’s position over 
the people was for the purpose of ensuring the people’s accountability to the sovereign 
will of God.
Morality was central to Bushnell's conception of govemment. Morality, he 
contended, is the chief concem of religion and society.®^  His socio-moral logic 
unfolds in four postulates, inevitably building a society politically structured to 
guarantee moral development. One, the Edwardian Evangelical emphasis on 
experience revealed clearly that human nature must be awakened to moral 
consciousness.®'* Two, this moral element existed in correspondence to God. Human 
moral consciousness and sensibility is a reflection of God. There is a "... grand 
analogy, or almost identity, that subsists between our moral nature and that of God; so 
that our moral nature and that of God's make faithful answer to each other."®® Three, 
morality is interactive. Within society and the web of human relations, humans 
encounter God's moral immanence and achieve a moral self-understanding. It is in 
society that they develop morally. Four, govemment is to be instituted so that it 
structures society around this divine-moral basis.®®
The interesting fact about Bushnell is that he combined central features from, 
three periods of American religious development. His ideas of theocentric 
govemment are clearly Puritan-Calvinist derived. His use of Evangelical personalism 
shows a degree of influence stemming from the shift in understanding begun with 
Jonathan Edwards. However, with Bushnell, it formed the basis for an analysis of 
human nature and the immanence of God, with a corresponding revision of the 
orthodox teaching on the atonement. Morality was to be formed within a social 
matrix rather than merely being the collective expression of an otherwise 
individualistic ethic. In this, Bushnell discloses the beginnings of American 
liberalism.
What is striking about Bushnell's positions (looking back from the late 
twentieth century), is his hostility to the Jeffersonian premises and his insistence that
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society must be formally organized on theocentric premises. He saw himself as 
confronting a misguided attempt to "get up authority from below" (i.e. the sovereignty 
of the people and the assertion of inherent rights) which he believed would end in 
social chaos.®^  Clearly Bushnell reveals the persistence of the cleavage between the 
religious and secular sourcing of America.
“Fixity”
Summary
There were four areas which exhibited the problem of fixity during that early 
antebellum period; religious tests for public office (clearly related to the same logic 
from which Puritans worked in denying non-church members eligibility for election in 
the common court); public monies for the support of religion; the formal identification 
of America as a Christian nation; and public laws that criminalized behaviors that 
trespassed socio-religious sensibilities. These included Sunday laws, blasphemy, 
divorce, and religious [i.e., Protestant] instruction within the public schools.®® 
Obviously, one era was passing and another was being bom. The old lived on while 
the new was gaining predominance.
This explanation appears to be sufficient, especially since many of the above 
manifestations of "fixity" were eventually challenged and displaced, some within 
mere decades.
But there is another reason for this development, having to do with a new 
force that emerged distinct to the nineteenth century. After disestablishment, the 
Christian identity and Christian self-understanding that was germane to particular 
colonies came to be transformed and extended to the entire republic.®® This was 
facilitated both by the pietistic individualistic redefinition of religion and the 
formalization of individual liberty within the American national polity.
One might say that Protestantism's vision for America was sufficiently elastic 
and dynamic to embrace the new era of republican liberty. And here this "embrace," 
as such, was not for what it was in radical Jeffersonian Enlightenment terms, but one 
distinctly religious-Protestant. The consequence was that evangelicals sought to 
ensure that the new America would reflect what they understood it to be. Even though 
Protestantism's own religious hegemony in the new America prevailed, tension still 
existed with the Founding Fathers’ Enlightenment premises. Protestants frankly were
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not ready to read the first amendment of the Constitution in such a Jeffersonian light.
Protestantism's understanding of religious freedom was not about extending religious
privilege to deists or infidels or irréligion.®® It appears that two sets of principles were
at work. On one side. Evangelicals understood "Christian" (a code word for
Protestant) values, morals, and basic beliefs as antecedent to the republic. In this
regard the disestablishment of religion did not mean that the new nation was to be
religiously neutral, but only ecclesially neutral. No sect or church was to dominate by
virtue of political privilege. Disestablishment did not imply the creation of a chaotic
competitive Christian sectarianism, divided and fragmented. Rather, it was conceived
as a new Evangelical ecumenism. Most importantly, this position should be
recognized for its antithesis to the secular sourcing of America that emerged out of the
Founding Fathers’ Enlightenment premises.
Nineteenth century evangelical Protestantism attempted to ensconce the new
liberal republican project in predetermined religious fixtures, and to a significant
degree succeeded.®* As such, the new liberty was politically and culturally in the grip
of Protestant definitions (just as Protestantism was no less in the grip of
republicanism). Sydney Mead captures the tension in this early period of the republic.
"There is no simple way to do justice to the nuances of difference between 
those McLoughlin calls the Evangelical separationists and 
rationalist-humanists. But their significant difference was in their respective 
views of the kind of commonwealth that was being bom. As stated by 
McLoughlin, Jefferson and Madison envisaged the creation of 'a secular state 
with "a high wall of separation" to keep religion at bay.' These men 'explicitly 
denied that America was or should be a Christian nation,' while 'Backus and 
the Baptists wanted to separate church and State in order to create a truly 
Christian state'—assuming, as did 'most nineteenth century Evangelicals' after 
them, 'that America was not only a Christian nation but a Protestant one.' In 
the Courts this difference appeared in the question whether Christianity was, 
following English precedent, part of the common law. Jefferson flatly denied 
this. Evangelicals assumed and affirmed that it was. In my jargon, the 
Jeffersonians were 'outsiders' and the Evangelicals were 'insiders' with a 
typical Thwackum syndrome, and with Parson Thwackum's addendum that 
honor and morals were 'dependent upon this religion; and is consistent with 
and dependent upon no other.'
Mead continues,
"McLoughlin concisely summarizes the results of the dominance of this 
evangelical perspective: Few nineteenth centuiy evangelicals saw any 
inconsistency in supporting laws to enforce the Protestant Sabbath or
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prohibition, laws against blasphemy and profanity, laws against lotteries, 
gambling, theater-going, dancing, and ultimately, against the teaching of 
evolution.
Section B 
“Freedom”
From the colonial period through the national constitutive period, religion's 
relationship to society was formulated in three different ways: New England-Puritan 
model, the Roger Williams-Baptist model and the Enlightenment model. While there 
are other variations, (cf. Isaac Backus which is between the first and second of these), 
it is these three that are the primary contributors, informing mainstream development 
in this area. It is the contrast between the configuration of the Puritan model of the 
society-religion relation and the Founding Fathers' model that discloses why 
“freedom,” i.e., integration and assimilation, occurred. As "society" began to change 
under the influence of new Enlightenment ideas, mainstream Protestant churches’ 
relation to society would subtly change, ultimately leading to a new identification 
between Protestantism and the modem republic - its premises and ethos.
The Founding Fathers conceptually reorganized society using both eighteenth 
century Enlightenment ideas, effecting in principle and polity a religio-social 
inversion. Puritanism had organized society around religion. The Founding Fathers 
emancipated society from the yoke of established religion and called religion into an 
informal subservience to social-republican interests. As already discussed, there 
existed an underlying presuppositional tension between these two.
Calvin's impulse to bring all spheres of fallen human existence under the 
sovereignty of God necessitated a formal religious correlation of society to the 
transcendent biblical God. This required the “co-ordination” of church and state. 
Puritanism revolved on a theocentric axis, one which informed both its social building 
and social ordering. In post-revolutionary America, new Enlightenment ideas were 
drawn upon in the political reorganization of society. In this setting, the basic 
premises were anthropological, not theological. But in America, this did result in the 
exclusion of God and religion; these were not antithetical (as claimed in the French 
Revolution) but they were inverted.
As introduced, the deistic-Enlightenment presuppositions of the Founding
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Fathers necessitated that God and religion were to be correlated to republican society, 
albeit informally. This precedent in part set the stage for Christianity to be aligned in 
support of national liberal democratic ideals and goals.
In order to understand this, it is important to return to the Enlightenment 
premises of America's national beginning. In America, English and French 
Enlightenment ideas were ostensibly distilled for political ends, not to challenge or 
displace ecclesiastical organizations. In Europe, especially France, Enlightenment 
ideas also posed an explicitly religious challenge. The irony is that America's 
involvement was so precise and limited.
However, from one perspective this may not in fact be the case. American 
colonists appropriated Enlightenment ideas with relative unanimity and ease, 
polemicizing the political situation with their mother country. For the most part the 
mainline denominations, with the exception of the Anglican clergy, supported the 
Revolution and were relatively at ease with the political ideas of freedom and 
democracy. Even Puritans, as Andrew C. McLoughlin points out, had within their 
tradition resources that were relatively compatible, if not contributory, to the new 
political concepts.^^
When the revolutionaries radicalized individual right and autonomy, making 
them into critical implements to polemicize political institutions, they simultaneously 
impregnated their republican projects with seeds taken from the Enlightenment’s 
anthropological vision. In principle, these ideas were as much a threat to traditional 
religious conventions and institutions as to traditional political conventions and 
institutions.
As Martin Marty has argued in his book. The Infidels, there was a militant 
effort in America to extend Enlightenment ideas beyond mere political critique to the 
existing Protestant denominations (the Catholic minority not excluded).^ The 
ideological heart of this attack was aimed at these institutions and their conventions in 
general, because they were seen as the organizing catalyst for human beings under 
heteronomous authorities that ultimately derived their power from tradition and the 
ecclesiastical control of the Bible. At bottom, their religious logic was built on the 
premise that human dignity disallowed the pre-eminence of any tradition, truth claim, 
convention or institution, be it political or religious. True humanness necessitated an 
unqualified autonomy. The enlightened use of reason qualified political and religious
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subservience and disallowed participation in systems that required it.
This small militant development achieved notoriety approximately a decade 
after the Revolution, lasting to around the end of the first decade of the nineteenth 
century. The movement was best known for three leaders, Thomas Paine, author of 
The Age o f Reason (1794), and The Rights o f Man, Ethan Allen author of Reason, the 
Only Oracle o f Man (1784), and Elihu Palmer, a blind Baptist preacher turned apostle 
and organizer of deistic societies. These men and those who identified with them and 
their works, represent a radical extreme which never succeeded in its mission.^^
The mainline churches of American Protestantism had enjoyed nearly two- 
hundred years of cultural development. They were part of the "texture of America,"^  ^
If the ideas of the Enlightenment were to gain entrance and affect American religion, 
it would not come as Thomas Paine hoped, through frontal assault. As Benjamin 
Franklin said to a friend, to challenge the churches was to "spit into the wind."^’ But 
while this movement failed, it was important because it put on display in an explicit 
manner the relationship between Enlightenment premises and religion in society. 
Human-social development was preeminent and religion was placed in its service.
The attack that militant deism leveled at existing Christian institutions as priestcraft 
and ecclesiastical tyranny, corresponds to its doctrinal revision. The Enlightenment 
provided a basis to challenge all claims located totally outside the individual. Reason 
and experience gave individuals the justification to repeal claims which established 
themselves on tradition, convention, metaphysics or revelation alone. In harmony 
with this anthropological appraisal, deists revised their inherited Judeo-Christian 
religion.
On the other side of this Enlightenment anthropological and epistemological 
shift, they approached God, Jesus, biblical miracles and morality. The transcendence 
of the sovereign God was abstracted into an absolute designer so that God's personal 
involvement with humans was lost. This made way for the autonomy of reason and a 
design or rationality immanent and accessible within the laws of nature and 
experience. In moderate deism, Jesus remained as the premier teacher of humanity 
providing exceptional insight into universal ethics and moral leadership. Even ideas 
of Jesus' partial uniqueness were plausible. The Bible as revelation was only 
problematic if revelation claimed for itself something ultimately not accessible in 
principle by pure reason. Humanity was not viewed as complete in its native state.
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Through the use of reason and the formation of virtue, the dignity and nobility that 
was humanity's destiny could be realized. This destiny was viewed within both a 
secular and eternal framework, revealing deism’s fusion of the Enlightenment's high 
anthropology with Christian categories of immortality. Religion, science, and 
education, in a climate of liberty, were the sources of good human social 
development. Tyranny of tradition, social aristocracy, political absolutism, priestcraft 
and established religions, held humans back from the development which was their 
God given human birth right. Every doctrinal revision and every reform deism called 
for, could be correlated more or less radically to its new anthropological appraisal. 
This was its standard for revision.
But American religion, in the larger picture, was not directly revolutionized by 
deism as a doctrinal revision and institutional challenge. Neither was Unitarianism to 
carry the Enlightenment premises into the mainstream. Rather, it was the benign 
deism of the Founding Fathers that disclosed how religion subtly assumed a partially 
new role and position regarding the new world.
The primaiy statesmen, the social-political artisans of the new nation, were 
thoroughly steeped in Enlightenment and classical republican thinking. Most of these 
men, including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, Alexander 
Hamilton, and to some degree, John Adams, James Madison and George Madson, 
were deistic in their thinking.^ ® According to Catherine L. Albanese, fifty-two out of 
the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence were members of the Masonic 
temple, an organization that was permeated with "benign" deistic thinking.^^ But 
unlike Paine, Palmer and Allen, these men were not militantly antagonistic to 
organized religion.
Jefferson idealistically thought that in time the primary religion would be 
Unitarian, since it was in his opinion the most rationally true.^ *^  And in an open 
climate truth would triumph. Even so, Jefferson was Episcopalian in background and 
not outwardly antagonistic to the churches.
Benjamin Franklin, thoroughly deistic in his thinking, supported all sects, 
giving them money and courting their approbation with qualified praise for their role 
in fostering virtue and morality, while remaining reverently agnostic toward many 
doctrines. The attitude of all these leading statesmen was to encourage the free 
exercise of religion, not simply out of loyalty to their principles of equality and liberty
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for all individuals and sects, but because they saw religion as axiomatic to morality 
and virtue. Religion served to underwrite the political venture of reorganizing society 
on individual freedom. Their idealistic social and anthropological interests were 
paramount, and religion was correlative to that.
Puritanism had placed society in relation to religion. Deism inverted this 
relation. If the Founding Fathers’ basic deistic orientation is overlooked, this 
inversion is obscured. On the one hand, deism had familiarized them with the validity 
of this inversion, and on the other hand, their political reorganization of society 
around freedom and equality was itself freighted with Enlightenment idealism.
In other words, the eventuality of the modem state possessed an intrinsic 
"religious" element. A humanitarian idealism was informally and imaginatively part 
of its beginnings. As an entity and as an embodiment of ideals, the Founding Fathers’ 
creation of the modem state was elevated to historical humanitarian importance. As 
such, it was in part viewed "religiously".^* The fact that they openly and explicitly 
invited the churches and religions (and God in general) into a supportive relationship 
to their republican project, disclosed their familiarity with deistic Enlightenment 
presuppositions which elevate human and social ends. The early Puritan divines, 
steeped in Calvin’s theocentric world view, would no doubt have sharply 
anathematized this inversion. As it was, many of the Puritan divines of the 
Revolutionary period, while ultimately at variance with the humanistic base of the 
social contract theory, were in serious conversation and sympathy with it.
It was through the Revolutionary victory and subsequent political restmcturing 
of the nation around republican values, that the deistic inversion between religion and 
society infected mainstream Protestantism.^^ While the Founding Statesmen 
consciously clarified their own underlying presuppositions, their role allowed them a 
formative and pervasive influence. As discussed in the introduction of this chapter, 
society moved from the position of being organized around religious interests to one 
in which religious interests became increasingly identified with and subserviant to 
social-“secular” interests.^  ^ On the transition from distinctively Christian goals 
toward social-civilization goals in nineteenth century Protestant America, Robert 
Handy makes the following statement:
"In the earlier period, the priority of the religious vision was strongly 
and widely maintained; it was Christianity and civilization, Christianity as the
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best part of civilization and its hope. In the latter part of the century, however, 
in most cases unconsciously, much of the real focus had shifted to the 
civilization itself, with Christianity and the Churches finding their significance 
in relation to it. Civilization itself was given an increasingly positive 
assessment, chiefly because it was understood to have absorbed much of the 
spirit of Christianity.” '^*
Mainstream Protestantism became susceptible to this deistic inversion by 
being transformed through evangelicalism and disestablishment. The termination of 
the religious hegemony, which disestablishment formalized, simultaneously signaled 
the emancipation and independence of society. Society was viewed as an autonomous 
good, a project with its own legitimate ends and goals. Neither old-line Calvinism 
(by far the strongest religious force in the colonial period), nor the radical and liberal 
stirrings of religion more directly under the revisionary influence of the 
Enlightenment, were to advance to be central in the nineteenth century. Rather it was 
to be a "new" Protestantism that was emerging under the transformative influence of 
the Great Awakenings. These Awakenings ensured that the Protestant character of the 
country would not simply be dissolved by an Enlightenment movement that evolved 
from a political to religious agenda.
But the "evangelicalization" of Protestantism (shifting the religious center 
from doctrine and authority to experience and the individual), while allowing 
Protestantism to survive and prosper in a new era of individualism, liberty and 
pluralism, also rendered it more vulnerable to permeation by the spirit and logic of 
that era. Under the impact of evangelicalism, Protestantism became synthetic, taking 
into itself the republican-liberal vision, a vision which involved the "deistic 
inversion.
In the nineteenth century, America was just beginning to become fully self 
conscious of its identity as a republic. Its ideas of individualism and republican 
liberty took on a formative democratic character due to the struggle for independence 
against the resistance of the frontier and the British. America’s self-understanding 
was in part formed from its myth of resourcefulness. Freedom and the power to 
change destiny were essential to American identity. As Winthrop Hudson and Perry 
Miller, as well as William G. McLoughlin emphasize, the theology of determinism 
and divine sovereignty was on a collision course with the national consciousness.
The new theology of the second Great Awakening, which would dominate
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nineteenth century Protestantism and America, would be more Arminian than 
Calvinistic in essential character/^ It is this theology, mediated through evangelical 
revivalism, that would envelop democracy, not the Jeffersonian humanistic strain. 
Between 1800 and the beginning of the Civil War, Protestantism subdued and 
dominated the new republic, becoming fully identified and ftised with it. It was 
permeated by national ideas of change and progress, while understanding itself as the 
primary ordering principle necessary for republican liberty.
The new evangelical ideas of change. Perry Miller states, were a "complete 
uprooting of the historic conceptions of American Protestantism, so profound a 
reading of new meaning into the age of revival that it is in effect a declaration of 
evangelical independence."^^ Over against the lament of sinners that they are sinners 
and cannot help themselves, Charles Finney crafted a theology "wholly American." 
"Everybody can help it," he argued. "All men may be saved if they will." "Don't wait 
for feeling to do it." At the heart of Firmey's theology, was the "hatred for any form of 
the Protestant notion that Christian obedience is in any way 'imputed' to believers; that 
without it and before it they are enslaved in the toils of inability. Finney and his 
fellow Congregationalist, Methodist, and even Baptist evangelists, literally decided on 
revival and human change. Employing their methods, they created a new arena of 
social agency, derived from the piety which had been called into existence from 
revival conversions.
This concept of change was not merely individual, although individual piety 
sparked by the passion of revival was the source. Revival explicitly defined and 
promoted national ends; even though individual salvation of sinners was ostensibly 
the first goal.^  ^ As Perry Miller's research has shown, revivalism set its sights on 
providing the unitive and transforming basis of the new republic. It became explicitly 
and openly aligned with the fortunes and future of America, taking to itself the charge 
and responsibility of what the republic was and was to become. Revival preaching 
aimed at the community and sought to close the gap of inclusivity. It was not merely 
at the unrepentant elect (who were found among the many here and there) that the 
revival was aimed. The scope of the revival was to save entire communities. The aim 
of the revival was sectional and communal in character, ultimately envisioning 
national and millennial horizons. As Bull and Lockhart point out, "In the second 
Great Awakening, revivalists called for conversion and reformation of Character to
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achieve perfection of society and participate in earthly millennium...
There was a "mainstreaming of "puritan piety" to conquer and change the 
whole, not just the select ecclesial center of society. Revival sought to regenerate, not 
mere individuals, but entire aggregates of people. It focused on the heart. It was a 
new form of evangelical universalism, shaped not out of doctrinal agreement but the 
practical life changing effects that came in the wake of revival. Doctrinal differences 
increasingly became moot.
Most importantly, this unity was interpreted as the true fulfillment of the First 
Amendment's goal. Rather than a strident and divided sectarianism, a new Protestant 
pluralism was heralded, one which united America on the practical and pietistic 
essence of the Christian religion. Religion was creating the unitive cultural fabric of 
the nation. The universal dominance of the church over society, the Protestant goal in 
the colonial period, was replaced by a new goal in the national period, namely, the 
universal cultural presence of the Protestant religion of evangelical piety and morals 
in society at large.
The transformative goals of nineteenth centuiy evangelical revivalism were 
ultimately focused on America. Whereas the church and sects of seventeenth and 
eighteenth century America functioned as the stable religious social center of a given 
geographical area or settlement, evangelical revivalism enlisted the sects in a common 
mission to move the new republic to its proper destiny. The openly-acclaimed goal 
was one in which republican liberty was employed for its possibilities for good, i.e. 
national-social ends.®* Does freedom promote social ill or good? Evangelicalism was 
out to prove the latter. Its goal was to ensure that republican freedom did not simply 
degenerate into a fragmented social morass of self interest. Its antidote was to 
introduce evangelical piety into the equation of republican liberty. This would yield 
remarkable social and national results.
Revival called forth new spiritual impulses. It was a source of individual 
piety. This new piety was then channeled into action via associations, voluntary 
societies and institutions directed toward the transformation of society. This 
transmission of piety resulted in "not only the Sunday school but programs for the 
salvation of seamen, prison reform, relief of the poor, asylums for the insane, the deaf 
and dumb, the blind."®^  This social phenomenon was not merely the result of the 
“James’ Christian imperative” that “faith without work is dead.” It was religion
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channeled directly into the secular sphere with the explicit object of regenerating and 
remaking society. America itself was the goal, the shaping of a model nation or 
"national epistle," America became Protestantism's mission.
The same freedom that made possible the pursuit of self-interest and wealth, 
supported a religious system that returned the revenues of self-interest back to society. 
Revival created piety and piety led to benevolence. Transcending self interest was 
referred to as "benevolent" and came to be synonymous with "Christian." The 
end-product of religion was considered to be a "sublime" elevated harmonious and 
happy society, replete with piety and the resultant good social works that flowed from 
piety. In religious terms, this was the goal referred to in the Bible as that which 
necessarily preceded and brought the millennium. Nineteenth- century Protestantism, 
intoxicated with its power to change, embraced the millennium, not as a somber threat 
of apocalyptic judgment, but as a task achievable as never before under the new 
conditions and premises of republican liberty and Protestants’ new keys to human and 
social change.®^
Americans believed that they had changed and that change was possible.
Republican government which vouchsafed religious and economic liberty was the
necessary context out of which change and advancement occurred. That
evangelicalism's model of change was in part captive to nineteenth century
republicanism is not surprising. Given Arminian premises, Protestantism could only
progress deeper into a fusion with its culture. As Handy writes:
“They [mainstream Protestants] also failed to see how their attachment to an 
idealized America was having a reverse impact upon them. Their religion was 
becoming more and more patterned after culture. In Smylie's words 'instead of 
Christianizing the nation, the churches have been nationalized.’”®^
Pietistic ideas, while possessing an authentic richness, were preoccupied more 
by personal vice and relief of the poor. As Perry Miller states, temperance was the 
paradigmatic reform.®^  It almost perfectly reflected the premises upon which it was 
actuated. By appealing for temperance, the individual was being called to personal 
change, while at the same time the benefits of becoming sober were conferred upon 
society at large.
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“Freedom”
Summary
Protestantism saw itself as integral to America as a socio-political project.
This required Protestantism to be more directly open to the Enlightenment values and 
principles which were employed to underwrite the republic. As a result, evangelical 
Protestantism began to lose a significant degree of its substantive difference. This 
becomes apparent by reviewing the “corollaries of fi*eedom” discussed in the previous 
chapter. In the nineteenth century, these Enlightenment presuppositions penetrated 
deep into the substantive make of evangelical Protestantism. The five “corollaries of 
freedom” may be restated as follows.
(1) Democratic freedom is derived from the absoluteness of individual right 
and liberty which are God given or natural. The basic task of social polity is that of 
protecting this divine endowment of liberty. (2) Humans have the capacity to use 
freedom responsibly because they possess rational and empirical powers. (3) All 
humans can acquire the virtue required to live the kind of upright moral lives which 
are necessary in a liberal society. (4) In a framework of personal liberty and the 
rational empirical sciences, human and social life improve. (5) When a society is 
organized around individual liberty, harmony and fraternity result - all things work 
together for good. The way these five presuppositions of freedom penetrated 
nineteenth centuiy mainstream Protestantism, may be summarized as follows:
1.
The Individual Ethos
(1) As demonstrated in Chapter Two, in America, individual liberty and right 
were conceived as absolute bequests of nature and organized power was constructed 
around that premise. Beginning with the Revolution, this “absolute” individualism 
became a self-conscious component of the American psyche and commenced on a 
historical career. This was by no stretch of the imagination a simple development of 
the Puritan commonwealth social model. As discussed in Chapter One, the “free man” 
in the Puritan setting was in a formal covenant with his fellow citizens in which 
shared moral values, religious beliefs and social goals were explicit. Economic 
changes loosened the social fabric of this model, but in its historical beginning and 
conception, there was no place for the autonomous man or woman. Because
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nineteenth century Protestantism was so deeply identified with the social possibilities 
of the new republic, which was explicitly individualistic in its structural make-up and 
ethos, whatever remaining sensibilities it had about the importance of ecclesial-social 
covenantal fi-amework were greatly weakened. The religious life of mainstream 
Protestants progressively came to reflect and support the individualistic model of 
society.®^
As McLoughlin has shown, nineteenth century evangelicalism often saw
conversion as initiating and empowering just this kind of individualistic man.
"For most of these 'unfortunates,' however, those known as 'the deserving 
poor,' conversion would immediately implant in them the virtues of true 
Protestantism—industry, sobriety, thrift and piety. And having these, they 
could not help but rise in the world. 'It is a wonderful fact,' said Dwight L. 
Moody, the foremost evangelical revivalist of the post-Civil War era, 'that 
men and women saved by the blood of Jesus rarely remain subjects of charity, 
but rise at once to comfort and respectability.' The famous novels of the Rev. 
Horatio Alger, another prominent evangelical spokesman, captured perfectly 
the fundamental social principles of evangelical self-help and made 'the 
success myth' seem a reality within the grasp of all Christian men.
'Christianity is your character and character is your capital,' was the essence of 
this myth and it was believed by everyone from office boys to J.P. Morgan and 
John D. Rockefeller."®^
Kessler, summarizing Tocqueville, writes,
Although the Puritans tolerated material prosperity, their concern for wealth 
did not significantly diminish their piety. Tf any man among us make religion 
as twelve and the world as thirteen,’ warned a Puritan divine cited by 
Tocqueville, ‘such a one hath not the spirit of a true New-Englandman.’ The 
use of wealth or any worldly good for selfish ends was considered a perverse 
form of idolatry, ‘the grand enemy of truth and peace.
He [Tocqueville] shows in fact that a trend toward greater moral autonomy 
accompanied the growth of political freedom and religious individualism as 
American democracy matured. By the 1830's, private interest had become the 
‘chief if not the only driving force behind all behavior,’ making Tocqueville’s 
Americans more acquisitive, more preoccupied with comfort and convenience, 
and more self-reliant than traditional Christians were entitled to be. These 
Americans also came to believe.... that each individual had the right to pursue 
happiness according to his or her own lights.”®®
In another context, Tocqueville observed,
“Not only do Americans follow religion from interest, but they place in this 
world the interest which makes them follow it. In the middle ages, the clergy 
spoke of nothing but the future state. They hardly cared to prove that
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Christians may be happy here below. But American preachers are constantly 
referring to the earth... To touch their congregations they always show them 
how favorable religious opinion is to freedom and public tranquility; and it is 
often difficult to ascertain from their discourses whether the principal object of 
religion is to obtain eternal felicity or prosperity in this world.”
2.
Reason and Experience
The polemic that Revoiutionaiy America directed against arbitrary and 
hierarchical political authority impacted on Protestantism, especially the old line 
churches which were structured on a more clerical dogmatic and hierarchical pattern. 
Republicanism was forcing these older groups to find new means to secure the 
people’s allegiance. These included the apped to reasonableness of the truth; appeal 
to the experiential character of the truth; the use of persuasion and arguing the 
positive practical good that religion could generate. Hatch has shown that the key to 
understanding the diverse antebellum religious ferment is the impact of democratic 
idealism on American Protestantism. The average man and woman were invited to 
have valid unique religious experiences, subject truth to their own judgement, 
interpret the Bible for themselves, choose, join, build and lead their own religious 
communities.®^
A simple accessible truth available to the common person through an "open" 
Bible, placed within one's reach the means to ensure equality and individuality. The 
average person was, on account of this source of truth, given ground to stand on.
From this basis, a person could individuate self and underwrite their own equality, no 
longer seeing self as under and dependent on human authorities and institutions.^®
Nineteenth century frontier revivalism can be said to have offered a version of 
the American-democratic self-understanding. It was a kind of vulgarization and 
"religionization" of the high Enlightenment anthropological idealism, in which one 
dared to use one’s own reason and "read" the book of nature and natural law, thus 
individuating oneself.
As several scholars have shown, the democratization of America went forward 
and westward under the impulse of evangelical revivalism.®* In this phenomenon, 
religion and individualistic democracy were bound together. The revivalistic
'
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experience, shaped and informed as it was, simultaneously communicated a religious 
and an American understanding. The unfolding of Protestantism and the unfolding of 
Americanism occurred together. This unfolding was not the sanitized and orderly 
worship of the old Presbyterianism and Congregationalism. It was often vulgar, 
crude, emotional, experiential, polemical, individualistic and revivalistic, it was a 
people's movement. Through it, individualistic and egalitarian impulses spread.
While mainstream Antebellum Protestantism never dreamed of submitting the 
traditional references of Christian authority to the radical revision that deism did, it 
did shift in that direction. Insofar as Protestantism remained connected to classic 
doctrinal positions, they attempted to access new scientific arguments to prove them. 
They did so, not because they ceased to respect tradition and scripture, but because 
they felt compelled to prove the truthfulness of their faith as a republican obligation. 
They proceeded on the assumption that reason and revelation were ultimately 
harmonious because truth was singular and absolute. The revealed will of the Creator 
and the design of creation were in harmony.®^
Insofar as conversion, piety and change became the chief goal and purpose of 
religion, matters of truth were made more relative. Practical effects and human 
transformation required that truth be measured by an anthropological rule. On every 
account, autonomous and experiential standards of judging Christianity gained 
ascendancy. Even so, in antebellum Protestantism, truth remained connected to 
scripture and the Reformation tradition. Experience was tied to the evangelical 
conceptual language of sin, grace, repentance^ faith and piety. The church remained 
tied to pastoral leadership, but reason, experience and lay autonomy had gained the 
upper hand. Protestantism had not lost its connection to extrinsic authority, but this 
connection was dissolving.
3.
Virtue
Within the Enlightenment paradigm of the Founding Fathers, human beings 
were regarded as possessing the capacity to develop virtue. Virtue was not mysterious. 
It was neither the property of the elite or the possession of those with exceptional 
religious devotion. Rather it was contextual. In a social setting which enfranchised 
citizen rights and encouraged the pursuit of self-interest, the more commendable and
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noble traits of self-discipline, moral restraint, firmness of character would emerge.
Society would indirectly benefit from virtue. In addition, there existed a limited 
conception of a citizen’s duty to transcend his interest and act for the public good.
Human beings possessed the motive and capacity to do this.
Mainstream Protestantism accepted this model of virtue with the exception 
that they argued for the necessity of an evangelical element. In their mind, conversion 
played an important role in achieving this morally lean self-empowered individual.
And this conversion also freed the fundamental selfish individual to benevolent self- 
sacrifice. In this way, the Founders’ model of virtue was not fundamentally altered or 
challenged by mainstream Protestants. It was only connected to differing 
anthropological assumptions. They took the existing republican model of virtue and 
inserted the missing evangelical element.
4.
Change and Progress
It has already been pointed out how Protestantism became immersed in the 
eighteenth century Enlightenment idea of change which the Founding Fathers 
envisioned. Two additional clarifications are discussed in the following which more 
sharply focus the issue. Generally speaking, the Enlightenment model of change 
which gained respect in America believed that human and social betterment resulted 
from organizing society around economic freedom, rational and empirical science and 
republican virtue. Freedom was the formal requirement for humans to realize their 
creative potential. The sciences facilitated the mastery over nature by humans and 
virtue guaranteed that society would leave behind the degradation and corruption that 
seemed to be such an intransigent characteristic of human history.
Two revisions in Protestant thought removed the barriers that prevented it 
fiom becoming assimilated with this Enlightenment view of history. The first of these iIwas the historization of the millennium. This occurred in the seventeenth centuiy I
when the millennium came to be viewed as a period which preceded the Parousia. i
Before Christ’s second coming, a time of peace and righteousness would fill the earth. i
This of course allowed Christian ideas and secular ideas to be viewed within a j
common historical framework and this is what occurred in the nineteenth century for |
reasons discussed in the introduction of this chapter. The second revision that opened j
109
the way for this secular-religious merger was the weakening of Calvinistic theology. 
William McLoughlin charges American nineteenth century theology as shifting so far 
from its Calvinistic roots, that it bordered on Pelagianism.®  ^As discussed in Chapter 
One, a social pessimism was intrinsic to Calvinism’s view of election and total 
depravity. Society en masse could never be transformed, but it could be restrained and 
ordered around the sovereignty of God. And further, through the efforts of the Church, 
every institution in society could be developed to the glory of God. In short, 
substantial change but no ideal change could occur.
Nineteenth century Protestantism was less afraid of the world than 
seventeenth-century Puritanism. It was also more optimistic, and held the implements 
of universal change in its grasp. Puritanism, while optimistic about transforming the 
mundane and secular so as to be ordered to the glory of God, remained pessimistic 
about the world. The wicked world could and must be controlled but could not be 
fundamentally changed. In the nineteenth century, Protestantism truly became 
intoxicated with the idea of universal change. The idea of the church as a discrete 
community of faith in ontological tension with the world, was greatly lessened. In its 
place, Protestant religion was mainstreamed for its capacity to substantially heal the 
world and prepare it for the millennium.
The social significance of Arminianism and the Arminian direction of the 
second Great Awakening is that it theoretically opened the way for the whole of 
society to be transformed. And this is precisely what revivalism attempted to do. The 
result was that attention was directed away from the integrity and importance of the 
church and toward achieving universal social dreams. As emphasized, once the 
universal social realm was embraced, there was the inevitable absorption of existing 
universal secular dreams. Even so, antebellum evangelical Protestantism did not fully 
relinquish the theological basis which guaranteed a difference between a secular and 
Christian view of history.
5.
Fraternity and Inclusivity
There existed within the Enlightenment the postulate of social unity or 
fraternity. Instead of a social equation consisting of competing individuals locked in 
an adversarial connection with each other, not only relative citizen equality was 
envisioned, but a new fraternity. Reinhold Niebuhr and Alan Heimert have
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documented the different versions of this unity.®'* Clearly, unity was practically and 
conceptually a problem endemic to the nation’s commitment to liberty, especially 
religious liberty. Among the several secular, economic and transcendental versions 
which Heimert and Niebuhr review, they list Protestantism’s version.
“In 1798, Baptist Congregationalists, Presbyterians and other brethren of 
different denominations joined in concert of prayer for spiritual refreshes that would 
unite the Christians of the nations in the communion of Christ’s earthly kingdom. Out 
of this ecumenical longing came the great revivals of 1800,1801, and, out of the 
Awakening in the west, the hope that the Church of Christ, in this highly favored 
country, should resume that original unity promised in prophecy. Born o f this impulse 
was the nineteenth century faith that the true American union would come out o f the 
vitalized and harmonized action o f the nations myriad evangelical sects voluntary 
cooperating in revivalism missionary endeavors and a multitude of “benevolent” 
enterprise.”®^
Sidney Mead’s treatment of the problem of achieving unity in the New 
Republic struggles with the question at a more seminal level. He suggests that 
“Protestants (and deists) used the true Catholic answer in defining the nature of man 
and in confronting the problem of pluralism and religious freedom.”®^ Insofar as 
Protestantism sought to validate the universality of its basic religio-moral beliefs by 
appealing to rationality and natural law. Mead is correct. Furthermore, Protestantism 
minimized the importance of doctrine and emphasized the importance of piety, 
conversion and the practical firuits of Christianity. This turn to the subjective supplied 
the plasticity that their religion needed in the pluralistic social setting in which it 
found itself after the Revolution.
While sectarian tensions existed within Protestantism, especially the first half 
of the nineteenth century, an evangelical ecumenism began to take shape. Rather than 
challenge the democratic spirit of fraternity, they sought only to introduce the 
evangelical-protestant element into it. Full membership in the democratic fraternity 
was limited to those who shared the evangelical experience. In other words, the 
problem of inclusivity or pluralism in society could not be fully resolved by “secular 
republicanism.” Rather, “evangelical republicanism” was required.
As argued in the introduction of this study, “integration” best describes one 
side of the character of Protestantism’s relation to the fledgling liberal world that was 
emerging from the Revolution. Integrating its religious properties into the new order 
for the good of the new order, essentially defines the social logic of post-
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establishment Protestantism. This claim is made concrete by reflecting back on the 
complement Protestantism provided in each of the preceding “corollaries.” (1) As 
shown, Protestantism not only absorbed the Enlightenment value of an 
anthropocentric individualism, but it sought to complement the individual principle of 
“self-interest” with a social return “disinterested benevolence.” (2) It not only 
absorbed the empirical and rational shift, but it sought to ensure that scripture and 
scriptural truth remained valid in this new rational world. (3) It embraced virtue as 
necessary to a free society, but insisted that piety was the only safe foundation for 
virtue. As such, piety was given explicit social significance. (4) Rather than dismiss 
the idea of progress which was thought to accompany a society built on liberal values 
and rational science, they embraced it and brought to this vision their own millennial 
ideas. (5) Evangelicals did not discount the ideal of national unity. They merely joined 
their distinctive contribution to that goal. As Niebuhr and Heimert point out, 
evangelicals believed “... true American union would come out of the vitalized and 
harmonized action of the nation’s myriad evangelical sects.”®’
Conclusion
While evangelical Protestantism was busy making the republic Christian i.e. 
its cultural integrative activity ("the free exercise of religion"), it was nonetheless 
determined to keep America Christian. Fully able to celebrate and interpret 
democratic liberty, it was at the same time in tension with this liberty. Perry Miller 
states, "the student of the period is bound to stand amazed at how far, despite the 
fervent professions of devotion to the principles of separation, the mind of the country 
was from accepting the idea of purely secular government, national or state."®®
For instanqe, Supreme Court Justice William Story (a supporter of Jasper 
Adams' sermon) explained in 1833 that the object of the first Amendment is not to 
countenance infidelity but simply to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects.®® At 
the same time, Story could affirm that "the rights of conscience are beyond the reach 
of any human power and cannot be encroached upon by human authority," then 
proceeded to qualify his stance by adding, "without a criminal disobedience of the 
precepts of natural as well as revealed Obviously, Protestantism wanted
to hold America to the standard of "revealed religion" considering it to be as 
universally accessible and authoritative as natural law.
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While nineteenth century Protestantism celebrated freedom, it also was
adamant that the exercise of this freedom must be limited by its moral sensibilities.
When, for instance, Stonewall Jackson proposed mail delivery on Sunday, Protestants
vociferously protested.*®* Likewise, blasphemy was regarded as a breach of common
law. It was during this period that A. Frelinghuysen, a Protestant evangelical and
member of the United States Senate, in his book, An Inquiry into the Moral Character
o f the American Government, argued what evangelicals believed and attempted to
ensure: "without religion, law ceases to be law for it has no bond and cannot hold
society together."*®^  Of course, influence was the chief agency of the Christian
religion. But at bottom, nineteenth century evangelicals did not commit themselves
wholly to the "weakness" of influence. They insisted that the principles, values and
beliefs of Christianity were the common law of the land.*®^  Condemning blasphemy,
promoting Sabbath observance, preventing licentious books, and the eighteenth
amendment, as well as other religio-moral dogmas, all belong to the nineteenth
century mind. Most importantly, they contended that America was a Christian nation.
There may exist no clearer and more dramatic example of the irony and
tensions in the nineteenth century than the famous Girard case which came before the
Supreme Court in February 1844 (Vital et al v. Philadelphia). The trial itself was over
the issue of a large trust which, instead of being willed to the normal heirs, the
surviving kin, was given for the advancement of education, with the stipulation that
such education absent all explicitly religious teachers and teaching of religion. The
only institution that qualified was one which was erected linder the sole auspices of
humanitarian benevolence. The issue that was challenged by these heirs was,
“whether a trust could legally survive in opposition to the Christian religion.
In this case, law and religion came to that parting of ways which both lawyers 
and Evangelists had long feared which they had striven to postpone, and which 
for the next three decades they both pretended had not taken place in February 
of 1844".*®'*
Daniel Webster, the premier lawyer of the day (and presidential hopeful),
argued the case. Perry Miller described the situation as follows, summarizing the
essence of Webster's claim:
"He (Daniel Webster) brushed aside Girard's notions of rational benevolence, 
for three days propounded the thesis that Christianity is basic to common law 
and thus fundamental to the law of Pennsylvania. Since religion is to be
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taught only by the clergy, by excluding them, Girard manifestly intended to 
ridicule them, and so to send his hapless youths into the world with only deism 
or atheism as their guide, ’equally in defiance of Heaven, and in scorn of the 
law.' The Common Law has never sanctioned such a scheme, 'and the law of 
Pennsylvania, of which Christianity is a part, must disown and reject it.' 
Girard's project could not be considered charity, either in a Christian sense or 
in the sense of jurisprudence. As Webster worked up to his ultimate paroxysm 
of eloquence, he wept, the ladies wept, the Judges wept. All the founders of 
America, he intoned, Puritans, Quakers, Presbyterians brought with them the 
principle that Christianity inheres in the law of the land:
'And where there is any religious sentiment amongst men at all, this 
sentiment incorporates itself with the law. Every thing declares it. The 
massive cathedral of the Catholic; the Episcopalian church, with its lojfty 
spire pointing heavenward; the plain temple of the Quaker; the log church of 
the hardy pioneer of the wilderness; the mementos and memorial around and 
about us; the consecrated graveyards, their tombstones and epitaphs, their 
silent vaults, their mouldering contents; all attest it. The dead prove it as 
well as the living. The generations that are gone before speak to it, and 
pronounce it from the tomb. We feel it. All, all proclaime that Christianity, 
general, tolerant Christianity, Christianity independent of sects and parties, 
that Christianity to which the sword and the fagot are unknown, general, 
tolerant Christianity, is the law of the land.'" *“
In the end, Webster and the living kin of Girard lost. Miller points out the 
irony in the ruling that was handed down. The presiding justice William Story, an 
advocate of Christianity as the common law of the land, ruled on the legality of 
Girard's will, claiming that because it was aimed at "benevolence" as the will 
explicitly stated, and that since "benevolence" was essentially Christian, it must stand.
Protestant evangelicalism had elevated benevolence as that which was unitive 
and the substantive essence of true Christianity and the practical expression of it. But 
although Protestants in the antebellum period advocated benevolence, they were not 
ready to fully define Christianity and its relationship to society in that way. Story and 
the Supreme Court's ruling was the prolepsis of an approaching age, a prophetic debut 
of Protestantism's predicament of being too closely identified with the new world that 
was emerging.
The Jeffersonian-Lockean principles of government were only beginning to be 
consistently implemented by politicians and justices toward the end of the antebellum 
period. No clear unambiguous course marks this time. Churchmen, however, were 
less ambiguous. Starting as they did from theological premises, they interpreted the 
new liberty in the context of their bias about the necessity of religion and God to the 
moral and social order and stability of the state. But the Jeffersonian principle had
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inseminated the nation. Jefferson and others had exalted a new principle and given it 
political form at the heart of the new nation. Through the efforts and "conversion" of 
many in time, it would achieve a predominance in the country.
As will be discussed in the following chapter, some have recently argued that 
the country's Founding Fathers and the subsequent national beginning intended that 
Christianity, its beliefs and values, be the determinant moral boundaries of society - a 
position from which they lament America has now fallen. Rather than supporting this 
claim, their amassing of "historical" precedent and evidence (although selective), 
demonstrates that the beginning was not a neat and clean unfolding of the new social 
ordering. In that early period, the old and the new intermingled and compromised 
each other. Gradually, the secular sourcing of America can be seen to progressively 
emerge towards dominance.*®^  Even so, this review testifies to the entrenchment of 
premises that find their origin in the basic presuppositions from which the Puritans so 
eloquently argued. These take on a new militancy in the twentieth century, fueled not 
only by a past inertia but by a present more consistently organized under the 
individual principle, a principle which was disclaimed by Bushnell for the havoc 
which it created to social order and stability.*®’
In the final analysis, antebellum Protestantism’s problem of insufficient 
differentiation from the emerging modem world (manifested in the dynamics of fixity 
and freedom) must be viewed in contrast to the period that had past. Society had 
changed in two ways. First, it was formally, i.e. politically, being emancipated from 
Protestant religion. Second, the reorganization of society that had come with the 
Revolution was infused with meaning. Society itself, conceived as a human contract, 
claimed to embody ideals and a new kind of human future.
It appears that instead of being the death knell of religion in the form of social 
fixity, disestablishment and the formation of a republic served to unite the once 
divided Protestants in an effort to control the religio-moral boundaries of the new 
nation. This was in part motivated from a collective Protestant anxiety about the 
prospect of society's autonomy. Protestantism's "foster child" was officially leaving 
"home." Because of the depth of Calvinistic premises which made it impossible to 
view society autonomously, and because of the historical inertia which propelled the 
idea of Christian colonies forward toward a "Christian republic," only a revision of the 
relation of religion to society occurred in the antebellum period.*®®
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Much of nineteenth century Protestantism was unable to conceive of society as 
an independent entity. To view the new socio-national creation as a human invention 
abstracted from an explicit connection to the one sovereign God and his revealed will 
was to invite disorder and chaos. The result, was that Protestantism revised its script 
of how and why its religion should have ongoing authority in the public square. 
Protestantism abstracted and universalized a bottom line quotient of the Christian 
religion. Only that which was essential to maintain society's Christian identity in a 
broad sense would remain in force socially. Influence was the only proper means 
whereby Christianity was to enjoy its predominance over society. Protestants wanted 
to be part of the new age and place the Christian religion on the high ground of 
influence alone. At the same time, they wanted to ensure, even bias, the situation so 
that society would be under that influence. They wanted to "Christianize " America, 
that is to say, they identified and qualified the new republic as "Christian." Whereas 
in early times "Christian" had an ecclesiological content, it was now applied to a 
nation.
Finally, it may be said that they moralized Christianity for social ends and 
goals. They argued that the liberal character of their new government predicated the 
Christian religion. Individual liberty and Christian religion were axiomatic. In order 
for society to maintain its moral fabric, it must be correlated to that which provided 
authoritative moral guidance and force, i.e. the Bible as revealed truth and a 
transcendent God of rewards and punishments.
Just as the renewed passion for "fixity" arose out of the tensions and anxieties 
that came in the wake of society's shift toward autonomy, "fireedom" arose out of the 
attraction inherent in that autonomy (i.e. temptations and pressures). At the time that 
society was gaining autonomy, the creative power of religion (i.e. regeneration, "new 
birth" human change) was being, in part, abstracted from the ecclesial setting within 
which it had existed. This was due both to the influence of evangelicalism (elevating 
the importance and imperative of personal experience) and the Enlightenment 
(elevating the sanctity of conscience necessitated by the dogma of individual liberty 
and dignity).*®®
The result of this abstraction or individualization of religion was that it was 
freed to coalesce around the greater new entity of society, an organized and idealized 
modem republic. The "Arminiazation" of much of American Protestantism
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functioned to weaken it, making it more vulnerable to become organized around the 
interests and values of the emerging nation-state. The arguments for a Christian 
i^erica, and the axiomatic relation between liberty and the Christian religion, also 
served to foster this enmeshment in republican idealism. In these two phenomena 
(fixity and freedom), an eventuality occurred in which Protestantism was on the one 
side attempting to limit society's differentiation from itself. On the other side, 
Protestantism was losing its critical differentiation and moving under the attraction 
and powerfiil ethos of this new entity. In both of these, sociological movement and 
theological selection and change were at work.
Endnotes
1. “In Franklin’s words, those notions were ‘the existence of the Deity; that he made the 
world, and govern’d it by his Providence; that the most acceptable service of God was the 
doing of good to men; that our souls are immortal; and that all crime will be punished, and 
virtue rewarded, either here or hereafter.’ A century later, in 1885, these notions were so 
much a part of the American ethos, that Josiah Strong, a Congregational pastor and leader, 
probably thought he was merely repeating a truism when he said that ‘The teaching of the 
three great fundamental doctrines which are common to all monotheistic religions is essential 
to the perpetuity of free institutions, while the inculcation of sectarian dogmas is not. These 
three doctrines are that of the existence o f God, the immortality o f man, and man’s 
accountability. '^"  ^American Civil Religion, ed. Russell E. Richey and Donald G. Jones, “The 
Nation With A Soul of a Church” by Sidney Mead, (New York: Harper & Row, 1974) p. 57.
2. The Religion o f the Republic, ed. Elwyn A. Smith, “The Voluntary Establishment of 
Religion” by E. Smith (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), p. 158.
3. “... there was general agreement that American republicanism enjoyed biblical sanction 
and that, as Theodore Freilinghuysen argued, ‘Republic is a word of Christian meaning.’ 
Benjamin F. Tefft discerned the ‘republican tendency in Christianity’ in the ‘absolute justice 
and the most consummate equality of [God’s] moral government’ and in ‘the main principle 
of practical Christianity,’ the instruction ‘to love our neighbours as ourselves[,]... the first 
maxim of all free institutions.’ Then, too, there was the emphasis on individual judgement 
and personal responsibility in both Protestant faith and republican practice. A French 
commentator, Michel Chevalier, saw clearly this evangelical sense of ‘harmony between... 
political and religious schemes’ in America: ‘Protestantism is republican; puritanism is 
absolute self-government in religion and begets it in politics.’
“American republicanism appeared not just scriptural but God-given. It was part of 
the Lord’s ‘grand and glorious destiny’ for the country, a step towards ‘the introduction of 
[the] Political and Civil Millennium,’ evidence that Americans were ‘repositories of an 
important trust.’” Richard J. Carwardine, Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America, 
(Yale University Press, 1993) p. 19.
4. “Evangelical Protestant churches on the defensive against deism and natural religion 
through the Revolutionary Era, recovered their confidence during what is known as the 
Second Great Awakening, and established themselves as the primary religious force in the
117
country.,.
“During the urgent later stages of the Second Great Awakening in the 1830's and 
1840% hundreds of thousands of new converts became full members of the Protestant 
Churches. By mid-century, evangelical Protestantism was the principle subculture in 
American society.” Ibid., p. 1.
“By the mid-nineteenth century American religious life was dominated by an 
expansive, revival focused evangelicalism which enjoyed considerable congruence of 
belief...” Ibid., p. 2.
“American evangelical Protestantism was certainly more homogenous than the 
multiplicity of denominations suggested but for many church members their attachment to 
denomination meant more to them than being part of a wider evangelical community.” Ibid., 
p. 4.
5. Reinhold Niebuhr and Alan Heimert, A Nation So Conceived, (New York: Scribners, 
1963), p. 20.
6. “Republicanism was a beautiful but tender plant, a form of government ‘which has 
never yet succeeded since the world stood’ and which would perish without the protection of 
public virtue and religion. As Banjamin Tefft put it, “A republic is the body, Christianity is 
the soul.” Richard J. Carwardine, Evangelicals and Politics, p. 20.
7. See Simon Schama, The Embarrassment o f Riches quoted in Chapter One.
8. Compare J.F. Maclear’s “The Republic and the Millenium” in The Religion o f the 
Republic, ed. Elwyn Smith (PhiladelpMa: Fortress, 1991) p. 188, with Reinhold Niebuhr’s 
The Irony o f American History, where he discusses the puritan view that providence and piety 
are connected, pp. 51-54 and pp. 70-71.
9. See J.F. Maclear’s “The Republic and the Millenium,” p. 183 ff.
10.1 am referring here to the millerite movement which predicted the sudden end of the 
world on October 22,1844.
11 ."Society is a dialectic phenomenon in that it is a human product... that yet continuously 
acts back upon its producer... The statement, that society is the product of man and that man 
is the product of society, are not contradictory. They rather reflect the inherently dialectic 
character of the societal phenomenon." Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy (Garden City, NY : 
Doubleday, 1967) 3-4.
12. This point was in part recognized by Reinhold Niebuhr and Alan Heimert in their 
book, A Nation So Conceived. "Protestantism on the frontier not only increased the religious 
diversity of the growing nation, it also transmuted the pietistic sect into a socially radical faith 
which espoused the political cause, first of Jefferson, and then of Jackson. In the process the 
original perfectionism and rigorism of sectarian Protestantism became a rather complacent 
equalitarianism and libertarianism which solemnly affirmed the new world would create or 
had already created the perfect equality and liberty which the effete and moribund nations of 
Europe sought in vain. Thus there grew on American soil a religious and evangelical version 
of the spirit of the secular Enlightenment in France—a form of utopianism which regarded 
'liberty, equality, fraternity' as simple historical possibilities." A Nation So Conceived, p. 49.
13. The "standing order" spoken of here is the persistence of the New England Puritan 
policy which required every household in a given town to financially support the official 
house of worship or houses of worship.
118
14. As is well known among students of the Revolutionary period, Baptists, i.e. pietists 
and Enlightenment rationalists came to common ends from different starting points in their 
thinking. The Rationalists and the Pietists joined hands and called for separation of Church 
and State, but within the Baptist pietists, that is to say even within the so-called emerging 
"left-wing Evangelicals," there was the faint line of an eventual cleavage for and against the 
ongoing official role of religion in the public sphere. See William G. McLoughlin, "The Role 
of Religion in the Revolution," in Essays on the American Revolution, ed. Stephen G. Kurtz 
and James H. Hutson, (University of North Carolina Press; W.W. Norton, 1973) 207 ff. Isaac 
Backus worked out his position on church-state relations from New Light Edwardian 
Calvinistic premises while the other preeminent out-spoken Baptist of the period, John 
Leland, took up his position on Church-State separation on historic Baptist premises, in a 
more synthetic, less critical relation to popular rationalism. See Stanley Grenz, "Sweet 
Harmony: Isaac Backus and His Vision of Church-State Relationships," Report from the 
Capital (Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, March, 1985). "The Writings o f Elder 
John Leland, ed. L.F. Greene (New York, 1845) 561-570. Though Backus' views on Church 
and State are often equated with those of Leland, it is clear that the two had distinctly 
different positions on many aspects of this question. Leland, perhaps by virtue of his long 
residence in Virginia, held views much closer to those of Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison than to the pietists of New England. While he lived in Massachusetts during the 
latter part of his life and continued the fight for disestablishment after Backus' death, he was 
always viewed as extremely eccentric by the Baptist leaders both in his theological and social 
attitudes. The key to their difference can be seen in the fact that while most of Backus' 
friends who lived into the age of Jackson became theocratic Whigs, Leland was an ardent 
anticlerical Jacksonian democrat." William G. McLoughlin, Intro, to Isaac Backus on 
Church, State, and Calvinism: Pamphlets 1754-1789, ed. William G. McLoughlin, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Belknap, 1968), 51.
15. Ibid., 49-52.
16. "Backus expressed no opposition to Sabbath laws, teaching Calvinistic doctrine in the 
public schools, proscribing blasphemy and conducting official days of fasting and prayer." 
Arlin M. Adams and Charles J. Emmerich, A Nation Dedicated to Religious Liberty: The 
Constitutional Heritage o f the Religion Clauses, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 1990) 15. McLoughlin's research suggests similar conclusions. See McLoughlin,
Intro, to Isaac Backus on Church, State, and Calvinism, 50-52.
17. See Sidney Mead, The Old Religion in the Brave New World, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1977), 93.
18. A, Premier scholar on Isaac Backus, William G. McLoughlin, summarizes Backus' 
Church-State position as follows, "He wrote and worked to exalt the religious liberty of the 
individual above the Church and the State, yet he always asserted the necessity for a Christian 
state subservient to the ultimate moral authority of God's law... The instability of his polarity 
between the desire for a corporate Christian state and the insistence upon an individualistic, 
voluntaristic polity in Church and State remains the basic problem of the American pietistic 
experiment in freedom. McLoughlin, Intro, to Isaac Backus on Church, State, and 
Calvinism, 61.
19. Stanley Grenz, "Sweet Harmony," 5.
20. McLoughlin, Intro, to Isaac Backus on Church, State, and Calvinism, 51.
119
21. Ibid., 54 ff.
22. Daniel L. Dreisbach recently resurrected this sermon and published it complete with 
the letters of response which Adams received, along with a review of it. In addition, 
Dreisbach included with the sermon a valuable introduction and historical commentary. 
Daniel L. Dreisbach, ed.. Religion and Politics in the Early Republic: Jasper Adams and the 
Church-State Debate, (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1996).
23. Dreisbach, preface to Religion and Politics in the Early Republic, xii, xiii.
24. "Adam's sermon and the review essay illustrate two sharply contrasting interpretations 
of the constitutional role of religion in American public life." Dreisbach, preface to Religion 
and Politics in the Early Republic, xiii.
25. President Andrew Jackson was viewed by many Protestants as moving the nation 
toward a secularist culture. Chief among Protestants' complaints was Jackson's insistence 
that the U.S. Mail be delivered on Sunday.
26. As already pointed out in the preceding footnotes in this chapter. Baptists, while 
markedly more Jeffersonian in their bias, were not uniformly behind the full implications of 
the Jefferson/Madison position.
27. Dreisbach, Intro, to Religion and Politics in the Early Republic, 15.
28. Ibid., 17,18
29.1bid., 14-18.
30. Ibid., 17,20.
31. Ibid., 17.
32. Ibid., 18.
33. Ibid., 7, 12,14-17
34. Robert Baird, Religion in American, critical abridgment by Henry Warner Bowden 
(New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1970) 110.
35. Ibid., 100.
36. Ibid., 110.
37. Ibid., 100.
38.Ibid., 111.
39. Ibid., 111.
40.Ibid., I l l
41. Ibid., 111,112.
42. Ibid., 112-114
43. Ibid., 113.
44. Ibid., 113.
45. Ibid., 115.
1 2 0
46. Ibid., 116
47. It was in the Baptist Joint Committee's Archives that I first became aware of Backus' 
position as cited here. Baird's work was already in my possession. It was Sidney Mead's 
chapter, "Christian Orthodoxies Versus the Premises of Republic" in The Old Religion in a 
Brave New World that brought to my cognizance Bushnell's thinking on the subject under 
discussion. Adams' work was introduced to me through the Library of Congress.
48. "Reverses Needed," July 1861. In The Spirit in Man: Sermons and Selections (New 
York: Scribner's, 1910), 159-84. "Popular Government by Divine Right," November, 1864, 
in Building Eras in Religion, (New York: Scribner's, 1910), 186-318. "The Idea That Caused 
a War: Horace Bushnell Versus Thomas Jefferson," The Journal o f Church and State, XVI, 1 
(1974), 73-83.
49. Mead, Old Religion, 102,103.
50. Ibid., 101
51. Ibid., 102.
52. Ibid., 103.
53. Claude Welch, Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Volume I, 1799-1870, 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), 263.
54. See Ibid., 262; and H. Shelton Smith, Robert T. Handy, and Lefferts A. Loetscher, 
American Christianity: An Historical Interpretation with Representative Documents, (New 
York: Scribners, 1963), 270-275.
55. Protestant Thought, 267>,
56. This conclusion is drawn from a number of strands of Bushnell's thought. The "new" 
emphasis on sin being transmitted through social structures in time gave birth to the logical 
emphasis on the transformation of those environs which accounted for humans' social 
formation. Walter Raushenbusch's A Theology o f the Social Gospel represents the end 
product in the second and third decades of the twentieth century of the precise logic Bushnell 
spearheaded in America in 1850. As shall be discussed later, this entire movement suffered 
from a logical silence on the doctrine of the church, immersed as they were in a doctrine of 
immanence and the social origins and resolution of the human plight.
57. Mead, Old Religion, 102.
58. Morton Borden, "Christ and the Constitution," church and State, (September, 1987): 
10-13. Edwin S. Gaustad, "Religious Tests, Constitutions, and 'Christian Nation'," in 
Religion in a Revolutionary Age, ed. Ronald Hoffman and Peter J. Albert, (Charlottesville:
US Capitol Historical Society-University Press of Virginia, 1994). Edwin S. Gaustad, "From 
Notary Public to President," unpublished manuscript, (Washington DC: Baptist Joint 
Committee). Walter Bems, "The Writing of the Constitution of the United States," reprint 
from The Making o f Constitutions (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute). Isaac 
Kramnick and R. Laurence Moore, The Godless Constitution, (New York & London:
Norton, 1996). Robert Boston, Why the Religious Right Is Wrong, (Buffalo: Prometheus 
Books, 1993).
59. The Protestant attempt to establish religion in America in the nineteenth century is 
most fully evidenced by the National Reform Association, "a coalition formed in 1863 by
1 2 1
representatives from eleven Protestant denominations. One of the group's stated goals was 
"to secure such an amendment to the Constitution of the United States as will declare the 
nation's allegiance to Jesus Christ and its acceptance of the moral laws of the Christian 
religion, and so indicate that this is a Christian nation." Boston, Why the Religious Right Is 
Wrong, 86.
60. Cf. Baird, Religion in America, xxxiii, 113.
61. "The de facto Protestant establishment was made possible because most Americans 
were Protestant and because the federal courts rarely involved themselves in Church-State 
matters. Therefore, there was little to stop lawmakers from passing and enforcing laws that 
had religious veneers. At this time, the First Amendment and the Bill of Rights was not seen 
as binding on the states. Although the Fourteenth Amendment was passed following the 
Civil War, it was not interpreted as applying the Bill of Rights to the states until 1940.
Boston, Why the Religious Right Is Wrong, 82.
62. M.Q2ià, Old Religion, 92-93t.
63. See Andrew C. McLoughlin, Foundations o f American Constitutionalism 
(Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1961), 18-37.
64. Martin E. Marty, The Infidel: Freethought and American Religion (Cleveland: 
Meridian-World Publishing, 1969). See chapter entitled "The Intrusion of'Infidelity of the 
Tom Paine School' (1784-1809)", 19-32. Mays' Book and its premise see Marsden'.
65. William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus, 52, 53.
66. Martin E. Marty, The Infidel: Freethought and American Religion, (Cleveland: 
Meridian-World Publishing, 1969). See chapter entitled "The Intrusion of'Infidelity of the 
Tom Paine School' (1784-1809)", 19
67. Ibid., 27.
68. See Marty, The Infidel, 26-32. Edwin S. Gaustad, "Disciples of Reason," Christian 
History, Issue 50, (XV, no. 2):28-31. Adrienne Koch, Power, Morals, and the Founding 
Fathers: Essays in the Interpretation o f the American Enlightenment (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, Cornell Paperbacks, 1961). Norman Cousins, The Republic o f 
Reason: The Personal Philosophies o f the Founding Fathers (San Francisco: Harper &
Row, Perennial Library, 1988). Edwin S. Gaustad, Faith of Our Fathers: Religion and the 
New Nation, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).
69. "...deists and deism had entered the Protestant churches through the door of natural 
religion. And in its pure form, deism moved past Protestant Christianity to take a non-church 
form... important deists posited belief in an afterlife of future reward or punishment. The 
deists creed emphasized a good and moral life, and it looked to nature and its law as source of 
revelation and guidance. Significantly, deism found organizational expression in the fraternal 
societies of fireemasonry, an institution and system of belief and practice that we will explore 
in more detail... Here the brotherhood supported an ethic of right relationship in one's doings 
and dealings with one's fellows.
"Deism was carried through the colonies within the ffeemasonic lodges. Indeed as 
brother masons deists played a key role in the political process that brought the new nation 
into being. The revolutionaiy organization of the Sons of Liberty and the revolutionary 
committees of correspondence were tied closely to freemasonry. Probably fifty-two of the 
fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence were Masons, as were the majority of the
n
1 2 2
members of the Continental Congress. Moreover, nearly every American General in the 
revolutionary war was a mason. Enshrined in the freemasonic lodges, deism existed cordially 
beside Protestant Christianity and by so doing moved Protestant Masonic brothers in a liberal 
direction... Masonic symbols were often biblical, but could also be understood in terms of 
deist natural religion, and deists' rituals could likewise be so understood." Catherine L. 
Albanese, American Religions and Religion, 2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1992).
70. William G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus, 52.
71. William G. McLoughlin, writing about the founding statesmen such as Madison, 
Jefferson and George Mason in contrast to late eighteenth century pietists, discloses the 
"religious" element in their position. "While both viewpoints are individualistic, the pietist 
was concerned with the spiritual welfare of the individual soul in relation to God and eternity 
while the deist (or latitudinarian) was concerned with the social and political welfare of the 
individual personality (defined in terms of "reason and conviction") in relation to his fellow 
men on earth. The pietist wanted religious freedom so that men may follow the Truth of 
Revelation, the deist wanted it so men might seek the Truth wherever reason may lead; the 
pietist was concerned with God, the object of worship; the deist with God the Creator of the 
universe." McLoughlin, Isaac Backus, 47-48.
72. The following statements by two American historians, Catherine Albanese and Martin 
Marty, are characteristic of students analyzing this period. "In sum deism, although in its 
most integral version not Christian at all, managed in the new world to make its way into 
Protestant thought and life... Blending with currents of Arminianism and rationalism, deism 
furthered the spirit of tolerance." Albanese, 122. "The Enlightenment prevailed over the 
form American religion took in its development from Calvinism." Martin E. Marty, The New 
Shape o f American Religion (New York: Harper, 1958-1959), 71-72.
73. See De Touqueville, Democracy in America Vol II, 127, quoted in James Wood, 
"Religion, Fundamentalism and the New Right," Journal o f Church and State 22 (1980) :
410.
74.. Robert T. Handy. A Christian America: Protestant Hopes and Historic Realities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971) 110.
75. "With the birth of the nation, the evangelical and millenarianism merged with the 
Jeffersonian sense of mission. By 1800, our Fathers saw this democratic nation as a bright 
and shining example for the oppressed inhabitants of the world." Niebuhr and Heimert, A 
Nation So Conceived.
76. "Calvinism proved unable to maintain its hold over an America growing rich, strong, 
free, egalitarian, and self-confident. Calvinism required a submissiveness to Providence, 
authority, tradition, and mystery which the rationalism and "common sense" of the 
"enlightened" Americans found unnatural and even unchristian. Thomas Paine, Ethan Allen, 
and Elihu Palmer found it all too easy to prove that Calvin's God was cruel, tyrannical and 
inconsistent—characteristics which seemed unworthy of the God who had blessed America 
with such good fortune. But few Americans were willing to replace Christianity with the 
abstract laws of nature and the religion of reason. Instead they found new light in the Bible 
which did away with Calvin's arbitrary God of wrath. During the Second Great Awakening 
they concluded that God was really a God of love, benevolence, and free grace who was as 
eager to produce revivals and to distribute salvation as men were to receive and rejoice in 
them. God, the arbitrary tyrant, was succeeded on the throne by Jesus, the loving friend.
123
After 1830, man and God worked together as partners to save the world from sin," William 
G. McLoughlin, Isaac Backus, 52-53. Perry Miller, "The Intellect of the Revival," chap. in 
The Life o f the Mind in America: From the Revolution to the Civil War, (San Diego:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, A Harvest/HBJ Book, 1965), 3.
77. Miller, Life o f the Mind, 33.
78. Ibid., 32.
79. See for instance Perry Miller, Life o f the Mind p 78-84.
80. Malcolm Bull and Keith Lockhart, Seeking a Sanctuary: Seventh-day Adventism & the 
American Dream (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), 166.
81. De Tocqueville observed in his trip to America that "religion in .America takes no 
direct part in the government of society, but it must be regarded as the first of their political 
institutions." See Tocqueville. See James Wood, "Religion, Fundamentalism and tiie New 
Right," Journal o f Church and State 22 (1980) : 410.
82. Miller, Life o f the Mind, 79.
83. See comments on the Battle Hymn of the Republic, a testament to Protestantism's 
fusion of religion with national goals in the nineteenth century. William G. McLoughlin, ed.. 
The American Evangelicals, 1800-1900: An Anthology (Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 
1968), 28-29.
84. Robert T. Handy, A Christian America: Protestant Hopes and Christian Realities 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 113.
85. "Because the mass of temperance literature was, of course, devoted to the deleterious 
effects of alcohol upon physiology, we are apt to dismiss it as cranky. We thus lose sight of 
the central motive in the movement, which was, as Grimke explicitly declared, to discover a 
cause that was simultaneously Christian and American. In it 'ftie principle of individual 
responsibility and social influence has ever been manifested.' It makes every allowance for 
American individualism, but also holds persons responsible to the common stock. 'The 
Temperance Reformation is peculiarly Christian, AMERICAN.'" Miller, Life o f the Mind, 86.
86. McLoughlin, The American Evangelicals, p. 102.
87. McLoughlin, The American Evangelicals, 13.
88. Kessler, Tocqueville’s Civil Religion, p. 131.
89. See Nathan O. Hatch, “Introduction,” The Democratization o f American Christianity, 
(Yale University Press, 1989), pp. 3-16.
90. Catherine L. Albanese, American Religions and Religion, 2nd ed. (Belmont, Calif.: 
Wadsworth, 1992).
91. Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization o f American Christianity (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1989). Reinhold Niebuhr and Alan Heimert, A Nation So Conceived, (New 
York: Charles Scribner's Sons,1963), 44ff.
92. Both the deistic moral reference and its evangelical variant were derived from 
universal inexorable laws of creation and/or an absolute infallible Bible, both of which 
practically orientated humanness toward a fixed absolute, source outside of oneself.
First in Europe, later in America, this came to be regarded as one of the
124
Enlightenment's flaws. By linking reason to a fixed design, it compromised its openness to 
particularity and its promise to birth a new humanism. In appropriating the Enlightenment, 
America appropriated and structured this "flaw." Nineteenth century America fostered a view 
of freedom modeled after the eighteenth century Enlightenment republican conception. 
Protestantism's use of the Bible, less theological and exegetical, more proof-text and 
authoritarian, was less able to be a prophetic, critical resource and was more exploitable by a 
static ethos.
93. See McLoughlin, The American Evangelicals, 26.
94. Reinhold Niebuhr and Alan Heimert, A Nation So Conceived (New York: Charles 
Scribner & Sons, 1963), pp. 15-30.
95. Ibid., p. 20.
96. Sidney Mead, The Old Religion In Brave New World (Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 1977), p. 8.
97. A Nation So Conceived, p. 20.
98. Miller, Life o f the Mind, 67.
99. Ibid., 37.
100. Ibid., 37.
101. Dreisbach, Intro., Religion and Politics in the Early Republic, 4-8.
102. Miller, Life o f the Mind, 39.
103. In Chapter 4, "Law and Morality," in The Life o f the Mind in America, Miller 
discloses the extent to which some leading Protestant public figures went to argue 
Christianity was the foundation of civil law. See 186-202.
104. Miller, Life o f the Mind, 198,
105. Ibid., 200.
106. "The de facto Protestant establishment was a throwback but it did not last.
Eventually an attitude reflecting the proper relationship between church and State, which was 
pioneered in the post-Revolutionary War period and lay neglected for nearly one hundred 
years, re-emerged. Following the Civil War, courts became increasingly reluctant to look for 
religious justifications to uphold laws. Steven K. Green, an attorney for Americans United 
for Separation of Church and State who has researched the Christian nation concept 
extensively, reports that after 1860 courts began turning to secular justifications to uphold 
blasphemy statutes or school Bible-reading laws. In other cases, judges rejected the laws 
outright." Boston, 90. "Thus, the limits of religious freedom in the nineteenth century were 
defined not by the national government, but in the states. While the tale is one of increasingly 
liberty, the pace was ragged, with declarations on the subject often contradictory. Nearly 
every state adopted in its constitution some clause proclaiming religious freedom, but upon 
closer examination this liberty was far from absolute." Melvin I. Urofsky and Philip E. 
Urofsky, "Two Hundred Years of Mr. Jefferson's Idea: A'W all'of Separation: The 
Expansion of Religious Freedom in the United States," (Richmond: Virginia Department of 
Education).
125
107. In the nineteenth century society, cultural and religious interests merged. George 
Marsden correctly summarizes that Protestantism consolidated its cultural hegemony in the 
first half of the nineteenth century ( 4). The eventuality that occurred from this was that 
"Protestant church related institutions typically regarded themselves as essentially public 
institutions." "As well...they made almost no distinction between the ideals that should shape 
the whole of American society and the particulars of the Protestant faith"( 6). Foremost 
among these institutions was that of the nation’s educational systems. For all practical 
purposes, the mainstream of the American educational system would become thoroughly 
enmeshed with Protestantism. During the nineteenth century, Protestantism standards and 
beliefs and, in the case of colleges, the actual administration were explicitly evangelical 
Protestant, filling both sectarian and socio-cultural needs. But this was not simply a growing 
pluralistic America under the cultural hegemony of Protestantism.
Protestantism was increasingly permeated with republican values and it mediated these to 
society. Marsden lists four examples of this. First, they accepted and promoted scientific 
standards, a critical standard for modem knowledge. Especially was this true of the post 
Puritan New England Protestants who held the undisputed lead in educational pursuits. 
Second, Protestantism became the grid through which the nation received the republican 
moral ideals that grew out of the Revolution. Third, Protestantism elevated the romantic 
principle of individual development. And fourth, it adopted the German idea of the 
university for America. In time, Protestantism's involvement with its world would lead to a 
"Protestant universalism" in which its "Christian values" came to be increasingly abstracted 
and universalized for pluralistic culture. In this its institutions would become more secular 
and its faith more identified with a social-moral idealism and social transformation. George 
M. Marsden, The Soul o f the American University: From Protestantism to Established 
Nonbelief (Oxford University Press; Oxford. 1994).
108. "James McClellan, a biographer of Justice Story, observed that Adams's sermon 
'deals with this very issue of the absolutist [i.e., strict separationist] versus the no preference 
theories at both the state and federal levels.' A nonpreferentialist, McClellan described 
Adams as 'an informed critic of the wall of separation theory' whose sermon 'offers an 
abundance of evidence to refute the notion that Church-State relations in early nineteenth 
century America ever followed the absolutist example offered by Jefferson and Madison.' 
Story's letter further buttresses the nonpreferentialist position. Separationist advocates, in 
sharp contrast, have found succor in Madison's strong dissent to Adams's thesis. For 
example, reflecting on Madison's letter, Adrienne Koch concluded that Madison "tried to 
establish a secular moral order as the American political system, and thought it might be 
good, perhaps even the best order ever devised.' These contrasting views persist to modem 
times." Dreisbach, Intro, to Religion and Politics in the Early Republic, 22. See also 48-49.
109. In the mid-nineteenth century, Baird could say, “Nineteen twentieths of all 
evangelical churches in this country believe that there is such a thing as being bom again.” 
Evangelicals and Politics in Antebellum America, p. 2. This history no doubt was the seed 
bed for William James’ pivotal book 50 years later, The Verities o f Religious Experience. By 
this time, “New Birth” was easily wrested from its parochial evangelical language and could 
be viewed and discussed as a universal spiritual phenomenon.
126
CHAPTER FOUR
Two Manifestations of Fixity and Freedom in the Twentieth Century
In this chapter, I analyze several distinct twentieth century developments of 
“fixity” and “fi*eedom.” The entire scope of the century is not under study. The goal is 
only to selectively demonstrate the ongoing development of this two-sided 
phenomenon in this century.
The groups which are reviewed are Protestant liberalism, the social gospel 
movement at the beginning of this century, and the fundamentalist driven Religious 
Right that has emerged in the last decades of this century. Starting fi'om what has 
been said about Protestantism’s uncritical identification with its world, Section A 
attempts to show how Protestantism, in the form of liberalism and the social gospel 
movement, became more deeply integrated into the emerging modem world. In 
Section B, a contemporary manifestation of the problem of fixity is discussed. 
Between 1901 and 1930, the liberal movement in mainstream Protestantism so 
thoroughly assimilated the Enlightenment premises that had been woven into the 
American beginning, that its fundamental differentiation was in question. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, the origin of this assimilation derives from the fact that in 
the wake of the Revolution and disestablishment, mainstream Protestantism refused 
Jefferson’s and Williams’ separation of church and state for a new kind of union. It 
identified the Republic with its goals and it identified itself with the Republic’s goals. 
As discussed, while in the antebellum period, this identity was not consistent, 
nevertheless, significant assimilation occurred. Substantive distinctions existed but 
these were eroding - Protestantism was undergoing revision. In liberalism, 
Protestantism completes this journey. While much has been written on the 
phenomenon of American liberalism, the emphasis has been on the corrosive effect of 
eclectic influences such as Darwinism, biblical criticism, neo-Platonism, scientific 
and technological advancement. The thrust of this thesis is to point to a more 
fundamental problem: Protestantism’s historic identification with America as a new 
kind of modem society. The real problem with liberalism did not originate from its 
radical theological revisions. These were symptoms of a deeper confusion about the 
nature of Christianity’s relation to the developing modem world.
In 1979, the fundamentalist driven Religious Right came into existence.
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exhibiting Protestantism's historic propensity to control its world. Not able to suffer 
the widening difference between its own traditional " Judeo-Christian" values and 
modernity come of age, the Religious Right reached for implements which would 
minimally realign the sociocultural world to their familiar religio-moral "absolutes." 
As will be discussed, the roots of the Religious Right go back to that constituency of 
Protestantism which resisted liberalism’s assimilation of modernity - fundamentalism. 
Because fundamentalism never addressed the deeper problem behind liberalism - the 
relationship of Protestantism to America, in time, like liberalism, it too was destined 
to betray this identity. This was manifested in its efforts to control the religious and 
moral parameters of its world. Both the Religious Right and liberalism refused to 
suffer the estrangement of a world which had become different. The difference 
between the responses of “fixity” and “freedom” at the end of the day is the difference 
between attempting to force an approximate external unity or attempting to achieve a 
substantive unity through theological revision.
What makes each of these movements a serious manifestation of the problem 
of “fixity” and “freedom” is not that Protestantism's propensity toward either of these 
dynamics necessarily intensified with time, but the changes that occurred in the world 
and correspondingly within Protestantism itself. The nineteenth century antebellum 
world, while inseminated with the seeds of modernity, remained in part "nascent 
modernity." It was a world in a Protestant cultural grip whose own socio-cultural 
principle had not been fully realized. When the nineteenth century world began to find 
its own secular feet, and modernity came into its own, the price for remaining closely 
identified with the "new" world increased. If Protestantism was to continue to be a 
participant in the socio-cultural project of modernity, more thorough adjustments and 
revisions would be required. It is in the context of these adjustments and revisions 
that Protestantism's historic problem of weak differentiation became serious. That is 
to say, it was in danger of completely losing its essential difference.
Section A
“Fixity” and “Freedom” at the Turn of the Century
In the twentieth century, Protestantism would become even more identified 
with the sociocultural project that came into existence with the modem state than it 
was in the nineteenth century. This claim is supported through three overlapping
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discussions.
First, the preexisting problem is reviewed. The premises that had come to 
dominate Protestantism in the nineteenth century were the bridge for a more serious 
involvement.
Second, the social gospel movement further narrowed the difference between 
the church's goals and that of the world. It was a case of building on nineteenth 
century Protestantism's precedents while keeping in step with the changes that came to 
be recognized as necessary to bring modernity's project to its proper maturity.
In the reforms the social gospel movement sought to effect, there are to be 
seen characteristics of both “fixity” and “freedom.” As will be discussed, the social 
“gospelers” were both optimistic and pessimistic. They were optimistic insofar as they 
believed in the democratic realization of the Founders’ liberal values. They were 
pessimistic insofar as they had come to believe that these liberal values would not 
automatically embody the republic. Measured by the standards set up for this study, 
the social gospel movement saw Christianity’s social relevance in a regulative and 
integrative light. They believed both in modem freedom within a democratic 
framework and saw Christianity as essentially in harmony with and supportive of that 
value and they recognized that the democratic extension of rights and liberties 
required accessing political power. With this awareness, Christianity came to be 
understood as overtly political. A new vision of political power to check the abuse of 
liberty and extend the republican dream came into existence. It is important to 
emphasize however, that the social gospel movement did not engage in its new socio­
political mission from a safe distance, i.e., a clearly differentiated identity. In their 
minds, the line of distinction between modem America and Christianity was faint, if 
not absent.
In the third sub-section, liberalism's shift from evangelical empiricism to a 
consistent doctrine of immanence is reviewed. Nowhere is the deepening of 
Protestantism's captivity to the idealism of modernity more apparent than in this 
revision.
Protestantism's Identification With Nascent Modernity:
A Review of the Nineteenth Century Problem
As demonstrated, the roots of Protestantism’s close identification with
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America are facilitated by nineteenth century revivalism and its piety. Both 
Protestantism, liberalism and the social gospel movement would build on this 
beginning and deepen Protestantism’s identity with its world.^
Nineteenth century Protestantism became permeated'with Arminian, or as one 
historian refers to them, "Methodist" premises.^ It was in this new form, that 
Protestantism proceeded to dominate American culture,^ and it is this phenomenon 
that primarily accounts for Protestantism's involvement in the cultural shift to 
modernist premises.
If nineteenth century Protestantism had had sufficient differentiation from 
culture, it is unlikely that it would have become so deeply mired in the cultural 
secularism that erupted in America toward the end of the nineteenth century and the 
first thirty years of this century The analysis of the distinguished Baptist historian 
Winthrop Hudson, is especially helpful in explaining this. The cultural success and 
dominance of Protestantism in the last half of the nineteenth century provided the 
bridge for it to become uncritically involved and invested in modernistic premises and 
goals.
Arminianism was the mainspring of nineteenth century evangelical revivalism. 
It allowed and encouraged Protestant religion to become optimistically involved in the 
project of human change. It proceeded on the assumption that all human beings 
possessed the capacity to be transformed and that God's spirit, via evangelical 
dynamism, stood ready to be released at will toward that end. Once the conclusion 
was reached that one person could change, it was one short step to the next 
conclusion: an entire society could be changed. The implement to accomplish this 
had at long last come into view: revivalism. Contained in this solution was a 
reductionism.
Christianity was being pressed toward one primary shape, namely, that of its 
instrumental capacity to effect change. To create new human beings, a new society of 
such human beings, all alive with individual piety and virtue, became the new goal. 
These individuals would in turn permeate and transform the institutions of society. 
This was not merely a dream but was substantially realized in the nineteenth century 
and well into the twentieth.
Protestantism took on the shape of busyness and became an agent for 
individual and social betterment. Revivalism led to moral idealism. A conquest of
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culture by Protestantism had occurred so that, as Winthrop Hudson writes, by the turn 
of the century it had "brought into existence a society and a culture that were 
recognizably Christian."^ "It had established undisputed sway over almost all aspects 
of the national life,"  ^But the problem was that it was lost in the society it helped 
fashion/ "By the end of the century it had become more the creature of American 
culture than its creator."®
"Culture being molded by religious faith was to end with a religious faith 
being molded by culture."^ Its self understanding was by this time not sufficiently 
grounded in a distinction ultimately located apart from the cultural mainstream o f . 
America. It had labored to define America, and ended up not able to understand itself 
apart from America as a socio-cultural entity. Protestantism progressively elevated 
the practical fruits of religion. It measured religion by the standard of individual and 
social change. At the same time it relativized dogmatic beliefs. A bold frank 
pragmatism prevailed which placed a value on religion commensurate to the 
individual and social quality it produced. Protestantism increasingly understood itself 
as the primary agent to shape cultural values and effect social change. It became 
deeply invested in this socio-cultural project. But this culture was bigger than 
Protestantism, and it was moving and changing under greater exigencies and 
motivations. Protestantism was aboard and culture was departing for new ports.
Protestantism's Identification With Modernity Deepens:
From Arminianism to the Social Gospel
In order to understand how Protestantism's identification with its world 
deepened in the modem period, at least two points need to be restated about its 
nineteenth century setting.
First, as emphasized, Protestantism became enamored with the project of 
creating a successful republican society. It explicitly assumed a measure of 
responsibility for its success. It was their project, their task, their mission.
Second, Protestant Christian strategy for accomplishing this goal was itself 
deeply penetrated by the secular republican individualistic ethic. The religious power 
which Protestantism could release into society was not only viewed as a force for 
change but their view of change from one perspective was not fundamentally different 
from the individualistic ethic of the Founding Fathers.
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The power to save society was identified as the power to save souls one by 
one. The saving of a soul was simultaneously the creation of an "individual" that 
looked and acted veiy much like a successful republican citizen. This point is crucial 
for understanding how Protestantism's close identification with its world deepened in 
the modem period.
In the nineteenth century, the relationship between Protestantism and its world 
may in part be characterized as naive and dualistic. Protestantism was saving souls 
and making republican citizens. Both goals were explicit and interrelated - saving 
souls and "saving" society. However, in the larger picture, this saving activity was 
understood as bringing the world to the eve of the biblical millennium (understood as 
Jesus' retum).
Materially speaking, there were distinctions. The change released by revival 
and conversions accomplished two ends: it facilitated the republican "social" dream 
and it brought the church and world nearer to their millennial hope - "this gospel shall 
be preached in all the world then shall the end come". Millennium and the hope of 
successfully reconstmcting society on liberal values were in the mix together, but they 
were not consistently identified.
Because mainstream Protestantism's primary view of the millennium was post- 
millennial, the door was open for a narrowed distinction between modem cultural 
goals and religious missional goals for society. Both came to their task with similar 
assumptions about improving society. Protestantism however, remained 
fundamentally dualistic in its world view. But, when the unsavoury effects of laissez 
faire led to the critique of the individualistic paradigm of society and change, a 
segment of mainstream Protestantism began to revise its individualistic ethic. In 
concert with other cultural protests, the social gospel movement took up the cause of 
expanding the contemporary model of change beyond its preoccupation with the 
individual to the economic structures of society. If the Founders’ vision of a 
relatively harmonious equal citizenry was to be realized, it was not simply going to 
happen automatically as an outgrowth of a natural principle or law. The stmcturing of 
liberty into society as the protected first principle of the republic contained within it a 
hidden evil that had come to fruition. Perhaps no one saw this clearer than 
Rauschenbusch, who wrote in his Christianity and the Social Crisis:
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If it were proposed to invent some social system in which covetousness would 
be deliberately fostered and intensified in human nature, what system could be 
devised which would excel our own for this purpose? Competitive commerce 
exalts selfishness to the dignity of a moral principle. It pits men against one 
another in a gladiatorial game in which there is no mercy and in which in 
ninety percent of the combatants finally strew the arena. It makes Ismaels of 
our best men and teaches them that their hand must be against every man since 
every man’s hand is against them. It makes men who are the gentlest and 
kindliest friends and neighbors, relentless taskmasters in their shops and 
stores, who will drain the strength of their men and pay their female 
employees wages on which no girl can live without supplementing them in 
some way.
Ironically, those Protestants who broadened their social ethic [the social gospel
movement] deepened Protestantism’s identification with modernity. Contemporary
standards of righteousness and sin certainly cried out for reform. In Protestantism’s
myopic attention with so-called personal vices such as drinking, theater going,
dancing, gambling, it had failed to address the “weightier matters of the law.” The
Social Gospel movement was bom because of this void. Certainly, the movement’s
courage to challenge culture at the level of wages, hours, workers safety, tmsts,
monopolies and the like, was certainly prophetic. But in extending Protestantism’s
social ethic beyond that of mere character development (so as to be made to embrace a
more democratic social structuring of society), Protestantism's historic identity with
the new world project became more consistent. This is especially apparent in Walter
Rauschenbusch’s thought, as Ken Cauthen points out:
"Yet, with regard to the democratic element in American life Rauschenbusch 
saw a profound harmony between the values of Christ and the values of 
culture. Indeed, many of the faults which he found in American business 
could be overcome, he felt, if democratic principles were applied to the 
economic realm. Thus, at least with reference to democracy, it can be said that 
Rauschenbusch is one of those men who, in the words of H. Richard Niebuhr, 
'hail Jesus as the Messiah of their society, the fulfiller of its hopes and 
aspirations, the perfecter of its tme faith, the source of its holiest spirit.' The 
Jesus Rauschenbusch knows is fundamentally a 'Christ of culture’...The Social 
gospel is God's predestined agent to complete the idea of God. The God of the 
social gospel seeks the redemption of all mankind and the union of all men in 
a world wide brotherhood. Theology must revise its doctrine of God he 
contends in light of this kingdom idea!"^^
Another example of this tendency to make the modem social project and 
Christianity consistent, is B. Fay Mills. Mills was a nineteenth centuiy evangelist who
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started his ministry within the individualistic ethical paradigm later to expand it to the 
socialist ethic. Not long after the social ethic took hold of his mind, Christianity’s 
essential distinctivity eroded in his thinking.
The reason that this segment of Protestantism, more than others, nearly lost the 
distinction between Christianity's goals and modernity's sociocultural project, is 
inherent in how it formulated its social ethic. The emergency created by the inherent 
weakness in the Founders’ plan, tempted Protestantism to become even more deeply 
identified with the outcome of modernity. In a former period, Protestantism found 
within itself, i.e, its religious resources, a culturally relevant individualistic ethic. In 
the years directly before and after the turn of this century, it found within its religious 
sources a socialist ethic which was relevant to the crises at hand.
But in taking up this new social ethic and combining it with the already 
teleological orientation of nineteenth century Protestantism [i.e., Protestantism that 
had become enamoured with its power to change society and move it towards a 
“higher” goal], the stage was set for a segment of Protestantism to lose the remaining 
distinction it had between itself and the democratic modem vision.
As shown, the activistic change oriented Protestantism of the mid-nineteenth 
century had increasingly fused Christian individual and republican individual ideas 
and had become more optimistic and goal oriented. In principle, nothing was different 
about the late nineteenth centuiy and early twentieth century social gospel movement. 
They did not break from the teleological activistic shape which had come to define 
Protestantism, nor from the close identification of democratic and Christian ideas of 
the human future. They merely radicalized the democratic egalitarian-fraternal idea 
embedded in the Founders and they correspondingly appealed to scriptural warrants 
that supported their social democratic reform.
The teieological-activistic propensity of Protestantism was intensified in the 
social gospel movement when it linked itself to the idea of Kingdom of God and 
attempted to access political leverage for its realization. Like Wise, the identification 
of Christian with the Founders’ secular vision was intensified with the transition from 
an individual to a more inclusive, social or democratic model.
The social gospel segment of Protestantism thought it found in Christianity 
and within the "new" democratic ethic a common point of agreement. This more 
egalitarian ethic and vision for the republic [i.e., the extension of liberty and rights
j
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horizontally] had been present from the beginning in the more idealistic of the 
Founders, especially Jefferson/^ But the Founders assumed that it would occur 
naturally. The revival and broadening of this ethic which emerged out of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century socioeconomic condition created a new, and 
even more friendly and apparently compatible meeting place for Protestantism and 
modernity. This was thought to be modernity of necessity come of age and 
Protestantism's ideas of the kingdom come of age. It was a short step to identify with 
democratic socialistic values, abstract values of human betterment and with a social 
ideal of the “brotherhood of man.” The broadening of the Protestant ethic from an 
individualistic model to a more social model, moved Protestantism even further away 
from the other worldly to the this worldly. The fulfillment of an individualistic 
soteriology ultimately leads to a heaven above, while the fiilfillment of a more social- 
communal soteriology leads to a new earth. But what was this “new earth?” Was it 
really “new?” Was it the Kingdom of God or a deeper identification of 
Protestantism’s God with the new world that was bom in 1776? Ironically, in the 
social gospel movement, Protestantism realized both its most prophetic and its most 
identified relation to modernity. The grand vision of changing overarching social 
structures rather than puny individuals vrith perverse natures seemed to contain 
eschatological implications.
When Protestants began to entertain the idea that the real source of the 
problem of human corruption was environmental and the real power for change was 
persuasion and legislation, they were on the verge of a complete break with their 
Puritan forefathers. The intransigence of human corruption rooted in a depraved 
nature and the idea of a permanent cleavage between righteous and the wicked made 
the Puritans true advocates of “fixity” (i.e., the control of a wicked world versus the 
transformation of it].
In the final analysis, within the social gospel movement some distinctions 
remained between its social vision and a purely secularist vision. As Ruether points 
out, within this movement there persisted among some the conviction that social 
change must also be accompanied by a deeper work of change by God’s grace in the 
human heart.'® Even so, McLoughlin argues that at the turn of the century 
Protestantism went in two different directions. One direction was individualistic, 
which focused on the depraved nature that awaited conversion with a corresponding
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social mission directed at helping and changing individuals. The other way focused on 
evil social structures that awaited the legal extension of the Founders’ democratic 
promise imbued with Jesus’ ethic of love, brotherhood and justice. The spokesmen for 
this movement, however, did not completely eliminate a line of distinction between 
the future coming of the kingdom initiated from the side of a transcendent God and 
the present occurrence of the kingdom through the works of humanity interpreted as 
the immanence of God.'^ For the social gospel movement, the goals of modernity and 
the goals of Protestantism had become thoroughly suffused with only veiy weak 
distinctions between these remaining.
The Social Gospel and “Fixity”?
Economic realities at the turn of this century challenged the veracity of the 
Founders’ vision requiring something more of modernity. The policy of laissez faire 
led to the rich becoming richer. Rather than leading to greater harmony and equality, 
laissez faire served to protect existing concentrations of wealth. The social risk 
inherent in the policy of imposing the least possible restriction on individual liberty 
was not offset by virtue. What appeared to be a blueprint for the realization of sublime 
harmonies, became an implement which effected extreme social disparities. With the 
industrial age came severe poverty, soaring unemployment, the exploitation of labor 
by capital, a boom and bust economy, urbanism bringing with it a corresponding 
increase in health and criminal problems, all of which fed off of the naive promise of 
laissez faire. The irony here is that America’s self-conscious embrace of the premise 
of laissez faire was in part bound to the critique of British power by the colonists. 
Against the authority of a venerated political institution, America appealed to a higher 
authority which possessed its own authority. By appealing to a principle out of the 
reach of human control, the Founders accessed rights that could not in principle be 
subverted or contravened. By canonizing that artifice, the stage was set for the cultural 
baptism of socio-economic disparity. That which was exploited to break power vis-à- 
vis England was simultaneously the implement to entrench and protect the new 
investitures of power and wealth in the new world.
Part of the problem was that the economic means the Founders had conceived 
of as underwriting the realization of their vision were eroding. These were the 
relatively simple availability of property, skills and an accessible market where one’s
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labor and skills could be gainfully sold. Through these, one could achieve reasonable 
prosperity and security. As the nineteenth century progressed, these tangible means 
steadily deteriorated under the increasing dominance of a technologically driven 
industrial capitalism creating an intransigent labor class. In order for the dream to be 
salvaged, society’s commitment to laissez faire had to be relativized so that it was 
necessary to use political and collective power to achieve what did not arise naturally. 
This is a familiar history and does not need detailing here. It is the shift that occurs in 
this that points up the character of modernity come-of-age [i.e., the shift away from 
strict adherence to laissez faire grounded in the presupposition of natural law, 
harmony and toward the use of collective and political power].
The necessary qualifying of laissez faire discloses the new edge of modernity’s 
crisis. No hidden universalism existed which ensured social harmony. The nation had 
saddled itself with a policy of autonomous individualism which was causing 
enormous social injustice. In the end, individualism equaled economic elitism. The 
eventuality of reaching for political power to rehabilitate the Founders’ republican 
vision was predictable. Late nineteenth and early twentieth century social conditions 
became the seed bed for a new growth of centralized power. History had shown 
harmony and natural law to be fiction. The new recourse to collective and political 
power that took hold in America at the turn of this century, as necessary as this was, 
points up the fact that ultimately there existed an antithesis between the Founders’ 
vision and the social principles they postulated as necessary and sufficient to achieve 
that vision. The reach for political and judicial leverage against the abuse of economic 
liberty is a conservative stabilizing development. It signals within the economic 
sphere what modernity creates in every sphere of society: a propensity to reach for 
power and human intervention in the face of the absence of cultural design. The fact 
that no harmonious egalitarian citizenry emerged out of a policy of liberal values, as 
postulated, signaled the problem that was inherent in modernity. In spite of the 
original confidence in the social integrity of individual liberty, centralized political 
power was revisited.
In its interest in political power, the social gospel movement is similar to the 
Religious Right discussed in Section B of this chapter. While the social gospel 
movement reached for political leverage to limit economic liberty, the Religious Right 
reached for political power to limit socio-moral liberty. Each held a religious vision of
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the republic, believing in a “Christian” or “Judeo-Christian” America. Of course, the 
substance of their visions was different -  social justice versus individual morality.
As will be shown in Section B, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century, the policy of individual liberty had not yet progressed to the stage where it 
was having a deeply corrosive effect on culturally embedded moral values and 
boundaries. When the fraying of moral consensuses occurred, a segment of 
Protestantism renewed its interest in political power in order to achieve or maintain 
the corporate or national Christian identity that they imagined had existed.
According to the thesis paradigm “fixity” and “freedom” both express a 
relationship between Christianity and the greater socio-cultural world that is very 
close, if not in some way identified. The difference is that “fixity” sustains that 
identity through recourse to external leverage (hence the term “regulative”) while 
“freedom” represents an optimism that the nation’s “Christianness” can be maintained 
by placing the church’s religious resources in service to the principle of individual 
liberty, so that people will exercise freedom in a responsible way (hence the term 
“integrative”). In this endeavor, the church’s mission and theology were revised so as 
to be compatible with, and supportive to, the modem value of liberty. When viewed in 
this light, the social gospel movement clearly falls under the classification “freedom.” 
It remained basically optimistic in the democratic construction of the Founders’ 
liberal values. When the social gospel movement sought recourse to law, it was in 
order to change problematic environmental conditions so that the Founders’ vision of 
democracy [which they also believed was the essential framework of the Christian 
vision of the kingdom] could occur. They were theologically and missionally 
revisionary in order to integrate Christianity to social democratic goals and values.
The religious fixity discussed in the next sections, solicits political packing for 
religio-moral “values” which are not formally constituted in the polity of the nation. 
While the social gospel movement found scriptural support for its reforms, this 
support was optional. At the end of the day, it was asking for nothing more than what 
its secular democratic socialist counterparts were calling for. This, in part, explains 
why there was a collapse of distinction between the social gospel and democratic 
national goals.
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Protestantism's Optimistic Involvement With Modernity Deepens:
From Evangelical Empiricism to the Liberal Doctrine of Immanence
The situation in which Protestantism found itself around the turn of this 
centuiy is suggested by the following series of comparisons. During the Colonial 
Period, there existed a world view characterized by an anthropological dualism 
colored in Augustinian Calvinistic hues. Humanness was defined within a theocentric 
relation that correlated the transcendent sovereign God and the particularity of the 
human. If this correlation was severed, individual and social chaos was thought to 
result. The material means to keep these together was the purified religion of the 
Reformed faith made plain through scripture. Formally, these two were kept together 
by the two God-ordained institutions. Church and State.'®
In the Jeffersonian Enlightenment model, humanness was defined within a 
this-world humanistic fi*amework. While the person was not viewed as complete in 
himself or immediately safe for liberal society, the means for achieving these were 
intrinsic to the self and the collective selves of society. Out of these presuppositions, 
government as a social contract emerged with an emphasis on the importance of 
public education and private religion. These two sources of American society, one 
religious (Puritanism), the other secular (Enlightenment, i.e. the Jeffersonian guild), 
lived on together during the last half of the eighteenth century and well into the 
nineteenth century antebellum period.
Two phenomena kept them fi*om fully polarizing and colliding. The historical 
factors which arose out of the secular side were (1) the common cause of the 
Revolution, and (2) the pressures of pluralism created by original diversity intensified 
by immigration. Also, firom the Revolutionary beginning, the dissemination of 
Enlightenment thought spread through the populace by a massive tract and book 
campaign, promoted by the well-established and influential aristocratic elites and the 
Masons. Most importantly, the Enlightenment provided the resources necessary to 
build a national identity around liberty and equality.
On the religious side, evangelical empiricism moderated Protestantism both 
institutionally and doctrinally, making it more compatible with the Jeffersonian 
premises. While evangelicalism certainly defined humanness relationally or 
dualistically, this relation was more consistently sustained by an empirical 
experience.'^ In other words, evangelicalism (particularly nineteenth century
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evangelicalism), emphasized the human and individual element of religion while 
correspondingly moderating both doctrinal and ecclesiastical elements/® This 
occurred at the very time the notion of the individual in the American experience was 
emerging on essentially secular-economic grounds.
The evangelicalism of the nineteenth century became vulnerable to losing 
itself as it increasingly measured religion by change and experience, i.e. by its human 
and social value.^' It tended to abstract religion from its formal moorings, allowing it 
to become more permeable to a cultural ethos and ideals. Insofar as it tipped away 
from its doctrinal-biblical side and toward a human experiential pietistic side, it 
shared similar empirical common ground with the Jeffersonian Enlightenment 
position.
Rather than accepting the privatism [i.e., organized religion as an esoteric 
voluntary association] that was thought by the Jefferson guild to be the consequence 
of disestablishment and the first Amendment, Protestantism saw in its evangelicalism 
the new face of its social universalism, albeit a qualified 'universalism'. And in 
principle, it was precisely this element of human transformation on which the 
compatibility rode. By its nature, evangelicalism was precarious. It could slide in 
either direction.^^ It could shift back toward its biblical-dogmatic moorings 
(exploiting and intensifying and thereby distorting its authoritative principle), or 
forward toward a greater openness to and preoccupation with the human experience 
(thereby obscuring or losing its authoritative principle). In other words, its correlation 
to "objective" external fixtures was under cultural strain.
The spirit of the times pulled evangelicalism out of balance toward an 
emphasis on immanent—human and social transformation. Protestantism came to be 
permeated by the unwarranted optimism which accompanied the progressive severing 
of objective and external moorings. Evangelical pietism was one of the major 
bridges, for mainstream Protestantism's more consistent involvement in the goals and 
premises of modernityThis shift toward the subjective predisposed Protestantism 
toward the more radical ideas of immanence coming from continental philosophy and 
theology.
Protestantism's focus on the experiential subjective elements of its religion 
was not the same as understanding Christianity within a consistent immanental 
framework.^"' Religious experience stood in juxtaposition to a biblical - revealed
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locus of authority. This dynamic paralleled the Enlightenment confidence of that 
period that understood reason and experience in juxtaposition to natural law. In 
America, the shift toward a more consistent immanental understanding of truth would 
occur toward the end of the nineteenth century. In both the secular and the religious 
spheres, revision was necessary to accomplish this. In the wake of these revisions, 
Protestantism’s identification with modernity reached its high water mark..
Theoretically, the Founding Fathers’ ideas of liberty arose out of both modem 
and pre-modem ideas. Their political design to organize society as a guarantor of 
individual liberty grew out of a new Enlightenment confidence about human capacity 
to use reason and become virtuous. The potential necessary for people to use liberty 
responsibly resided within their nature. The risk inherent in liberty was offset by their 
optimistic anthropology. Liberty would not jeopardize the socio-moral integrity of 
society because citizens would naturally rise to the new social challenge and 
opportunity. The Founding Fathers’ vision was bom in the functional dualism 
characteristic of the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. Their appeal to the 
accessibility of tmth via reason and experience was in part contradicted by 
Judeo-Christian premises. The absoluteness of design, discemable in nature’s law and 
order was in part a transmutation of the absoluteness of the Christian personal God of 
the Bible. The deistic framework of the thought of the Founders, abstracted creation 
from the creator personal God of the Bible, giving it much greater autonomy. 
Accordingly, it tended to sever the direct human connection to this creator God 
(supported through Revelation) and substitute a relation to a master design sustained 
through reason.
By dignifying reason and experience, the Founders invited the commencement 
of a human history. But by correlating reason and experience to a dogma of fixed law, 
they unwittingly invited the persistence over history of a rigid, absolute design. There 
is a tension between human fi-eedom and absolute design. The most one could hope 
for was that humans could harmonize with the fixed natural moral order of an 
impersonal universe. This deistic world view, indebted to Newtonian physics, 
persisted in nineteenth century America and allowed for a degree of compatibility 
between Protestantism and Enlightenment schools. Whether revealed through 
scripture or discemed through reason, morality was derived firom one ultimate fixed 
design. Protestantism scrambled to show its reasonability and the Enlightenment
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school granted the “basic” religio-moral truths of Christian universality. This 
“Fraternity” was possible because both schools remained dualistic. The individual was 
in relation to an absolute truth outside him. But this “outside” locus of truth 
contravened human freedom.^ ®
Generally speaking, the revision that occurred in the late nineteenth century 
attempted to save the autonomy of reason and experience by reconceiving the 
character of natural law. The idea of a fixed absolute design, which through reason 
brought men and women into proper relation, was reconceived as organic to human 
nature and human community. No one definitive, accessible design existed, with 
which humans could harmonize and achieve positive ends. Truth was immanent to 
the life process. The "new" order, theoretically speaking, had a life of its own, 
immanent to human nature. In this way, reason and experience were viewed less 
instrumentally (i.e. instruments whereby humans could bring themselves into harmony 
with a law higher than themselves and fundamentally outside themselves). Rather, 
reason and experience were conceived as liberated from a rigid design, finding their 
own ends and fulfillment. In this way, modernity came to view the truth as 
residential, intensive and progressively unfolding. All particular expressions of truth 
were fragmentary, transitory and finite.
The effect was to sever the correlation of humanness "upward" or "outward" in 
relation to a transcendent God or a static design and order. Modernity was portrayed 
in an optimistic, progressive framework. And it removed all serious critical bases to 
question its development. In the end the belief in an immanent informing principle to 
humanness and society came up against the harsh realities of history.
The grim social facts arising out of the industrial revolution, the Great War 
and the depression sobered modernity's optimism. Both the world view that life was 
organized around a fixed archetypal pattern in which humans could achieve harmony 
through reason and virtue, and the world view that nature and human nature had a 
greater law of truth at work within itself, were postulated fictions. Although they 
served the purpose of underwriting the optimistic social venture of modernity, in the 
end they obscured the inherent risks and flaws that came with that endeavor. 
Modernity, under the influence of the Enlightenment, had broken with the pessimistic 
view of human nature characteristic of Protestantism, especially the Reformed faith 
that dominated colonial America. As a consequence, there existed a naive confidence
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that a rational, virtuous person and a relatively equal society would emerge out of a 
political matrix of freedom.
Theoretically, that which stood in the way of a complete identification 
between Protestantism and the modem sociocultural idealism, was the persistence of a 
Christian dualism. It is one thing to emphasize and elevate the empirical - 
experiential elements of the faith. It is another thing to reinterpret the faith within a 
consistent doctrine of the immanence of God. Through most of the nineteenth 
century, Protestantism held to its traditional distinctions -  this world and the next, 
heaven and hell, a sinful and a innocent state of human nature, revelation and reason. 
The foundation of this dualism was a sovereign transcendent God and sinful humanity 
in a context of redemption, which placed this world and the kingdom of God in 
fundamental discontinuity. These distinctions were moderated practically by 
revivalism and theologically by Arminianism and post-millennialism.
Beyond these two forces, several theological developments also contributed 
within mainstream nineteenth century Protestantism. In the early decades of the 
century, the Scottish school of common sense realism argued that "from his own 
innate common sense, man could 'intuitively' derive beyond the shadow of a doubt the 
validity of such abstract ideas as immortality, the existence of the soul, the concept of 
rewards and punishments after death. In this theological and philosophical 
development, which had a pervasive influence both inside and outside mainstream 
Protestantism, the religious and moral truths once known only through Revelation 
could be derived from "observing men's inner consciousness."^^
Inner consciousness consisted of what could be empirically deduced as 
universally true from observing instinctual social and moral habits and patterns of 
human nature. This did not mean Revelation was made redundant or needed revising. 
Rather, inner consciousness was a way of witnessing to Revelation's truthfulness. 
Nevertheless, by building this argument, Protestantism dignified anthropocentric 
grounds for deriving truth. The primaiy point of departure from the deistic 
Enlightenment school was the belief that for real moral change and reformation to 
occur, not only was human reason, will and education necessary, but more so, divine 
grace. Both parties however, were focused on the human subject and empirically 
verified truth.
Although in the middle years of the nineteenth century Protestantism
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continued to be enchanted with exploring an anthropocentric locus for evangelical 
truth, the attention came to be focused on feelings, emotions, intuition and 
imagination. This was the period which McLoughlin calls "Romantic 
Evangelicalism."^® The primary figure outside mainstream evangelicalism who 
presented the most consistent expression of the romantic emphasis was Ralph Waldo 
Emerson. Emerson countered cool rationality with a doctrine of God’s immanence in 
the human soul. God could be known directly, intuitively known and felt, by the 
heart, not the head. The first language to proceed from an encounter with God was 
poetry, and the place where God was experienced was in life. In nature, birth, 
children, motherhood and the great mysteries and cycles of existence, humans 
experienced a pulsating emanating divine presence. Emerson saw Jesus Christ as one 
who was most fully responsive to this divinity in life. Jesus Christ, he claimed, was 
just one among many incarnations of God in humanity. "He (Jesus Christ) saw that 
God incarnates himself in man, and evermore goes forth anew to take possession of 
his world." According to Emerson, Jesus said, in essence, "would you see God, see 
me or see thee"^^
While evangelicals did not sever their ties to revealed truth or classic Christian 
beliefs, with Emerson they came to emphasize the direct intuitive perception of truth. 
North American Protestantism's greatest preacher of the day, Henry Ward Beecher, 
and its best theologian, Horace Bushnell, both strongly reflected the shift toward the 
heart religion of the day. Beecher’s preaching appealed to the aesthetic dimension of 
truth. This included the personality of Jesus and the love of God rather than the justice 
of God. Bushnell developed a view of "familial grace" which, in contradistinction to 
crisis conversions characteristic of revivalism emphasized the role of home and 
motherhood.
It was not, however, until the last decades of the nineteenth century that 
Protestantism's turn toward the immanence of God in humanity would fully mature. 
Only a serious revision of Protestant thought could bridge the gap between modernity 
come of age and Protestantism’s historic Christian dualism. For such a revision, 
Americans relied on European theologians, primarily Schleiermacher and Ritschl. 
Only Schleiermacher is reviewed here, as his thinking is sufficient to demonstrate in 
principle what needed to occur in order for a more consistent involvement of 
Protestantism with modernity to take place.
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Schleiermacher’s importance for Protestantism is precisely in the juxtaposition 
of the Enlightenment on the one hand, and the evangelical center of the Reformation 
on the other. In the larger framework, it is not his polemic over where religion is to be 
grounded, the ethical realm in conjunction with the will, the realm of thought in 
conjunction with the powers of reason or piety in conjunction with the feeling of 
absolute dependence, that is of enduring significance. Rather, it is the creation of a 
basis whereby the Christian tradition in the Protestant evangelical heritage could be 
united with epistemological assumptions not fimdamentally contradictory to the terms 
of the modem world. Like many, Schleiermacher recognized that the grounds on 
which tmth claims could be made, had changed.^® For many, the church’s tradition 
was simply anachronistic and redundant. Despite the mediating efforts to build a 
'deeper' compatibility between rational circumspect tmth and the church's dogmatic 
tmth, increasing alienation between these two concepts of tmth was occurring. 
Schleiermacher is to be credited for his pioneer work in formalizing a theological 
union. His epistemological analysis possesses an underlying critical compatibility 
with the Enlightenment consensus on the anthropological grounding of tmth. By 
tying the Christian faith to this epistemological basis, he would not only save it from 
redundancy (from the standpoint of Enlightenment premises) but involve it in a new 
crisis: a misplaced confidence in humanity and the simple immanence of tmth within 
humanity toward which the post - Enlightenment world was inevitably moving. 
Schleiermacher's initial "question" and "breakthrough" is over the "tme" source or 
nature of human religiousness.
But Schleiermacher posited an alternative. He centered on piety grounded in 
feeling, understood as a precognitive consciousness of absolute dependence. This, 
Schleiermacher urged, was universal, and lies below the superficial realm of the flux 
of existence in which the human being lives out of the interchange of desires, 
necessity and environmental forces. An analysis of human nature at this level betrays 
the existence of finitude in a setting of infinite unity; finite distinction in a setting of 
transcendent infinity. Schleiermacher argued that finite self-hood or 
self-consciousness was derived from a feeling of infinity transcending the self.
Absolute dependence describes precisely this analysis of self-consciousness. 
Piety, defined first as dependence, and second as behavior consonant with this deeper 
awareness, represents Schleiermacher's understanding of religion. The tme ground of
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religion is not reasoned truth leading to changed behavior, not the categorical 
imperative of the behaving subject leading to disinterested morality, but piety arising 
out of the feeling of absolute dependence, or, in theological language, "God 
consciousness" expressing itself in acts of devotion and love.
This discovery for Schleiermacher explained both the true source of beliefs as 
well as accounting for diversity in its conceptual formulation. By beginning with 
piety (and not doctrinal knowledge) as the foundation of religion, he emphasized the 
relativity of the claims of knowledge of the church. Beliefs and doctrines are the 
linguistical and conceptual formulations made ’within the accidental and historical 
impingement of sundry forces, which are themselves expressions of this underlying 
piety. It is important to emphasize that by making anthropology the starting point for 
religion, beliefs and traditions were not being dismissed. The fact that doctrines are 
not the basis of religion does not mean for Schleiermacher that they should not be 
taken seriously.
It is Schleiermacher’s revision of the soteriological or evangelical 
breakthrough (which was the centerpiece of the Reformation) which discloses the path 
that liberal Protestantism would take in removing the theological obstacles between 
itself and the modem world.
The familiar Reformation theological slogan was solo gratia, sola fide and sola 
Scriptura. The formal locus was scripture, the instrumental, faith, and the material, 
Christ. What Schleiermacher did was to correlate his anthropological analysis of 
absolute dependence to the Reformation's instrumental arm of faith.^  ^ This equation 
between dependence and faith is one of the central meanings of Reformation faith. 
Luther and Calvin, in a way not fundamentally dissimilar, argued for an understanding 
of faith as trust or personal confidence before God.^^
What constitutes a revision of Reformation thought is the location of faith in 
Schleiermacher's system.^  ^By characterizing the intrinsic nature of faith as a universal 
anthropological quality that could be named absolute dependence, Schleiermacher 
gave faith, understood as dependence, an autonomy and preeminence it did not enjoy 
in Reformation evangelicalism. '^  ^By this autonomy, the entire axis of the Reformation 
was shifted.
This is not to underestimate the subtlety of Schleiermacher's work. By 
identifying faith with this anthropological a priori of dependence, and making it the
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source of piety which becomes the genesis of conceptuality or “word," the Pauline 
order to which Reformers appealed, i.e., "faith comes by hearing of the word," was 
reversed.^  ^ By Schleiermacher's logic this "reversal" was reintegrated within the 
Protestant tradition. Faith came through hearing, i.e. via the preaching and ministry of 
the word. This clarifies, awakens and stirs what is there. It does not in the absolute 
sense create it.^  ^Schleiermacher kept the extrinsic mediation of faith via "word", but 
the priority of the word as the absolute source of faith was compromised. The word 
became a resource or support to faith. In the final analysis, the source of faith was an 
anthropological phenomenon.
The importance of this for Schleiermacher is more fully recognized by how he 
conceived of the material content of salvation. Building out of pietist 
post-Reformation development, Schleiermacher focused the transformed life. His 
interpretation was, of course, not constructed along the old pietist ideas, but out of the 
most astute intellectual and empirical insights into human nature of the time. 
Nevertheless, his debt to pietism is often noted as an important key to understanding 
the evolution of his thought.^^
Shifting the center of Christianity from doctrine to piety, has its roots in the 
pietistic reaction against doctrinal formalism. This shift represents a distortion of the 
Reformation. The changed life of the Reformation was thoroughly grounded in the 
priority of a changed relationship before God through the extrinsic historical 
redemptive work of Christ.^* The changed life of pietism, by contrast, became 
preeminent and increasingly studied in a way that abstracted it from its former 
Reformation setting.
Schleiermacher's foundational premise of absolute human dependence cleared 
the way for piety to assume the definitive content of soteriology. In short, his 
anthropological insight of dependence became the organizing motif of soteriology. In 
this, Schleiermacher revised the material content of the soteriological priority of the 
Reformation.
At stake in this argument is Luther's conception of justification by faith. It 
cannot be denied that the early Luther held a view of justification which was primarily 
conceived in gracious Augustinian terms and involved human transformation. Only 
well into the Reformation did his objective views come to be fully clarified.^^
It is no surprise that, for some, an evangelical Reformation precedent is
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thought to exist for the priority, if not the exclusivity, of a subjective soteriological
emphasis.'*® Such an interpretation fails to come to grips not only with the presence
and significance of the objective pole for its importance to the coherence of its
evangelical thought, but the robust humanistic character of the Reformation's
understanding of the Christian life; one in which freedom and unconditional
acceptance constituted its initial impulse.
In the nexus of justification and faith, Luther first clarified faith in relation to
grace in contrast with works. Faith was viewed individually and personally, rather
than ecclesiastically and formally. Second, he clarified Christian righteousness. Before
God, righteousness was complete (i.e., justification); in the believer, it was always
incomplete and flawed (i.e., sanctification). While he could speak profoundly about
the Christian life of faith, his mature overarching theology emphasized distinction and
priority between the subjective and objective of Christ’s work.. GC Berkhower
argues this point when he writes,
"The forensic justification of the Formula of Concord is not a slip into the net 
of scholastic, intellectual order of salvation; it is the end result of a desire to 
keep the sola fide and keep it pure... This was the uniting truth of the sixteenth 
century...It is the preaching of grace, sheer, unalloyed, unmerited grace... 
Forensic justification has to do with what is extra nos, with the imputation of 
what Christ has done on our behalf. This was, indeed, the original disposition 
of the Reformation...Thus, in the forensic idea of justification the sola 
fide-sola gratia finds its purest incarnation. The doctrine of forensic 
justification embodies the gracious act of God in Christ Jesus, whom man can 
take to himself in faith alone.'"**
Ultimately, justification was grounded not only in a gracious (Augustinian) 
God but an objective work of Christ. While some statements of Luther are 
admittedly ambiguous, they are not sufficient to supplant the witness of his mature 
thought. It may be that scholastic formalism and German pietism are not only to be 
seen as action and reaction, but two siblings of the Reformation, neither one a true 
heir of its evangelical witness.
For Schleiermacher, as well as the prominent liberal theologians who came 
after him (such as Ritschl and Herrmann) Christology became the instrumental rather 
than the material means of salvation. The historicity of Jesus's role in salvation is 
maintained, but this role is more properly identified as a means to an end. For 
Schleiermacher, Jesus functions as one man who, in a definitively and quantitatively
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unique degree, embodies God consciousness. Here, the importance of the historic 
Jesus is not relinquished.
What cannot be denied is its new instrumental priority. Jesus is relative to an 
anthropologically identified potentiality. As such, it is Jesus' humanity that survives 
and is made especially important in Schleiermacher's revision, while the dogmatic 
ideas of his divine nature are revised accordingly. Divinity, insofar as it is applicable 
to Jesus, is a matter of the quantity or perfection of God consciousness and therefore 
his difference is one of degree and not of kind, although the degree of Jesus God 
consciousness is such, that in some sense he must be viewed as fimdamentally 
different. In the following statement. Heron captures the subtlety of Schleiermacher’s 
position:
“God-consciousness also supplies the key to the person of the Redeemer and 
the redemption he has accomplished. Jesus was divine in the sense that he was 
‘distinguished fi-om all (other men) by the constant potency of his god- 
consciousness, which was a veritable existence of god in him.’ Similarly, ‘The 
Redeemer assumes believers into the power of his God-consciousness, and 
this is his redemptive activity.’ The awareness of God which is fragmentarily 
and partially there in all men was fully and perfectly formed in Jesus, and 
spreads from him to those who believe in him. This is the essential meaning of 
the old dogma which described his as god incarnate and as our Savior and 
Redeemer. It is also the meaning of the doctrine that he alone was perfect and 
wholly free firom sin.
“The Christian consciousness of God is thus, for Schleiermacher, 
inextricably bound up with Jesus himself, and derived from him. It is not 
simply a general or universal awareness of God, though it gathers up and 
refines the more general consciousness to be found in other religions and at the 
very core of human existence as such. But it is only in and through the 
Christian modification of the God-consciousness that the significance of Jesus 
can be grasped, and it is in terms of God-consciousness that his person and 
work, who he was and what he achieved, must be interpreted.”
Comprehending Jesus’ christological mission within an anthropological 
framework was crucial. Revising the divinity of Christ around the material priority of 
Schleiermacher's anthropological goal cut liberal Protestantism free fi*om the 
Reformation’s objective and theocentric orientation. The authoritative grounds for 
liberalism's claim could not be sustained, either by scripture (which was subjected to 
extensive criticism) or by the person and work of Christ (that traditionally stood both 
in union but in qualitative distinction from humanity). It is the humanity of Christ
149
that is familiar and pliable within an anthropological analysis. The divinity of Christ, 
even following the most rigorous attempts to explain it, possesses a residual 
strangeness. In dialectical theology, as in the Reformation, the dogmatic view of 
Jesus Christ was exploited and correlated with a soteriology which found its priority 
in an interpretation of the human predicament that had its focus in the gulf between a 
righteous God and sinful humanity.
Schleiermacher's critical approach yielded a Jesus who was familiar to the 
nineteenth century, one in which an exceptional level of God consciousness was 
developed. It is not surprising that it was to this very area, the incarnation, that Barth 
would return to regain his footing. This objective theocentric pole began 
foundationally with the righteousness of God. Its radical distinction from the human 
would in time be exploited by dialectical theologians, both to regain the church's 
discontinuity with society, and as a transcendent anchor (over against the 
post-Enlightenment crisis of "fixity").
The soteriological axis fundamentally shifted in Schleiermacher, so that Christ 
was enlisted in a religious anthropological goal of dependence. The Reformation 
Christ, by contrast, was anchored in a predicament that was defined theologically. In 
Reformation thought, the first problem humanity has is the "wrath of God." This 
starting point for soteriology has something of a strangeness to it. It begins with the 
radical disjuncture of God and humanity that cannot be overcome from the human 
side. Within Reformation thought, Jesus Christ bridges this in his life and death, and 
scripture comes to be increasingly appreciated as witnessing to this peculiar human 
problem and resolution. This, in principle, was the real genesis of the Reformation's 
idea of truth, albeit it was a fledgling, vulnerable beginning. It was susceptible to 
being subtly distorted, so that weight might be placed either on the formal components 
scripture and doctrine or existential components faith and piety.
By making clear the evangelical soteriological center of the church (and 
clarifying its authoritative preeminence), the Reformation broke the power of 
ecclesiastical authority, but in so doing, it both created and increased the vulnerability 
of the church to the modem world development, "evangelical authority" is by nature 
especially vulnerable.'*  ^ It is in nineteenth century Protestantism, not Catholicism, that 
the main cultural-philosophical synthesis first occurred. Both Barth and the 
dialectical theologians around him, as Schleiermacher before him, recognized that
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Protestantism (precisely because of its evangelical center) possessed a theological 
character that could be exploited. Barth attempted to radicalize the Reformation's 
evangelical breakthrough, emphasizing its objective or Christocentric side, thereby 
creating a dialectical implement of critique brought to bear against the 
post-Enlightenment assumptions and liberal Protestantism. Schleiermacher, on the 
other hand, revised that evangelical center on its subjective and anthropocentric side, 
thus making it vulnerable to a marriage to post-Enlightenment idealism. This 
revision, created the iiberal-modemist experiment.
Socially and practically the problem can be identified as one of the church's 
uncritical openness to the modem world. But at a deeper level, it is about 
Protestantism's involvement in the westem world's stmggle to transform and relocate 
its authoritative principle this side of the Enlightenment.
In the larger picture, the significance of Schleiermacher’s theological revision 
has to do with whether or not Christianity can be integrated into the anthropological 
foundation of the modem world.
From one perspective, Schleiermacher's "evangelical revision" is merely 
incidental in this story, since it is not the evangelical element that survives into the 
twentieth century, but the religious element. But from another perspective it is 
important, first, because it points up what is vulnerable in Protestantism and second, it 
discloses a shift from the transcendent theocentric revealed moorings of the church to 
a conceptualized anthropocentric mooring. In principle, of course, it is not the 
definitive nature of Schleiermacher's work that is important, but how and what he did 
to link Protestantism to the epistemological terms acceptable to the modem world. He 
accomplished this by prioritizing the subjective faith element in the evangelical 
equation. Barth later exploited and radicalized the transcendent "objective" 
theocentric element of the Reformation's evangelical equation via the revealed word 
as a response that served to reclaim a proper church-world differentiation.
Modemism reconstmed the location of tmth from a position outside and 
above the individual and society to one within. In nineteenth century America, 
society lived with two reference points for social norms and moral boundaries — 
scripture and natural law (corresponding to revelation and reason). Both were viewed 
as absolute and objective, corresponding to a divine givenness that transcended and 
preceded the human encounter with the tmth.
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Modem culture's vision was the emancipation of humans from the 
heteronomous forces of necessity by diminishing the rigid natural law design and 
elevating an immanent model of tmth. Liberal Protestantism opened up a serious 
conversation with this model of tmth. In so doing, it surrendered its conceptual 
justification of correlating society to explicitly "Christian" (read Protestant) values 
and beliefs, as normative criteria for social boundaries. The corresponding 
intensification and deepening of biblical inerrancy on rational grounds had within it 
the opposite conclusion.
The movement toward immanence had its origin in European neoplatonism, 
imported by some late nineteenth and early twentieth century American philosophers 
and theologians. The problem was not its ideas of the immanence of God, spirit or 
mind. Christianity always postulated the immanence of God's spirit to the human 
spirit. Some form of idealism seemed imperative to save the Enlightenment, from a 
barren materialism. Without these developments originating with Kant, Fichte, 
Schelling, Schleiermacher and Hegel around the end of the eighteenth-century, the 
"enlightened man" was destined to lose freedom to a mechanistically determined 
universe. The immanence of divine mind, truth, or goodness, however it was 
conceived, was necessary to save humanity from a materialistic abyss.
However, from the standpoint of Christianity, this effort to conceive of the 
eternal as in some way lodged in the temporal, the spiritual in the material, 
compromised the human dependence on a a unique revelation of truth via scripture 
and the Christ event. The door was opened for humanity and the world to be viewed 
in a more positive, optimistic and developmental way.
What was once grounded wholly outside the human except by the gift (grace) 
of the Holy Spirit working through the testimony of scripture'*  ^came to be variously 
construed as intrinsic to the created make-up of humanity. On this difference rides the 
relationship of the church to its world. To the degree the church viewed truth as 
intrinsically lodged in human nature and world (however that is philosophically 
construed) it conceived its mission as one of employing its religion in service of the 
sociocultural development of its world. If, however, the truth that saves is lodged 
outside of the human experience, and only made known by the testimony of the gospel 
and scripture, the church will take up its proper work as a witness and response to that 
testimony.
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Within the world, within nature and human nature, within history, there was 
the resonance of eternal mind. In the absolute idealism that dominated the time [1900 
- 1930’s and beyond] the identity between the world and Mind was virtually complete. 
But for most strains of liberalism, it was not necessary to embrace this identity in a 
fully radical manner. Immanence, as a direction and as a new framework to 
understand God and truth, was sufficient.
American liberalism may be understood as a project to subject Christianity to 
this one principle of immanence, which guaranteed, as Kenneth Cauthen pointed out, 
three contemporary interests: continuity, autonomy and dynamismJ^  ^ Continuity 
emphasized the inherent unity of this world, making suspect traditional distinctions: 
this world and the next, heaven and hell, a sinful and innocent state of human nature, 
revelation and reason. Autonomy emphasized that no pronouncements, truths, or 
values existed over a person that were not first within that person. In this way, 
freedom was not violated in principle. Regarding the nature of the church's truth, 
autonomy was fully evident as a principle. No matter how Bible truth was construed, 
it was not allowed to be in ultimate tension with reason. Dynamism denoted 
development and openness: truth was a constantly emerging phenomenon.
This radical revision is one manifestation of Protestantism's cultural fusion. It 
is American Protestantism's historic entrenchment in its new world sociocultural 
political project come to flower. Its vision was not one of building the church. Rather, 
it focused on religion's relation to building modem culture and society. Arthur C. 
McGiffert said it this way: "A religion that is to promote and sustain democracy must 
first of all be a religion of faith in man... Religious education in a democracy should 
not be such as to encourage the delusive belief in supernatural agencies and 
dependence upon them, but it should be such as to convince everybody that things can 
be controlled and molded by the power of man.'"*^  This is the more extreme Arminian 
notion in Charles Finney’s theology gone to seed.
Those who were less involved in this revision were by that fact not necessarily 
less distinguished from the cultural shift. In one sense, the "liberals" at the turn of the 
century were less schizophrenic. They recognized the cultural shift and knew that 
unless Protestantism was integrated with modernity, it would forfeit its position 
(which evidently it lost regardless). But from the standpoint of the times, the creative 
theological movement of liberalism is to be credited at least for their awareness that
153
modernity was changing. If Protestantism wanted to maintain its identity, revisions 
were necessary. Many of those Protestants who were less sympathetic with liberalism 
were no less enmeshed in the changing cultural milieu. H. Richard Niebuhr wrote,
"The compromise of the church with anthropocentrism has come almost 
imperceptibly in the course of its collaboration in the work of culture".'*^
Summary
Heretofore it has been argued that the Founders did not simply introduce the 
American colonies to a naked idea of freedom and independence. Rather, they 
presented freedom in a framework of corollary ideas which were of deistic 
Enlightenment origin. As demonstrated in Chapter Three, because of nineteenth 
century Protestantism’s close identification with the new republican venture, it 
assimilated these new social and anthropological ideas. Even so, substantive 
distinctions remained. As this section has attempted to demonstrate, that which 
characterizes the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century modernist 
movement in mainstream Protestantism, is the erosion of these distinctions and an 
even more consistent attempt to contribute to modernity on terms fundamentally in 
harmony with, and complementary to, its goals and premises. This is best summarized 
by returning to these corollary ideas of freedom and noting the extent to which the 
modernists achieved agreement with them. For the sake of brevity, these ideas may be 
identified as (1) the individualistic ethic; (2) virtue; (3) reason; (4) fraternity and (5) 
progress.
The Individual Ethic
Antebellum Protestantism basically embraced the individual claim of 
republicanism and provided religious support for it. Salvation was directed at saving 
and remaking individuals. Modernists argued that the moral support conversion lent to 
the republican polity of individual liberty was not enough to prevent it from causing
destructive social problems. Recourse to legislative power was required to extend the
1promise of liberty horizontally, i.e., democratically. As such, the modernists sought I
legal measures to accomplish the liberal social vision which the Founders believed j
would flow naturally from laissez faire liberty and which the evangelicals thought 
would occur because of the support that regeneration would lend. As pointed out, this I
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shift in the Protestant modernists represents a weakening in their commitment to and 
optimism in the power of conversion, and simultaneously a strengthening of their 
belief in the recreative power of politics. This of course led them to become more 
consistently aligned to secular social goals.
Virtue
The idea of virtue in pure republicanism is basically pelagian. The Protestant 
who dominated nineteenth century certainly believed that virtue and liberty were 
linked, but they contended that virtue ultimately derives from evangelical piety which 
requires human cooperation with divine power. The virtue the republic needed was 
available through revival. This represented a step away from their Puritan forefathers 
which viewed the world through dualistic and deterministic lenses. For them, the 
masses could not achieve true virtue - they could not change. But they held their view 
in an era not yet overtaken by change and progress. Nineteenth century Protestantism 
did not have that luxury and accommodated their view of human change to the new 
climate of hope, optimism and progress which was bom out of the Enlightenment 
empowered revolutionary events.
Protestant modernists must be viewed in much the same light. They lived at a 
time when laissez faire economic liberty had gone to seed. In the face of the problems 
of their day, it was difficult to remain committed to the belief that conversion was all 
that was needed to save society from the ill effects of individual liberty. As a result, 
they shed much of the remaining pessimism in their anthropology. The new focus was 
not on changing a person’s perverse nature but rather evil social structures. This shift 
in focus further moderated their historic view of human depravity, leaving the 
distinctions remaining between Protestant modernists and eighteenth century pelagian 
deists very weak.
Reason
The compatibility between reason and revelation which antebellum 
Protestantism thought it would always enjoy, ended when reason’s link to an absolute 
objective design gave way to a more organic immanent model of truth. Protestantism 
was left with two choices in the face of this transition. It could either deepen its claim 
to objective truth of scripture, employing rational arguments to attest to this fact, or it
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could join the search for a new paradigm of truth which was more profound, i.e., more 
immanent to nature and history. It took both courses. The modernists were convinced 
that what was really valid in their religious beliefs would abide. The problem was that 
in the new paradigm, truth lost its critical facility. No rule extrinsic to human 
rationality and experience remained. The result was that the modernist subjected the 
Protestant tradition and scripture to criticism based on values which were captive to 
early twentieth century democratic ideals. Whereas the nineteenth century 
Protestantism had accorded reason a place alongside Scripture, never questioning the 
objective authority of Scriptures, the modernists ended up subjugating revelation to 
reason in much the same way Jefferson did.'**
Fraternity
Antebellum Protestantism did not see a republic merely organized around 
liberal values but a Christian republic. Evangelical religion was the social glue of the 
nation. In the providence of God, it was the destiny of Christianity and republicanism 
to be joined. There was of course toleration for religious differences but full 
membership in the democratic banquet was culturally and to some degree formally 
tied to evangelicalism. The reconception of truth within a framework of immanence 
forced the Protestant modernists to broaden their parameters of inclusivity. Religious 
(and ethnic) diversity was not to be feared but given its place. The most that could be 
said about the specialness of Christianity was that it was more historically advanced - 
not the sole depository of religious truth. This conclusion weakened, if not in principle 
eliminated, the basis needed to support the vision of a Christian republic.
Progress
As discussed, in antebellum America the idea of progress was fed by two 
different streams which never fully merged. On the one side, Protestantism was able 
to envision itself coming closer to a millennial dawn which God had promised. But it 
tended to conclude that this millennial dawn was near because it had come to believe 
that human nature could be changed and it held in its grasp the evangelical 
implements of change. In the wake of revival came conversion, piety, benevolence 
and cultural reform resulting in the transformation of society. On the republican side, 
the idea of progress was fed by the belief that liberty was the formal requirement for
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creating a better society characterized by industry, discipline, virtue and reason. 
Reason working through scientific method, led to mastery over nature and a new 
sense of human transcendence. These two views of the future fed each other and 
complemented each and to some degree merged in the idea of manifest destiny. 
However, they remained distinct strands of thought. These distinctions evaporated 
when the Protestant modernists came under the influence of new-platonic and 
evolutionary ideas. The idea that within nature and history there existed a dynamic 
force, tempted Protestantism to view modem socio-political developments and their 
religious goals as one unfolding drama. This was one factor why the Protestant 
modernists thoroughly identified the religious realm with the secular realm. Another 
reason which has already been alluded to, was that their idea of change shifted from 
converting human nature to changing the social environment. This was a vocation that 
required the church to understand itself primarily as a social agency with moral 
conscience and courage.
The idea that the church possessed unique importance suffered in this 
development. This is reflected in the bold, if not unwitting, declaration made by a 
former dean of Harvard Divinity School. "The idea of the church is not and never has 
been the centre of our [North American] religious interest. We are more interested in 
the Kingdom of God in its totality."'*® This fact is more critically noted by American 
historians Smith, Handy, and Loetscher.
"Protestant orthodoxy as a whole has been largely indifferent toward 
ecclesiology. The same must be said also of Protestant liberalism. 
Investigation indicates that not a single Christocentric liberal fi*om the time of 
Bushnell until World War I published a major treatise on the nature of the 
church. Furthermore, the subject was almost entirely ignored in the two most 
influential works in liberal systematic theology. Leaders in the social-gospel 
phase of liberalism definitely feared that an emphasis upon the church would 
deflect attention from the kingdom of God. Rauschenbusch, for example, 
argues that the early Christian movement lost its prophetic character when the 
church replaced the kingdom of God as the object of primary interest."^ ®
Writing in the context of modernity's principles, Kenneth Cauthen says:
“Finally, the principle of continuity reduced the distance between the 
church and the total society. Liberals were more interested in the 
transformation of the whole society into the kingdom of God than in the 
church itself as a distinctive community of faith. The church was widely 
regarded in an instrumental and pragmatic sense. Its purpose was to 
co-operate with other social agencies in promoting the ends of justice and
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brotherhood. As a result, the doctrine of the church fell into serious neglect 
among many liberal thinkers."^*
Section B
Fundamentalist Evangelical Protestantism - 
The Religious Right and Social Fixity
In the latter decades of this century, the segment of Protestantism known as 
fundamentalism moved from a position of relative cultural separatism to that of an 
active agent for social reform. The following discussion progresses through three 
stages. First, the social conditions which comprise the seed bed for the rise of this 
phenomenon are reviewed. In principle "stabilizing" and moralizing movements are 
endemic to the individualistic structure and ethos of modem society. The rise of the 
fundamentalist driven Religious Right is an outgrowth of the individualistic structure 
and ethos of modernity come of age.
Second the history and conditions within fundamentalist evangelicalism that 
predicted its eventual emergence as an active social agent for moral stability and as a 
conserver of former cultural norms, are considered. Here a larger societal need is 
perceived and named (fixity: certainty, authority and stability), and a religious 
ecclesial source familiar with these qualities emerged to become a socially relevant 
agent to return these qualities to society. The third discussion analyzes the emergence 
of fundamentalist evangelicalism which matured into the present Religious Right. 
This discussion reviews the basis on which social fixity was thought to be obtained: 
authority and control.
The Societal Condition Necessary for the 
Rise of Religion as Social Fixity
The social polity and ethos of modernity created by the Founding Fathers 
contained within itself the seeds of an eventual sociocultural crisis. It is the arrival of 
this social condition or "crisis" that accounts for the rise of the Fundamentalist-driven 
Religious Right. The Founders were instrumental in implanting within their society a 
formal mechanism which could be endlessly exploited for cultural change (through a 
process of diversification and individualization). In addition to this, they instilled 
collective confidence in the values of modernity, insisting they were good for the
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individual as well as society. But they did this on the basis of their "Enlightenment 
faith." They presumed that if society was politically reorganized to guarantee 
individual liberty and empowered by the new ethos, it would inevitably lead to a high 
level of sociocultural harmony and cohesion. Two prominent American historians of 
this century have rightly identified the Founding Fathers as cosmopolitans who 
believed in the essential compatibility of ethnic and religious differences with social 
harmony. America for them was not about submitting these differences to a process of 
syncretism but empowering a new synergism.^  ^ Their plan rested in part on their 
naive Enlightenment faith in reason and natural law harmony (later revised and 
influenced by Post-Enlightenment immanental idealism). It was inevitable that with 
the acceleration of the process of pluralization, individualization, and secularization 
(along with the ethos that accompanied these), common cultural stores would be 
depleted and a less socially and morally coherent condition would result. This 
accounts for the rise of groups seeking, in one way or another, to reground, reconnect, 
or "resacralize" society. That religious groups would become involved in this 
"reclamation" of society, should come as no surprise to the student of history.
Religion has always been vulnerable to being co-opted into becoming a socially 
conservative principle.
With the coming of modernity, the nation's formal polity (declaring the right 
of life, liberty and, the pursuit of happiness to all) would be extended beyond the 
narrow cultural boundaries of antebellum America. Socially speaking, nothing 
characterizes modernity more than this phenomenon of pushing back the existing 
strictures of culture to make room for greater diversity. Through recourse to political 
judicial leverage via the courts and constitution, what belonged to the few became 
potentially available to all. Liberty, rights, social status, economic and educational 
opportunity were in principle universalized. Proprietorial, gender, religious and other 
differences, to which were attached sociocultural significance, began to be challenged 
and relativized.
While antebellum America made some progress in this direction, it was the 
Civil War that ushered in modernity proper. Even though the civil war was entered 
upon for less noble reasons than the defense of idealistic principles, it eventually came 
to be interpreted as a victory for America's original charter, "all men are created equal 
and endowed by their creator with inalienable rights." When the evil of one race's
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enslavement by another was challenged and overturned on the moral grounds of this 
principle, a new history of broadening the scope of America's charter commenced. In 
the wake of this victory, the United States would progress on a path of mini­
revolutions and struggles, each of which would relativize and loosen the existing 
organization of culture so as to accommodate greater diversity. Blacks, women, 
children, workers, ethnic and religious minorities and gays would demand inclusion 
into a social contract, which once was culturally bound so as to only fully include the 
white landed Protestant male. This process made society a matrix for individuation.
The policy of individual liberty and the ethos of individualism, as Gertrude 
Himmelfarb pointed out, are intimately intertwined.^^ In other words, as the rights of 
republic citizenship became legally and culturally more inclusive, the ethical fiction of 
absolute individualism grew stronger. This ethos is a cultural standard of value which 
encourages individuals to relativize and transcend collective definitions and 
determinations of themselves. These may arise from marriage, family, church, nation, 
etc. They may exhibit features that are rooted in social history, tradition, religion or 
ethnic heritage. Increasingly as the individual becomes more and more absolute there 
is less and less shared socio-cultural values. In this condition, society loses almost all 
critical force. Consent versus coercion and protection of children represent the extent 
of its moral horizon. All social behaviour not explicitly criminal is free to claim, 
expect and be granted social acceptance. Dignity, right and liberty are non-dialectical.
While the justification of this process is unquestionable by the standard of 
modernity's ethic, the cultural optimism inherent within it is parallel to the economic 
optimism of laissez faire. What law exists that can guarantee that the process of 
empowering individuation, greater social diversity, plurality and difference will yield 
results compatible with sociocultural cohesion and integrity? What principle 
guarantees that social atomization, divisions, fragmentation and the polarization of 
entities will not result? Is it a simple historical possibility to underwrite the 
legitimacy of all difference? Is it a historical probability that the social polity and 
ethos of modernity, which encourages (if not guarantees) the right of all persons to 
individuate themselves from preexisting social definitions, will automatically end 
with these same individuals transcending self so as to insure sociality? With the 
radical relativizing of institutional authority and political, familial, and ecclesiastical 
conventions, what is to insure the reintegration of the individual into a harmonious
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social relation? In short, what grounds ensure that the empowering of individual 
freedom does not end in social anarchy? Beyond merely an increased reliance on law 
and coercive power, what is there to guarantee society's cultural seams will not come 
completely unraveled? Historically, neither the Founding Fathers nor Protestant 
evangelicals ignored the element of social risk inherent in a policy which guaranteed 
individual liberty within the limits of the common good. That which allowed them to 
proceed with confidence on their course of reconstructing social polity so as to 
guarantee liberty was a set of informal presuppositions which they believed in.
Their model of society was constructed around the building up of suitable 
individual units: citizens. Such individuals were not directly connected in a posture of 
social solidarity and shared fortunes and futures. Rather, each person was 
individuated and was a distinct embodiment (to a greater or lesser degree) of 
republican virtue over vice, learning and experience over ignorance and folly, 
usefulness and productivity over poverty and latent untapped resourcefulness.^**
Religion, virtue and reason were instrumental in prompting the person 
"upward." Individuals were connected (as it were) "vertically." The social or 
horizontal vision was an automatic by-product of building a certain kind of highly 
individuated complete "man." This social model of a collective of individual units 
meant that the structures and conventions that organized society were regarded with 
moral indifference. Converted and changed individuals would "save" society. The 
individual, made right by learned virtue or evangelical piety, would create a ripple 
effect. His or her piety, moral force and sharpened sense of compassion and justice 
would automatically extend itself outward.
In this context, the moral capacity of the isolated individual was exaggerated 
by many in the nineteenth century, including prominent churchmen. Slavery as an 
institution would come to an end by the sheer force of moral persuasion exerted on 
estate owners, quite apart from any change in the law of the land.^^
As discussed in Section A, the vertical reference which provided society with 
an ordered world view, (i.e. an objective point of moral fixity) was not jettisoned but 
reconceived within a more organic and immanental paradigm. No one definitive, 
accessible design existed which harmonized humans to achieve positive ends. The 
"New" order, theoretically speaking, became a given. It had a life of its own.
Diversity on this ground was untouchable and optimistically entertained. Reason and
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experience (the grounds of Enlightenment humanism), liberated from strict 
conformity to external absolutes, could find their own ends and fulfillment/^ Truth 
was conceived as more within oneself, within societies and within history. This 
meant that, in time, all historical incongruities could be viewed in the framework of a 
larger resolution.
In the end, neither the eighteenth-century assumptions that viewed liberty in 
relation to natural law-design, nor the late nineteeth-century belief in immanence, 
warranted the Founders’ social optimism. The increased individualization and 
pluralization that occurred in society because of mainstreaming the promise and 
precedent embedded in the Declaration of Independence and Bill of Rights, cannot be 
neatly separated from the growing ethos of individualism and pluralism that pervaded 
culture. Both polity and ethos are intertwined and may be ultimately antithetical to 
social harmony, rather than conducive to it. The Founders’ economic assumptions 
about the realization of a relatively egalitarian citizenship were in the end based 
merely on laissez faire fiction. In the same way, it is appropriate to conclude that the 
policy of individual liberty regarding the realization of socio-moral harmony would 
eventually be called into question in light of deteriorating social conditions.
A number of prominent thinkers in this century have recognized the social risk 
that modernity's liberal principles present. Writing around the turn of the century, 
Ernst Troeltsch pointed out that the ethos of "rationalistic individualism passed more 
and more into a relativism, the disruptive and divisive effects of which are only too 
familiar to us today. There are not wanting, of course socializing reactions against 
this tendency...". He went on to speak of a political economic countermovement 
against autonomous individualism.^^
Reinhold Niebuhr also recognized the inherent risk in individualism: "Human 
freedom always produces disruptive as well as creative effects in the human 
community."^* "The unity and stability of the community makes liberty even today 
less than an absolute right. "Tragic events of recent history prove that organic and 
historic forms of human togetherness cannot be so easily dissolved by abstract 
individualism and universalism."^® More recently, Robert Bellah has suggested that 
individualism stands behind the "depletion of non-renewable cultural resources."^*
Gertrude Himmelfarb's, On Looking into the Abyss: Untimely Thoughts on 
Culture and Society, also focused on this problem: "Tocqueville, writing about
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America but having in mind all those countries (notably his own) that would 
inevitably follow America along the path of democracy, was especially alert to the 
dangers of excessive individuality - 'individualism' as he called it. That 'novel 
expression' he explained, derives from a 'novel idea': not selfishness (egoisme) in the 
old sense, which is passionate and exaggerated love of self, 'but a mature and calm 
feeling' which disposes eveiy individual to sever himself from society. Originating 
from democracy and thriving on equality, individualism saps the 'virtues of public life 
and eventually of private life as well.'"®^
The emergence of religion as a mechanism of social fixity is not merely to be 
explained as an inevitable reaction to cyclical social change, but a reaction to a linear 
problem that had been evolving for some time. Modernity come of age creates social 
problems that are rooted both in the very structure or polity which organizes society 
itself and the corresponding ethos that becomes culturally established. The 
persistence of a Protestant culture in the United States during its first century and a 
half, hid the underlying weaknesses of the system until that culture eroded.
Bonhoeffer recognized in his day that westem culture was living off of the 
religious capital of its ancestors. He spoke in one context of humanity and goodness 
"as the unconscious residue of a former attachment to the ultimate."®  ^ The social 
consequences of individual transcendence would eventually manifest itself by extreme 
socio-moral pluralism. The right to challenge social norms, conventions, traditions, 
taboos and morals in one area contains within it a vims which in time challenges all 
areas.
Freedom, defined as individual autonomy and inviolability, does not possess 
within it an informing teleological principle. Its socio-moral compass is determined 
by the interests and drives germane to the self.^ The dominance of this "ethic" 
demands that society accommodate the continual proliferation of individualistic and 
pluralistic claims, so long as no explicit injury to others is involved. The dogma of 
individuality within an existing Christian Protestant culture was benign, but with the 
passing of the culture (and the emerging maturity of the polity and ethos of 
individuality) a sociocultural condition inevitably arrived which spawned movements 
(such as the Religious Right) which aim to selectively circumscribe the political 
guarantee for individual liberty and seek to connect society to socio-moral 
"absolutes."
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This logic is further evident by exploring the implications of secularization. 
Protestantism remained invested in American society after disestablishment. 
Culturally, it had become (and would continue to become) deeply entrenched in the 
mainstream of American life. Educational institutions, public reforms [e.g. 
temperance], Protestant benevolent organizations aimed at relief for the poor, children 
and widows, provided Protestantism with a public character and interaction.
But its public face bore more than a benevolent complexion. Protestantism 
had insisted that America was a Christian nation, and it insisted that the morals, 
values and broad beliefs of Christianity be given preference through judicial and 
legislative protection. In the political foundations of the country, Jefferson and 
Madison embedded the liberal values which required the secularization of the public 
domain. But these principles were only gradually implemented.^^ Regarding the 
secularization, not of culture, but of public life, a steady increasing alignment with the 
Jefferson/Madisonian principle is historically discernible, dating back to the early 
decades of the nineteenth century.^  ^ While passionately resisted by Protestantism and 
its leaders, as well as significant political figures, the terms of public life steadily 
appealed to rational rather than religious categories of truth, right, wrong and justice 
in areas of public accountability and commerce. This one criterion distinguishes 
Modernity from the nascent modemism of the antebellum period, namely, the 
maturation, progress and wide acceptance of the Jefferson/Madison basis of society. 
Secularization, seeded by the Founders, eventually took root and grew to dominance. 
Growing ethnic and religious pluralism in America made recourse to normative 
religious claims increasingly impossible. What was once culturally normative 
eventually came to be regarded as the particularities of one group among others.
Socioculturally speaking, the nineteenth century had commenced with a rather 
unified Christian-Protestant complexion around its values, beliefs and morals. But the 
sociocultural complexion of America in the modem period steadily became less 
unified. This contrast has a philosophical parallel. At the beginning of the nineteenth 
century society, two reference points for tmth were both thought to be compatible and 
universal in character.®  ^ One was a rational (and empirical) standard, the other a 
reveiational standard (i.e., the Christian Bible). As a normative reference for right and 
wrong, for basic values and for belief in God and tmth, the Bible was widely regarded 
as socially normative. Reason and science reading nature could also arrive at the same
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conclusions. The Bible, regarded as a source rather the source of truth, was at once the
common source of truth. America came out of the Revolution confident in essentially
two compatible sources of authority.^*
In the nineteenth century, it was inconceivable to move society from this
foundation of truth. But modernity come-of-age emerges with only one normative
reference in society. Philosophically speaking, this transition is due to more than
pragmatic accommodation, to the increase in social pluralism or the progress of the
formal polity of the Founders. Two factors are involved: one secular, the other
religious. The secular sourcing of the nation, was not merely a formal arranging of
society around the liberal values of freedom and equality. Freedom contained an
ideological fuse. It was grounded in an optimistic reading of human nature, which
was at once in tension with puritan religio-political thought which held to a
pessimistic view of human nature and required a corresponding exercise of political
power to limit the socio-moral freedom of the masses.
What once existed under the authoritative purveyance and dissemination of
these institutions (i.e. the morality and truth necessary to conduct one’s life, saving it
from corruption etc.) was, by Enlightenment standards, readily accessible to reason.
The Enlightenment argued that through the critical power of reason and experience
alone, universal eternal moral truths could be discerned and given their proper place in
society, thereby making heteronomous institutions and sources redundant. Kant
enthusiastically claimed that Enlightenment was the agent of the kingdom of God
because it made universal through reason what had been previously caught in the grip
of parochial ecclesiastical institutions.^® In his critical study of Christianity, Religion
Within the Limits o f Reason Alone (1793), Kant wrote,
“We have good reason to say that 'the Kingdom of God is come unto us' once 
the principle of the gradual transition of ecclesiastical faith to the universal 
religion of reason, and so to a (divine) ethical state on earth, has become 
general and has gained somewhere a public foothold, even though the actual 
establishment of this state is still infinitely removed from us. For since this 
principle contains the basis for a continual approach toward such a 
consummation, there lies in it (invisibly) as a seed which is self-developing 
and in due time self-fertilizing, the whole which one day is to illuminate and to 
rule the world. But truth and goodness... do not fail to communicate 
themselves far and wide once they have become public, thanks to their natural 
affinity with the moral predisposition of rational beings generally. The 
obstacles, arising from political and civil causes, which may from time to time 
hinder their spread, serve rather to make all the closer the union of men's
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spirits with the good (which never leaves their thoughts once they have cast 
their eyes upon it). Such, therefore, is the activity of the good principle, 
unnoted by human eyes but ever continuing—erecting for itself in the human 
race, regarded as a commonwealth under laws of virtue, a power and a 
kingdom which sustains the victory over evil and, under its own dominion, 
assures the world of an eternal peace.”’®
It was not with the church’s morality that American Enlightenment elites such 
as Jefferson were in conflict. Rather, it was the pretension of ecclesiastical authority 
that they disavowed. Through reason, these could be given a simple historical social 
existence. Unwittingly, Protestantism in America entered into the new republican 
arrangement in good faith, thinking that while the ecclesiastical universalism of 
church as an institution over society was past, a functional universalism guided by the 
minimal contents of their faith and practice would remain in place. It was 
inconceivable that their truths and values would not be given their proper universal 
dignity, grounded as they were in revelation and convinced as they were that reason 
was not in fundamental conflict with revelation.
Enlightenment idealism, insofar as it was infused into the social reorganization 
of the nation, was in principle never benign regarding the church or its religion. In 
principle it wanted to provide for the social privatization of religion (as a right under 
its commitment to individual sovereignty) and the social endorsement of reason (as 
universally reliable and the only proper coinage of public commerce).’* Protestantism 
resisted this privatization by deepening its claim to the public character of its 
knowledge. But in the end this claim could not be sustained under the increasing 
dominance of the terms of modernity. It is, however, the character and predicament of 
modernity that is important to recognize. Modemily's problems are two fold. First, 
the privatization of religion contributes to the contemporary condition of a shrinking 
or diminishing common cultural texture. In the widely read study. The Culture o f 
Disbelief Stephen Carter claimed that religion as a reference for social public 
intercourse and interaction had gone by the wayside.’^  All appeals to ecclesiastical 
and religious rationale were relegated to the precincts of one's private group. Not only 
was there no common religio-moral language, but there was also an absence of respect 
for those appealing to their own religious reference to authority within a public 
setting.
Second, contemporary society is living after the disappointment of the collapse
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of universalism. In the modem period, individuals and groups claiming their own 
sanctions and warrants have increasingly emerged, creating a competitive, polarized, 
and compartmentalized society. In short, Kant's optimism about the simple historical 
realization of eternal values and morals via individual reason is not historically 
verified. Within a social polity that sanctions individual rights and differences, reason 
does not create what ecclesial-political power supplied: cohesion or unity and a 
common moral language. That is to say, rationality is servant to particular interests, 
not fundamentally a “higher” faculty which naturally enables a person to transcend 
himself and access universal order and interests. The secularization of society, 
created by the universalization of reason and the privatization of religion, led to a 
crisis.
Modernity is defined by the coincidence of both of these phenomena, creating
what may be descriptively identified as cultural erosion, the exhaustion and depletion
of those historic religio-cultural resources that provide cohesion and stability to the
social body.’^  Little or no common criteria remain to adjudicate social boundaries
(right from wrong, better fi-om worse, self interest versus community interest). It is
the presence of this condition that explains the rise of "top-down" stabilizing
strategies, whether economic, social or religious.’*
Himmelfarb, quoting Nietzsche, summarizes the problem with which
modernity finds itself saddled:
Nietzsche, who took nothing for granted, least of all the virtues of self control, 
self-restraint, and self-discipline, had contempt for those English moralists - 
that "flathead" Mill, as he called him and that "little moralistic female" George 
Eliot - who thought they could secularize morality by divorcing it from 
Christianity. Beneath their "insipid and cowardly concept 'man' " lingers the 
old "cult of Christian morality." What these "moral fanatics" do not realize is 
how conditional their morality is on the religion they profess to discard. And 
it is only because of the persistence of that religion that, for the English, 
"morality is not yet a problem."’^
The phenomenon of the rise of a Protestant-led Religious Right from the 
background of this analysis, and in light of Protestantism's history, is clearly more 
than a mere collision of different values (which, of course it is). It is more than a 
Right - Left polemic. And it deserves a more dispassionate analysis. While truly 
lacking as a constructive socially viable response, the concerted action of right-wing 
religion grows out of a sociocultural condition that is rapidly losing cultural integrity.
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It is the existence of this condition which prompted the Right in America to take the 
"high" ground and present a united front to save America and save society.
Stepping forward in this messianic spirit, rather than merely polarizing over 
key issues, was not out of character with Protestantism’s past relation to America 
during both antebellum and colonial periods. Neither this messianic relation to 
society nor the Religious Right’s "plan of salvation" which was to connect society en 
masse to religio-moral absolutes, was in principle unique. What is relatively 
distinctive is that for the first time this occurred in a setting in which society is 
consistently organized around Enlightenment liberal values. The Enlightenment 
social experiment has had time to fully mature, so that its effect on society's cultural 
moral cohesion is much more clearly recognized. There is nothing in the 
Enlightenment premises which prevents a condition of individualistic socio-moral 
relativism. Over against grounding moral choices in the individual [even the 
“rational” individual], the Right suddenly came to the forefront claiming that there 
exists a clear moral reference outside of the individual.
To the surprise of many in the late 1970's, fundamentalist Protestantism 
emerged out of its social insularity, joined hands with other religious groups, and 
commenced to wage an all-out cultural war to save the nation, insisting that America 
return to its former religio-moral foundations. Over against the breakdown of a 
cultural-moral consensus it asserted a gospel of moral absolutism derived from 
natural, transcendent (i.e. religious) and historical (traditional) referents. Further, it 
engaged the Republican party in an effort to harness the democratic process for 
socio-moral reform. In this, it selectively attacked not only the ethos but the polity 
which allowed for the individualization, pluralization and secularization of society.
The Right attributed special significance to particular social changes. They 
contended that certain changes not only reflected but caused America’s social 
collapse. In the early 1960's, prayer (that is, public prayers) and Bible readings in 
public schools were finally prohibited.’  ^ In taking these steps, the courts were not 
moving ahead of cultural change, but in the wake of it. America had changed, 
becoming religiously plural and culturally more secular. In time Fundamentalists 
would seize upon this step, finalized by the Supreme Court, as the signal that America 
had slipped off its Judeo-Christian foundation and become fully secularized. They 
would also link this "secularism" in the public schools to the breakdown of morals in
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the youth as contributing, if not causing, a train of social ills.”  It is almost impossible 
to estimate the extent that these decisions would be exploited as the irrefutable 
evidence of a secularistic takeover.
In 1973, the Rowe v Wade Supreme Court decision paved the way for the 
legalization of abortion, upholding a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy. During 
the 1970's divorce increased 67%, and families headed by unwed mothers rose 356%. 
In 1979,17% of all white children and 55% of all black children were bom out of 
wedlock. In the wake of the late sixties and throughout the 1970's, the use of dmgs, 
pornography, and teen pregnancy rose sharply, with a corresponding rise in 
dependence on the welfare state. In this same period, feminism became a social force 
and homosexuals began to assert their place within society. The former director of the 
Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, James E. Wood, Jr., made the following 
statement concluding his analysis about the sudden rise of the Religious Right in the 
late 1970's:
"The reasons behind the emergence of (religious) fundamentalist political 
movements are not difficult to understand. Many ills attend American 
society... The social revolution of recent decades has resulted in placing a 
severe strain on moral and religious values and in posing severe threats to 
family life throughout the nation. The eroding patterns of authority and the 
growing permissiveness of an increasingly pluralistic society have had a 
frightening effect on millions of Americans. Understandably, there is a 
nativist longing for the certainties of the past that the new right readily 
seeks to fill...The political arm of fundamentalism sees itself as offering the 
moral and political answers to the nation’s ills as furnishing a virtual blueprint 
for the reordering of American society."’*
The Rise of Religion as Social Fixity
In the 1970's, Protestant fundamentalism moved from a separatistic posture (in 
its relations to mainstream America and the cultural course of the nation) to a posture 
of political militancy in an effort to reassert a measure of social control. The sudden 
shift of late twentieth century Protestant fundamentalism from cultural insularity and a 
solely individualistic soteriological focus to one of sociopolitical engagement can only 
be properly understood in light of past transitions.
In the nineteenth century, sectarian divisiveness was, in part, tamed by 
evangelical revivalism and the strengthening of what Protestantism held in common. 
This was paralleled by the cultural establishment of Protestantism versus the political
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establishment of particular churches of the previous era. But despite being the "first" 
religion of the republic and achieving a significant level of cultural homogeneity, 
uneasy tensions persisted. A measure of control over the identity of the republic and 
its values was part of the nineteenth century Protestant mind-set. That this impulse 
did not become more volatile in the nineteenth century is likely due to the fact that 
Protestantism had fully domesticated its world and kept it familiar.
The exercise of formal control over society, as well as the exercise of 
influence over society (culturation), were both live Protestant evangelical "strategies" 
in the nineteenth century, with control progressively giving place to the dominance of 
the latter. It is, however, another question whether the premises that supported a 
posture of control disappeared. What is clearly evident is that influence was working. 
By the close of the antebellum period, Protestantism held undisputed cultural 
dominance. It had lent enormous persuasive power to the abolitionist cause, as well 
as the temperance campaigns.
Even so, Protestantism's cultural dominance was partly an illusion. The new 
world had been penetrated by the modernistic premises sown by the Jefferson and 
Madison school. Positivistic seeds were in the soil of the new nation to which 
Protestantism was culturally wedded. Society was inexorably moving in the direction 
of a more consistent incarnation of secular premises. It was almost inevitable that, in 
time, Protestantism would itself be rent by this development, one part staying with 
culture and modernity, another part becoming more separatist, both toward the 
modem sociocultural world as it matured and toward the mainstream of Protestantism 
that remained invested in that world. It is also true that the estrangement that occurred 
eventually increased, taking on a life of its own, polarizing around doctrinal issues, 
chiefly around the question of biblical authority.
Because modernity had epistemologically challenged moral and biblical 
absoluteness, fundamentalism defended itself by pushing beyond its normative 
confession of the trustworthiness of scripture. Out of this controversy, a divided 
Protestantism emerged. One part, freed from its internal opposition, and emboldened 
by its apparent victory, moved deeper into modernistic premises and culture. The 
other part gradually moved away fi*om the modem world. New denominations, 
seminaries, colleges and printing houses were created in the wake of an exodus from 
mainline churches and institutions, who were viewed as infected with modemism.
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The spirit and confession (i.e. piety) of the new churches were openly shaped in 
antagonism to cultural standards. In essence, Protestantism had identified, not just a 
single issue enemy, but an entire world direction. Mission was understood in strictly 
individualistic terms. Social agency and activism were not important, as such. 
Conservative evangelical theology strengthened Protestantism’s historic appeal to 
scripture by claiming that the entire scope of scripture was inerrant and all that it said 
was infallible. In addition, this evangelicalism became consistently pre-millennial.^^
Separatism is often a covert form of aggression. It signals loss of control and 
an intensifying of hostility and alienation with its world. In fundamentalism’s case, 
this was an alienation from a world that had previously submitted to its cultural and 
religious values. Unable to remain domesticated by Protestantism, the "New World" 
completed its emancipation. It was inevitable, in hindsight, that part of Protestantism 
would take up a counter-cultural position. Here piety is not merely a statement of 
one’s understanding of Christian discipleship. Rather, it represented the location of 
the individual in her relation to the world. It is in part a world-denying statement, 
bom out of a collision with an eroding cultural ethos. Fundamentalist Protestantism’s 
turn toward a posture of sociocultural separatism signifies the failure of its efforts to 
control its world and represents an unresolved tension with its world. This is the 
background necessary for understanding the renaissance of religion reshaped in the 
form of social fixity.
Fundamentalist Evangelical Protestantism — The Religious Right and Social 
Fixity: The Cultural Mainstreaming of Authority and Control
Before 1978, there were some concentrated attempts to socially activate 
fundamentalists’ latent antagonism toward modernity, but these did not materialize.*® 
Where others failed, Reverend Jerry Falwell, fundamentalist preacher and 
tele-evangelist, would succeed and inaugurate a new social engagement for religion. 
The broad outlines of this history are generally well known.
Falwell formed the Moral Majority to polemicize the modem social trends and 
gather a base of support to reverse the "breakdown of traditional values," Other 
tele-evangelists from similar right-wing evangelical backgrounds joined in. Soon, a 
well-funded, broad-based religious movement began to coalesce around 
sharply-defined positions. Alliances with cultural and political conservatives were
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formed. Para-church organizations for every conceivable socially conservative cause 
sprang up and proliferated, on local, state and national levels. Major coalitions were 
built with sophisticated networking skills, so that elections (from the presidential race 
to the seats on local school boards) were swung: Issues once thought secure by law 
were mired injudicial and legislative battles.
What began under the dynamism and authoritarianism of the evangelical right, 
spread beyond Protestantism to Catholic and Jewish circles, creating a religious rather 
than a strictly Protestant or Christian right. The movement is now over two decades 
old and shows no signs of abating. It has grown through experience and adversity and 
is now admittedly less strident and openly crude in its rhetoric. While no less 
religious and theistic, it is now working through fine-tuned para-church agencies that 
are cross-connected with their wider counterpart ecclesial and political constituencies.
The explanation for fundamentalist Protestantism's sudden emergence from 
cultural insularity to militant social action lies in the discovery of a mutual point of 
contact. On the one hand, the historical trajectory of the experiment of society, 
organized around liberal values, had come to maturity. The acceleration of a process 
of individualization, secularization and pluralization was resulting in the "depletion of 
cultural stores." By formalizing individual liberty into social polity, and by the 
cultural establishment of an ethos of individualism, a condition characterized by 
increased particularism had progressively come to define society, creating a less stable 
situation (characterized by increased individual autonomy and greater moral diversity 
and relativity).
On the other hand, a culturally parochialized Protestantism looked out at this 
peculiar social condition, eventually to recognize within itself at least two 
characteristics that it would come to regard as relevant: (1) the absolutizing of its 
religio-moral standards and (2) the extension of the minimal content of these 
standards beyond the parameters of its ecclesial life for larger social-national 
purposes.
In the latter of these, fundamentalism was reengaging that part of 
Protestantism's past which had manifested itself in colonial and antebellum times, that 
is, with one exception. In the colonial and antebellum periods, modernity was in the 
process of being bom. For fundamentalist Protestantism to regain a measure of 
religio-moral control over the nation in the late twentieth century would require a new
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direct collision with modernity's social premises and a new kind of political 
involvement.
That the new Religious Right was inaugurated by fundamentalist evangelicals 
was not an accident. Fundamentalism discovered within itself that which society 
appeared to lack and need. It was the most coherent, self-conscious religious 
depository of those qualities of certainty, fixity, stability, authority and unity, missing 
in contemporary society. Furthermore, there is no evidence that this branch of 
Protestantism ever reconciled itself with relinquishing the hope of an on%om% formal 
connection between the nation and its values and beliefs. Its emergence from 
reclusivity to social relevance would require two new employments of its religion: 
authority and control. This involved a partial transformation or abstraction of itself 
and its religion.
In the fundamentalist mind, socio-moral cohesion, i.e., “fixity,” is ultimately 
dependant on society’s connection to a set of moral absolutes. It is this absolute given 
(i.e., eternal) character of moral truth that ensures society will not succumb to moral 
erosion and change. For this reason, forging this connection and establishing the 
absolute character of morality are both crucial to fundamentalism. If society is not tied 
to a well defined moral anchor, it will drift and shipwreck in a sea of moral confusion. 
In principle, this theory shares much with New England Puritanism, the elitism of 
eighteenth century republicanism and nineteenth century attempts to force a Christian 
republic. There is implied in this idea a sense that nations can escape the aging 
process; that they can endure as if exempt from the corrosive effects of the historical 
process because of a connection with that which is eternal. Of course, this is all 
dependent upon the presupposition that the absolute moral truth is simply and 
unambiguously accessible in time.
Authority
What existed within a sharply defined parochial setting, required 
transpositioning to a "universal" secular social setting. Authoritarianism and 
absolutism may have functioned relatively well within the social microcosm of 
fundamentalism, but could it also be made to so function within a macrocosm 
(society)? Could it be easily transmuted to that plane? Fundamentalist, absolutistic 
tendencies in part derived their strength from "negative energy," that is to say, their
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tension with modernity's ills and exploits, manifested in society and in 
liberal-moderate Protestantism. Furthermore, fundamentalism's experience with a 
high degree of social stability and rigidity transpired within relatively small, closed 
ecclesial social units. Even so, eventually a national network of self-help groups for 
recovering fundamentalists sprang up.
The movement of religious authority from a parochial to a wider social setting 
took place, analytically speaking, out of the mutual attraction of opposites. A social 
condition was forming, defined by the absence of moral consensus (or the cultural 
breakdown of such a consensus corresponding to a greater display of idiosyncratic 
individualism). It is in this vacuum that the question arose: If society is not to find its 
socio-moral order and norms from within its cultural format, from where shall it 
derive them?
Fundamentalist social "relevance" arrives with this question. Its sources of 
authority are "needed." Of course, this is an effort to disclose the underlying logic of 
this phenomenon. What is readily evident is that fundamentalism exploited its 
authoritarian sources in the historical moment by judging a wide gamut of social 
changes and weighing them in the balances. The authority with which they were 
familiar was brought into the mainstream of society. The certainty, lack of ambiguity, 
black/white, right/wrong ethic they brought was met by many within society as a 
refreshing victory over the “anaemic” morality of the times.**
This predilection for adjudicating social issues in black-white relief may in 
part be challenged as anachronistic. The social structures necessary for an absolutist 
approach, if they ever existed, had largely disappeared.*^ Many of the issues, broadly 
speaking, have been and continue to be gathered under the rubric "family,"** a term 
that became highly politicized and used in umbrella fashion. "Family" became a 
euphemism for right-wing ideology.
Over time, the Religious Right would exploit three sources, with the intention 
to resupply society's apparent critical-authority deficit: The transcendent, i.e. 
religious sources (in this case biblical revelation); nature, the natural ordering of 
creation; and history or tradition.
Fundamentalism had previously fought a war to salvage biblical authority 
against the attacks of modernism. They were equipped with a dogma of a plenary 
infallible, inerrant Bible and with a rather simple direct approach to understand and
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apply its instruction.*'* This battle forced them to reach for respectable and 
sophisticated rational arguments so as to fend off the steady advance of historical 
criticism. If scripture was to escape the relativization of its authority, the ground of 
that authority had to be made secure.
Before the turn of the century in America, Princeton and Charles Hodge Sr. 
(followed by his son and Benjamin Warfield) took up the task of safeguarding and 
strengthening the authority of scripture. Later, Cornelius Van Til and Carl Henry, 
among others, carried on serious theological efforts to defend the authority of 
scripture. In the seventies, a host of lesser lights, more fundamentalist than 
theological, such as Hal Lindsey, a former editor of Christianity Today and popular 
author, took up the task. Scriptural inerrancy, they argued, if compromised in the 
least, would cause the entire religio-moral foundation of human life to come 
unraveled. It is the rational grounds of this authority that is insisted upon, without 
which the claim of universality versus mere "special pleading" or parochiality rests. It 
is this logical-rational basis, theoretically speaking, that legitimizes the claim that 
society's norms ultimately must be informed by biblical standards. In other words, 
arguing for the authority of scripture, disqualifies scriptural norms from functioning as 
socially normative. Rationality, so-called, pretends to prove the Bible’s authority. As 
such, it attempts to establish the Bible’s religio-moral positions on a basis which the 
world must respect and give credence. In this way, the Bible is made to function for 
making authoritative statements about social choices, directions, positions. In short, 
reason is employed to prove the absoluteness of fundamentalism’s Biblical authority. 
Thus, society can regain its moral stability.**
Protestant fundamentalists, who postulated a simple authoritative application 
of biblical instruction to the particulars of individual and public life, soon realized 
they had friends where they least expected. Those whom they once anathematized 
were being reapproached as allies.*® Fundamentalist evangelicals found that 
conservative Roman Catholics were appealing to natural law in the same way that 
they were appealing to scripture.*  ^Within the Catholic tradition. Natural law had 
always been a way of fusing this world's social order to (the fixed) created ordinances, 
a way of introducing the eternal into the flux of time.
History is the third area to which the Religious Right turned in an effort to 
reconnect society to religious moorings. The propensity to invest pivotal junctures of
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the past with ongoing authority is, of course, inevitable. Eventually, the Religious 
Right returned to the nineteenth century claim that America was a Christian nation, 
formally constituted on Judeo-Christian principles and morals. In time, this claim 
came under fire, which served to deepen the position of some. Others ostensibly 
moderated their position.**
Control
Contemporary Protestant fundamentalism and its metamorphosis, the 
Religious Right, attempted to reformalize America's connection to the religio-moral 
values once esteemed. In a previous era, Protestantism promoted a social platform 
with minimalistic controls. Later it enhanced its posture of influence, relaxing its 
formal claims to control the religio-moral boundaries of society. The recent eruption 
of the Fundamentalist Religious Right represents a return to the strategy of control, 
but of course, times had changed.
In the early period of the republic, Jeffersonian-Madison principles were just 
beginning to be grasped and implemented. The nation traveled a long way before the 
radicality and relative consistency of their premises would achieve mature political 
incarnation. In other words, the Protestant efforts to effect a measure of control, first 
in the early nineteenth century, and second late in the twentieth century, faced 
different odds. The early period was more vulnerable to a Protestant insistence for 
understanding liberty linked to particular religious moral norms, because their early 
place and role in America's development and radical Enlightenment basis of liberty 
was not fully formed. Furthermore, pluralism in America was far less pronounced.
In the late twentieth century however, reconnecting society at large to a 
particular reading of socio-moral norms was much more difficult. Secular maturity 
and religious and moral plurality defined the time. When Protestantism returned to its 
mission of ensuring that the nation would "regain" its socio-moral coherence, 
inevitably it had to revisit political power. But at the end of the twentieth century, 
accessing such power required more subtle, less overt and more democratic means.
When fundamentalist Reverend Jerry Falwell used his television program, the 
Old Time gospel Hour, to build the Moral Majority, essentially what he did was 
combine an evangelical form with a national-social cause. The evangelical heritage 
has its own distinctive form, which corresponds to its traditional content. The form,
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as it has been practiced in America, is not known as being primarily didactical, 
prophetic, mystical or sage. Rather, it is declaratory, "factual," confrontational, 
decisive and personal.
This evangelical form, in the hands of gifted and charismatic-spirited men 
(and occasionally women), has had no rival from other public religious mediums. It 
has always galvanized human response and commitment in America, as its form 
fosters and ensures its social edge. What evangelical fundamentalist Protestantism 
did in part, was to abstract this powerful form and marry it to a sociocultural agenda 
under the imperative of a degenerating national condition. The evangelical modalities 
of urgency, decisiveness, destiny, commitment (backed by biblical authority), all 
evangelical modalities were enlisted in the reclamation of American society.
Religious power was effectively released from its spiritual context and remarried to a 
national mission. Combined with the prowess of clever men, the technology of radio 
and television and preexistence of social conditions, a movement was bom overnight. 
In the first stage, 1979-1989, three or four major tele-evangelists joined in a campaign 
to save America from socio-moral min. They called on frmdamentalist-conservative 
evangelical constituencies to abandon an exclusively pietistic ethic for one of social 
action. By rallying followers to channel their latent antagonism to modernity into 
proper patriotic regard, these ministries generated a large financial and influence 
base. In their peak years, the early- to mid- 1980's, the combined gifted annual 
revenues of a handful of TV ministries may have been close to a half billion dollars.*  ^
The sheer size of the dollar and people support, provided the basis for a new 
employment of influence.
This analysis points to the methodological genius of the Protestant Right 
(eventually to become the Religious Right). Evangelicalism, a powerful religious 
form, was linked to a "new" dogma of religio-moral absolutes derived from the 
infallible authority of scripture and married to a patriotic cause - saving the nation 
from social-moral min. It was this combination that laid the foundation for generating 
an enormous influence base. This influence became their chief social implement.
The sociocultural conditions that are the mature result of the Founding Fathers' 
organizing principles, stimulate "top-down" strategies. Control necessitated accessing 
power, but direct or blatant political power within the democratic system has been 
checked. That is to say, political power is not readily accessible, since it must be
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channeled through an electoral-representative grid and it is dispersed in several 
governmental branches at various levels. Furthermore, it is bound, even in its 
democratic form, by the dogma of the inviolability of the individual (having to do 
with inalienable right and liberty). Essentially, what the new Religious Right 
proceeded to do was reforge their influence base into a democratic implement for 
political control. In a democratic system, influence is the primary dynamic for 
directing power, and for that reason, it is the most valuable commodity.®®
Furthermore, as Madison reasoned, the success and health of the democratic 
system is commensurate to the wide distribution versus the concentration of 
democratic leverage in any one group.®* Generally speaking, the Religious Right did 
two things with their collective weight of influence. First, they sometimes put 
extreme pressure, on all levels of the representative system, in order to secure 
alignment to their positions.®  ^ And second, they called for the loosening of those 
mechanisms that limit democratic power, relativizing the formal ground which 
supported individualism, pluralism and a secular public space.
Regarding the Religious Right's interest in effecting change in society through 
accessing power in the electoral and representative system, several strategies stand 
out. First, they formed alliances with the political right. High-level contacts between 
the political right, the Republican Party and the religious right increasingly began to 
occur. A quasi-fusion between the political and religious right began to form.®* 
According to James Reichly (of the Brookings Institute), an exchange 
occurred. Whereas the Republican platform had traditionally consisted of military, 
economic and foreign policy issues, it broadened to become a forum for conservative 
moral issues.®'* This occurred under the increasing influence of the Religious Right, 
who could promise large numbers of votes and were willing to embrace and moralize 
the traditional GOP [Government Of The People, i.e., the Republican Party] platform. 
Here the churches' religious weight was fused, not to an issue, but to a political party 
and its agenda. Because of this, the Right often found its absolutism mired in a moral 
quagmire in the midst of conflicting inner-struggles, with very ambiguous results. In 
addition, it targeted elected officials, setting up a sophisticated scoring criteria based 
solely on a narrow range of moral and political issues. As a result, some officials 
received high scores and right-wing religious backing while involved in unlawful 
financial and sexual conduct. The new Religious Right found themselves blessing
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some of the worst rascals in Washington and cursing some of the best defendants of 
social justice.®*
In the first decade, 1979 to 1989, Protestant fundamentalists controlled the 
new religious movement. Harnessing the antagonism of their religious constituencies^ 
they aimed primarily at the federal political level. In the second phase, after the failed 
attempt of Pat Robertson to capture the GOP nomination for president, the movement 
regrouped and formed the Christian Coalition and organized a bottom-up takeover, 
starting with towns and school boards.
A second use of influence reveals the dynamic of control. This is the attempt 
to circumscribe individual and minority privilege in an effort to compromise the 
pluralization and secularization of society. Theoretically speaking, it was inevitable 
that the individual principle would come under attack with the acceleration of cultural 
difference. What the Religious Right did and continues to do is put pressure on the 
socio-moral sphere of the individual principle by exploiting the democratic principle. 
It assumed that its pietistic and individualistic understanding of Judeo-Christian 
values was normative.
And it assumed that this understanding was always espoused (if they were true 
Americans), by those representative constituents that clearly grasped what America 
was about. Since America is a Christian nation, founded on Judeo-Christian values, 
and is called to be a vanguard of the true cause and use of freedom and liberty in the 
world, socio-moral idiosyncrasies must be brought under normative democratic rule. 
In this claim, the priority in the dialectic between the individual and the 
collective-social is moved to the collective.
The direction of the Founding Fathers, especially Jefferson and Madison and 
their coterie, was to abridge political power (political power organized 
democratically). Furthermore, the wheel that turned every other wheel in their polity 
was the idea that the individual was inviolable. It is likely that most of the 
mainstream of evangelical America (during that formative period and shortly 
afterward) was never fully converted to this principle.
Isaac Backus was one among other representative figures in this regard (cf. 
Chapter 3). He certainly valued freedom, but for different reasons than the 
Enlightenment elites who were the nation’s formative architects. From his Puritan 
Baptist background, he approached the new America with reservations about the
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intrinsic capacity of the individual to use liberty properly. In this tradition, which 
represents one major strand that informed American consciousness, human nature was 
regarded as safe for society only when integrated into a greater relation to the invisible 
God. The awareness of this historical difference, viewed in light of the recent 
emergence of cultural conditions which stressed the boundaries of the democratic 
principle, sheds light on the eruption of a militant Religious Right less respectful of 
the Founders' sensibilities.
In the larger view, America's nativity was shaped by two forms of pessimism, 
one of individual human nature, the other of collective power. The former finds its 
historical antecedent primarily in Reformed beginnings. The latter derives from a 
secular sourcing, i.e. the American translation of the Enlightenment premises against 
Parliament. A logical tension between these two, contains the potential for the 
emergence of an eventual cultural division.
In their efforts toward social control, the Religious Right launched a political 
campaign to subvert the formal basis, which has allowed the individualization, 
pluralization and secularization of society. These three developments stand and fall 
together as each involves and includes the other. Key rights issues, such as gay and 
lesbian rights, the right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy, free speech rights 
involving the arts media and the publishing and selling of pornography, religious 
rights displacing official prayers in public school, and a host of subsidiary issues 
involving civil rights/Bill of Rights claims (including many that come and go on 
account of the changing venue of legislative and judicial activities) derive their formal 
strength from the liberal polity of America and a growing cultural ethos that sanctions 
the presence of socio-moral difference.
Instead of merely enlisting influence to counter this expansion, the Religious 
Right has attempted to access means of control in order to formally subvert it. This 
betrays their anxiety, militancy and expediency manifested in their alliances). It has 
not only built and used a voting base to oppose legislation, but also called for the 
circumscription of the individual principle in hopes of reviving a righteous "orthodox" 
(middle-class family) democratic majority rule. For instance, where public school 
official prayers offend Jews, Muslims, atheists and others, they openly argue that the 
individual principle must be sacrificed for a majority good. Where the rights of 
individual citizens are at stake in pro-choice, it is not the rights of "potential citizens"
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that are really at issue, but the precedence of a "moral" majority that is at issue.®® In 
efforts to control freedom of speech, a community moral good is always the basis of 
argument. Again and again, the religio-political right exploits the inherent tension 
between these two, not only against the individual but for the presumed moral good of 
society at large.
Near equal to the abortion debate has been the debate over the first two clauses 
of the First Amendment of the Bill of Rights. The Religious Right believes that the 
root of all American evils in principle is linked to a liberal interpretation and 
application of this amendment. Claiming the present policy as hyper-separationism 
(i.e. separation of Church and State), they insist that if only this policy could be 
relaxed, God could be reintroduced into the public square and the civil-social healing 
effect would be substantial. One of the more intellectually astute of the 
religio-political right has summarized the issue as follows:
“What may finally be at stake are matters far beyond those a judge is 
permitted to contemplate in reaching a decision. The case for the absolute 
separation of religion and government is well known. It is that when religion 
and government merge, the individual is less free both in his faith and in his 
politics. Jefferson said that 'religion is a matter which lies solely between a 
man and his God' and he approved what he called 'a wall of separation 
between Church and State.' That is the individualistic view, but there is a 
communitarian view.
"There may be in man an ineradicable longing for the transcendent. If 
religion is officially removed from public celebration, other transcendent 
principles, some of them very ugly indeed, may replace them. Neuhaus makes 
the point by paraphrasing Spinoza, 'transcendence abhors a vacuum.' The 
public square will not remain naked. If religion departs, some other principle 
will arrive. The way is prepared by the loss of democratic legitimacy. Again 
Neuhaus: 'This is the cultural crisis—and therefore the 
political and legal crisis—of our society."®^
Whether the Religious Right itself is merely a passing phenomenon only 
history will reveal. What is predictable, in light of the nature of modernity, is that 
"top-down" strategies will likely continue to occur, stimulated by the anxiety of less J
coherent and less stable social conditions. Judicial, political and religious institutions |
(as well as historical and philosophical disciplines) are under pressure to function and i
provide more socially authoritative precedents.
The reshaping of Protestant religion in a more absolutistic, authoritarian and I
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moralistic direction (and the extension of its values for social emergency) represents a 
distortion of Protestantism's historic biblical and evangelical character and calling.
This segment of the church has failed to remain properly differentiated from the 
pessimistic forces at work in the larger sociocultural world around it. It is 
Protestantism's differentiation, properly understood, that comprises its true social 
relevance. Furthermore, its reaching for political leverage, while marginally ethical 
by existing political standards, discloses the extent to which it has lost its own power 
of prophetic-Christian witness and has taken up a strategy of forming alliances to 
access political power.
The explicit attempt to define America as Christian or Judeo-Christian, to 
make "saving" the nation its goal, to formally circumscribe individual freedom, and to 
"save" the family, unmasks the depth of its confusion. It has exchanged faithfulness 
to Christ for social relevance, a confessional word for an "authoritative" moralistic 
word, witness and the power of the spirit for gains in electoral, judicial, and legislative 
advantage, saving the new social order of modernity. The influence that Christians 
gain among a few in their attempt to be socially relevant must be weighed against the 
widespread resentment they create by their political levering.
The modem attempt to tie society to so-called religio-moral absolutes is 
similar to pre-modem periods in which Christianity and society were co-extensive. It 
is similar but not the same. The political terms of modem society forbid such an 
effort. Disestablishment based on the First Amendment of the Constitution altered 
forever the possibility that American society could be functionally linked with a given 
religious establishment. This has not however destroyed the propensity to formally 
link “essential” religious values and society. Quite the opposite is trae. The 
organization of the modem state on liberal values exacerbates this propensity. More 
than in previous times, there is now perhaps an even greater temptation to attempt to 
connect society to a foundation both transcendent and absolute, thereby saving it from 
a relativistic abyss or a constant state of flux and change. This effort, of course, need 
not be distinctively Christian, but simply religio-moral, answerable to a broad range of 
traditions and belief systems rooted in an authoritarian ethic.
"Interfaith" pluralism holds in common the conviction that an etemal form of 
design precedes and informs socio-moral pattems and these are indispensable to 
government of the mundane world. The existence of these certainties are seen to be
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verifiable and accessible, even though the means for their accessibility to the world 
differ among these traditions. Whether derived from the Bible-tradition, the church or 
nature-natural law in "conversation" (i.e. the social dialectic, in which reason 
concludes truth) or other sources, there is a unified moral reference. The first step the 
church takes toward social fixity arises from a misunderstanding of how the word of 
God supplies moral guidance to humans and their social existence. The belief that 
within the word of God there are simple and rationally verifiable moral absolutes that 
can be abstracted and mainstreamed into society, inevitably draws the church into a 
"new" soteriological mission - the saving of modem society.
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ATTEMPTS TO CORRECT FIXITY AND FREEDOM
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Modem America was formed out of both religious and secular sources. 
Reformed Protestantism, eventually transformed by evangelical Pietism, became the 
primary Protestant orientation in America. No group presented a more potent and 
consistent expression of the Reformed faith than the early New England Puritans. 
Likewise, it was the Enlightenment elites, especially Jefferson and Madison and those 
who stood closest to them, who influenced America’s national reorganization on 
secular premises.
In both the mainstream Protestantism and the Enlightenment elites, a wide 
range of difference existed. For instance, John Adams and Alexander Hamilton, both 
deeply affected by Enlightenment thought, did not share the consistent, more radical 
vision that Jefferson and Madison did. Madison himself, educated at Princeton, may 
have been slightly more theistic than the consistently deistic Jefferson. Socially 
speaking, the Anglicans, Puritan Congregationalists and Presbyterians had something 
to lose with the coming of disestablishment. There were important differences in their 
thinking. Nevertheless, the New England Congregational Puritans and the 
Madison-Jefferson Enlightenment School, are perhaps the most consistent 
incarnations of Reformed-Calvinist Protestantism and European Enlightenment 
thought in America. Both capture the ideological roots out of which the impulses of 
"fixity” and "freedom" have been given their life in America.
Chapters Five and Six return to two developments considered to be central 
Christian attempts to challenge the patterns of “fixity” and “freedom.” The “fixity” of 
New England Puritanism was challenged by Roger Williams and the early American 
Baptists, a challenge that began in England. Protestantism's uncritical involvement in 
the optimistic ideals of Enlightenment freedom and autonomy as they matured in the 
nineteenth century were first challenged by dialectical theology in Europe, by far the 
most penetrating challenge of the church.
But in America, only an academic interest was stirred by Barth, Brunner, and 
Bultmann. No church based movement arose out of the insights of Barth and his 
colleagues. However, after World War II in 1948, a different more church-based 
movement, the "neo evangelicals," did emerge. They explicitly attempted to position 
themselves between fundamentalism (who took up a separatist posture toward 
modernity) and liberalism (far more open to the goals and values of modernity). The
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following two chapters attempt to understand how these two movements proposed to 
sustain differentiation from their respective worlds, so as to avoid being pulled into 
the grip of neo-constantinianism [i.e., “fixity”] on the one side or an idealistic 
engagement with modernism on the other [i.e., “freedom”].
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CHAPTER FIVE
In Tension With "Fixity": The Baptist Movement in Colonial America
The attempts to formally connect society to the church’s religion (i.e. fixity) 
presented in Chapters One and Three, have a distinctively American and nascent 
modem character. Seventeenth and early eighteenth century New England Puritans 
and nineteenth century evangelical Protestants both worked to keep society connected 
to Christian values and beliefs. However, the means they used to preserve this 
connection were “new.” Over against the co-extension of church and society that was 
characteristic of Europe, there was an attempt to abstract religion from its ecclesial 
setting and connect it directly to the larger social setting. In both settings there existed 
a qualified idealism about the possibilities of transforming society through religion.
The beginnings of this "extra ecclesial" or "neo-constantinian" development 
are found in the early Puritan system. They empowered the Magistrate and the 
Common Court with a degree of autonomy from the church, while at the same time 
they insisted that their civic charge over the masses was to enforce religio-moral 
duties, reflecting the consensus of the church. This was the beginning of a "new" 
precedent in America. Although this particularly American development was 
modified by the national formation of a "republic," it has survived.
The first challenge to “fixity” in America came from Roger Williams and the 
Baptists. Williams sowed the seeds for a different vision of America, which by 
standards of his time, was quite radical. In his call to separate church and state, he 
made no formal guarantee for the minimalistic involvement of religion in society. 
Williams, and the Baptists before and directly after him, rethought the involvement of 
religion, society and church in a new way.
When Calvinism began to infiltrate Britain, it set into motion a movement to 
reform the Church of England and was met with ecclesiastical and political resistance. 
This is the setting behind the emergence of the Baptists. They were the more radical 
of the separatist Puritans insofar as their response to the ecclesiastical-political 
resistance to reform was to attempt to completely pry apart society and the church.
The co-extension of church with society, held together by the alliance of ecclesiastical 
power with political power, came to be regarded as the root of the English problem. 
This fusion, they concluded, compromised the integrity of both church and society.
1
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The question, "what were the Baptists doing?" as the contextual basis to 
understanding what they were saying, is crucial. Baptists exploited what may 
properly be called the evangelical center of the Christian message, in an attempt to 
effect a cleavage between society at large and the church. Puritans also had envisioned 
a new distinction between the world at large and the church, but Baptists went further 
than most Puritans, including those who emigrated to New England. Their arguments 
for separation are elementaiy, yet contain important conclusions drawn from the two 
poles of evangelical faith.
On the one hand. Baptists appealed to the objective theological side of the 
gospel, to challenge the power which held society at large and the church together.
On the other hand, they appealed to the subjective side of gospel as the basis of a new 
organizing principle for church. The consequence was that they became forbears of 
the modem period in three areas, church, society and religion. In calling for a discrete 
"gathered" voluntary membership, they pioneered a new understanding of church. By 
conceiving society as an open pluralistic entity with an abridged sphere of political 
power limited to civil affairs, they became socio-political architects. By emphasizing 
the subjective side of gospel, they lent integrity and importance to religious 
experience and introduced the concept of understanding religion from an individual, 
experiential basis.
Williams and the Baptists challenged the Erastian and Constantinianism of 
Europe and the “neo-Constantinianism” of New England. The purpose of this Chapter 
is to understand the underlying logic of this challenge and to assess its strengths and 
weaknesses. First, the historical setting of Baptist ideas is explored, especially within 
their American development. Second, the implications these have had for reshaping 
ideas of church, society and religion are considered. Third, the strength and 
weaknesses of the Baptist reform are evaluated. Over against the fusion of church and 
society [or religion and society], the Baptists called for radical distinction. The 
grounds upon which they attempted to secure this distinction and the implications of 
this distinction are of special significance in this inquiry.
The historian William McLoughlin pointed out that the history of voluntarism 
[i.e., church as the voluntary association of believers] is one of both "idealism and 
pragmatism."^ It is bound up with the impact of "diversity on uniformity" and the 
proverbial movement of social outcasts to the mainstream.^ This review focuses on
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the theological roots, rather than the sociological and pragmatic side of this 
development. Its aim is to disclose the ideas that informed one kind of church-world 
relation. Baptists of America started and led the battles for the political 
reorganization of their governments, so as to allow free and equal space within society 
for their own and all other religions. Originally, they came from England. Baptists 
were first Puritan Separatists. In order to understand their underlying persistence to 
continue in the direction they chose, we must look carefully at this beginning.
Baptists in America slogged away against determined resistance, not always in touch 
with the full depth of their principles. Most often, they had to make accommodations 
to far less than they wanted, and they were not always clear what they did want, 
beyond space for themselves. In time they were joined by others who, while sharing 
common ends, more often than not held other visions about religion's relation to 
society.
The evangelical pietism of the Great Awakenings brought fresh life to the 
Baptists, having the effect of strengthening their protest against church-state alliances. 
Baptists shared a common agreement with the Great Awakening on the mainsprings 
of true religion. However, they recognized, in a self-conscious historical way, that 
these evangelical-pietistic ideas were also the source of a new relation of Christianity 
to society.
McLoughlin has detailed this dynamic in his two-volume New England 
Dissent: 1630-1833. Perhaps the most amazing feature of this formative period in 
American history is that Baptists repeatedly returned to their elementary theological 
convictions, and renewed their efforts for reform. The review begins appropriately 
with Roger Williams, then returns to the earlier sources of his ideas, before 
concluding with an analysis of the Baptist view of Christianity’s relation to society in 
America, and the significance that this position has had for the problem of church- 
world differentiation.
Roger Williams and the Birth of a New Church - World Relation
Two years after Roger Williams came to the place he named Providence, he 
enlisted Ezekiel Holliman to baptize him, after which he baptized Holliman and 
nineteen others, all adult believers. The year was 1638. In that same year, the record 
shows that Williams and twelve others formalized the Providence Plantation social
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compact, initiating the first social experiment limited to civil affairs ("only civil
things"). The compact reads as follows...
"We whose names are here desirous to inhabit in the towne of Providence do 
promise to subject (ourselves) in active or passive obedience to all such orders 
or agreements as shall (be) made for publick good of our body in an orderly 
way by the major consent of the present inhabitants maisters of families 
incorporated together into a towne fellowship and others whome they shall 
admit (un to them) only in civill things"^
It would be easy to fail to recognize the extent of these radical developments. 
Believers Baptism, as the formal basis of the church, functioned as the implement that 
pried apart a socio-religious world, held together for centuries by political power and 
infant baptism.'* On the one side, Williams formed the church as a distinct and 
separate homogeneous society of gathered believers, ostensibly joined together by the 
individual freedom that comes from the inner sanction of the spirit and the outward 
confession of faith and piety. On the other side, he had formed a heterogeneous 
society which collectively consented to formalize power for justice and order, in 
accord with the common good; powers extending to matters of domestic and civil 
welfare only, Williams' contribution is that he went beyond the realm of ideas and 
gave each of these a distinct and separate sphere of existence. Through this 
development, a new church- society relation took form for the first time.^ Invested in 
this separation was a redefinition of both, arising not merely from pragmatic reasons 
or exigencies, but from new ecclesiological and theological presuppositions.
Williams’ two-pronged impulse, which separated church and state by giving 
the individual's experience of faith formative ecclesiological importance, and limiting 
the scope of government to the secular sphere, already had an ideological history of 
two decades in England. In order to correctly appraise this beginning and its 
presuppositions, it is important to see Williams in the historical context of the radical 
Puritan development he shared with others before him.
The Origin of Williams* Church - World Model
What was bom in America was conceived in Europe. The ideas which 
Williams formalized in Rhode Island, first emerged in Amsterdam in exiled radical 
English Puritan separatists who had come into contact with Mennonites. The 
connection with continental Anabaptist ideas, as Estep has proven, is both
2 0 2
indisputable and significant. But it is the English setting of these ideas that are 
distinctive, and it is this setting that provides the background for the American 
development.® A sketch of Puritan beginnings is necessary to frame this discussion.
The intersection of forces in the late sixteenth century and early to middle 
seventeenth century that precede the transition from Puritan dissent to Puritan 
separatism, provide the contextual setting to properly understand and evaluate the rise 
of Baptists. Their initial impulses and clarifications emerged in that setting, and were 
by all measurements in their time, ecclesiastically and socially radical. The rise of 
dissent within the Church of England was due to the impact of the continental 
Reformation, Calvinism in particular. Calvinism altered religious sensibilities 
regarding the rituals and pretensions of the church. Formally, there was growing 
alienation from such central features of religion as the sacraments and apparently less 
significant practices as making the sign of the cross in Baptism, bowing at 
communion, and the lavish apparel of the priest. Materially, they saw the church in 
the continued grip of a papist system. The nature of dissent came from those on the 
inside who wanted change. But in this instance, it was met not only by clerical 
resistance, but ultimately by the crown that exerted official authority over the 
ecclesiastical realm, viewing itself within the Erastian model as head of the church.
The origin of Puritan separatism is the transition resulting from failed dissent; 
the consciences of souls once awakened, seeking respite in religious expressions, 
resonate to their new sensibilities. Separatism was Puritanism pushed underground, 
forced to create its Calvinist counterpart, unable to obtain recourse in the setting of the 
mother church. The two elements that provide the immediate backdrop for separatism 
are Calvinism's new view of the church as the citadel of true religion and the 
resistance to reform by hierarchical, ecclesial and political power.
Early English Puritan separatists, while seeking sanctuary in the Netherlands 
in the first decade of the seventeenth century, solved both needs with one answer, 
which both modified and added to Calvin's ideas. These separatists were the so-called 
first General Baptists, led by John Smyth and Thomas Helwys, and later John Murton. 
The wheel that turned every other wheel of their reform, was a new view of the church 
as a people of faith, freely gathered under Christ's sole authority and word.’
Beginning first with their convictions about the need of Protestant reform 
within the Church of England (liturgy and doctrine), these Puritans proceeded further
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to question the formal basis of the church as a public institution. Correcting false 
doctrine and "papist" liturgy could not reverse what they came to regard as a flawed 
foundation of the church, ultimately grounded in temporal power.* In the New . 
Testament, only individuals who were regenerated to a new life and possessed a 
personal faith and devotion to Christ constituted the church. Furthermore, the 
integrity and vitality of the church depended on regeneration and personal faith. The 
Church of England included all subjects of the nation and used force to secure 
conformity to its beliefs and practices. It was this policy that was hopelessly corrupt. 
The true church, they claimed, was a creation of the power of the spirit and the word, 
symbolized in the New Testament by the phrase "the sword of the spirit" as the "word 
of God".’ The official authority of the bishops, backed by the literal sword of the 
magistrate as the basis of the church, represented an unholy alliance which disclosed it 
as false religion}^ In the final analysis, their separation rested on this "new" 
ecclesiology, a conclusion which represented the climax of their pilgrimage for a pure 
church.
Their ecclesiology, involving pneumatological arguments, was ultimately 
derived from christological arguments, which insisted upon the sole propriety of 
Christ's lordship over the religious realm, where human beings formed belief and 
espoused the truth by which they lived and died. For kings and magistrates to 
exercise power in that domain, was to trespass beyond their rightful boundaries. It 
was for these reasons that they concluded that the church had become Babylon, an 
institution built on the confusion of power. And they were sure that the imperative in 
John's Apocalypse, and Paul's Epistle; "come out of her, my people..." and "come out 
from among them and be separate," spoke with prophetic authority to their situation. 
(Revelation 18:4; II Corinthians 6:17)
That history has been kind to this radical Puritan break should be no surprise.
It was based not only on a critical stance toward the mother church but a vision for 
something new. Within it, there were the seeds of a new way of ordering society and 
a new understanding of church and a new view of religion. The arguments of the 
early leaders, John Smyth, Thomas Helwys, John Murton, M. Leonard Busher, and in 
America, Roger Williams and John Clark (as well the early declaration of the first 
Baptist association in London, 1640), all reveal similar lines of reasoning, leading to 
new understandings of religion and the church and involving a reordering of society.
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As such, history has accorded them the dual significance of being both ecclesiastical 
reformers and early contributors to modem socio-political ideas.
The following summarizes what this separation meant for a new view of the 
church, and what it meant for a reordering of society and a new understanding of 
religion.
Church, Society & Religion 
The Implications of Separation for a New Ecclesiology
Separation from the mother church and from society at large facilitated a new 
conception of the church, spiritual as well as evangelical. "Spiritual" in this setting 
does not indicate a consistent movement toward a subjective piety leading to a 
sectarian community.*’ Rather, it points to the character of their sociality, in contrast 
to a formal, obligatory relation to the church.
Separation facilitated the new spiritual and evangelical character of the church 
in several ways. First, it provided a setting in which the church could achieve 
"spiritual integrity." Spiritual integrity refers to the consensual integration of an 
individual into the church. In this setting, it was understood to involve the Spirit’s 
leading, the action of conscience and convictions, and freely made profession of faith, 
resulting in real amendments to one's personal life.
Secondly, this separation was understood to give the church sufficient social 
distance to clarify and embody its own values, the values of the kingdom of God as 
opposed to the world.*’ It was Williams, not Thomas Jefferson, who first employed 
the metaphor "a wall of separation."*'* In his meaning, this wall divided and thus 
protected the garden of God's church firom the wilderness of the world. In the context 
in which he was using it, he was lamenting the breach in the wall which allowed the 
world to grow freely in the church.*® His concern was with the purity of the church.
A third nuance of this separation for the spiritual character of the church, was 
the new kind of power on which it relied. This power was being derived completely 
from below, shifting firom passivity, receptivity and dependence, to that of individuals 
as agents and participants in their religion. Believers have unique experiences of 
God's grace and are able to discern and respond to God's tmth.
There was, in this vision, a promise of fulfillment of Luther's "Priesthood of 
Believers." The church was viewed more as a community of covenanted, gifted
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believers with a charge to keep one another in the way.*® And it was upon this
believing, gifted community, that the necessity for the care and renewal of the church
was thrust, a necessity which would force a certain kind of spiritual strength. The
direction of this shift increased the importance of the individual, and consequently
moved the church toward a more egalitarian configuration of spirit gifted believers.
Within this setting, the gifts and calling of the spirit tended to replace the hegemony
of clergy professionals (often well educated, therefore considered well qualified). The
Spirit, not training per se, brought with it the gifts the church needed.
Insofar as these spiritual characteristics alone influenced the shape of the
church’s relation to that of the larger mass of society, it was unlikely that this
development would escape the accusation that it possessed a sectarian relation to the
world, akin to continental pietism. However, Baptists, as Ernst Troeltsch points out,
did not sever their connection with an objective Christian truth for an inward piety.*’
For the most part, they remained confessional and they understood themselves in the
context of mission. As a modified expression of Calvinistic Puritanism, they retained
the identity of calling. Most importantly, this view displaced the idea of Christendom,
creating a new distinction which would allow the church to face the world again
evangelically in the form of witness and influence.
In short, the cleavage between the church and society at large was thought to
create a proper distance for the church to find its true calling as an agent of the gospel.
The logic behind this impulse originated from the Puritan conviction that the Christian
truth was objective and universally important. Commensurate with this understanding,
the church was vocationally correlated to the world. The effect of this ecclesiology,
was to spawn a new estimate of the importance, validity and autonomy of an
individual religious experience.** This Baptist evangelical Pietist experience
remained tied to an objective biblical reference and integration into a covenant
community with a vocational posture. Robin Lovin captures something of what it
meant to live within a covenant framework:
"A covenant society is one in which the members are bound together by 
choice, by mutual commitment, more than by chance. A covenant society is 
one in which the members see their moral obligation as growing out of this 
commitment, so that they hold their neighbor to a higher standard of conduct 
than they might if they were just thrown together at random; they expect more 
of themselves and they acknowledge that others who share in the covenant 
have a right to examine and criticize their behavior. It is not the moral health
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of each individual which is under scrutiny, but the righteousness or 
waywardness of the whole society. This sense that there is a common good, a 
well-being of the whole society that cannot be measured just by summing up 
the achievements and faults of all the individuals in it, is crucial to the 
covenant ideal."*’
The Implications of Ecclesial Separation for a Reordering of Society
Early on, the Puritans who became Baptists (English and American) were 
conscious of their role as social architects. It is the constructive character of their 
vision of themselves in this role, more than any other characteristic, that sets them 
apart from even the pietistic continental Anabaptists, who first conceived of 
church-state separation.’® The view of the church, existing in distinction from the 
social world at large led early Puritan Baptists to embrace radical social views. It is 
unlikely that they would have arrived at these views apart from the fact that the logic 
inherent in their new ecclesiastical ideas forced them to these frontiers.
The first premise was the limitation of government in things both secular and 
civil, leaving the realm of religion solely in the hands of Christ and his agent, the 
churches, who used only the sword of the spirit and the word to sway men and women 
to the truth. This limitation, if effected, necessitated three immediate social changes.
First, what it took away from government in the name of the sovereign Lordship of 
Christ, it of necessity conferred on individuals. While early Baptists did not conceive 
of individuals as having rights in a modem sense, the abridgement of government 
implied the inviolability of the person in realms that pertain to religious conscience, 
beliefs, worship, involving speech and assembly.
Regardless of the theological axiom from which this was conceived, when it 
was translated into the ordering of society, it took on a form which regarded and 
protected certain spheres in a person's life as inviolable. This concept holds a latent 
idea of human rights and freedom. It cannot be overemphasized that these ideas did 
not originate from early Enlightenment sources with their more optimistic 
anthropology. The Baptist conception is derived primarily from theological and 
ecclesiastical sources.’*
Second, they recognized that abridging government's power in the religious 
realm, invited religious pluralism. Repeatedly, these early reformers unequivocally 
stated their belief that society should be allowed to be religiously plural, even as far as |
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to allow for "papist, Jews, Turks or atheists."”  Of course, no other consequence was 
possible if the civil power to restrain the expression of religious ideas was removed. 
This was not an early manifestation of social libertarianism in the truest sense. They 
were not compromising their belief in the universal importance of the Christian truth, 
but they were relinquishing the idea of a Christian state. Pluralism was a necessary 
risk, the concomitant of achieving a pure church, of realizing the true force of religion 
in society. The new space where pluralism would grow, they urged, was the very 
setting in which the church could realize its true mission in Evangelism.”  With 
pluralism, they foresaw the risk of fracturing the visible uniformity of truth with the 
corresponding consequence of loosening society's binding to religious and moral 
underpinnings. Invested in this were ancient ideas of Christian civilization.’'*
But, over against the risk of a moral-religious void or chaos, they argued that 
the economy of the Spirit was one of freedom. The removal of heteronomous control 
was understood in juxtaposition to new possibilities to be realized in a more open 
setting. Appeal to the authenticity and potency of the spiritual, in a climate of 
freedom, is not to be misconstrued as severing connection with objective truth.
Rather, it stemmed from a new confidence in freedom as an axiom of true religion.
To live in the tensions and risks of pluralism, or even to tolerate secularists, it was 
urged, required spiritual maturity. Truth, they were confident, would triumph.
Christ's kingdom was in good hands, albeit invisible hands. This view meant that 
human efforts to control and visibly order the rule of truth on earth were 
misdirected.’®
Third, the early Baptist vision of society was to make it more civil rather than 
achieve a Christian civilization. Christian civilization, they argued, rather than 
producing civility, corrupted society. The use of coercion over human souls did not 
bring justice and peace, but bloodshed, tyranny, and evil. Therefore, they called for 
the end of "Christendom" and replaced it with a more modest goal: civility achieved 
through the reform of power.
At the heart of this reform, was the relationship of religion and society. The 
Baptists call for the repeal of religion from its formal imposition over society, was by 
all accounts a radical idea for its time. For over a millennium Christianity had existed 
as religio-publicus. To disenfranchise society from of a formal religion and religion 
from its captivity as a public institution, was regarded as an equation that would spell
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the demise of both society and religion.
From the start, the primitive Baptists argued that in fact, the opposite would 
occur. Given a more open forum, society would become more civil and religion 
would become more potent.
The Implication of the Baptist-Evangelical Position for Religion
The Puritan passion for a true and pure church not only focused on the 
outward forms of religion, its teachings and ritual, but on the spiritual integrity of each 
of its members. Rather than the entire mass of society being conjoined to the church, 
only individuals who had an experience of regeneration and faith with a 
corresponding amended life, were allowed into the church. For the radical Puritans 
who became the Baptists, baptism was predicated on such an experience, along with a 
suitable confession of faith in Christ.
The significance of this new elevation of giving a person’s religious 
experience decisive ecclesiological and salvific importance, cannot be overestimated. 
In this shift, an experience of grace was being given a new dignity - a unique validity. 
The individual possessing such an experience found him or herself immediately 
graduated into an ecclesial fraternity. The 'political' effect of this change was to make 
religion more autonomous, to give it a place outside of social or even ecclesial 
jurisdiction or control.
This partial shift to the subjective would in time be increasingly exploited to 
meet tensions between a pluralistic society and the established church. It represented, 
in its seventeenth century inception, the frontier of a new understanding and locus of 
religion. During the periods in which the Baptists existed as a dissenting people, their 
public call for reform appealed to the sanctity of an individual’s conscience and 
experience in religious realms.’® While they had arrived at this estimate from 
theological and pneumatological convictions (not from a new humanistic appraisal), 
their public argument drew on the human-individual logic of the propriety and 
inviolability of persons. The distinctive importance of the Baptists is not in their 
uniqueness in elevating this aspect of religion. Rather, it is in their insistence on its 
use to reconstruct church and society. The continental Anabaptists had already begun 
to emphasize the importance of experiencing grace and a life of piety. Later, this 
emphasis would form the substance of the Great Awakenings in America, the rise of
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Methodism in England and continental pietism.
The significance of having a religious experience in America in the 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, can be stated as comprising one 
indispensable condition for inclusion in the church, a church which made a particular 
confession of faith. Later in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, experience begins 
to be abstracted from this confessional - ecclesial setting. In the nineteenth century, 
the question turned to what particularly experience is; there is a search for conceptual 
material to color it. And the nineteenth century witnesses the relative success of this 
consensus in America, that religion at its root, is personal and individual—a principle 
that contributed to the repeal of ecclesiastical establishments and the official 
commencement of church in its new form of social "voluntarism." It is also this 
impact that helps break down sharp denominational divisions by elevating a common 
evangelical experience.
The conceptual material that interpreted and informed this religious experience 
was principally evangelical, a truly informed experience. As such, it possessed 
identifiable constituents of a sense of personal unworthiness and failure before a holy 
God (with a corresponding conviction of one’s sins), a sense of God's grace and 
forgiveness given freely in Jesus Christ, and a new faith or trust in Jesus Christ as 
savior (with appropriate attitudes and actions relating to amending one's life). In the 
Great Awakenings, this kind of experience was evoked through preaching that 
stimulated imagination. The confessionalism and formalism of the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries comprised a seed bed for the rapid growth of the "new" 
idea of religion, organized around human affections and interiority.
To define this experience simply as evangelical, is of course naive. As 
William McLoughlin has demonstrated, this experience was subjected to continual 
interpretation in America.”  Jonathan Edwards, drawing from Lockean empiricism 
and Calvinistic Puritan ideas about the sovereignty and glory of God, conceived it as 
an experience that enabled persons to transcend bondage to self interest so as to 
become "disinterestedly benevolent," a transition wholly incapable for humans, apart 
from an inward miracle creating new springs of desire for "Being."
Later, the ideas of the Scottish common sense, mixed with Arminian views, 
greatly compromised the profundity of Edwards' analysis. Under the influence of 
these, the evangelical experience was conceived as an awakening of the latent moral
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faculty which existed in all individuals. By the Spirit the conscience was stirred, but 
it was the individual who decided and acted on these convictions. Human beings 
were not only given a larger role, but their role in moral terms was less spiritual and 
theological. Right and wrong were ontologically resident in individuals, and the Spirit 
of God enables human beings to realize their human potential. This "Arminianizing" 
of the evangelical experience, can be understood as its Americanization; it echoed the 
image of independent entrepreneurial individualism that characterized the times. Still, 
later in the nineteenth century, aspects of the evangelical experience would come 
under the additional influences of romanticism and Kant.
The common denominator of the American evangelicalism (which grew out of 
Puritan Baptist beginnings) was its emphasis on individual religious experience. Just 
as a new socio-cultural world, organized around individual rights and freedoms, was 
being bom, Christianity in America came to be dominated by a new evangelical 
individualism, one which gave persons a unique dignity and integrity, elevating a 
rather simple individualistic idea of right and wrong. Only later would this emphasis 
contribute to a new understanding of religion as primarily personal and individual.
This understanding became in time a trademark of American religion. In the 
American beginning, this was most fully embodied by both Puritanism (cf. Cotton 
Mather) and Roger Williams and the Baptist insistence on regeneration as one 
condition for church membership.’* But in that period, it was Williams who boldly 
extended the idea of a regenerate membership to its logical conclusion, the complete 
secession of church from the state. In the eighteenth century, the Great Awakening in 
general (and Jonathan Edwards in particular) would intensify this direction, implicitly 
relativizing the formal, dogmatic and social-ecclesial prerogative of religion, by 
pointing to the reality and imperative of religious affections.
In the nineteenth century, the priority of the experiential in religion became 
nationally universalized and diversified. Rationalists, transcendentalists, evangelical 
revivalism, the holiness movement (as well as nascent liberalism) placed importance 
on individual religious experience and the sanctity of conscience. The importance of 
the primitive Puritan insight, which belonged primarily to the Baptists in the colonial 
setting, was that individual religious experience and church membership were bound 
together.
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The Progress of Baptists in Eighteenth Century America 
and the Work of Isaac Backus
There are three stages in the development of this evangelical-Baptist model. 
The first two have been reviewed; first, the emergence of these ideas as an outgrowth 
of radical Puritan separatism and, second, the early formation of these ideas in what 
came to be known as Rhode Island. Williams was also an original thinker and 
contributed to the clarification of the ideas which had emerged two decades earlier in 
England. John Clark also played a very important role in the political success of 
gaining the lasting charter that reflected Williams’ vision for Providence. Unlike 
Williams, he was a steady Baptist leader, contributing substantively to both sides of 
the "lively experiment." The amazing feature of Providence and the Rhode Island 
colony was that it formalized this new church-society relationship almost a century 
and a half before America structured it for the nation in the Bill of Rights. The period 
of time between Williams' beginning in 1638 and the 1797 Bill of Rights can rightly 
be understood as the third phase.
The early Puritan separatists who kindled the Baptist development, had 
stumbled on "new" evangelical-spiritual (or pietistic) axioms for religion and church. 
But rather than spreading quickly either in Britain or America, they were largely met 
with resistance. This was predictable since, of course, they challenged central claims 
of the existing church and state arrangement. By the end of the seventeenth century, 
the new ideas had settled into a sectarian form of religion at the margins of society, 
increasingly gaining modest levels of toleration.”
In Massachusetts and Connecticut, one historian of the period recorded about 
twenty-one congregations as late as 1740.’® Rhode Island, which guaranteed religious 
liberty, counted only seven. Williams' Rhode Island experiment was regarded by the 
mainstream Protestants of the day as a failure. It was not viewed as capturing the 
spirit of the future by New Englanders, but one of misguided libertinism.’* At best, 
the Baptists, both in England and America, were a fledgling movement making 
incremental progress. In the eighteenth century, this was to change dramatically.”
Two intersecting and complementary movements, one religious and the other 
political, lifted Baptist principles into the mainstream of American society like an 
incoming tide. First came the Great Awakening and then the Enlightenment 
rationalism that was appropriated for the American Revolution. Through these two
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movements, the underlying basis of religion and of government was to fundamentally 
change. The evangelical pietism of the Great Awakenings was essentially an 
eighteenth century revival of the original Puritan-Baptist axioms of religion, a shift 
from the formal heteronomous religion that was controlled by professional clerics 
(and backed by civil ordinances and magistrates) to one grounded in a personal 
experience of grace. In New England, the Great Awakening (which started in 1726 
with a pietist Dutch Reformed minister), jumped denominational boundaries, divided 
the Congregationalists, and gave fresh impetus and growth to the Baptists, revitalizing 
not only their churches but their protest for a new way of ordering religion in society.
Perhaps no one more than Isaac Backus, a New Light Congregationalist who 
turned lay Baptist preacher, is qualified to represent and articulate the importance and 
consequences of evangelical pietism for the emerging social ordering of religion in 
America. Backus is an important figure because of his original connection to the 
Great Awakening before becoming a Baptist. He absorbed its new locus of religion 
and then reflected on it with impressive logic. As will be discussed, it was this logic 
that accounted for his alignment with Baptists and his outspoken and unrelenting 
insistence that the old Congregationalist system of a coordinate fusion of church and 
society was dated. True principles were emerging with a clarity which necessitated 
socio-political changes.
Backus published, preached and petitioned for nearly fifty years against a 
system that continued to create hardship through fines, confiscation of property and 
imprisonment for reasons bound to no other than lack of religious conformity. He 
articulated at a conscious level what generally became true in America.
Although not fully grasped or implemented in every detail, and although it was 
constantly adapting to existing ecclesial structures, many American churches moved 
in form, if not also in spirit, toward the individual piety centered religion that had 
permeated New England and the southern colonies through the Great Awakenings. 
Backus conceptually articulated the logical correlation between the new emphasis on 
the imperative of an evangelical experience and the reorganization of religion in 
society to a place where it would be fi-ee and voluntary. "Religion," Backus urged, " 
was a matter between God and individuals."”  "As God is the only worthy object of 
all religious worship, nothing can be true religion but a voluntary obedience unto his 
will...Religion...can be directed only by reason and conviction not by force or
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violence."’'* For these reasons, church must be a voluntary freely gathered body within 
society rather than coterminus with society.
This is the main basis of his public argument; namely, that in society, religion 
is to be voluntary and disentangled from civil laws and political powers. To repress 
one form and coerce and establish another form, even if allowances were made for 
non-conformists, was to violate the delicate fabric of true religion, which suffered to 
the extent leverage was attached to it. The source of this conviction, as has been 
alluded to, did not come first from reflection or study, but from his own experience of 
conversion.’® Conformity to religious ordinations and a formal alliance with the 
church did not provide a place in the kingdom of God. Only regeneration can fit one 
for that honor. "No man can see his kingdom nor have the power therein without 
regeneration."’®
It is important to recall that this is not a mere religious experience but an
evangelical experience, one informed by the New Testament constants of Christ's
forgiving grace and one's own sense of sinfulness. This evangelicalism brought with
it both a new appreciation for the individual and the Christian community of faith.
Most conversions, as McLoughlin points out, took place outside the church meeting in
private, alone "between God and the soul."”  As Backus witnessed, Christ was like
the shining sun whose:
"rays appear to point as directly to us as if there was not another person in the 
world for it to shine upon. And we partake as it were, of the whole benefit of 
its influence; and yet tis as free for thousands of others as for us...when any 
soul is brought to behold his glories, them [sic] eternal rays of light and love 
shine down particularly upon him to remove his darkness, heal his wounds and 
shed immortal blessings on his soul."’*
This experience carried with it both social-egalitarian and political 
implications. Originally, Congregationalists were Puritans in search of a true church, 
allowing only members who were proven by examination to be true Christians.”
Over time, this standard became more formalized and infant baptism (even of children 
of nonmembers) was accepted, all but guaranteeing that the church would eventually 
become co-extensive with a certain class of society and its values. Eventually, the 
only measurement for membership was a bourgeois moral rectitude.'*®
The Great Awakening clarified for Backus the true make-up of the church, 
which alone could guarantee its purity and distinction. In 1754, he wrote on this
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proper basis of the church...
"Let me inquire where God has shown you that you (i.e. addressing the 
Congregational Pedobaptists) shall be a father of many nations and that a 
church shall spring from you which shall be large and that natural instead of 
spiritual birth shall bring persons into it? Here lies the pinch of the 
point...Natural birth and some outward ceremonies then brought persons into 
the church and into the priesthood, but now spiritual birth and the work of 
God's grace is necessary in order to bring souls aright into the church and the 
ministry".'**
Backus, having first clarified individual religion/regenerated church, entered 
the fray, calling for a disentanglement of church and state, so as to relocate the 
church's place in society as free and voluntary, open to and made up of all peoples. 
Christianity, viewed as a regenerate community of faith, was antithetical to 
Christianity as an institution with the power to extend its religio-moral tenets over the 
whole of society. Backus’ argument, cast in a mid-eighteenth century context, recalls 
similar arguments of the early English development and Roger Williams. He argues 
for the two swords having two spheres and two kinds of power. "My kingdom is not 
of this world...else my servants would fight...! come to bear witness to the truth," 
(John 18: 36,37)
Backus comments...
"the true difference and exact limits between ecclesiastical and civil 
government is this, that the church is armed with light and truth to pull down 
the stronghold of inequity and to gain souls to Christ and into his church to be 
governed by his rules therein, and again to exclude [only] such from their 
communion who will not be so governed, while the state is armed with the 
sword to guard the peace and the civil rights of all persons and societies."”
He urged the abridgement of the government's power over the consciences of 
its citizens, based on Christ's prerogative and sole authority over his church and its 
members.
"And when the son of God, who is the great law-giver and king came...and 
established a better covenant or constitution of his church...we are assured he 
was faithful in all his house. What vacancy has he left then for fallible men to 
supply, by making new laws to regulate and support his worship.”'*’
"The first and capital article in his (Christ's) doctrine is that he is head over all 
things to the church...a fourth (article) is that the civil magistrates power is 
limited."'*'*
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As for the risk of evacuating religion from society by insisting that religion be 
voluntary, he urged the evangelical optimism that truth and true religion in this new 
form would triumph. Like Williams, Backus was not so much concerned about the 
effect of freedoms on social order and moral harmony, but the corrupting effect that 
the entanglement of religious and political power would have on the peace and 
harmony of society. At the same time. Backus was not the radical that Williams was. 
His principles and arguments implied a pluralism, but he failed to be consistent with 
his own principles.
Summary and Application
The Baptist answer to pre-modem “fixity” [i.e., the co-extension of church and society 
-  England] and to nascent modem “fixity” [i.e., the co-extension of religion and 
society -  New England], was to redefine Christianity as a discrete community of 
regenerate believers. This involved a partial redefinition of society and religion.
Fixity and the Baptist Idea of Church, Society and Religion 
Church
Baptists only valued that Christianity which possessed spiritual integrity and 
such a Christianity, they were sure, could only be realized by creating a separate and 
distinct community of faith and piety. Attempts to connect either Christianity or 
Christian beliefs directly to society at large were wrong to Baptists, primarily because 
these compromised the essence of Christianity. Christianity for Baptists was strictly 
an ecclesial fellowship, not a socio-political entity. Their zeal was directed toward the 
goal of achieving Christianity’s spiritual integrity by returning it to an ecclesial locus. 
The church’s socio-cultural separateness was the formal requirement for Christianity 
to recapture its essential character and power. “Fixity” would be wrong by Baptist 
principles mainly for contextual reasons. They argued that when society was 
Christianized via infant baptism and political power, no proper environment existed 
whereby Christianity was able to achieve its proper spiritual character, either as a 
community in fellowship or in its mission of witnessing to the world.
The church as a freely gathered people, existing in associational distinction 
from society is the basis of the church's spiritual integrity and can be understood as the
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formal criterion of its social relevance. The primitive Baptist insistence on distance, 
and the fact that it was to be supported "spiritually" and evangelically, has merit. In 
the American post-Bill of Rights era, all churches and religious orders are organized 
on a voluntary associational principle. The fact that Baptists and evangelicals 
emphasized that the integrity of this association is to be derived from "below", (i.e. 
from members, spiritually), can be a strength which supports community, 
complementing its institutional character, and thereby underwriting its substantive 
differentiation from the larger socio-cultural world.
Williams and the Baptists rightly understood that the power and purity of the 
church was commensurate with its distinction from the world. That which sustains 
distinction, comprises the potential basis for truly relevant interaction with the world. 
Distinction potentially keeps the church in touch with its own unique sources, so that 
it can address the world and the problems from a perspective not available from 
within the world. Williams' wall of separation can function to inform the church's 
distinction from the world, thereby empowering a critical and redemptive relationship 
to its world.
Williams and the early Baptist reflection on the English Erastian configuration 
of religion and society, concluded that the power of religion in society was 
commensurate with its spiritual integrity, not its extensive parameters, i.e. quality, not 
quantity. Their focus was not on withdrawing religion from society, but creating a 
context in which the power of Christianity to influence its world could be fully 
exercised and its effects realized.
Religion
Integral to this idea that Christianity requires a distinct spiritual community is 
the concept that religion has to do with the inner sanction of the spirit and not outward 
constraint. Religion that imposes upon a person moral and dogmatic tenets is not true 
religion. According to the premises of the early Baptists, pre-modem and modem 
ideas of “fixity” were wrong because they trespassed into the realm of Christ’^s 
sovereignty over souls and violated the tme nature of religion which corresponded to 
the proper faculty of human response and motivation - the conscience.
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Society
The Baptist idea of society was also in tension with modem pattems of fixity. 
In Chapters Two and Three it was argued that the Founding Fathers idealized 
republican freedom. That is to say, they regarded it as the key to human social 
betterment, not just a guiding principle for reconstmcting political power. Most 
nineteenth century Americans believed that the United States was special and that it 
was called into existence by the providence of God to inaugurate a new and better 
religio-political chapter in the history of humankind. From the beginning. Baptist 
premises fostered a more critical perspective. In the early decades of the seventeenth 
century, Baptists distinguished themselves from their fellow Puritans by resisting the 
monopolistic vision of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. As shown, their focus was on 
the church, not on creating an ideal socio-cultural world. They were in favour of 
political reform so that the church could achieve its proper form. For them, the realm 
of civil power existed to restrain evil and preserve liberty, not to create an ideal 
social order. Both Williams and Backus polemicized the Puritan passion to order the 
world according to a unitary religious vision. As already noted, this did not mean that 
Baptists abandoned their belief in an objective tmth which possessed universal 
significance. They simply did not attempt to historicize it except through evangelical 
witness. For Williams the tmth had already achieved historical incamation in Jesus 
Christ. To attempt a religio-political creation of tmth was to deny Jesus Christ had 
come in the flesh.
In the nineteenth century, when many evangelicals became enamored with the 
potential that republicanism and revivalism seemed to present for ushering the 
millennium, many Baptists remained intransigently other worldly.'*®
The Baptist-evangelical view of society, especially its insistence that society 
be relieved of over-arching religious constmcts, is especially pertinent. By abridging 
government's province to one of order and freedom (as it eventually came to be 
viewed in America), it underwrote the right of voluntary associations to compose their 
own ultimate meaning and value. The idea that this redefinition of the role of 
government hopelessly fragments and weakens society, is countered by the argument 
that overarching ideological and religious constmcts imposed on society en masse 
from above are potentially tyrannous and idolatrous. The right of the people to form 
their own meanings, has the negative value of contradicting the rise of monopolistic
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religious definitions, and the positive value of creating webs of meaning in societies 
in which people integrate. From one standpoint, the multiplicity of these narratives 
need not be interpreted as evidence of social fragmentation, but rather as penultimate 
meanings and unities, symbols of hope in messianic trust.'*®
Baptist minimalist views of government were constructed in response to what 
they perceived as the overreach of power. Williams and Clark created a social model 
in which political power was bounded by a higher religious prerogative and not the 
other way around. This precedent has served as a corrective to reaffirm religious 
liberty as a right rather than a privilege. Over against the propensity of political power 
to trespass its bounds, the church(es) are empowered to critique government in the 
name of the gospel and the Lord of the gospel and insist on its proper limits.
It is this point that opens up the discussion of the relationship of religion to the 
state. Furthermore, this point has implications about the way individual liberty is 
understood. This is poignantly disclosed by Williams' defense of women's "rights" to 
attend religious services. The logic to which he appealed was not the Enlightenment's 
anthropological appraisal of reason's sufficiency. Rather, it was made on a theological 
basis. God has the first and ultimate claim on the person. Therefore, society must be 
organized so as to make room for and respect that claim and its outworking. Neither 
patriarchical authority or civil authority took precedence. There existed no view of 
individual right and liberty which arose out of a dogma of the autonomy of the self. 
The fear of obstructing conscience was not first an awakening to human rights 
(although that was a derivative fact). It was the fear of trespassing in that realm which 
was properly God's domain. As such, freedom was always axiomatic to transcendent 
references. In short, the early Baptists had no framework for an anthropologically- 
grounded view of freedom. But this very fact also contributes to a potential for Baptist 
evangelical type groups to be naively pulled into misguided attempts to circumscribe 
religio-moral pluralism as McLoughlin observed. Backus preferred to argue as Roger 
Williams had done, for the divine rights of God rather than for the natural rights of 
man. In fact, it may be said that the Baptists never came to wholly accept the Lockean 
theory of religious liberty in Jeffersonian rationalist terms - a fact which explains why 
it was so easy in the nineteenth century for the evangelical inheritors of the separatist- 
Baptist viewpoint to ignore the rights of non-evangelicals (Catholics, Mormons, the 
Indians, atheists, Free Masons), in order to protect the moral order of a Protestant
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nation.'*’
What does this mean for the Baptist view of an entire society organized around 
freedom? Two perspectives in particular can be traced to Baptist beginnings. First, 
Baptist support for the Revolution and the liberal organizing of society was grounded 
in a functional rather than an idealistic view of freedom. Freedom was necessary for 
the gospel's power to be effective. Second, the Baptist entry into the mainstream, 
effected by the Great Awakening, had remnants of Puritanism in it.
During the period of the first Great Awakening, many of the "New Light" 
Puritans joined or formed Baptist churches because of the resistance they encountered 
in their original congregations. Like Isaac Backus, they brought with them strong 
reservations toward Enlightenment freedom. But, unlike Roger Williams, they were 
favorable to the social establishment of minimalistic religio-moral values and beliefs. 
It is this history that may explain the recent direction of the leadership of the Southern 
Baptist Convention to "lower the wall" of separation of church and state.'**
The Weaknesses in Baptist Reformulation of Church, Religion and Society
Attempting ecclesial integrity by exalting an empirical experience of faith and
regeneration, involves a corresponding risk of creating a righteous separatism from
the world. James Wood, Jr., a former director of the Baptist Joint Committee on
Public Affairs, makes the following historical indictment. Writing about religion in
the colonial period he says...
"Antinomians, Baptists and Quakers... exemplified the sectarian [type]... The 
sectarians washed their hands of the filthy world, limited membership in the 
church—a voluntary association— to the saints, and struggled for freedom of 
conscience and the separation of church and state."'*’
Exploiting the subjective side of the gospel to underpin the integrity and 
discrete existence of the church from the world meant in part that the righteousness 
that functioned to effect ecclesial separatism from the world resided in the "saints." 
Therefore, a thoroughgoing human difference was perceived as guaranteeing this 
cleavage. This bifurcation made the church vulnerable to a church-world dualism and 
to apocalypticism. It cannot be denied that the separation achieved by Baptists and 
other evangelical groups involved them in a problematic separatism from their world 
and its plight. Separation can be exploited for separatism, a prospect that distorts
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church and robs the world. Roger Williams’ proverbial "wall of separation" between 
the church and world can problematically insulate these two from a proper encounter 
with each other, breeding ecclesial esotericism, narrowness and cultural secularism.
Baptists achieved their separating principle as it relates to church-world, 
world-church cleavage, by appealing to two criteria. First, they argued for the 
limitation of political power of the civil realm by appealing to the sovereignty of God 
as alone Lord over the souls of women and men. Second, they argued for the 
separation of the church from the world by insisting on the requirement of spiritual 
change. Inclusion into the church by this requirement was decided by measuring the 
authenticity of one's conversion. The historical origin of this, as shown, was the 
Puritan idea of the Pure gathered and covenanted church, over against the Erastian 
ecclesial model of the coextension of society with church. The effect of this, both to 
early Puritans and Baptists, was that of placing ecclesiology on the side of human 
change. To the degree that this aspect was magnified, ecclesiology was given an 
experiential or cultic grounding.
An empirical experience of religion, rather than being accidental, increasingly 
became determinative of the church's self-understanding. In this shift, the subjective 
pole of the gospel was made to bear the primary weight of the church's social 
difference (or an individual's social difference). This eased the problem of Christian 
denominational pluralism, which engendered strident sectarianism but fostered 
righteous parochiality and experiential "culticism."
What then does the exclusive principle of this microcosm, the church, rest on, 
if not experiential authenticity and/or doctrinal purity? There is another possibility 
having to do with the "objective" side of the gospel. It is sufficient to suggest here 
that the spiritual character of those comprising the church itself does not bear the 
primary weight for its social difference. The church's separate social reality is an 
imperfect reflection of a transcendent ground of human unity. (This is spelled out in 
Chapter Seven). Accordingly, in this the accent is not laid on the church's qualitative 
difference from the world, but the world's pretense to order itself in tension with the 
new unity of humanity that the Messiah has inaugurated. The church is then merely ' 
an imperfect response to that reality.
Where ought the weight or priority be shifted? The "Objective" or 
transcendent and the experiential immanent must not be played off against each other.
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There is in this a tension, something akin to the Chalcedonian formulation (union 
without fusion, distinction without separation) with the priority laid on the 
transcendent. Separation resting on criteria immanent to humanity or the resident 
righteous difference of the church, can only end in exacerbating the dividedness of 
humanity, and making religion into a dividing rather than a unitive force. But without 
a mechanism to guarantee or anchor distinction, the church would be pulled into the 
world's cultural ethos and, to a greater or lesser degree, forfeit or lose itself. But a 
basis of unity that transcends human particularity and human transformation, not 
immanent to humanity itself, theoretically offers a true universalism.
The Baptist call for ecclesial separation also has negative implications for 
understanding society. Baptist logic required abridging government so that it simply 
exerted police power to maintain peace and order, thereby ensuring their religious 
rights and other individuals' rights and freedoms from trespass. This thinking was in 
part naive. It failed to anticipate the need for a broader constructive use of power 
because of problems arising from urbanization, industrialization or even slavery, 
problems having to do with structural injustice and inequality which were rooted 
deeper in society than individual infractions of law and order.
While it is true that the eighteenth century and a large part of the nineteenth 
century did not, and perhaps could not foresee these problems, it is also true that the 
social-political viewpoint created by Baptist-evangelical thinking could and did blind 
them when social protest and political intervention was called for. Also, viewing the 
essence of religion in individualistic experiential pietistic categories, further 
contributed to social blindness.
Pietistic evangelical individualism was not well suited for the problems of the 
industrial age. The great Evangelists of the nineteenth century reveal the stark 
limitations inherent in their logic. Charles Finney frankly confessed that while slavery 
was wrong, it would be no use to attempt to eradicate it until the hearts of the southern 
masters were converted by the gospel.^ ® As William McLoughlin says, "the road to the 
millennium lay through God’s reformation of the human heart. All man-made efforts 
of social reform...were sheer folly."^  ^ Dwight Moody, the foremost evangelical 
revivalist of the post Civil War era said, "It is a wonderful fact men and women saved 
by the blood of Jesus rarely remain subjects of charity, but rise at once to comfort and 
respectability."^^ "Christianity is your character and character is your capital," was the
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persuasive evangelical sentiment.
There are two further implications of evangelical pietism that are potentially 
problematic. First, the evangelical emphasis on the immanental sphere of religion 
eventually rendered Protestantism more vulnerable to the cultural ethos of the time. 
Immanence was vulnerable to being informed and interpreted by the changing spirit of 
the times. Second, evangelical pietism eventually contributed to the disconnection of 
Protestant religion from its ecclesial roots. As times changed, the essence of religion 
increasingly came to be viewed as an individual experience, quite distinct from church 
membership. As such, mainstream nineteenth century America was given an 
experiential religion only remotely connected to the church. The focus of this religion 
was individualistic in an individualistic age. The Baptist answer to Puritan “fixity” 
was ecclesial separatism, but it was a separation that rested on a substantial 
experiential difference between the saints and the world, this was its weakness. While 
religious experience served an ecclesiological need, it was a first step toward the 
isolation of religious experience (and eventually its abstraction) from a strictly 
ecclesial setting. In time, this Baptist-evangelical turn to the work of God in the soul 
(immanence), which once served ecclesial separation from the world, became the very 
thing that laid the groundwork for a new religion-world fusion in a new era enamored 
with anthropocentric-social change.
Conclusion 
“Fixity”
The Baptist reformation of church, society and religion was in tension with 
“fixity” because (1) it argued Christianity was to be no more than a separate spiritual 
body; (2) because Christ did not deputize the state with spiritual power. Therefore, 
society must be allowed to be pluralistic, void of overarching religious definitions 
[i.e., secularized]. The state must be limited to civil affairs; and (3) because they 
insisted religion was a matter of the heart and conscience involving a free response to 
the sword of the spirit. Coercion (the sword of the state) in matters religious, was 
antithetical to true religion and conscience.
A propensity toward “fixity,” although chastened and weakened, has lived on 
in some Baptist circles because of the influence of converted Congregationalists who
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brought with them ideas of a minimally “Christian” republic [cf Isaac Backus, Chapter 
Three].
The Baptist answer to English Erastian and Puritan establishments laid the 
foundation for a problematic church-world dualism. How the Baptists conceived 
Christianity’s separation from world was in part flawed.
“Freedom”
While Baptists did not reformulate their understanding of Christianity in 
reaction to a situation in which the church was idealistically attached to a socio­
political project, their reformulation is related negatively and positively to the rise of 
that eventuality. This is evident by reviewing the five corollaries of freedom discussed 
in the earlier chapter.
(1) Absolute individualism: As shown, early Baptists had no view of the 
individual as possessing inherent rights and liberties. The individual was viewed 
inside a theological and religious community framework. The so-called liberties of 
republican governance were necessary to ensure the integrity of these frameworks. 
Even so, the arguments for liberty (at the time of the Revolution) from some Baptists 
such as John Leland, are in many respects the same as those of the Founding Fathers’. 
Many Baptists had shed too much of the Puritan pessimism of human nature and 
viewed republican liberty as a plant from heaven which would surely bare only good 
fruit. This is less a matter of Enlightenment idealism than benign naivete.
(2) Reason and experience: Baptists did not develop with an emphasis on 
learning and rationality. Rather, it was fitness of the spirit and the accessibility of the 
Bible to every person for which they are known. As such, they resisted the corrosive 
effects of Enlightenment rationalism on Christian distinctives. Their emphasis on 
heart religion and new birth experience does however form a point of contact with the 
nineteenth century shift of religion which became more immanental, anthropocentric 
and preoccupied with change and fruit. As shown, this emphasis formed the main 
bridge which connected Enlightenment humanism and Protestant evangelicalism.
(3) Virtue: Baptists remained committed to piety as the source of virtue, but 
their commitment to republican government predisposed them to view piety as the 
complement to liberalism.
(4) Pluralism and secularism: As shown in the previous discussions. Baptists
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emerged with roots which were both naively optimistic about society organized this 
way [i.e., Leland] and marginally pessimistic [i.e.. Backus].
(5) Progress: Baptists did not view the creation of modem society in idealistic 
terms. The political organization of the state was only to restrain evil and guarantee 
liberties, not to create an ideal society. As a result. Baptists developed with the 
resources to resist becoming too closely and idealistically attached to a so-called 
national dream. But at the same time, they could be prone to be naively complacent 
about the career of Enlightenment freedom. Their historical experience was with the 
abuse of religio-political power and the absence of liberty. They assumed that when 
power was reformed, social civility would be more or less automatic. They were the 
religious complement to the political radicals whose chief polemic was against 
political “tyranny” with the proviso that the Baptists did not share the underlying 
humanism and nationalism of the Jeffersonians.
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CHAPTER SIX
In Tension With "Freedom";
The Neo Evangelical Movement In Modem America
When studied in light of this thesis, neo-evangelism may be understood in 
partial contrast to two other Protestant movements of this century which have already 
been discussed - liberalism and the fundamentalist driven Religious Right. Both of 
these movements viewed the development of America [understood as a national entity 
or a modem socio-cultural entity] and Christianity [or some part of Christianity] 
within a unitary frame of reference. The nature of this unity was of course not 
ecclesiastical, as in colonial times, but religious. Liberalism believed that particular 
religio-moral values of Christianity could be harmoniously integrated with modem 
culture. No fundamental challenge to the underlying premises of modernity was 
required. What modernity needed was religious depth. Liberalism was confident that 
Christianity, properly understood and formed, provided this need. In this way, they 
envisioned the Christianization of America.
The child of ftmdamentalism, the Religious Right, also believed in a Christian 
America. However, its strategy to effect this identity was not “integrative” but 
regulative. It refused to allow America to exercise its freedom outside the pale of 
“Christian” values. At least this was its aim. This required accessing the political 
means to control society’s moral boundaries and it required fundamentalists to 
constme Christian values and tmth in an absolute and authoritative manner.
In liberalism’s model, modem society organized around freedom is “saved” 
because the individuals that make up that society and the culture that is developed 
from the collective life of society absorb and incamate Christian values and morals. 
Christianity, in this view, can be harmoniously woven into the fabric of modem 
society and its liberal principles. The Religious Right “saves” modem society, not by 
empowering freedom “from below,” but by marking the socio-moral limits of 
freedom. The exercise of freedom outside these limits is not Christian and lacks socio­
moral integrity. Society as such has no moral foundation.
As already argued, a society organized around modem freedom creates 
conditions and fosters an ethos which tempt and pressure Christian constituencies to 
either of the above postures. Furthermore, the propensity of Protestantism in America
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to relate to the republic from a unitary frame of reference [i.e., as a “Christian” 
republic] has deep historical roots. The question with regard to neo-evangelicalism is 
whether or not it is formulated in such a way as to remain properly differentiated from 
modem America. Neo-evangelicalism is a partially new construction of Christianity. 
Implicitly (or explicitly), this constmction contains within it the nature of neo­
evangelicalism’s social relevance. In other words, the question behind this chapter is 
whether evangelicalism is constmcted in such a way as to render it vulnerable to 
either of the religious and cultural forces (“right” or “left”) which are seeking to wed 
the Christian religion to the “needs,” goals or values of modem society. Is neo­
evangelicalism formulated in such a way as to escape being coopted either in a 
regulative or integrative strategy and yet not end up embracing a church-world 
separation? Is its make-up such that it is able to counter the historical inertia and 
cultural pull toward an uncritical identity with modem society. Fundamentally, this is 
a question about the sources of neo-evangelicalism differentiation.
The chapter begins by showing that neo-evangelicalism emerged as a centrist 
movement. This fact is significant for understanding it. Following this historical 
review, the chapter proceeds to enquire more concretely how neo-evangelicalism 
attempted to establish its centrist position. In the concluding discussion of the chapter, 
neo-evangelicalism’s positions are evaluated in light of the problem of identification 
and “fixity” and “freedom.”
Neo-evangelicalism began to come into self conscious existence in the 1940’s. 
The NAE (National Association of Evangelicals) was founded in 1942. The 
movement occurred after liberalism had crested but before the religious right was 
formed. The fact that liberalism's power was on the wane, encouraged, if it did not 
open the door for, a new evangelical response to modernity. In hindsight, it is 
predictable that in America an "evangelical" response to modernity would come from 
more historic American traditional evangelical sources that were moderately to the 
right than from a disenchanted left (as in Europe).
While "neo orthodoxy" [so called], contained a far more penetrating critique of 
modernity, it originated more directly from Europe and was more singularly located in 
academic circles.  ^ It was not and did not become a grassroots movement involving 
the local churches and laity. Protestantism's domination of America after the birth of 
the nation, was not due to the existence of the staid old-line Protestant churches, but
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rather because of those sects that were both more friendly to and instruments of 
revivalism (the Baptists, Methodists, Disciples and the more passionate evangelical 
Presbyterians). If Protestantism was going to reclaim a healthy tension with 
modernity in America, it would almost surely have to develop out of the offspring of 
that more historic popular evangelical constituency which had become central in 
Antebellum America. When neo-evangelicalism began to distinguish itself, its 
"evangelical" platform was such that it appealed to popular American Protestantism. 
Its claims were simple, direct, accessible and Christ centered.
In order to properly assess evangelicalism's attempt to place Christianity in a 
new relation to modernity, it is important to review the fundamentalist roots of the 
movement. One of the most dramatic features of the American religious scene in the 
twentieth century was the division of Protestantism in the beginning decades of this 
century. The relative harmony in spiritual temper and belief that characterized 
antebellum Protestantism, gave place to three antagonistic forces. The idealism of 
society, organized around democratic freedom and liberty penetrated a Protestantism 
already extended as a public religion, pulling it more consistently into its goals, 
premises, and this-world optimism. In response to this "liberal" development of 
Protestantism, fundamentalism emerged. Over against adaptation to modernity, it 
called for the conservation and protection of the past. While its main preoccupation 
was doctrinal and biblical, it was also on a path that would lead it into a more 
separatistic posture, away from both the modem world and the other mainline 
churches.
By the third decade of the twentieth century, much of American Protestantism 
had been rearranged. Unable to capture the bases of institutional power, the 
"fundamentalists" voted with their feet, more or less leaving the mainline 
denominations to their liberal destiny. It is precisely in this exodus that a new 
dimension of fundamentalism came into existence. Their mission evolved beyond 
that of "conservers" and "defenders" of the faith, to a call for separateness. "Come out 
from among them and be separate" (Rev 13) became their watchword. Separate 
schools, separate mission agencies, separate seminaries, churches, denominations and 
printing houses were put in place.
As this posture of being "in defense o f  and "separate from" became 
institutionalized, it began to be reflected in almost every aspect of fundamentalism's
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life and faith. Pre-millennialism found in fundamentalism a ready soil, oriented away 
from the transformation of this world toward rapture to another. Saving souls from 
both the world and the corrupted churches, largely defined their mission. The gains of 
science in any area that called into question classic Christian assumptions were 
rejected outright. These included scientific theories about origins (Darwin), about the 
human condition (Freud), about the historical and literary conditioning of the Bible, 
and others. With few exceptions, they insulated themselves from the positive 
achievements within culture, in music, theater and the other fine arts, as well as 
certain areas of literature.
Between 1950 and 1970, evangelicalism emerged from fundamentalism to 
take a self-consciously distinctive place in the American religious scene. From a 
distance, it may appear that American evangelicalism emerged as an inevitable 
centrist phenomenon, mediating a position between the two extreme poles of 
liberalism and fundamentalism.^ While there is an element of truth to this, it is not 
helpful in understanding the precise dynamics that have attempted to take form in the 
development of neo-evangelicalism. Over against the posture of its fundamentalist 
progeny of "in defense of’ and "separate from," evangelicalism emerged in search of a 
more offensive and inclusive posture. It is these "new" kind of dynamics that are the 
primitive impulses of twentieth century evangelicalism. Only in light of the 
fundamentalist background from which evangelicalism consciously sought to 
distinguish itself, can the spirit and distinctive character of this movement be fully 
understood or appreciated.
The turn of events which mark the self-conscious emergence of modem 
American evangelicalism, all clearly bear the presence of this "new" dynamic that 
may be generally described as inclusive and offensive [note neo-evangelicals were 
offensive in that they abandoned a fundamentalist dogmatic assertive style for a more 
apologetic style]. They were anxious to argue and debate their position with the 
opposition. The organization of the National Association of Evangelicals (1947, 
1948), the opening of Fuller Theological Seminary (1947), as well as Billy Graham's 
open break with separatist fundamentalist ideology (around 1950), compose three 
early and highly significant occurrences that explicitly bear the presence of this more 
offensive and inclusive style.
In hindsight, it is clear that no one player or set of players in this emerging
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phenomenon fully understood the implications of the new directions. Once the spirit 
of this new dynamic was released, it proved to be greater than any one institution or 
significant personality to harness or define. George Marsden's work. Reforming 
Fundamentalism, made clear the way that Fuller Theological Seminary, more than any 
of its peer evangelical institutions, captured the spirit of the new direction. Froml950 
onward. Fuller took a number of decisive steps away from the fundamentalists’ 
exclusivist defensive posture. It released the gospel from many fundamentalist and 
sectarian trappings. Personal ethics, having to do with taboos on dancing, alcohol, 
theater, cinema, went by the wayside. Over against the myopic concern for personal 
salvation to the exclusion of social transformation. Fuller came to argue for a 
thoroughly offensive engagement with the structures of suffering, evil and oppression 
in this world. Dispensationalism (with its otherworldly focus), a well-established 
article of faith in fundamentalist circles, came first to be optionalized and then 
doctrinally refuted as a perversion of the New Testament gospel. A theological 
dialogue was opened with science in a number of areas, such as evolution and 
psychology, areas anathematized and polemicized by the fundamentalists. An 
openness to culture and the positive achievements in music, arts and literature were 
affirmed.
Not least among these has been Fuller's struggle to distinguish what is and 
what is not authoritative in the Bible, calling forth anathemas from other evangelicals 
and fundamentalists. These movements toward greater openness are by no means the 
monopoly of Fuller. They signify currents and changes throughout evangelicalism 
over its modem forty-year history. In fact, they bear the presence of a "new" direction 
toward a more offensive inclusivist posture, where fewer and fewer religious 
distinctives are inside the non-negotiable center, and more and more are relativized to 
the circumference or judged to be purely of a parochial or of a culturally-conditioned 
character, possessing no intrinsic relation to the Christian message.
Only progressively did this new spirit take on a self-conscious form under the 
description "evangelical." Its history is clearly evolutionary in character. Just as 
self-conscious individuated persons are not bom in a day but emerge through a series 
of events and decisions that serve to form them, evangelicalism similarly "developed." 
While this offensive inclusivistic dynamic is clearly present, it is often shrouded in a 
degree of ambivalence. This is so, because it has never fully been sure where its
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''fundamentalism'' ends and its "evangelicalism" begins. Modem evangelicalism has 
always carried within it the general theological moorings of fundamentalism, while at 
the same time it has attempted to step to a different beat.
Nineteenth century evangelicalism and twentieth century evangelicalism are 
not the same. Historically, nineteenth century evangelicalism represented a broad 
protestant mainline consensus centering on classic protestant orthodoxy with its 
preeminence around the gospel of free grace through faith in Jesus Christ. This was 
distinctly cast in the mold of the eighteenth - and nineteenth century awakenings, in 
which decision and an empirical Christian experience tended to be uniquely informed 
and more or less absolutized.
Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the centrist character of 
evangelicalism seemed to be allowing for more diversity at the circumference. Some 
pattems of early modernism sought to build liberalizing theologies out of an 
"evangelical Christocentric empiricism." However, for the most part, this broad, 
tolerant, cohesive evangelicalism suffered badly in the fundamentalism- modernist 
controversy. While it is not accurate to say that nineteenth century evangelicalism 
was extinguished at the turn of the century schism, it is a fair assessment that its broad 
cohesive base splintered. Only a few denominational structures kept this spirit alive.
Self-conscious twentieth century neo-evangelicalism returned to this term 
"evangelical." Perhaps it is more historically accurate to say they came to isolate it, 
and identify themselves definitively by it. However, in doing so, they did not simply 
pick up where nineteenth century evangelicalism had evolved, but brought to it the 
needs of the new situation created by fundamentalism.
While the general character of nineteenth century evangelicalism exists in the 
new twentieth century evangelicalism, it is not precisely identifiable. The new 
historical situation in the twentieth century altered it. Contemporary evangelicals 
rightly argued, in concert with their nineteenth century heritage, that Christianity does 
not necessitate this defensive separatistic posture of fundamentalism. But in 
attempting to loosen the grip of these rear guard dynamics, evangelicals were thrust 
into a new tension between fundamentalist separatism and liberalism's problematic 
openness. Evangelicals historically sought to meet the challenge of the new tension 
they stepped into, through the resources inherent in a nineteenth century American 
evangelicalism. However, this attempt has only been partly successful. New
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situations make old truth uncouth.
Evangelicalism has been hard put to remember that nineteenth century 
evangelicalism either hardened into fundamentalism or became uncritically involved 
in modernism. Fundamentalism survived modernism by employing separatism, 
exclusivity and defensive intransigence, and intensifying biblical-dogmatic authority. 
Ostensibly, neo-evangelicalism sought to moderate this image and enter upon a course 
of greater openness and dialogue, with modernity and liberalism embracing only what 
they believed to be distinctly “evangelical.”
But in this approach what was to ensure that the new "evangelical" freedom 
would not overflow the threshold of its constituting difference, that distinction which 
was needed to maintain a clear identity? What could ensure that the determinants 
needed for internal cohesion, calling and "mission" would not come unraveled 
through an increasingly open posture? Or on the other hand, because of the threat of 
dissolution, what would prevent a lapse back into a defensive fundamentalist 
intransigence and separatism from the world and other churches?^
The Dynamics That Neo-Evangelicalism Employed in its Attempt 
To Negotiate a Path Between the Problematic Closeness of Fundamentalism 
and the Uncritical Openness of Liberalism
In its short history, the new evangelicalism has had within it a number of 
predispositions that have influenced this tension, albeit with ambiguous results. These 
may be described as pragmatism reductionism and evangelistic empiricism.
Pragmatism
In so far as pragmatism is the vrillingness to allow certain external pressures 
and circumstances to have a degree of influence on the expression and witness of 
truth, it appears to have a limited but definite influence in the history of the new 
evangelicalism.
George Marsden's work. Reforming Fundamentalism, brings to light that the 
early Fuller group carefully selected its positions and statements so as not to offend 
the sensibilities of its more fundamentalist constituency. It is not as if these pioneers 
were bravely following a new creative impulse of the gospel into an unknown world. 
They appeared to be more like a nervous thief who makes his way with eyes flashing
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right and left. On the right was a more fundamentalist constituency that buttered their 
bread. On the left was the plague called modernism or liberalism, with which they 
could ill afford or imagine themselves as being in their company.
Many of the institutions that gave form to the "new" evangelicalism, grew 
outside the pale of denominational structures. It is this phenomenon that allowed the 
degree of freedom and movement they needed to take on their own unique character 
and interests. Denominations obviously have their own interests and historical 
distinctiveness to care for. While the new evangelical coalitions attempted to 
construct bases that transcended these denominational particularities, they were 
constantly on guard so as to keep themselves in good stead with the various church 
organizations. It was from them that they drew the largest share of their support on a 
person-to-person basis. Moreover, it was in part through the good will of these 
denominations, that their ministries gained their influence. The breadth of this kind of 
constituency necessitated careful (often calculated) moves. The new evangelical 
sympathies were coming basically from a conservative to moderately conservative 
sector of Protestantism. At the same time, evangelicalism was attempting, with 
increasing success, to revitalize mainline churches with the old familiar gospel that 
had fallen on hard times. Many of those in these institutions recognized that within 
the new evangelicalism, aspects of the old fundamentalists' spirit were still alive.
All of these factors exerted on evangelicalism a strong element of pragmatism 
or "practicality" that served to moderate both the degree of closedness and openness it 
confessed. Even so, it should be noted that as the new evangelical institutions have 
grown stronger in influence and financial independence, the extent of this pragmatic 
element seems to have decreased. In hindsight, it seems inevitable that in the 
fledgling transdenominational context of evangelicalism's modem revival recourse to 
this kind of pragmatic approach would occur. It might even be said that, for a season, 
it helped enable evangelicalism maintain the positive tension between openness and 
closedness. But it is just as tme that the presence of this element of pragmatism, 
could only hinder evangelicalism from finding within itself the resources for a 
creative stasis (over against the rather arbitrary rigid intransigence of 
fundamentalism). Or it could also hinder evangelicalism from achieving an informed 
openness (over against the more unconditionally open posture of the mainline
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churches who were increasingly experiencing a crisis of identity and meaningful 
content).
Reductionism and Rationalism
A second force that exerted an influence on this tension between the uncritical 
openness of liberalism and the problematic "closedness" of fundamentalism, was the 
attempt at an evangelical reductionism of Christianity. Theoretically speaking, the 
circumscription of the essential defining elements of Christianity served to widen or 
"universalize" its scope. This definition included primarily three articles: the 
authority of scripture, orthodoxy, and the necessity of a bom again experience. The 
last of these will be discussed under the next sub-heading.
Neo-evangelicalism concluded that if the church was not to slip into the grip 
of modernity's premises and values, the integrity of the authority of scripture must be 
maintained. Rationalism, critically applied to scripture, had made it pliable to 
modemity's values and world view. Securing the scripture's authority was crucial, and 
the way neo-evangelicalism went about securing this authority reveals the extent to 
which they themselves were captive to modernity. Neo-evangelicalism was not 
comfortable being in the modem world on their own terms, i.e. confessionally.
Following the legacy of men like Charles Hodge, Benjamin Warfield, 
Cornelius Van til, Edward Meachan, Edward Camel and Carl Henry re-opened the 
theological attempt to derive the veracity of scriptural authority and Protestant 
orthodoxy from warrants that were implicitly rational. Alister McGrath, agreeing with 
Donald Bloesch, writes, "In the end, Heniy risks making an implicit appeal to a more 
fundamental foundation (i.e. 'logically consistent divine revelation') in his affirmation 
of the authority of scripture", leading to the conclusion that "the authority of scripture 
itself is derived from this more fundamental authority". He goes on to recall the 
similarity of this effort to Princeton's historic "confidence in the capacity of reason to 
judge the tmth of revelation". Finally, he asks, "whose rationality provides the basis 
of scriptural authority?".
George Marsden has shown that modem evangelicalism is unmistakably 
linked with a history that is coimected in an unbroken line to the early decades of the 
republic when Protestantism triumphed over the Enlightenment radicals ("infidels"), 
by itself appropriating a non-skeptical strain of Enlightenment thought, the Scottish 
school of common sense.  ^ It was in conflict with "extreme rationalism" that
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rationalism infected American Protestantism.
While it is true that modem evangelicalism's more rational apologetic 
commenced with a preset doctrinal agenda, it nonetheless reveals the extent to which 
evangelicalism was reacting to and "talking" to modernity, rather than confessing its 
faith to the world. In other words, neo-evangelicalism had not found an informing 
basis for the church which allowed it to be in the modem world in a non-anxious 
confessional "witnessing" posture. Lacking an evangelical epistemology, it was 
burdened by a rationalistic tendency (if not a rationalistic epistemology).
In the end, the existence of this element is one factor that subverted the 
possibility of Protestantism being in the world on its own differentiated basis. 
Evangelicalism’s view of Biblical authority rendered it vulnerable to the Religious 
Right. It was because evangelicals insisted that the authority of scripture as evenly 
resided in the whole of scripture, and not primarily in its role of providing an 
evangelical witness, that their position lent itself to the Right’s claim that the Bible 
provided individuals and society with a source for religio-moral absolutes in an age of 
relativism. Moreover, to the degree that this authority could be linked to rationality, 
its normativeness within human society could be urged and established by appeal to 
universal canons of thought, so called. Evangelicals’ view of truth poses a similar 
problem.
In neo-evangelicalism’s formative years, no two figures had a greater 
theological influence than Henry and Camel. The direction they established defined 
the course of the movement in its early period. Both were intensely apologetic in their 
approach to theology. Hemy was particularly devoted to the idea that the tmth of 
divine revelation must be translated into propositional form. Tmth, he insisted, could 
be given an objective propositional expression which could be apprehended through 
the faculty of reason.^ Ray S. Anderson points out the reason behind this theological 
approach. Henry’s “analysis of the contemporary situation is that the modem mind has 
succumbed to relativism with a loss of absolutes in moral values and of certainty with 
regards to tmth.”  ^For Henry, “Christian faith must be rationally defensible in terms of 
the criteria by which all tmth is verified. Otherwise claims of faith fall back on the 
slippery slope of existential and subjective experience with no basis of certainty.”^
Henry’s theological-conceptual basis for demonstrating the veracity of tmth 
may be simply stated as follows: he employed the Aristotelian law of non-
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contradiction as a measurement of truth; by employing philosophical presuppositions, 
he sought to establish the integrity of doctrinal truth. As Anderson points out, Henry 
transmuted the God of the Bible into a philosophical theistic principle. The logic 
inherent in this principle was that God had revealed the truths which determine all 
rational knowledge and make it certain.^ Divine revelation is the source of all truth, 
reason is the instrument for recognition and logical consistency is the test of truth. 
Anderson goes so far as to claim that Henry insisted “... that human reason can grasp 
and even validate divine revelation apart from the work of the Holy Spirit and the 
presence of faith. Donald Bloesch, an evangelical who shows an appreciation for 
Barth, writes that Henry’s and Clark’s theological method is fundamentally deductive, 
in that they attempt to derive the veracity of truth from rational principles.
George Lindbeck noted that evangelicalism’s idea of truth betrayed a 
“voluntarist intellectualist and literalist” mentality which arose out of “unusual 
insecurity and naivete.” Anderson, who stands within the evangelical community, 
makes a similar claim. He writes that “Henry’s theology is a response to the 
contemporary craving for stability and certainty.”*^ “Authority is the key issue for 
evangelical theology. Authority must be grounded in absolute certainty, must be 
logically verifiable and rationally accessible to every person.” '^^
Evangelistic Empiricism
One of the major events involved in the cleavage within fundamentalism 
which led to modem evangelicalism, was Billy Graham's decision to break with 
separatist ideology. Like his eighteenth - and nineteenth - century prototypes, Graham 
made distinctions between what was essential and what was peripheral. By following 
the tradition of placing the gospel of Grace through Christ by faith in the center (and 
relativizing everything else), he was able to extend the boundaries of his ministry 
beyond the division between Catholicism and Protestantism. Graham's ministry, 
along with a host of lesser lights with the same spirit, have reminded American 
Christians of the legacy that nineteenth century Protestantism had largely come to 
affirm, namely, the things that Christians hold in common are far more significant 
than the things that separate them. Putting a few central articles inside the 
"non-negotiable" center, Graham's ministry played a significant role in forming a 
transdenominational evangelical consensus with a more offensive open and inclusive
241
posture.
However, Graham's ministry in particular and the evangelism of evangelicals 
in general, while breaking down certain barriers, have raised others. Building on the 
tradition of eighteenth and nineteenth century evangelicalism, these new players have 
come to place an increasing weight of emphasis on both the individual's decision of 
faith and an empirical experience of conversion (new birth). In many spheres of the 
new evangelicalism, the business of repenting, believing, praying the "sinner's 
prayer," the opening of one's heart to let Jesus come in, and the changed life, have 
tended to become standardized and absolutized. In this view, there are only two 
groups: those who have been transformed through a certain prototypical evangelical 
crisis experience and those who have not. By standardizing and absolutizing this 
salvation equation, the new evangelicalism has opened itself to the critique of 
introducing into the church and world a new separatism organized around a “bom 
again” experience. In so doing, it has subtly shifted the terms of exclusivity to the 
more difficult and elusive realm of decision and experience. The effect of this shift is 
to replace Protestant sectarianism with an evangelical “universalism” that derives its 
definition in part from subjective experiential change.
One of the problems inherent in evangelicalism’s emphasis on an individual’s 
empirical religious experience is that it does not contribute to a strong ecclesiology. 
New birth experiences can be mainstreamed so as to distinguish an individual within a 
large socio-cultural setting quite apart from any ecclesial solidarity. To the degree that 
the new birth experience is made definitive for the identity of the church, the church 
rests on the changed life of the saints.
As will be discussed, twentieth century neo-evangelicalism emerged with a 
new interest in social justice. As early as 1949, Carl Henry attempted to set a new 
course.^  ^Over against fundamentalists who did not recognize social justice as integral 
to the Christian mission and in distinction from the liberal social gospel movement 
whose members understood Christian mission entirely in terms of social justice (or 
nearly so), Henry envisioned a middle course. The two positions between which he 
sought to mediate may be called dualistic and monistic. The fundamentalist position 
was basically dualistic. For fundamentalists, Christianity had no interest in the 
transformation of the world and its socio-political structures. Salvation was entirely an 
individual phenomenon. The sole mission of the church was to save souls. Insofar as
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personal piety provided a godly beneficial influence on others and therefore on society 
at large, fundamentalists had a social ethic. The liberal position was basically monistic 
(to use Ken Cauthen’s description). Salvation was not merely or primarily directed at 
changing sinful individuals. The entire socio-economic organization of society 
required being made Christian. As argued in Chapter Four, this view became intensely 
political and led to the collapse of distinction between Christian and liberal 
democratic goals and values.
Henry wanted to awaken in the new evangelicalism a social conscience 
without succumbing to the monistic consistency of the social liberals. This required 
making distinctions about the Church’s mission. Evangelism and social justice were 
not optional and could not rightly be separated but they must not be identified. 
Evangelism addressed individuals. Through the gospel, individuals were called to 
faith, repentance and a new life of obedience to God. As Ronald Sider writes, “Only 
individuals can respond to this Good News. Hence, it is confiising nonsense to talk of 
evangelizing political or economic structures. Multinational corporations or political 
entities cannot repent, enter into a personal relationship with the Risen Jesus and 
become his disciple.” ®^
In the early unified period of neo-evangelicalism, justice primarily, if not 
exclusively, meant extending compassion and help to those in the world who were 
suffering. The social function of the church was defined in this humanitarian sense 
with the intent to quicken the conscience of evangelicals toward those in need in the 
world. This was not an attempt to realize a Christian egalitarian value in society, but 
to become responsive to real needs through voluntary private and ecclesiastical 
initiatives. Viewed from the standpoint of the interest of this thesis, neo­
evangelicalism’s strength was found in its attempt to chart a road between a 
Christianity-world dualism and the monism of the liberal social gospel movement.
The weakness in evangelicalism’s position was that even though it began to reconnect 
to the needs and interests of society from a differentiated posture, this connection was 
weak and flawed. Its social conscience was fundamentally the 19* century 
individualistic vision of reality tvhich H. Richard Niebuhr described as “the 
conviction that the human unit is the individual.” ’^ “The defect,” writes Reinhold 
Niebuhr, “... is that it (i,e., the evangelical view) obscures the dual individual and 
social character of human selves and the individual and social character of their
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virtues and vices.” *^
Neo-evangelicalism did not view humaness with sufficient social depth and it 
did not see in the gospel a new social model of humanity apart from transformed 
individuals. Therefore it had no vision of changing social structure. Part of the reason 
for this was that the movement consisted largely of status quo middle class Americans 
who lacked a critical relation to capitalism^  ^as the recipients of capitalism’s material 
blessings and enhanced freedom in lifestyle. A simple gospel confined to the 
individual spiritual dimension wore well with them.
In time, some evangelicals deepened their social ethic while maintaining and 
(in some cases) clarifying the distinctions which were original to the spirit of the 
movement. Ronald Sider, for instance, urged that evangelicals had neglected the 
larger organizing term for Christ’s mission “Kingdom.” When this term was 
employed, it was possible to think of the Church’s mission as embracing all spheres of 
fallen human existence including social and economic structures.^® He insisted,
“social concern involves both relief for those suffering from social justice and also the 
political restructuring of society for the sake of greater social justice.”^^ This however 
did not mean that he was departing from the medium (i.e., between monism and 
dualism) that evangelicals had originally attempted to negotiate as is evident from the 
following: “To label this increased social justice ‘salvation’ is however confusing. 
Until our Lord’s return, all attempts to restructure society will at best produce only 
significantly less imperfect societies tragically pockmarked by the consequences of 
the fall.”^
Wes Micheason and James Wallis also appeal to the Kingdom motif and
polemicize the traditional individualistic evangelical view of salvation. In the
following statement, they urge that neo-evangelicalism’s emphasis on salvation as
transformed individuals lacks critical tension with modernity’s individualistic culture.
The mainstream evangelical witness, they insist, fails to come to grips with the
importance of the social character and historical particularity of the church which is
necessaiy for Christianity to resist uncritical identity with the world around it.
“... what the gospel means is itself still a very controversial question. What is 
the evangel? The traditional view would say that the heart of the gospel is 
justification by faith, the atonement, getting one’s heart right with God. Then 
there are social implications and political responsibilities that derive from that. 
Others would say fiiat the meaning of Jesus is the inauguration of a new order
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of things. Whenever you delete the coming and the meaning of the kingdom 
from the proclamation of the gospel, the inseparable unity between 
justification by faith and participation in the Idngdom of God is broken. 
Reconciliation is required because to participate in that new order requires a 
change so fundamental that the apostle calls it a new birth...
... Now [i.e., in 20* century evangelicalism] the kingdom imperative is 
on the periphery and neglected or removed altogether so that what you have is 
a gospel defined by the four spiritual laws. That theology seems to me to be 
inherently susceptible to being used to sanction the social order the way it 
is .”^
Summary
Almost as soon as modem American evangelicalism achieved self- conscious 
identity and distinct recognition, it has begun to come unraveled. Within the last 
decade, leading churchmen have been talking about the breakdown of the meaning of 
the word "evangelical." Within the 1970's, Richard Quebedeaux, a prominent 
evangelical, published two books entitled The Young Evangelicals and The Worldly 
Evangelicals, both of which pointed to the cleavage of a "right" and a "left" within 
evangelicalism. In the latter of these two books, the author's enthusiastic optimism for 
the "left" is much more tamed. He appears to not be so sure or enthusiastic about 
where evangelicals are going or who they are becoming.
Donald Blosech, a prominent long-standing evangelical scholar and author, is 
also concerned. In The Future o f Evangelical Christianity, he mourns the splintering 
of evangelicals, while attempting to mediate a broad basis upon which unity and 
identity could prevail. Of course, Blosech is not without his own biases about what 
should go into this evangelical platform. His answer seems to come out on the 
historical side. Evangelicals can only make their way into the future by establishing 
the determinants or their identity with the past. He pleads for a "catholic" doctrinal 
tradition, including a rather high view of the sacraments, building on the clarification 
of the Reformation's insights on faith and grace.
Today, evangelicalism is having trouble finding solid common ground, ground 
that will enable it to make good on its promise to stand in a more offensive, dialectical 
posture to the world neither, problematically separated from the world nor identified 
with it. Its pragmatism, empiricism and rationalism will no longer suffice. 
Evangelicalism is being challenged to come of age. It is being driven back on itself, 
to see if it can draw out of its own center the resources to sustain the tension it
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pretended to step into. Failure to do so, will no doubt spell its demise, at least in the 
highly coherent self-conscious form it has recently enjoyed.
The issue is one that is inextricably bound up with the basis upon which it 
attempts to secure its critical differentiation from the modem world's ethos, values, 
and premises. Its success at achieving this critical differentiation in principle, can be 
no better than the basis it has laid down to support it. As such, its present existence is 
in a crisis in so far as its historical defection from fundamentalism is being tested. The 
question is whether it was a temporary rebellion or the evolution of something that 
has and will show itself able to call forth new resources to negotiate a difficult but 
necessary tension.
Neo-evangelicalism attempted to distance itself from liberalism's problematic 
fusion with modernity and its relativistic premises and values. Also it attempted to 
distance itself from fundamentalist's problematic separatism and parallelism to the 
modem world and its social needs. In other words, it attempted differentiation from 
and connectedness to the modem world. Its strategy to accomplish differentiation was 
to retum Christianity to the common nineteenth century evangelical beliefs: biblical 
authority, Christ's substitutionary work (and the cluster of doctrines that support that 
truth) and the requirement of a new birth experience. It sought to secure Christianity 
from becoming caught in the grip of modernity by tying it to a few non-negotiable 
distinctly Christian, i.e., evangelical beliefs. Ironically, to protect these from the 
corrosive effects of rationalism, they employed reason and placed a greater emphasis 
on the authority of the scripture. Evangelicalism’s strategy to connect to the social 
needs in the world was to extend the Christian ethics beyond the individual to the 
social realm. Though this was fledgling, somewhat anemic effort, it was part of the 
original design of neo-evangelicalism.
Practically speaking, the question is whether the foundation that evangelicals 
laid to achieve differentiation and connectedness will ultimately support this tension. 
Will it enable them to be "in the world but not of the world?”
Even while neo-evangelicalism seemed to be succeeding in giving 
Protestantism an expression in tension with liberalism (and fundamentalism), it was 
quickly moving toward a crisis. In 1979, the Religious Right emerged building its 
Christian republic campaign out of religious premises that were very similar in 
principle to that of neo-evangelicalism. By insisting that Christian truth and values
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could be verified by a common (public) source of appeal - rational thought, neo­
evangelicalism unwittingly contributed to the conclusion that a basis existed to justify 
a “new” social role for Christianity - the regulation of public standards of morality. 
While Henry himself seemed to oppose the New Right, his theological principles 
contributed to it by construing a fundamental unity between the truth of God and the 
rationality of this world. As Anderson points out, for Henry “the finite and infinite are 
comprehended in one and the same logicality
At the end of the day, neo-evangelicalism’s risked loosening the church's 
confessional-dialectical posture toward the world, and engendering an authoritarian 
posture which made it vulnerable to the assimilation into the Religious Right. 
Furthermore, its evangelical reductionism and empiricism do not in the end provide 
the church with an enduring basis to resist the corrosive effects of modernity on its 
distinctive Christian character. As discussed, the focus of evangelicals on individual 
salvation via new birth, is viewed by many as contributing to the cultural 
individualism that is endemic to modernism’s premises. The problem, as it is most 
often represented by critics, is one of balance. It is not the individual experience focus 
per se, but the absence of a social dimension. Evangelicalism is faulted because its 
only answer to the individualism in society is a better converted individual 
empowered to practice benevolence. The problem however lies deeper than this. The 
salvation logic of American evangelicalism grew out of English and continental 
pietism. This logic did not consistently build its understanding of salvation on the 
foundation of a finished objective work of Christ for all humanity; a work which 
changed humanity’s relation to God and each other. Evangelicals gave the particular 
individual’s saving experience of Christ both a preeminent place in soteriology and a 
relative autonomy. The consequence of this is that no clear social description of 
human reality is derivable from their primary soteriological emphasis.
Although overstating the matter, Harold Bloom describes the experiential 
individualism as the essence of American religion. Bloom argues that modem 
American religion took on its distinctive experiential emphasis at the August 1801 
Cane Ridge evangelical camp meeting. On that occasion, 25,000 people, mostly of 
Presbyterian, Methodist and Baptist backgrounds, met for a week of revival. The 
participants engaged in what Bloom describes as “... a kind of orgiastic individualism 
in which all the holy rolling was the outward mark of an inward grace that
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traumatically put away frontier loneliness and instead put on the doctrine of 
experience that exalted such loneliness into a being alone with Jesus... The American 
Jesus was bom at Cane Ridge... He is a Jesus who barely was cmcified and whose 
forty days of resurrection upon earth never have ended. Or if he ascended, he has 
come back and keeps coming back in the pouring out of spirit. He cannot be known in 
or through the church, but only one on one...”^^
At the end of the day, the problem is not one of balance, but twofold: where 
evangelicals consistently begin their soteriological reasonings, from the objective- 
historical versus the subjective-experiential and what is comprehended in that 
objective work -  an individual and social view of humanness versus an individual 
view of humanness. As already quoted, Wes Michaelson and James Wallis and the 
Niebuhr brothers reveal some perception of this problem. In Chapter Seven it will be 
argued that Barth provides an understanding of the gospel which clarifies both aspects 
of the above equation.
Viewed in relation to the presuppositions or corollaries of American freedom, 
neo-evangelicalism may seem in the following light:
(1) Over against the absolute individualism endemic to the modem project, 
neo-evangelicalism witnessed to the importance of a spiritually transformed 
individual; one who was empowered to be compassionate and one who was beginning 
to become aware of his or her social responsibility. Even so, as argued, this view did 
not present a potent challenge to, or liberation from, the modem individualistic ethos.
(2) Over against modemity’s confidence in reason alone as the necessary 
epistlemological corollary to freedom, neo-evangelicalism, especially in its coherent 
early decades, returned to the nineteenth century hope of achieving a marriage 
between reason and scripture. Evangelicals resisted what seemed to them the 
parochiality and relativity of biblical truth caused by skeptical reason by a renaissance 
of rational apologetics, especially as regards the authority of scripture. This strategy 
made them vulnerable to the designs of the Religious Right and a loss of the 
differentiated relation to the world they sought to achieve.
(3) Over against the presupposition that virtue and freedom are interdependent, 
evangelicals emphasized the new birth. As already discussed, this view of salvation 
did little to bring Christianity into a creative tension with the modem ethos. 
Christianity as such remained complementary and supplementary to the American
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way.
(4) Over against the American platform of freedom that says that individual 
liberty yielding a pluralistic society naturally achieves sufficient harmony and 
fraternity, the principles of evangelicals conclude that pluralistic harmony is achieved 
through new birth. Mass revivalism continues in its nineteenth century image and to a 
lesser degree, accomplishes a similar need for national cohesion. In addition, the 
insistence of evangelicals on giving the church’s witness rational veracity, suggests 
their propensity to provide pluralistic America with a simple accessible universal 
basis of truth. As Ray Anderson has said, Henry believed that “... human reason can 
grasp and even validate divine revelation apart from the work of the Holy Spirit and 
the presence of faith.”^^
(5) Over against the linking of freedom and progress, unlike mainstream 
nineteenth century evangelicalism, modem neo-evangelicalism has been largely pre- 
millennial. It has not been enamoured with the prospect of the transformation of the 
present age. This fact may express evangelicalism’s greatest tension with modernity. 
This position may support evangelicalism’s design to not become identified with the 
modem socio-cultural project, but it also may do little to enable evangelicals to be 
creatively connected to this world.
In the end, American neo-evangelicalism combined its evangelicalism with 
pragmatism, rationalism, reductionism, empiricism, and social ethicism, thus creating 
an inadequate and flawed foundation for the restoration of the church's differentiation 
from the modem/post-modem world. Chapter Seven will argue that a well-formed 
ecclesial Christianity which is neither problematically separated from or too closely 
identified with the world, requires a more consistent evangelical base. 
Neo-evangelicalism represents, to a significant degree, the impress of a composite 
artifice containing elements which betray its intention. Even so, much of 
evangelicalism is changing. Fuller eventually began to look for a way to understand 
Biblical that was not so rationalistic and totalistic as their early leaders insisted.^  ^
Some evangelicals are talking to Yale neo-liberals and recognizing the importance of 
a confessional vs. a highly apologetic-rational approach to Christian truth.^* As noted, 
many evangelicals have recognized that the early horizons of social justice needed 
expanding. Both a compassionate response to particular needs and a challenging 
destructive socio-political structures are required.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
Chapters One through Six have argued that segments within mainstream 
Protestantism have often been and continue to be problematically identified with the 
modem socio-cultural world that has grown up in the United States, and that this 
identity has been manifested in the patterns of “fixity” and “freedom.” Ultimately, 
however, a problem can only be fully recognized as a problem when it is seen in the 
light of positive criteria. In other words, in the fullest sense, the “answer” is necessary 
to understand the problem. No discriminative judgements are possible without some 
theoretical claims about the truth of the matter. This chapter argues that the inner logic 
of the church’s evangelical theology (as well as other fields of knowledge), requires 
and empowers Christianity’s differentiation from and relatedness to the world. The 
method used to demonstrate this is metaphorically similar to that used in a court of 
law. Several “witnesses” who view the matter fi*om slightly different perspectives are 
examined with respect to the question at hand. This approach requires the reader to 
suffer circles of arguments that overlap and discussions that sometimes appear 
tangential to the subject, rather than to enjoy the luxury of concise, direct linear 
argument. It is of course hoped that breadth of insight into the subject will be the 
reward of this more cumbersome approach.
Section A
Sociological Resources: Murry Bowen’s Family Systems Theory 
In the 1950's and 1960's, Murry Bowen broke with the psychoanalytic- 
Freudian approach of understanding human behaviour and began to construct a new 
paradigm that would come to be known as family systems theory. Systems thinking 
represented a shift from looking for the source of a problem in a condition rooted deep 
in an individual’s sub-conscious to looking outside the individual, to the individual’s 
relationship system. Bowen insisted that the particular manifestation of a problem was 
of relative importance. The real issue, he argued, had to do with a person’s response to 
the emotional signals that were present in their primary social worlds. The importance 
of the social world for Bowen is not the environmental and cultural forces so often 
noted for their determining power. Rather, it is the emotional field that comes into 
play in all levels of human togetherness, from the smallest to the largest of social
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organisms.
By emotional field, Bowen was drawing attention to his observation that in the 
groups to which humans belong, there is an unspoken exertion of emotional energy 
generated from external and internal sources. Externally, a particular social entity may 
be subjected to an invasive threat, loss, challenge or crisis which raises anxiety. From 
within groups (family is central here), there is an exchange of emotional energy 
generated by the responses of particular individuals to external forces and to 
constitutional and existential factors such as feelings, motives, drives, self-interests 
and needs. Edwin Friedman lists “thoughts, fantasies, associations, past connections, 
physical make-up, genetic heritage and even current metabolic states,” as all playing a 
role in creating an emotional zone that exists between interdependent individuals.^ 
Bowen believed that “there is a chronic anxiety in all of life that comes with the 
territory of living.”^
“Problematic” behaviour, including many physical diseases, Bowen urged, 
must be understood as a predictable but self-defeating response on the part of a 
particular organism to the emotional field that circulates like electrical energy 
throughout the group. Existence involves coexistence with others within social 
organisms. Emotional fields are endemic to these social orders. Healthy integration 
into a given social unit, rather than occurring as a simple, natural and harmonious 
process, involves challenge and struggle. No stable setting to achieve differentiated 
togetherness exists as a simple gift of nature (or history). Healthy differentiation 
involves struggle and change.
Even though its intensity fluctuates, the presence of an emotional field is a fact 
of nature which thrusts a necessity upon a particular organism to move in one of two 
directions. One direction is the explicit attempt on the part of a given organism to 
stabilize its relationship to the group by fusing others to itself through a strategy of 
control or linking itself to others by eliminating or reducing its presence as a 
differentiated self. In this option, togetherness is maintained either by eliminating the 
outwards expression of difference exhibited in the group (i.e., control) or a given 
organism eliminating or reducing its outward difference with the group (i.e., 
assimilation).
The other direction Bowen defined as “differentiation.” Differentiation 
represents a self-defining rather than a self-absolutizing or self-marginalizing strategy.
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The term attempts to encapsulate a creative response to the emotional field which 
derives from a deeper source stemming from the unique character of the organism’s 
make-up. Edwin Friedman defines differentiation as "... the capacity to become 
oneself out of one’s self with minimum reactivity to the positions... of others. 
Differentiation is charting one’s way by means of one’s own internal guidance system 
rather than perpetually eyeing the ‘scope’ to see where others are.”  ^It is “...the 
lifelong process of striving to keep one’s being in balance through the reciprocal 
external and internal processes of self-definition and self-regulation.”'*
Bowen recognized that the great struggle of social existence was integrity in 
connectedness; integrity of the self to the self in its connecting with others. 
Differentiation as such does not mean autonomy, independence or individuation (in 
the popular sense of how those terms are used).^
“Differentiation has its origin in tiie biological notion that cells can have no 
identity purpose or distinctiveness until they have separated from - that is, left their 
progenitors... But also implicitly in this biological metaphor or homologue is the idea 
that such self has little meaning if the cell cannot connect. In its simplest terms, 
therefore, differentiation is the capacity to be one’s own integrated aggregate-of-cells 
person while still belonging to or being able to relate to a larger colony.”^
Differentiation is the key to social change. Whereas, in the first direction 
mentioned above, a particular body’s response to anxiety was explicitly aimed at 
achieving social stability and harmony, in the second direction (differentiation), these 
goals are left to the realm of “faith.” That is to say, they are left to the process. 
Precisely because of this willingness to forego the “easy” route to achieving stability 
and “harmony,” an environment comes into existence conducive to creative growth. 
Growth and premature stability are antithetical.
For Bowen, positive change is neither evolutionary (automatic) nor pragmatic 
(the direct result of human planning and design). Rather change is “accidental.”
The hubris that humans can simply effect change is denied in favour of a view 
that by defining themselves with integrity in any given historical situation or social 
setting, humans can affect change. The change that occurs in this model is not 
legislative. It is to a degree novel in that the new occurs as a result of the kind of 
connection a person sustains to others. Change emerges out of a setting in which the 
variables and end results are outside the control of any set of participants. Bowen does
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not focus on change, per se, but on process. Integrity of self in relating, especially in 
critical and disease-ridden situations, is what is called for. People cannot change 
people, but what they can do is change the emotional field to which others are 
exposed. By remaining connected to others in a differentiated posture, the emotional 
field is charged in such a way that a new kind of response is made possible. This 
approach does not guarantee positive change or what Friedman calls maturation, but it 
does create a climate conducive for genuine growth.
Bowen’s idea of change is in tension with “complementarity.” 
Complementarity refers to the propensity of one body to organize itself around a real 
or apparent need of another body ^ d  to supply what is lacking. This type of 
connection creates two immediate problems. It relieves the needy party from assuming 
responsibility for themselves and it creates a pseudo identity for the one filling the 
need. In this latter instance, a person or body achieves relevance by assuming 
responsibility for a deficit created by another, one which can only be properly filled by 
that person becoming responsible for meeting the need themselves. Bowen’s theory of 
change begins precisely at this point. It is a form of connection with others that neither 
retreats from nor takes responsibility for their problems or needs. It is a form of 
connection in which the challenge of self responsibility intensifies.^
Originally, Bowen’s insights were focused on the nuclear family and the 
behaviour of individual members. Gradually it became clear, as Edwin Friedman 
states, that “Bowen theory has the potential for being a true paradigm shift that 
challenges thinking in all the social sciences...”  ^“Bowen theory is not fundamentally 
about families but about life. The fact that it can be applied to families is almost 
incidental to the wider focus that Bowen has tended to refer to as the “‘human 
phenomenon.’” “In Bowen thinking, making the nuclear family the unit of observation 
is only a way station in the outward migration of perspective. Focus on the family is a 
way to maintain a direction that leads toward understanding the more encompassing 
natural systems that families mirror, and of which they are a part...”  ^“Bowen theory 
will appear to belong less to therapy than to the disciplines of sociology, ethology or 
anthropology.”*® The unit of application for family systems logic, Friedman insists, is 
not confined to the individual’s relation to the family, but all bodies in their relations 
with other bodies.
Insofar as Christianity’s destiny is to take the form of a historical social body
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and must relate to other social bodies [including modem nations organized around 
liberal values], Bowen’s observations may provide useful resources for Christianity to 
think critically about its relationship to the social worlds it shares. This is especially 
so if Christianity finds within itself theological and biblical precedents that parallel 
some of Bowen’s insights.
After the Revolution and disestablishment, American Protestantism for the 
first time began to imagine itself as a collective religious force rather than a divided 
sectarian phenomenon. The problem with this, from the standpoint of Bowen’s logic 
is that this new unity formed in part as a reaction to the anxiety created by 
disestablishment. Consider for instance the “emotional” impact on Protestantism of 
Jefferson’s view that the future of the churches was to be strictly confined to a 
private-personal sphere. In his view, Protestant groups were to have no public role or 
voice. There was also anxiety about the potentially negative social consequences of 
the spread of republican liberty to all levels of society. Liberal society, without the 
religious surrogacy of Protestantism, created an emotional climate. This “anxiety” 
driven response empelled Protestantism toward a relation to the greater social order 
(characterized by control and assimilation) instead of a creative dialectical connection. 
Of course, no comprehensive indictment of nineteenth century Protestantism is totally 
tme to the facts. As shown, Protestantism was in a fledgling stage in its relation to the 
new republic. While it sowed regulative (i.e., control) and integrative seeds that 
matured into the Religious Right and liberalism, it was not without a measure of 
differentiation. Differentiation, Bowen insists, is not about a state, but a direction on a 
scale of greater to lesser distinction.
The deeper problem with the development of post-establishment Protestantism 
was the nature of its unity. The new unity that emerged was in part a direct answer to 
the anxiety that was prevalent at the time. What informed the unity came more from 
the perceived religious dislocation and new political “risks” than a creative 
engagement with Protestantism’s own sources. The “religious” character of this new 
unity betrays the fact that it was to a significant degree an answer to the perceived 
situation rather than a creative response which had complete integrity to what 
Christianity is.
The new unity was formed in order for Protestantism to forge an organic, that 
is to say, a cultural, unity with the new world. It explicitly attempted to be culturally
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integrated into the new social order. Primitive Christianity does speak of an extra- 
“denominational,” extra congregational unity of Christians and Christian 
congregations, but this unity remains rooted in and attached to an ecclesial definition 
of Christianity, not a hybrid socio-political or socio-cultural definition of Christianity 
comprehended within ecclesial categories. The concrete historicity of the church as an 
entity that comprehends the spiritual and religious unity of Christian believers lays the 
foundation for properly working out Christianity’s differentiation within a large 
shared social setting such as the political organization of society into a nation. From 
this standpoint, the challenge that confronts Protestantism in America is to “re- 
imagine” its unity with an eye to being true to itself. This will not end in weakening or 
forfeiting its ecclesiality. Systems logic would suggest that the power of 
Protestantism’s connection with America as a nation is in direct proportion to the 
nature and scope of its unity. Differentiation and unity, understood in their proper 
sense, are integral. Unity results from a process of clarifying oneself, i.e., 
differentiation. It is, to quote Friedman, the process of “knowing where one ends and 
another begins.”** As the next two sections attempt to show, this involves 
rediscovering the evangelical rudiments of the church’s existence. If Christianity can 
re-imagine its unity and be creatively connected to its world, penultimate positive 
change has a real chance to occur. The struggle Bowen would insist is not for the 
church to be relevant to its particular world, but to be sure it remains true to itself in 
its presence to the world. Relevance and change (i.e., true growth) are judged after the 
fact.
Section B
Theological Resources: Karl Barth *s Dialectical Construction of the Gospel
Tillich observed that Barth’s work “saved contemporary Protestantism from 
sectarian seclusion on the one hand and from secularism and insignificance on the 
other.”* This sentence may be explicated as follows: “Sectarian seclusion” is 
Christianity-world separatism. Secularism is a form of Christianity - world 
identification. In Tillich’s view, Barth enabled Protestantism to connect to its world in 
a relevant way. The purpose of this section is to show how Barth’s dialectical 
construction of the gospel provides an indispensable resource to accomplish what 
Tillich said it accomplished. In other words, how did Barth’s thought open the way for
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Protestantism to be involved with the world in a way that guaranteed relatedness and 
differentiation while not succumbing to identification or separatism?
With this goal in mind, this section is organized under five subheadings. The 
first of these addresses the historical and theological context that was the seed bed for 
the emergence of Barth’s dialectical construction of the Gospel. However, no effort is 
made to reconstruct the historical, philosophical and theological details of continental 
Protestantism’s “embourgeoisement,” as that would require a study parallel to the 
American situation. This omission is justified because the claim that continental 
Protestantism lacked critical differentiation from the dominant liberal culture is not 
disputed.^ The goal is merely to focus the issue of differentiation as the practical and 
theoretical problem it was at the time of Barth’s theological breakthrough. Two 
discussions make up the introduction: Barth’s own description of continental 
Protestantism’s problem of uncritical identification with its world and a brief 
theoretical analysis of the problem.
In the second subheading, Barth’s early dialectic is examined with special 
emphasis on the radical distinction it opened up between humans and God. The third 
subheading focuses on how in time, Barth stabilized his idea of God’s distinction 
from humanity while at the same time making clear God’s relatedness to humanity. 
These discussions pave the way for the fourth essay, which attempts to show how 
Barth’s dialectic lays the groundwork for understanding Christianity’s differentiation 
from and relatedness to the world. In the final sub-heading, Bonhoeffer’s insights on 
this subject are reviewed.
1.
The Breakdown of Church-World Differentiation:
The Bac%round of Barth’s Dialectical Construction of the Gospel - 
A Practical Description of the Problem
In 1957, approximately forty years from the writing of the first draft of 
Romans from his parish study in Safenwil, Barth spoke to a group of ministers, 
reflecting on the situation that faced them at the turn of the century. Openness was 
their key problem, he said.  ^ The church in its theological engagement with the world 
had become uncritically open.
The situation as he represented it can be understood as follows. On the one
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side there is the need of the church in its theological work to be related to the world, 
culture and to wrestle with the issues of the time; to expose itself to the world.'* "It 
must be engaged in conversation... whatever the means of the dialogue."^ On the 
other side the church must be differentiated from society. It must clarify its own 
identity. This has to do with its own housekeeping; what it believes, its life, its 
scriptures, its concern of faith.  ^ In other words, there exist two tasks, one within and 
the other without. It can not afford to be insular, separatistic, in the world, or neglect 
its own task of clarity concerning its uniqueness or difference. In a word, it must be 
open, but critically open. It must be distinct, but not divorced from the world, 
problematically closed. Some have not understood Barth on this. He is often judged 
as problematically closed when it comes to the church and cultural political and 
philosophical currents. In actual fact he comes out on both sides of this dialectic, 
albeit in his own unique way.
This dialectic is not symmetrical. The church's relatedness to the world is not 
primary. Rather the church's clarity about its own definition is the basis upon which 
relatedness is a constructive possibility. It must take itself seriously and not be 
forgetfril or careless regarding its own content.^ The positive task in and for the 
church must take primacy.* There is a psychology evident in Barth's thinking at this 
point. It is not merely a matter of balance between two poles of openness and 
closedness. Openness and engagement with the currents of thought, culture and social 
ideology in the world are contingent upon the clarity of the church's own identity and 
belief. If openness is not to lead to the dilution and loss of identity, an internal basis 
must exist to insure a critical engagement; integrity in assimilation or participation. 
Barth talks about the sheer degree of openness and assimilation beyond the capacity to 
maintain identity—too much stimulation.^ His observations are strictly practical. That 
is to say, he recognizes that tension exists between openness and closedness. Healthy 
openness, he insists, is not a simple possibility. It must take place from a position of 
some strength and internal security about the church's givenness and truth. It must not 
be entered into idealistically or naively, as if openness could remain unproblematic 
purely by human astuteness, as if human beings could simply face the attraction and 
challenge of external forces and enter into dialogue with them.
Furthermore, the nature of openness needs consideration. The openness that ' 
constitutes a kind of dialectic proceeds asymmetrically, he urges. By this he means '
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that dogmatics can be the basis for good apologetics.*® Here Barth is not arguing that 
some sermons resemble a stone cast at the people. Dogmatics as apologetics, as a 
basis for a church-world dialectic, arises first out of the otherness or strangeness 
inherent in dogmatics, i.e. the Godness of God, the extrinsic confessional character of 
truth. This strangeness, he implies, can account for the potency or viability in the 
dialectic. The point of contact is not a point of contact conceived as "common 
ground", but precisely in the attraction of difference; the challenge of the dissimilarity, 
the polarity of opposites.
Second, "dogmatics as apologetics" is not solely the church taking a dogmatic 
stand, but dogmatics as apologetics! Dogmatics is introduced into a particular context 
and addresses that.** This is not a Tillichian correlation. Rather, it brings a different 
view and priority of reality which relativizes, if not transforms, the questions and 
problems in any given situation, without attempting to overthrow either questions or 
problems. There exists no Christian world view to be exchanged with a cultural, 
political or ideological one. The church brings to bear its witness to the word of God 
and there is a critical encounter, a transformative impact on the world. In this way 
dogmatics as apologetics tends not toward insularity and a problematic separateness, 
but toward healthy relatedness. If the church-world dialectic is not to be 
short-circuited, Barth argues, it must be entered into from the priority of dissimilarity, 
while maintaining the relevance of truth.
Barth reflects that in the nineteenth century liberal Protestant theology took the 
world too seriously.*  ^ It entered into apologetics seeking points of contact 
philosophically and as such sought to disclose the church’s common ground with the 
world. The priority was shifted from the tasks of building up the church itself to that 
of the church's relatedness to world. Its confrontation with the contemporary age was 
"decisive and primaiy."*  ^Furthermore the foreign was given birthright.*'* The 
church-world dialectic was short-circuited insofar as it tended toward assimilation or 
synthesis. As far as the "world," this meant the loss rather than advance of the 
church's relevance. It had no critical edge, no prophetic power in the context of the 
socio-national struggles. It tended to become identified with causes and ideologies 
with serial predictability. As Barth noted, when he wrote of the “secularizing” of 
Christ in his day for the “umpteenth time,” today for democracy, or pacifism, or the 
youth movement, or something of the sort, as yesterday it would have been for the
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sake of liberal culture or our countries Switzerland or Germany.*  ^Viewed within the 
larger picture of liberalism's premises the synthesis and fusion that was occurring 
between itself and the Enlightenment — post-Enlightenment world/culture was not 
wholly accidental or naive. As Barth said, "nineteenth century [continental 
Protestant] theology worked on the general assumption that relatedness to the world is 
a possibility for general acceptance of the Christian faith.
A Theoretical Description of the Problem
In the nineteenth century, the west was confident that through their science, 
technology, culture and religion, humanity was taking a step toward perfection. In 
contrast to previous times, humanity was seen as shedding swaddling clothes and 
opening up a new kind of future. Anthropologically, this was defined by the 
emergence of what Barth calls the "absolute man" or as Emil Brunner described, a 
personality "grounded in itself and self sufficient.** This was a person who was "free 
lord over himself'.*^ As Robert Jenson points out, this view required humans to be 
“well rounded” in accordance with the model, "nurtured through the last decades of 
the eighteenth century by such thinkers and literati as Lessing, Herder and Goethe. 
This was the vision of the human person as his/her own work of art; of the person as 
formed through his/her history into something like a classical sonata movement in 
which the greatest possible diversity is held together in a transcendent temporal 
unity".
Socially, this spirit is one which breathes the air of confidence in human 
advancement and progress. The person of the nineteenth century was confronted on 
every side with the overwhelming spectacles of scientific and technological 
achievement. No sooner had Darwin published his theory of biological evolution 
through the survival of the fittest, that thinkers such as Waldo Beach began to build a 
similar view postulating socio-cultural evolution. A sense of historical consciousness 
took hold of the collective imagination of this period.
No deep faults, contradictions or divisions characterized nature or human 
nature. As such, it was not a time of miracles and the supernatural, but one in wMch 
no problem was thought to be insurmountable. As Barth puts it, this man of the 
nineteenth century possessed an infectious confidence. "... He gave up thought of 
eternity surrounded as he was by the riches of his time." He was, as such, a human
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with "unshakable self-assurance".^*
It was inevitable that Protestantism, which was already part of the socio­
cultural fabric over large areas of western Europe, would be penetrated by this spirit 
of the times, further compromising its critical distinction with its world. This 
phenomenon is evident in the theological revision and adaptation within continental 
Protestantism that occurred during the nineteenth century. As shown in Chapter 4, 
Section A, Schleiermacher opened the century with an effort to interpret Protestant 
thought in such a way as to establish a critical conversation with Enlightenment 
thought. In so doing, he shifted the focus of faith to its anthropological side, thereby 
blazing the way for Protestantism to understand itself on grounds that were ostensibly 
accessible from an analysis of anthropological phenomena. There was a risk that 
came with this shift. As Emil Brunner said, "...Theology was in danger of losing itself 
in the ...psychology of religion. While Schleiermacher (and those who followed 
him) set up a critical conversation with Enlightenment thought and culture, there 
occurred a subtle shift in preoccupation. At the end of the eighteenth century and 
beginning of the nineteenth there developed, as Harold Nebelsick writes, the 
"...idealization and anthropocentrization of the faith.” The individual had become the 
focus of reality. Divinity had penetrated into humanity and nature. There was a 
reconciliation and integration of faith and culture.”^^  The building blocks for this 
development had been laid by Hegel, Kant, Schelling and Fichte and it was "out of 
these...neo-Protestant theology was constructed. The theological philosophy of the 
philosophers was to become the philosophical theology of the theologians." '^* 
Protestantism had become permeated with the cultural and ideological 
optimism of the times. Formally speaking, it was necessary to restore to 
Protestantism a proper differentiation or distinction from culture. Materially, this 
required addressing the problem of unwarranted optimism at its roots. The source of 
the problem was the anthropocentric premises inseminated into modem culture from 
the Enlightenment. It was towards that end, that Barth's initial polemic was 
fundamentally directed. Only by exposing the fallaciousness of this confidence, could 
Protestantism's identity with its world be dissolved. Later, Barth would approach the 
challenge inherent in the formal problem, that of constructing a constructive basis to 
sustain a proper church-world differentiation. It may be said that what Barth did 
occurred in two stages, one negative, the other positive. First, he reversed liberalism's
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postulate that the divine be viewed within the human, insisting instead that the human 
be viewed over against the divine. He would demonstrate that humanity, viewed in 
light of the Godness of God, could not be construed as possessing within itself the 
religious, spiritual or moral potential necessary to postulate the certain development of 
stable whole lives and societies. In short, he polemicized the philosophical basis upon 
which progress was postulated. Second, Barth showed that the ground of human 
existence resided outside of humans in Jesus Christ. It is this premise that emerges to 
the forefront of Barth's thought which holds profound consequences for the 
reclamation of church-world differentiation.
2.
Barth's Early Dialectic^^
God’s Differentiation from the World
Bruce McCormack has shown that Barth’s dialectical formulation passed 
through four stages of development en route to its matuiity^  ^The treatment of Barth’s 
dialectical thought provided in the following is aimed only at supplying a sufficient 
conceptual base to demonstrate how the gospel lays the foundation for understanding 
church-world relatedness and differentiation. No effort has been made to sort out all 
the subtle transitions in the career of Barth’s dialectical pilgrimage.
In the truest sense, there is not a "basis" for Barth's dialectic, or, to be more 
precise, Barth's dialectic does not rest on any "basis." Barth did not pretend to have 
discovered the hidden rationale of all truth - namely that it possessed a paradoxical 
character. Rather, Barth’s dialectic was derived from revelation and was directed as a 
critique against all formulations of truth.^’ It was a reflective device and as such it 
was aimed at mirroring the truth vis-à-vis opposites. The opposites to which Barth, 
Brunner, Bultmann and Gogarten began to direct their attention between 1918 and 
1928, were not about a profound paradox that lies below the surface of this world's 
order. Rather, they consisted of a theological revelation that humanity and this world 
cannot be properly understood from the standpoint of information available to 
humanity and this world but only in light of unseen but revealed God. When one 
inquires into the "basis" of Barth's dialectical construction, what one really finds are 
existing resources critically used to dialectically formulate a revealed claim, which 
itself is intended to function as a resource for critique rather than as a direct simple
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formulation or source of truth.
In the following, Barth's dialectic is considered theologically within a biblical 
perspective and evangelically within a reformation perspective. It is of course 
impossible to dissect Barth's dialectical paradigm of truth into several parts.
The Biblical-Theological Basis
Barth's dialectic is simple yet profound. It begins on the one side with a claim 
about the Godness of God, derived from the Bible, "The Godness of God: that was 
the bedrock we came up against, God's independence and particular character not only 
over against the natural world but as against the spiritual world also. God's absolute 
unique existence, might and initiative, above all in his relationship with men."^* In 
the simplest analysis, all Barth did was to exploit and radicalize the significance of 
this truth of the Godness of God, arguing for its absoluteness. And in this, to begin 
with, it was not what God was within God's self that was of material concern. God, 
simply by virtue of this absolute Godness, limited human existence. This meant that 
nothing human could be fused or equated with God.^  ^ Regardless of the origin of 
human and religious claims, nothing could be accorded a status beyond that of the 
human, where fallibility, partiality, distortion and brokenness persisted. This included 
every claim that stemmed from mystical experience, the Bible, faith, dogma and 
conscience or the religious and social realm. God was most decisively a dialectical 
negation of the absoluteness or near absoluteness of humanity. God’s Godness 
imposed a limit, a boundary, a critical contingency over humanity.
Eveiything rested on this positing of difference. The "infinite qualitative 
distinction"^® between God and humanity created the dialectical possibility. The axis 
of Barth's theology at this point turns not on the separation of God and human beings, 
but on the qualitative difference. This way of viewing humanity and God within a 
dialectical configuration resembles Chalcedon's Christological formulation, "union 
without fusion, distinction without separation." The emphasis on difference is not to 
be equated with separateness. The statement quoted in the beginning of this 
discussion and another one similar, but even more emphatic, exemplify this attraction 
to "God's absolute unique existence ... in his relationship to men." "God is in heaven 
and you are on earth. The relation of this God with this man, the relation of this man 
with this God is for me the theme of the Bible as well as the substance of
265
philosophy."^* The qualitative difference itself creates the basis for relatedness, not 
separation. God's Godness related to the human imposes a definition on the human. 
Descriptions of humanity from an analysis of humanity in isolation or in total, are 
flawed because they lack a dialectical reference point. They cannot bring to human 
self-understanding anything except a "self understanding. Such a view is limited by 
virtue of its being closed within a monadic sphere. God, posited as God of humanity, 
exorcizes the pretensions of human absoluteness. Self-definition in light of God opens 
up critical distance, self-redefinition and appraisal. It facilitates a realistic, sober view 
of human-cultural endeavors.
Everything depends on a difference that is qualitatively grounded and on a 
relational unity that does not collapse into a fusion. As the Chalcedonian formulation 
indicates, two possibilities always exist. On the one hand, a separation can occur 
through radical distinction. Under this option, using Barth’s logic, one would likely 
point to deism, theism, and agnosticism, which share common ground with secularism 
and humanism. Any approach that tends to view God in a non-involved relation to 
the world falls into this category.
On the other hand, there is a danger of the collapse of unity into a fusion.
Here one would likely list mysticism as well as modernism and natural theologies.
Barth claimed to arrive at his dialectical insight first from the Bible. He never 
ceased to emphasize that what he encountered in scripture was God breaking through 
and addressing the human person. In the Bible, Barth encountered the “Godness of 
God.” God, presenting himself as God, was the foundation of all truth. Truth was not 
derived from philosophical presuppositions precisely because these were extensions 
of human thought. When God reveals Godself as Lord of humanity, an entirely new 
view of humanity comes into existence.
Barth's simple appeal to the Bible is his fortress from which he is able to 
sustain the possibility for his dialectical claim. Later he reshaped this into a 
sophisticated doctrine of revelation, which sought to foreclose all philosophical and 
theological compromises with this biblical claim. It is sufficient here to note that 
early on Barth appealed to his rediscovery of God in the Bible, arguing that what 
emerged was not human thoughts, ideas, experiences and faiths about God, but God 
speaking and addressing the human as God in love and judgment, in yes and no.^ ^
This appeal is to be understood in contrast to any other possible sources.
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especially those originating in human experience and reason. Barth recognized 
immediately that these sources short-circuited his dialectic. In the Bible, God is 
represented as an unreasoned lordly sovereign being that confronts humanity with 
uncompromising determination. From out of God’s own concrete unique and absolute 
particularity, God says, "I will be their God and they will be my people."
It may be safely concluded, as Brunner pointed out, that Barth’s initial "insight" 
was that truth in the Bible was cast in the mould of fall, brokenness, the disjuncture 
between God and humanity. Truth did not take the form of monadic conceptions, 
ideas or doctrines, per se. Rather, it was consistently found in a dualistic, historical 
and existential form.^  ^ Accordingly, the present world was viewed over against the 
kingdom of God, the person over against fall and creation over against redemption. 
Humanity is viewed in light of God in Christ and time in light of eternity.
This dualistic structuring of truth meant that humanity and this world could 
not be saved simply by being improved either by cultural or religious means. No ideal 
concept of reality or moral idealism was seen to exist even as "potential." A rupture 
or a discontinuity between the human and the divine was seen to be the "sub-text of 
scriptural truth". Nowhere in scripture could one find "essential truth," or truth in its 
religious or "spiritual" profundity, only "dialectic" truth. Thus, truth was a viewing of 
the whole concrete person, lost, judged, condemned and in the grip of death but in 
Christ found, justified and in possession of life. It was such truth that confronted a 
person from a standpoint outside of themselves and tended to define personhood and 
reality in terms and meanings not accessible "essentially" from within or apart from 
this word.
Barth did not see himself as arriving at this insight from a process involving 
the critical parsing of the historicalness of the text of scripture, but from a process 
which involved spiritual wrestling with the "inner dialectic of the subject matter."^ '*
He found that this "inner dialectic" is the pervasive sub-structural form of truth that 
ran through the entire Bible.^  ^Barth came to view as a flawed premise the idea that 
one could simply peel through the layers of historical conditioning and access the 
essential truth.^ ® At its deepest level, the problem was that this approach not only 
required a high level of confidence in the work of historical criticism, but that it failed 
to grasp the character of truth. Essential truth could not be simply isolated, grasped 
and applied to the human situation. The nature of historical inquiry often aims at
j
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explaining the truth as if truth was a one line reasoning process which is “non- 
paradoxical” and “direct.”^^  Dialectic as the sub-text was a process of coming to grips 
with the paradox of truth, which must of necessity be met with faith, i.e., “the broken 
line of faith.” *^ It draws the person, not into the security of known truth, but the crisis 
of faith. It is the epistemological break, not the epistemological continuity between 
the human sphere and God, that one comes up against in scripture.
For Barth, truth cannot be simply stated by making, as it were, a unified 
presentation of it. Truth implies that whatever is posited can only be posited in light 
of a polar negation and that one half truth is "no truth at all!"
Reformation-Evangelical Basis
It is Barth himself who claims to be developing his dialectical thought firom j
the Reformation and Paul. In both Luther, Paul and Kierkegaard, he saw that reliance iI
on paradox was central. From Luther he could point to simulJustus et Peccator or j
desperatio fiducialis, as well as his law-gospel antithesis in scripture and Christian |
existence (an antithesis that for Luther was never resolved). From Paul he could cite I
Îany number of paradoxes, such as "having nothing yet possessing all things", or "the jIthings that are seen are temporal and the things that are not seen eternal." But central Î
to both of these, was the article of justification by foith. In justification by feith j
interpreted along the Reformation lines, Barth recognized a primary Reformation jIprinciple in support of his dialectical approach.^  ^ ;
The early Barth's Evangelical-Refbrmation dialectic can best be understood |
within a discussion of the idea of crisis. Historically, the idea of crisis is indebted to !
Iwhat the ancient philosophers named krisis, the point beyond human perception. This i
is the point that came to be informed by Hegel, where the ideal interfaces with the j
actual, creating disparity. By the second edition of his Romerbrief, Barth came to his ]
own usage of krisis. Partly because of his brother Heinrich’s philosophical work on }
this subject, Barth radicalized the idea of crisis. For Barth, no realm of idea came into \
view at the boundaries of cognitive knowledge. The essence of the supernatural was |
not lodged in the natural realm. No subtle correspondence occurred between the actual j
physical realm and the spiritual realm. Eternity was not lodged in time producing |
tensions which eventually gave way to penultimate resolutions. Of course this does |
inot mean Barth was a materialist. He had found in his brother’s thinking a key. j
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Writing of Heinrich’s philosophy, McCormack states that he took a position beyond 
neo-Kantiasm by projecting the ursprung (i.e., the standpoint outside every given 
content generated by the cognitive apparatus of the human knower) into the realm of 
idea: a realm which was “fundamentally withdrawn from the world”"^  Barth (Karl) 
recognized that unless the dialectic between the actual and the ideal (so called) was 
made absolute, no truly critical force would occur. In other words, unless the ideal 
was completely removed beyond the human this world realm, it could only end in 
mirroring back to humans their own spiritual, religious and cultural projections. The 
krisis about which the philosopher spoke, Barth exploited and absolutized so it could 
be reconceived as a dialectic between humanity and God who was wholly other; a 
God who revealed God’s self in Jesus Christ. In this way, Barth addressed the realm 
of the actual, however it was conceived, but supremely in cultural achievements, 
ethical-moral and religious terms, as well as truth claims and was brought in 
dialectical tension with another realm, the realm of God, the kingdom of God, the 
absolute and non-contingent righteousness of God. This encounter with the "ideal" 
created a crisis. It may be called simply a "di-opsis", a seeing two, a breaking of a 
myopsis such that the scales of illusion fall from one's eyes. It is a kind of 
disenchantment in which the durability, permanence and perfectibility of the realm of 
the actual is rejected. Death embodies and signifies this point from the side of the 
actual. It is that point inside the realm of the actual that is the least capable of 
disguising the temporal finite weakness which is descriptive of the entire realm of the 
actual.
This is a way of construing Barth's early ideas of crisis so that the Evangelical 
constituent of his dialectic can be clearly seen. The Evangelical component, that is to 
say the Christological element in Barth's early thought, both participates in this 
dialectical tension and functions as its peculiar resolution. For Barth, the rupture or 
"diopsis" creating the crisis is ameliorated by Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ structures the 
two in distinction while securing the level of the actual (i.e. the world, time, the 
human) from "an-nihilation." Jesus Christ participates in this crisis and is its unique 
resolution. He embodies the forgiveness, mercy, grace, resurrection and love, which 
at every point participates in the negation or "no," but His participation equally 
introduces God's "yes." Mercy implies judgment, grace—helplessness, 
forgiveness—sin, saving love—lostness and resurrection to life real death.
269
Barth’s evangelical resolution “saves” not because it enters within the actual 
and infuses it (gratia infusa) with transforming grace, such that it becomes durable and 
perfectible, but because it gives the world a provisional existence that is due to grace 
that is outside the world in Christ. This life outside, faces the actual and by its critical 
gaze renews, judges and corrects it: It saves it from destroying itself by works of 
pride or the nihilism of despair. Because it faces the world with a word of 
forgiveness, grace, mercy and redemption, the world is affirmed in God given (gifted) 
value. It refuses to allow it to conceive of itself as an end in itself, while also by its 
disparity with the good, the world (i.e. the human realm) cannot extricate itself firom 
the good.
It is to be emphasized that this Evangelical resolution does not resolve the 
tension between the ideal and the actual. Rather, it makes living in it possible. It both 
reinforces the dialectical cleavage or polarization, while at the same time it provides a 
new way of being in this tension. Concerning the world, it is no more a case of 
"seeing men as trees walking". No naive optimism or substantial belief in the 
perfectibility of the created good persists in this critical disparity. Moreover, no 
unqualified confidence in the gains of the human or submersion of the self in the 
religio-social and political projects is possible. The human is saved, on the one hand, 
from the loss of the self by escaping the ascendancy of himself/herself, or any 
particular human embodiment of the good, to a level of determinative importance. On 
the other hand, because the realm of the actual is claimed in forgiveness and mercy, 
the self is saved from the annihilation of despair. Barth intends that his dialectic 
enables an engagement in the world with one's "eyes open," critically, relatively, 
hopefully, substantially, but nevertheless "positively." It allows no escape from the 
tasks of the world that seek to lessen the disparity between the actual and the ideal.'**
It is both the hubris and submersion within these that his dialectic disallows.
Precisely because dialectic does not posit a fusion of the absolute, i.e. the 
"righteousness of God" with the world, nor a separation of it from the world, but 
rather presents the world in a larger framework of grace, mercy and forgiveness, the 
world is caught in a kind of polar attraction. As such, it is unable to extricate itself 
and either destroy itself through hubris or fall into its created and sinful subsistence, 
which cannot sustain it.
In 1919 Barth addressed the question of the place of the Christian in society
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from the logic inherent in his new dialectic.^  ^ In the course of his presentation, he set 
out three possibilities. One possibility is that of "an unhappy separation, a 
thorough-going opposition between two dissimilar magnitudes".Presumably Barth 
is speaking here of Christianity and modem society. The other side he generically 
names as "ecclesiasticism."'^ Ecclesiasticism is the attempt to fuse and connect the 
two worlds together by extending the institutions and projects of the church outward 
into the zones of society intersecting society and thus "taming" or domesticating it, 
i.e., “Christianizing” it. This frision, Barth urges, begins with benign social work but 
ends with the full scale secularism of Naumann—"the liberalism of Naumann."'^  ^
Between these two possibilities, Barth attempts to unfold his elusive dialectical 
position, which neither succumbs to separatism nor loses itself in fusion. The 
dialectical way necessitates listening for the word of God which involves a revolution 
before all revolutions; a word from above that penetrates human revolutions but is not 
co-extensive with them. The kingdom of God has its own goal which is germane to 
God and under God's power and direction. Humankind must wait on and follow after 
this kingdom, working as it were in its wake, but never confusing their work with 
God's. Here, as in the realm of truth, Barth's dialectic gives one no place to stand, no 
"standpoint.'"'^
The elusive character of this resolution must not be missed. Because it 
partakes of the nature of paradox, it resists being reduced to a simple equation. The 
early Barth sees his evangelical resolution as pointing toward a new way between two 
typical options. On the one side, this may be referred to as dogmatism, and on the 
other side, mysticism and modernism. It is what these two extremes in principle stand 
for (in so far as they by contrast disclose the unique character of this evangelical 
resolution), that is important. The two poles of Barth's dialectic may be described (for 
the sake of the present point), as "the idea of God" and "the criticism of humanity." 
These as emphasized are not to be considered independently. The dialectical 
approach which Barth argues is the Reformation-Pauline approach which insists that 
these two must be considered together. The criticism of man, he says, does not lead to 
God, but "man with a vengeance.'"'^ But neither does modernism which believes in 
the potential of humanity arrive at God. Instead, modernity ends up trumpeting man 
with a loud voice. Both of these represent a collapse of distinction. The idea of God 
and the criticism of humanity are in need of a structure that prevents them from
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collapsing into indistinction. Both of the above paths begin in a relative distinction 
and progress along a path toward diminished distinction which bears fruit in human 
distortions.
If mysticism and modernism, beginning on the side of the human, seek to 
actualize the God in the human “via negativa” or “positiva,” Biblicism and 
traditionalism begin on the side of the idea of God. They seek to overcome the tension 
that the dialectic names as permanent. By providing fixed truths about the idea of 
God, the kingdom of God and salvation, these violate the Godness of God bringing 
truth into the unambiguous grasp of the human. Protestant scholasticism, with its 
elevation of the Bible to inerrant infallible status, as well as its mastery of Christian 
truth by orthodox dogma, (underpinned by rational epistemologies), most fully depicts 
this dynamic.
The problems with this approach, as the early Barth and Brunner clearly 
realized, were many. Most fully they attempted to pull God into the grasp of the 
human. Moreover, not only is the human distorted through religious hubris, but the 
critical encounter with God is overcome. The human is placed in something like a 
spectator, worse yet a proprietorial relationship with the idea of God. “Fixity” in truth 
means that the church has swung to one side of the dialectic and "set up house" 
pontificating, legislating,, controlling and dispensing the truth, thus destroying the 
"Godness of God."
The dialectical understanding of Barth is progressive in its development. In 
time, continuity and some discontinuity are evident. Nevertheless, from the beginning 
there is a use of the Evangelical-Reformation that in principle persists into the mature 
Barth. This use is that of introducing into the dialectical opposites a mediating center. 
For the early Barth, Jesus Christ becomes the "living center" which keeps this 
dialectic from collapsing or sundering, such that the opposites irreconcilably cleave. 
Jesus Christ represents the mediating point where the divine intersects the human 
realm without intersecting humanity. That is to say, the realm of God and the realm 
of the human intersect only in this one person, Jesus Christ. Everything else that 
Barth goes on to say in his massive dogmatics is an addendum and exegesis of this 
one claim. It is a mistake to argue that Barth simply moved "from dialectic to 
dogmatics." In the broader, but no less accurate sense of the term dialectic, Barth is 
involved in a defense of this one incamational claim that structures all life and
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theology in a tension characterized by the Chalcedonian Christological formulation 
union without fusion, distinction without separation. The foundational structure of 
Barth's early and mature theology rests on this incamational premise, that Jesus Christ 
both sustains and intensifies the tension between God and humanity, while at the same 
time securing this tension from an irreconcilable mpture.
The difference, properly speaking, is not between dialectic and dogmatics, but 
one having to do with ensuring the adequacy of dialectic itself. In time, Barth was 
forced to greater clarity regarding the theological underpinning of his dialectic.''^
The question is, how does the Reformation-Evangelicai's appropriation of 
Jesus Christ enable the church to avoid the twin shoals of Biblicism and traditionalism 
on the one side and mysticism and modernism on the other? Does not Jesus Christ 
provide "hard" or "fixed" meaning and tmth about the idea of God on the one side? If 
not, how can it be said that the tmth of God is in any concrete sense accessible to 
humans? On the other side, does not Jesus Christ in some real sense provide an entry 
for God into history, the realm of the actual? If so, how can this dialectic be 
maintained in its absoluteness?
Succinctly stated, how does this evangelical dialectic bring God near so as to 
encounter the human and keep God distinct and elusive so as to protect God's 
Godness?
The problem is a practical and theological one. If God is dealt into the human 
equation, does it not compromise the dialectic? If God is dealt out, does it not 
conclude in the direction of nihilism, humanism and secularism? Paradox or dialectic 
itself is not fully adequate, as is evident by Barth's attention to crisis. While Barth 
conceived of the two, the "actual" and the "ideal," as intersecting in Jesus Christ, he 
also constmed Jesus Christ as a means via the kerygma to that end. Eventually the 
discussion had to reach the point where it addressed the role of the human subject. 
Jesus Christ, as the one who embodied God's yes and no, was brought out of the past 
into the eschatological now, through the kerygma. It was at this critical moment in the 
human subject, that the "absolute" antithesis between time and eternity was arrested. 
This may be seen as a kind of realized eschatology. The crisis of faith, conceived as 
the moment of subjective decision overcame the chasm of paradox.
At that early juncture in Barth's thought, this resolution seemed adequate. 
Theologically it seemed defensible in light of the Kierkegaardian argument for the
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subjectivity of all truth, an argument no doubt indebted in part to Schleiermacher. 
Neither Barth nor Kierkegaard, nor for that matter, the liberal pioneer Schleiermacher, 
contended for the absence of objective truth. The crisis, however, focused on the 
subjective appropriation of Jesus Christ which required a decision, a decision which at 
no point could be made in the comfort of the objective fixity of truth with a capital T.
Here Barth's construal of this crisis clearly resembles existential thought. In 
time, Barth would move away fi-om this "crisis incamationalism" to emphasize more 
fully his word of God-revelation incamationalism over the issue of subjectivity. He 
was concerned that this existentially informed subjectivity compromised his dialectic. 
He saw that the objective pole of his dialectic tended to gravitate so that it was in 
danger of being ensconced within an existentially informed idea of crisis. If God in 
the last analysis could only be discussed and referred to, even conceived of as jfrom 
within this movement of the subjective crisis of decision, then for all practical 
purposes, his dialectic returned humans to an anthropological focus. At the end of the 
day, the tmth of God as wholly other remained trapped inside the human experience 
of faith.
From this analysis, it is possible to see that Barth's move away from crisis is 
not an abandonment of dialectic in its tme sense, but an effort to protect it. The 
question, “What is Barth doing”? is significant. Barth is on a theological pilgrimage 
as a pastor and professor seeking to pry two "worlds" apart (fusion), while keeping 
them together in distinction. It might be said that his dissatisfaction with his early 
theology, to the degree that he was dissatisfied, was because of its practical 
implications. He no doubt came to realize that his dialectic would bear fruit in kind 
not dissimilar to the "captivity" he sought to break from. R. Roberts likely overstates 
the issue when he argues that in his early dialectical formulation, Barth laid hold of a 
radical diastasis and abstracted it into pure ontological antitheses which could then be 
exploited with destructive power.''^ In fact, Barth never sharpened his new theology 
into a dialectical wedge that could be driven to the point of a complete cleavage of 
time and eternity, and infinite God and finite humanity. His dialectical implement was 
only for prophetic not destmctive ends. Even so, Barth eventually modified his 
thinking in his Christological development.
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3.
Reconciling God’s Differentiation From And 
Relatedness To the World
Even though in Barth’s dialectic the faith event was conceptualized in such a 
way as to safeguard the otherness of God and the relativity of a human knowing of 
God, it nevertheless made the human experience of God as a point of contact with 
God. In other words, as much as Barth had attempted to close the door to a 
problematic human knowledge and experience of God, he recognized, in principle, 
that this door was left open and compromised the dialectic and the purpose for which 
it had been crafted.
There existed a risk that the principle of the infinite qualitative distinction 
between God and humanity might be compromised by faith. In principle, the 
absoluteness of the cleavage lays the foundation for nihilism, the absence of it, or 
relativity of it, a foundation for utopian hubris. In his dialectical beginning, Barth had 
made its relativity rest in the nature of faith. What Barth eventually did was 
reconstrue faith, taking from it any potential to become the focus of an independent 
inquiry into an experiential knowledge of God.^ ® This required that faith be absolutely 
correlated to Jesus Christ. Faith was made to derive all its significance from its 
functional instrumental character of orienting the person to the extrinsic source and 
ground of significance, Jesus Christ. Faith, no less the work of the Holy Spirit, was 
the recognition of where one's life and connection with God resided, namely, outside 
oneself in Jesus Christ.
Instead of a concentration on the "eternal moment" as the impossible 
possibility, that flash of revelatory lightening that relativized humanness and placed 
one in a new tension, Barth began to focus more singularly on Jesus Christ. As 
Alasdair Heron tersely puts it in this change, "revelation (was) in Jesus Christ and not 
merely through Jesus Christ..."^' Faith was correspondence to that reality, a change of 
inquiry from faith in itself to the object of faith, faith understood less mystically, less 
existentially and more Evangelically.^^
This necessitated epistemological clarification. Barth recognized that 
existential concepts were relied on to inform faith and thus supplanted the very 
intentions at which his dialectic was aimed. If a human system of thought was 
allowed to explain the reality and action of faith, then Christianity was welded to
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philosophy which returned it to a debtor relation to prevailing cultural ideas. As 
Jenson puts it, "why should faith find the warrants of its rationality in analysis 
conducted prior to faith?"^^
Again, Barth moved in a more singular evangelical direction. The revelation 
in Jesus Christ not only became the focus, but was made to inform the 
rational-conceptual coherence of belief. The being of God is the axis of all faith and 
theology. These derive their existence from the fact that God reveals God's self. This 
revelation is made in Jesus Christ; He communicates this revelation of Himself to us 
by His Spirit. In this revelation, God communicates God's self as sovereign Lord and 
judge over humanity in Jesus Christ, as a gracious and forgiving father and savior in 
Jesus. This is a certain kind of knowledge that has its own kind of rational integrity 
arising out of who God is, a knowledge that at the same time is definitive for what 
humanness is. Faith does not create this knowledge.
The significance of this approach for the larger problem that launched Barth 
into this theological project, can be more clearly seen by the following contrast. A 
typical Evangelical strategy is to first identify the human predicament, the plight and 
problem and situation in which women and men find themselves. This strategy 
requires naming, conceptualizing and interpreting the particular predicament, using 
constructs, ancient or modem. Second, the strategy must correlate the conceptualized 
predicament to the biblical - evangelical resolution.
Barth, in contrast to this approach, placed the problem and solution of 
humanity's predicament in the same fi-amework, disclosed in and through Jesus Christ. 
The rationale for his approach was not derived from a conceptual coherence outside 
that disclosed in the gospel. This "consistency," in principle, safeguarded the original 
purpose of his dialectic—that of the problematic fusion of cultural with religious 
(Christian) ideas. From a positive perspective, Barth's approach was more than 
preventative. It was in principle an inversion, so that rather than creating a relevance 
for the gospel, the human situation were given an "evangelical" reading. The 
discontinuity completes and safeguards the human turn to externals.
By firmly locating the sovereignty of God, i.e. the "Godness of God" in Jesus 
Christ in which love is made the ultimate principle of God, the being of God is seen as 
being in relation. The affirmative character of God comes into view. As such, God's 
being is given a discrete extrinsic verity in Christ, that is to say, God comes into the
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human realm in a way that is not vulnerable to human exploitation. In Christ, God is 
structured in differentiation from and relatedness to humanity. This provides a 
theological ground that in principle prevents the search for God in cultural 
anthropological and immanental sources. Theologically, God's being is given a 
qualitatively distinct existence with regards to humanity. The knowledge from this 
revelation provides a new realistic security from which human existence can proceed. 
While it undermines the basis for idealistic pretensions, it restores to humanity a 
gracious forgiving context out of which to live.
The incarnation may also be understood in this light. In the incarnation, God 
as creator, judge and redeemer, is given a "concrete" existence in time. In Jesus 
Christ (toward humanity) God fulfills God's self in these vocations which are intrinsic 
to God's being. Likewise, in Jesus Christ as son of man, humanity has been judged by 
a righteous God and condemned, forgiven by a gracious God and redeemed. In Jesus 
Christ humanity is the son/daughter of God, lives to the glory of God and worships 
and serves this God. In Jesus Christ, humanity is turned out to his/her neighbor in 
love and service. In Jesus Christ, humanity collectively is reintegrated in a loving 
unity, serving each other, reorganized under God in devotion and loyalty.
The incarnation recasts humanity in a new mould. In Christ, God and 
humanity are related in a new way. Humanity is seen to be reintegrated under God in 
devotion to God and alongside of one another in love. The task that is left to human 
beings is to live reflexively out of the new Christocentric reality. To search for the 
religious and moral depth in human nature and culture is to look for God in the wrong 
place. Even though such efforts are done in the name of religion and the interest of 
humanity, such efforts must be judged as pretensious; a species of hubris.
4.
God’s Differentiation From and Relatedness To The World as the Basis For 
Understanding The Church’s Differentiation From and 
Relatedness To the World
Barth came to recognize that the continental Protestantism with which he was 
familiar was too deeply mired in the prevailing cultural ethos. It lacked sufficient 
differentiation firom its world requisite for a critical relation to it. As a pastor, Barth 
saw a Protestantism that was apparently blind and unaffected by the injustices of the
Ill
bourgeois world/'' Moreover, he observed that when segments of Protestantism did 
awake to these injustices and rallied with secular socialistic forces, they did not 
possess sufficient distinction to prevent them from more or less collapsing their 
identity with these particular counter-cultural movements, causes and values/^
This particular problem had its roots in the evangelical revision of 
Schleiermacher reviewed in Chapter Four. Schleiermacher relativized the objective 
elements of Protestant faith while elevating the subjective, anthropocentric, 
immanental side. It was this revision that opened the door for a more consistent 
relevant commerce between Protestantism and its world and the idealism(s) of the 
time. Once the objective element was more or less severed, Protestantism was 
vulnerable to becoming identified with any idealism. This is one side of the problem 
of Protestantism's weakness to culture. It points to why Protestantism could and did 
lose itself in the face of the attraction of its world.
The other side of the problem was the fact that the Enlightenment world 
arising out of a crumbling Constantinian era was essentially an idealistic world, in the 
sense that it placed a new confidence in the capacities and possibilities inherent in 
rational man/woman. It saw itself as not only breaking free from an authoritarian era, 
but possessing within itself the keys to a superior human future.
The fundamental problem of this nineteenth century world was that the line of 
distinction between the finite and the infinite had eroded, insofar as the human was 
not viewed in critical tension with God.^ ® That is to say, the human was viewed in a 
more optimistic framework. This is one way of describing the theoretical skeletal 
structure which supported the full-bodied, naive anthropological and social optimism 
(progress) that characterized the period. Protestantism partook of that confusion so 
that it may be said that its insufficient differentiation from and problematic 
relatedness to its world mirrored the prevailing cultural confusion regarding God's 
peculiar distinction from and relatedness to humanity. It was at this point that Barth's 
work fundamentally began. He did not mount an isolated attack on Protestantism's 
embourgeoisement so much as he confronted this cultural confusion at a bedrock 
theoretical level.
Barth commenced to rebuild the theoretical foundation which supported the 
God-human distinction in such a radical way, that it not only destroyed the basis for 
naive optimism in the evolving Enlightenment social dream, it threatened to negate
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the value of all cultural efforts. In short, Barth’s early dialectic had achieved 
differentiation between God and humanity almost at the expense of relatedness. It 
threatened to open up a God-human chasm. Theoretically speaking, the problem was 
how these two, God's differentiation from and relatedness to humanity, could be held 
together.
Only when he reapproached the covenantal significance of the incarnation was 
this problem resolved. And it was precisely in that incarnation breakthrough, that 
"distinction from" was recast in a larger framework of "relatedness to." Relatedness 
reassumed priority, but not in a form which was vulnerable to human exploitation. In 
other words, Barth first took humanity's "godness" away, negating simple continuity 
between humanity and God, so as to return humanity to the covenantal God in Jesus 
Christ, a God that chose his own form of being present to humanity. This God 
"appeared" as true God and Lord of humanity in judgment and love. As such, human 
life was reclaimed on a provisional basis, and therefore sobered with regard to naive 
idealisms, but not destroyed.
Barth’s dialectical construction of the gospel provided a theoretical basis for 
continental Protestantism to reclaim a differentiated relation to the greater socio­
cultural world in two ways. First, it gave the church a realistic basis from which to 
view and relate to the socio-cultural and political developments within the world. As 
already discussed, Barth’s insight into the gospel provided the church with a point of 
distinction from which it could “safely” come into contact with the modem world’s 
scientific and technological power, cultural “richness” and ideological claims, without 
being naively and uncritically drawn into a celebration and attachment to these. At the 
same time, the gospel prohibited the church from escaping into a cynical, separatistic 
and nihilistic attitude and relation toward the world.
All men and women in the world and the socio-cultural and political projects 
of the world, exist by virtue of God-given, i.e. gifted value, and are provisional; that is 
to say, they persist by virtue of the covenant of grace that God provided in Christ. 
Their place as such, is not established by fact of creation, historical validity or 
development, but because of the unseen patience, purpose and judgement of the 
resurrected Lord.^  ^If they existed by virtue of natural law, they would be credited with 
an autonomy and dignity that would be problematic.
The church understands this and therefore cannot escape the debt that comes
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with this knowledge. It is the responsibility of human beings both in their individual 
and collective endeavors neither to fail to exert proper efforts to live responsibly and 
improve human-social life, nor to attribute to these endeavors an autonomy, freedom 
and importance that is beyond their bounds. Especially is this true of the state that is 
invested with power. The institutions of society are given a functional role in the 
economy of God’s purpose. Their work has to do with order, the prevention of chaos 
and the investiture of power against tyranny. The state exists to prohibit the over­
reach of economic, social and cultural forces which would enslave and dehumanize.
Here the logic is again negative. Barth is not willing to give institutions a truly 
positive role in the economy of God’s redemptive work. Human socio-political 
agencies exist in and under the Lordship of Christ and their role is functional, having 
to do with keeping social space from being surrendered to the demonic, chaotic, 
tyranous anti-Christ forces.^* Their role is not to become a material agent for the 
realization of the Messianic Kingdom and its redemptive healing. The church sees the 
orders and endeavors of human society from a different perspective, purpose and 
function than society itself views these.^  ^Barth recognizes that the gospel alone 
sustained the church’s different view and empowered it to address these institutions 
from a different critical imperative, which bears the impress of their penultimate 
provisional character and their functional relation to the Kingdom.
This is a summary of the “negative” way in which the church is enabled to 
take up a differentiated relation to its world. Positively speaking, differentiation was 
empowered by Barth’s dialectical construction o f the gospel because it returned the 
church to its own primary task and vocation in the world. It laid the foundation for 
him to clarify the direction Protestantism must move — away from a cultural existence 
toward an “ecclesial” existence. Essentially, what Barth did was to call Protestantism 
back to its true ecclesial identity as the primary form of being in the world. In the 
covenantal framework of God's relatedness to humanity [relatedness cast in the 
distinction of being a relatedness in Jesus, thereby preserving God's Godness, i.e. 
God's difference], Barth had discovered the foundation which supported the unique 
existence of the church.
Basically, Barth built his doctrine of church on this Christological foundation 
and out of a historical sensitivity shaped by his experience of liberal Protestantism's 
predisposition to become uncritically enmeshed in its world. Protestantism's
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differentiation from and relatedness to its world, he saw, could only be secured by its 
correspondence to this preceding fundamental Christological framework of God's 
relatedness to and distinction from humanity. Only in this way do these two dynamics 
hold together.
The genius of Barth's approach is that he first addressed the relation of God to 
humanity and humanity to God in Jesus Christ. By clarifying this, he laid the 
foundation for Christianity to reclaim its proper focus and interest. In Christ, Barth 
argued, all humanity is in a new relation to God and others, in a new form of social 
co-existence. The gospel calls all human beings into conformity to this messianic 
reality.^ ® The church, properly understood, is a penultimate but substantial incarnation 
of that. It is the appropriate response to the new messianic reorganization of humanity 
that has made its debut in time in Jesus Christ.^' “Ecclesial” Christianity, versus 
cultural Christianity, is not correlated "directly" to its world in relevance (although it 
is no less worldly). Rather, the world is related to the gospel's universalistic vision to 
which the church bears witness, embodies, and by which it judges all individual and 
social constructions of reality. The church as such can never afford to surrender the 
"high" ground. It can ill afford to be naive about modernity as a unified, coherent and 
promising socio cultural configuration of humanity.
Barth shifted the emphasis away from the significance of the subjective 
anthropocentric side of the gospel in favor of developing its covenantal-historical 
significance. Over against the cultural fusion of Christianity to the world - a modem 
anthropocentric, idealistic world - Barth first asserted the qualitative difference of God 
and humanity (his initial dialectic) and then the relation of God to humanity in Jesus 
Christ, the New Covenant. This then became the foundation which theoretically 
sustained Christianity's ecclesial distinction from modernity. Conceptually speaking, 
Christianity thereby was enabled to be ecclesia—the "called out" or called 
apart—because it was given a substantive basis whereby that distinction (not dualism) 
could be sustained. In this manner, its discontinuity with the modem world was given 
an evangelical basis. The God of the church and the gods of the world were given 
contrary loci. They were mutually exclusive.
By giving God His own relation to humanity, but one in which humanity was 
reciprocally called into a new relation to God, Barth invited Christianity in the modem 
world to reunderstand its ecclesial character, i.e. its differentiated character. The only
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way Barth found to emancipate God from an anthropocentric culture and yet keep this 
God related to humanity was to "evangelize" this God. Only as such, could it be 
ensured that God defined God's self in God's relation to humanity and vice versa.
This was Barth's critical breakthrough.
Insofar as Christianity makes this God (i.e. God related to humanity in Jesus 
Christ and humanity related to God in Jesus Christ) the revealed truth that determines 
its particular existence does Christianity become ecclesial Christianity. Christianity's 
discontinuity with the world is given a substantive, not merely a formal basis. 
Accordingly, that the church's difference with the world of common men and women 
is not substantive to itself, thereby creating a basis for a church-world dualism.
Rather, because Jesus Christ is the sole place of the union of God and humanity, the 
church's distinction from the world is provisional, eschatological, fimctional, 
penultimate, relative. The church is the first fruits of humanity coming into 
conformity to the new order of humanity disclosed in Jesus Christ. The church exists 
in the world to witness to this truth that precedes and transcends it. Its visible 
community, i.e. its distinct societal shape, is not its own act so as to protect itself from 
the world or gain control over the world, but an act of fidelity to the truth of God 
revealed in the gospel, a truth that requires and inaugurates a new social-spiritual 
reconfiguration of humanity. The act of "ecclesiality" awaits eschatological 
verification.
Christianity, in faithfulness to this truth in Christ, is given a relationship to the 
world which is defined not by the world, its needs and projects, but by the gospel. The 
church’s question to itself is not about its relevance to the world, but its faithfulness 
in calling those in the world into proper relation with the new reality that made its 
debut in Christ. Through the gospel, the church sees the entire world in the 
inexorable grip of a new messianic destiny that has already revealed itself. As such, 
the church's prophetic character is not merely "prophetic." Its task vis-à-vis the world 
is not merely to name the wrong in the world and call for its replacement with the 
right, so the world will work better. Rather is it to go further and speak of the 
reorganization of right in the Kingdom of God that has come and is coming in Christ.
The "strange" element in Christianity, that essential character that sets it apart 
and enables Christianity to resist being domesticated by the world, is its 
evangelical-eschatological ordo salutis. Without it, Christianity can be easily
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subverted to human social, national, and individual ends. By making the church's 
foundation evangelical truth, the God in Jesus Christ, the church is placed in a 
confessional relation to the world around it. The fundamental discontinuity between 
God and this world, except in Jesus Christ, elevates a confessional "dogmatic" over 
against, for instance, the apologetic-philosophical witness that dominated nineteenth 
century Protestantism.
In this way, the church does not begin on the assumption of shared underlying 
premises or religious premises which the world can be made to recognize through a 
more profound use of reason in natural/universal laws. Properly speaking, the church 
knows no common truth shared between itself and the world. Its task is to relate the 
world (its problems and issues) to "evangelical" truth, not universal truth accessible 
through reason and apologetics. Evangelical truth, because it is not anthropocentric, 
but revealed theocentric and eschatological truth, is not easily exploitable, for 
instance, by anxieties created by the modem-post-modern development about the 
absence and need of universal absolutes to secure a runaway relativism and 
libertinism. Nor is "evangelical" tmth easily exploitable by modernity's optimism for 
social-human development.
Under the pressure and attractions, the problem and promise of modernity, 
reason has been applied to scripture in the interest of both rendering it more absolute 
and universally authoritative over humankind and more critically relative to the 
interest of modem humanity. For Barth, the church has no simple access to 
authoritative religious absolutes via scripture. God embodies “absoluteness” and calls 
humanity directly into relation to God’s self in the person and form of Jesus Christ. 
The God who reveals God's self, only in Jesus Christ and by the Holy Spirit, calls 
humanity into that reality. Scripture by the Spirit is made to participate, serve, form 
(i.e. give definition to) that evangelical reality as a faithful witness. It is not to be used 
to provide the basis for a morality independent, alongside or in addition to 
“evangelical tmth.”
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Section C
“Ethical” Resources: Dietrich Bonhoeffer on the Church’s 
Relation to the World
The following reviews three essays taken from Bonhoeffer’s writings, two of 
them from his Ethics, “Christ, Reality and Good,” “On the Possibility of the Word of 
the Church to the World,” and “Protestantism Without Reformation.” The second 
essay which is reviewed might arguably be regarded as Bonhoeffer’s most insightful 
treatment of the subject of the church’s distinction from, but relatedness to the world, 
with special emphasis on safeguarding the basis and importance of distinction. In the 
first essay, relatedness and distinction are addressed with the emphasis shifted to the 
importance and basis of relatedness. The final essay which is reviewed, Bonhoeffer 
never developed. It touches upon problems which are peculiar to American 
Christianity. While Bonhoeffer’s ideas reflect his debt to Barth’s seminal work, his 
approach bears the impress of his own unique thinking -  more Lutheran in outlook 
than Barth.
“Christ, Reality and Good”
Analysis and Explication
The stated goal of this essay is to address the subject of ethics, specifically to 
explore the idea of the nature of good from truly Christian-evangelical 
presuppositions. As will be seen, Bonhoeffer’s pursuit of this goal leads in a direction 
that is immediately and directly related to the interest in this thesis. This is suggested 
from the outset by the editor’s identification of the discussion provided in brackets 
under the title “(Christ the church and the World).” His enquiry into the nature of 
goodness, leads Bonhoeffer to the question of Christ’s relation to the world and then 
to the church’s relation to the world. How he formulates these connections and the 
precision and care he takes to parse the distinctions so that they neither dissolve nor 
harden into divisions, is considered to be highly instructive and significant to the 
interests germane to this study. The following analysis and explication does not aim at 
representing eveiy application of Bonhoeffer’s premise. Rather, it focuses on 
capturing the basic logic of Bonhoeffer’s argument and the central development he 
gives it.
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Beginning with the question central in the study of ethics, “How can I be 
good? and How can I do good?” which are related to the goal of making the world 
“good through my actions,” Bonhoeffer introduces a contrasting question from which 
he insists “Christian ethics” must start.' This question focuses upon a larger issue, 
“What is ultimate reality”? to commence upon an enquiry into good in-and-of- itself, 
in human life and endeavors, and in society and the world, is an abstraction. It is to 
parcel off the matter of good from reality-ultimate and true reality. “If the ethical 
problem presents itself essentially in the form of enquiries about one’s own being 
good and doing good, this means it has been decided that it is the self and the world 
which are ultimate reality.”^
Ultimate reality is God. Not merely God as God in-and-of-Godself (that is, 
from an inquiry of God’s inner being), if such were possible, but God understood in 
relationship to this world (“Creator, Reconciler and Redeemer”) and this world in 
relation to this particular God.  ^Goodness first and foremost pertains not to the subject 
of what is morally necessary, accessible and possible in the world, but to God who 
reveals Godself in goodness towards this world. By elevating God as the locus of 
good, the world is not here being “sublimated” and ethics being side-stepped.'' Rather, 
ethics is integrated into ultimate reality. Reality and good are united rather than the 
good being approached from an abstract point of enquiry. “Any perception or 
apprehension of things or laws without Him is now abstraction, detachment from the 
origin and goal.”  ^“Any enquiry about one’s own goodness or the goodness of the 
world is now impossible unless enquiry has been first made about the goodness of 
God. For without God, what meaning could there be in a goodness of man and a 
goodness of the world?”  ^“The point of departure for Christian ethics is not the reality 
of one’s own self, or the reality of the world; nor is it the reality of standards and 
values. It is the reality of God...”’
The starting point of Bonhoeffer’s ethics is God, that is to say, God in Jesus 
Christ, i.e., God in relationship to the world. Inquiry into the nature of good must not 
take place in abstraction and independence to God who is ultimate reality. Because 
God has revealed himself in history in Jesus Christ to be the God of this world and to 
have reconciled the world to himself, then human good has to do with humans’ 
correspondence to or “participation in” this reality (“divine reality”).* Ethics turns on 
the issue of alignment versus “detachment with reality. The question of good becomes
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the question of participation in the divine reality which is revealed in Christ. As such, 
it is holistic in its scope. The question of good embraces man with his motives and 
purposes with his fellow-men and with the entire creation around “In Jesus
Christ, the reality of God entered into the reality of this world.”'® “The place where 
the answer is given both to the question concerning the reality of God and to the 
question concerning the reality of the world, is designated solely and alone by the 
name Jesus Christ. God and the world are comprised in his name. In Him all things 
consist (Col 1:17). Henceforth, one can speak neither of God nor of the world without 
speaking of Jesus Christ. All concepts of reality which do not take account of Him are 
abstractions."
Approaching good from this christocentric logic led Bonhoeffer to attack 
ethical dualism and emphasize the connectedness of God and the world. The gospel of 
Christ discloses God to be inextricably joined to this world and the world joined to 
God. The attempt to be near God but removed from the world (pietism), and the 
attempt to be involved ethically in the world but be indifferent to God and apart from 
God (secularism), are both equally contradicted by the gospel. Because the world is 
already “sustained, accepted and reconciled” by God - claimed by God, a spirituality 
which is known by a separation from the word and a removal into a sanctified sphere 
set apart and over against the world, is disallowed.'^ Christian ethics requires a 
worldly involvement which is guided by efforts toward the realization of that reality 
which has been effected in Jesus Christ. “Christian ethics enquires about the 
realization in our world of this divine and cosmic reality which is in Christ...”"
The conception that posits two spheres in the world, one good, the other evil, 
or one secular and profane, the other holy, one natural and the other supernatural, 
falsely divides the world and polarizes it. “...The whole reality of the world is already 
drawn into Christ and bound together in Him, and the movement of history consists 
solely in divergence and convergence in relation to this centre.”"' Here, the distinction 
between the world and Christianity is that Christianity is about the realization in the 
life of humankind of that which is already the reality and destiny of this world and 
humanity manifested in history in Jesus Christ. Christianity properly understood, is 
not fundamentally about a different sphere where God and good come to be embodied 
in time. Christianity pertains not to the world becoming something other than that 
which already is the reality of the world - reality defined theocentrically and
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christocentrically.
What this signifies is that Christianity and the world are united, mutually 
related. “No static independence” the one jfrom the other is warranted." If the world 
presumes a secular autonomy, the church witnesses to the fact that the world’s 
existence is sustained by and for a divine power and purpose other than is evident 
fi-om an analysis within the world itself. If the church attempts to exist apart from the 
world or “in static predominance” over the world by formally connecting the world to 
its “Christian” laws or eternal religious principles, so called, it denies the gospel. In 
response to this, the world will rebel and throw off the “Christian” yoke. Neither party 
can rightfully take upon itself the prerogative of an intrinsic right and power to 
dominate the other." Bonhoeffer is clear that neither party can rightfully separate from 
the other nor control the other.
In Bonhoeffer’s logic, there is no sphere in the world that escapes the 
definition that God in Christ has placed upon human reality. Not even the darkest 
ghetto of human ignorance and evil or the region where the demonic reigns apparently 
intractable in its hold over men and women falls outside this definition. “The dark and 
evil world must not be abandoned to the devil. It must be claimed for Him who has
won it by his incarnation. His death and His resurrection. Christ gives up nothing of I
{what he has won. He holds it fast in His hands. It is Christ, therefore who renders Î
Iinadmissable the dichotomy of a bedeviled and a Christian world. Any static 
delimitation of a region which belongs to the devil and a region which belongs to 
Christ is a denial of the reality of God’s having reconciled the world with Himself in 
Christ.”"  j
If the church fails to stand in the relatedness that is herein referred, and if, in j
practice, it weakens this unity or severs it, there are consequences to both parties. “A
!
Christianity which withdraws fi-om the world falls victim to the unnatural and the {
irrational to presumption and self-will...”"  “A world which stands by itself in 
isolation from the law of Christ, falls victim to license and self-wilf.”"  I
After building his argument for unity, Bonhoeffer turns to the question of the j
nature of the distinction that exists between the world and Christianity. While not a i
separated “sphere,” the church does indeed occupy a definite space in the world.’® j
Here he refers to its public worship, parish life and her organizations.’' The church is j
not simply a “spiritual force” in the world.”  It does possess a “visible” character. It is ^
J
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precisely this visible character and the fact that it does inhabit particular space that 
often gives rise to the mistaken view that there are two spheres. This dualism must be 
overcome theologically. The space in the world that the church inhabits is to be 
understood as a distinction within a greater unity. “The church is the place where 
testimony and serious thought are given to God’s reconciliation of the world with 
Himself and Christ, to his having so loved the world that he gave his Son for its sake. 
The space of the church is not there in order to try to deprive the world of a piece of 
its territory but precisely in order to prove to the world that it is still the world, the 
world which is loved by God and reconciled with him.””  The church’s separate space 
then, does not reflect its own soteriological prerogative or power whereby it sets itself 
up in competition to the world, introducing a thorough going cleavage in the world. 
Nor does it justify assuming a hegemonic role over the world. Rather, it reflects the 
salvation of the world that is grounded in God. Rightly perceived when the world 
encounters the distinct particularity of the church, it learns something about the arrival 
of the universal destiny of the world in Christ, not something about a holy enclave 
separated and saved from the evil world. The church must find through the gospel and 
the guidance of the Spirit, a differentiated posture toward the world within a larger 
framework of shared unity; it must find and incarnate this in its witness and mission 
and in the shape and character of its distinct societal existence.
The radicalism with which Bonhoeffer presses his logic, is seen by his 
insistence that the world is already part of the body of Christ. “...The concept of the 
body of Christ... is not... intended primarily as representing the separation of the 
church from the world. On the contrary,... all men are taken up, enclosed and borne 
within the body of Christ and this is just what the congregation of the faithful are to 
make known to the world...””  “What is intended,” in this ‘making known,’ “is not 
separation fi-om the world but the summoning of the world into the fellowship of this 
Body of Christ, to which it already belongs.”’  ^Here it is clear that the act of 
formulating the church’s distinction from the world serves to witness to, realize and 
demonstrate the true character of the world’s unity.
It is important to stress what does and does not underpin the unity of the 
church and the world in Bonhoeffer’s thinking. This is not a natural unity. It is not 
shared common humanity that is the point of connection. This would lead to the 
church’s self-understanding on religious grounds, whereby its distinction could be
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accounted for because it is a variable within the spread of different dimensions and 
expressions of culture. If the church’s visible existence is explainable from an 
anthropological or sociological analysis, its difference bespeaks an underlying unity 
grounded in the nature of humanity and society. In such an explanation, unity with the 
world and a visible distinction among or within that could be descriptive of the visible 
church. The first problem with such an arrangement of unity and distinction is, that 
neither the church nor the world are placed in dialectical correspondence to truth 
outside of themselves as discussed in the Barth essay. In such a scenario, there is 
nothing to prevent the world from conceiving and formulating itself as a political or 
social entity grounded in itself. Viewed from this perspective, the church is also 
deprived of its transcendent sourcing and therefore made vulnerable to slipping into 
an uncritical identification with the world in its social and cultural developments. 
When the church’s distinction is conceived of as a variable of an underlying natural 
unity with the world, it ultimately serves that unity and lacks fundamental critical 
differentiating power.
In this essay, Bonhoeffer is absolutely sure that the church must not form or 
understand itself in separation from the world. He goes to great lengths to emphasize 
the underlying unity of church and world before taking up the task of nuancing the 
distinctions. By making this underlying unity rest on theological Christological 
foundations rather than natural foundation, he is able to guarantee that the world will 
be (actually is) in the grip of a destiny from which it cannot extricate itself. Dualism 
allows the world to persist safely in its pseudo autonomous course. Universalism, not 
natural universalism or ecclesiastical universalism, but Christological universalism, 
compromises the apparent independence and autonomy of the world. Theoretically 
speaking, Bonhoeffer has touched on a great truth in this point. This is so, because the 
world’s autonomy, so called, is “safe” so long as the church’s relationship to the 
world is ill-formed and misunderstood. The fiction of the world’s independence lives 
on as truth, so long as the church’s relation to the world lacks evangelical integrity.
To even the less than attentive reader, it is obvious that Bonhoeffer has taken 
great care to nuance the character of the church’s distinction from the world in such a 
way as not to be construed as constituting a division or separation from the world. 
Because he has sought to understand the distinction of the church from the world, by 
examining the peculiar character of the unity of the church and the world (unity
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precedes distinction) he is able to inform them appropriately. [“...The relation of the 
church to the world is determined entirely by the relation of God to the world.”’®] His 
development in this regard primarily points in two directions: one regarding the 
distinctive character of the church’s mission to the world, the other regarding the 
special character of its life “apart” from the world. As pointed out, these two may be 
reduced to their simplest definition (within the categories of this discussion) as 
witness to the world to the Christological universalism of the world and social 
embodiment of this universalism in the formation of the visible church community. 
Obviously, these two cannot be separated as they partake each from the other.
It is especially interesting to note, in light of the interpretive paradigm which 
guides the historical analysis in the body of this dissertation (fixity and freedom), 
how Bonhoeffer’s premise leads him to a categorical rejection of that tendency in the 
church towards “fixity.” When the church’s relationship is wholly determined by 
God’s relationship to the world in Christ, it cannot form itself toward the world other 
than according to what is consistent to this relationship.”  This means that since “the 
world belongs to Christ... it has need of nothing less than Christ himself. Everything 
would be ruined if one were to try to reserve Christ for the church and allow the world 
only some kind of law, even if it were a Christian law. Christ died for the world... only 
unbelief can wish to give the world less than Christ. Certainly, it may have well- 
intentioned pedagogical motives for this course, but these motives always have a 
certain flavour of clerical exclusiveness.”’*
If by some misunderstanding, the church were able to construe some grounds 
whereby it could justify and legitimatize its independence from the world, ostensibly 
by resorting to higher religious spiritual warrants superior to the world, it would 
succeed in instituting two spheres. In this, it would inevitably make higher claims for 
its own sphere. The result of this bifurcation, Bonhoeffer points out, would be 
conflict. Division creates conflict. It possesses no underlying unity. “If the Christian 
sector presents itself as an independent entity, then the world is denied that fellowship 
into which God entered with the world in Jesus Christ. A Christian law is established 
which condemns the law of the world and is maintained in an irreconcilable struggle 
against the world which God reconciled with Himself. Law always engenders 
lawlessness; nomism leads to anti-nomianism; perfectionism to libertinism.’®
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“On the Possibility of the Word of the Church to the World”
Bonhoeffer organizes this essay around a question that he recognizes has 
become a concern among many Christians during his day. This question is one of the 
church’s “word of solution” which it addresses to the world’s problems; problems 
which arise out of the social, economic, political, sexual and educational character of 
modem life.’® Evidently, among Bonhoeffer’s Lutheran colleagues, the sentiment 
persisted that mere preaching of Christian Orthodoxy was not sufficient. “Concrete 
instmction” must be directed to the “concrete situation.” This, he says, is what many 
believe is the great need of the church.’' “... The church must offer solutions for the 
unsolved problems of the world, and thereby fulfill her mission and restore her 
authority.” ”
Bonhoeffer engages this claim in a series of responses. First, he questions 
whether there are Christian solutions for worldly problems. He says, “It is obviously 
an error... that Christianity has a solution for all the social and political problems of 
the world, so that one would need only to listen to these Christian answers to bring the 
world into good shape.””  He does not deny that Christianity has something to say on 
worldly matters, but he does deny that it has at its disposal a Christian solution for all 
worldly problems. “...The question of the extent to which the church is called to solve 
worldly problems”’'' must be given earnest thought. This prospect of Christian 
answers to world problems, Bonhoeffer writes, recalls a cryptic phrase by Luther, 
“God in their hand.”’^
For instance, “Jesus concerns himself hardly at all with the solution of worldly 
problems.”’® “His word is not an answer to human questions and problems; it is the 
answer of God to the question of God to man. His word is essentially determined not 
from below but from above.” ”  “The way of Jesus Christ... leads not from the world 
to God but from God to the world. This means that the essence of the gospel does not 
lie in the solution of human problems and the solution of human problems cannot be 
the essential task of the church.”’* “It [The Word] is not a solution but a 
redemption.”’® The origin of this word does not arise out of a preoccupation with a 
human dilemma defined as the disunion of a world split between good and evil, but 
the “unity of the Son with the Father’s Will.”''® This word lies “Beyond” all human 
problems'" and comes as a message of redemption. For Bonhoeffer, this does not 
mean that human problems are not given any resolution, but that resolution is found in
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a different “plane” or framework/’ It is a matter not of the church being aloof from 
the world and its problems and evil. Rather, it is the point of departure from which 
these problems are encountered or addressed.'"
Furthermore, he queries whether these worldly problems “are to be and can be 
solved” as such. Returning to a way of reasoning resembling a Lutheran second use of 
the law, Bonhoeffer suggests that it may be that the “unsolved state of these problems 
is of more importance to God than their solution, for it may serve to call attention to 
the fall of man and to the divine redemption.” It may be that in their present 
representation, current problems are “wrongly formulated.”'''' If the biblical depiction 
of the nature and predicament of humanity is in tension with Enlightenment cultural 
assumptions, how could an easy translation of the Christian salvation to modem 
problems occur?
Bonhoeffer reminds the reader that “Christian [and “worldly”] answers to 
malignant social problems betray their weaknesses by their ambiguous, if not 
problematic results. “The abolition of slavery coincided with the coming into being of 
the British industrial proletariat.” (“It might be said the world will have its due.”)''® 
Prohibition (forced by Methodists) “led to worse experiences than those of the 
preceding period.”"® “The League of Nations was intended to overcome national 
antagonisms, but its result was to intensify them to the highest pitch.”"’
Bonhoeffer’s essay, however, is not just critical. It is intended to be 
constructive. He aims at making clear the relationship that the church is to have to the 
world and its problems. That is to say, the church’s relation to the world, not the way 
the world would draw the church into relation to itself and its needs and problems.
In answer to this challenge, Bonhoeffer returns to the “new” evangelical “ordo 
salutis” coming into prominence on the continent at that time (discussed in depth in 
section B). His logic is as follows: The church’s relation and word to the world, 
corresponds to God’s word and relation to the world. God’s word and relation to the 
world is not “direct” or “immediate” [in the proper theological qualification of these 
terms]. “It is in Jesus Christ that God’s relation to the world is defined. We know of 
no relation of God to the world other than through Jesus Christ.”"*
What this means in part, is that the church must approach the human dilemma, 
however it is historically formed, from a different starting point, a different reference. 
It is not a matter of being absent per se from a particular worldly dilemma-problem. It
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is a matter of being “absent” from the normative worldly criteria of examination, 
evaluation and resolution of given problems. “In other words, the proper relation of 
the church to the world, cannot be deduced from natural law or rational law or from 
universal human rights, but only from the gospel of Jesus Christ.”"®
Building on this premise, Bonhoeffer proceeds to identify what relating to and 
speaking to the world through Jesus Christ involves. Because the gospel is universal 
in character in that it is about the love of God for the world in Christ, the coming 
Kingdom of God in Christ and God’s judgement against unbelief, the church’s • 
relation to the world takes the shape of proclamation and a call to belief, conversion 
and preparation.®®
Because the gospel is about God’s love for the world in Christ, the church is to 
be in a relation of responsibility to the world in “word and action, bearing witness to 
this love.®' Here Bonhoeffer lays emphasis on the importance of responsible acts of 
love by the church to the world; a genuine care and involvement which images God’s 
love. It is this responsibility which “answers to the love of God for the world.”®’
The gospel means that the church cannot merely be present and related to the 
world in the posture of law [righteous imperatives], moral judgements on sin and 
cultural wickedness and corruption.®’ Being related to the world, i.e. morally 
“righteously” or “religiously” is foreign to the gospel. In the gospel, law and grace 
cannot be separated. To be present at any given situation in one form without the other 
form, is foreign to the God who meets us in Jesus Christ where judgement and love 
are inseparable.
This in turn means that the church does not have two different standards or 
values on ethical requirements, one for the church and one for the world. There exists 
no “double Christian morality.”®" What Bonhoeffer is polemicizing in this section of 
his essay is the idea that there exists independent legal institutions and conventions 
that possess absolute principles of morality. The claims upholding the right for 
property, marriage, life, honor do not stand on their own outside of the gospel, as if 
they possessed an intrinsic authority. If this were the case, then the church may well 
set itself up in society in a posture of a moral vanguard on natural moral law and 
human right. Quite to the contraiy, the gospel transforms all morality and human right 
(whether derived from the Mount Sinai or Mount of Blessings and the sayings of the 
Gospels), making it subservient, conditional and relative to a higher claim.®® So called^
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natural rights and laws are not legitimated by fact of creation, nor do they heal and 
harmonize human life by virtue of conformity to them. The gospel challenges the 
absoluteness of these. Absolute claims to the protection and enjoyment of the rights of 
property, honour and life inevitably lead to idolatry and dehumanization. These cannot 
be viewed as grounded in humanity, but within the greater framework of service, 
obedience, worship and glory to God. In this framework, their presence or absence 
achieves a certain relativity and purposefulness.®®
Equally so, the life of sacrifice is nothing until and unless it exists to the glory 
of God and free service to God. The church is to consistently address the world from 
this Christological standpoint. If it becomes intoxicated with a moral religious calling, 
although happily applauded by segments of culture and the status quo, it is not the 
church which is faithful to Jesus Christ.
Bonhoeffer presses his evangelical logic further in an effort to show how it 
informs the church’s interest in the state and secular institutions. The task of the 
church is neither indifferent to or idealistic about the existence of secular institutions. 
Because the gospel discloses that Jesus Christ is coming again bringing the Kingdom 
of God, the way must be prepared for that.®’ Therefore, it matters to the church how 
the orders of the world are formed and the way in which power is exercised - so they
present no obstacle to the way of faith “She (the church) must oppose every
concrete order which constitutes an offense to faith in Jesus Christ, and in doing this, 
she defines, at least negatively, the limits for an order within which faith and Jesus 
Christ and obedience are possible.”®* This may require the church to polemicize 
earthly conditions arising from social and economic attitudes which “destroy the true 
character of man in the world” and present a “hindrance to faith in Christ.”®®
Neither is it the place of the church to absolutize itself as if it held within itself 
that which could build a “concrete earthly order which follows as a necessary 
consequence from faith in Jesus Christ...”®® “The church possesses no doctrine of her 
own which is valid in itself with regard to eternal institutions and natural and human 
rights.®'
Bonhoeffer insists there exists no independent human and natural rights and 
the church has no business becoming naively or idealistically aligned with their 
advocacy. There is no such thing as independent man/woman “... all created things 
exist for the sake of Jesus Christ and consist in him (col 1:16 ff).”®’ For this reason, in
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the strictest sense, secular institutions do not possess an independent autonomy 
grounded in the fact of their existence. A qualified autonomy may be justified because 
“... the heteronomy of an ecclesiastical theocracy”®’ is at cross purposes with the 
gospel. As such, the church views and relates to the autonomy of world orders and 
institutions from a relative posture. It knows these stand under the judgement of God 
and are to serve ends related to the destiny of the world revealed in Jesus Christ.
“Protestantism Without Reformation”
A Summary of Bonhoeffer’s Critique of American Protestantism’s 
Relation to Religious Liberty
Toward the end of his brief stay in America (in 1939) Bonhoeffer began to 
compose an essay reporting on American Christianity as he perceived it. The title he 
chose for his reflections was “Protestantism without Reformation.” The following is a 
summary of one particular section of his thoughts which is related to aspects of the 
analysis presented in Chapters One through Six.
The decision of the early Protestant settlers that came to America was one to 
break from the “confessional struggle” in Europe and assert their Christian freedom. 
This Bonhoeffer recognizes was a step freighted with risk and cost. This was not 
merely a fleeing firom the creedal conflict, but a courageous enunciation of Christian 
freedom as a necessary response to it which involved suffering and hardship.
The problem Bonhoeffer surmises is when a “right won at the risk of their 
lives, becomes for the children a general Christian rule.”®" He recognized that there is 
latent poison, an ironic contradiction inherent in the transition from Christian freedom 
as a right struggled for and won, to right as a policy which becomes a “normal and 
ideal state of Christianity.” It is not the existence of this freedom that is itself the 
problem but that the heirs come to “misunderstand” this freedom.®® The first is 
contextual (mandated by conscience and constrained by the word of God), while the 
second is general.
The misunderstanding which develops is that of a relativism with regards to 
the creed. In other words there ensues a climate in which passion and struggle for 
truth is considered “unchristian” and Christianity itself is disassociated from truth 
(and correlated to works). While for the early generation the confessional struggle led
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to the truth of conscience to confess as one must to the later generation it came to be 
the “law” of religious pluralism and the negation of robust Christian truth claims. The 
arrival of this condition is the fact that Christianity is able to exist in a world by virtue 
of a peace it has not won. The subtlety is that religious liberty creates a parallelism 
characterized by thee absence of conflict or struggle between Christianity and its 
world. The lesson which America learned from European confessional struggles was 
in the end not the correct lesson at all. Religious liberty led to the privatization and 
relativization of truth claims. Americans became more interested in religion and its 
personal and social impact than in the world of God.®^
Religious freedom like other freedom means for America the “possibility of 
unhindered activity” (“given by the world to the church”).®^ What is evident from 
American pulpits, Bonhoeffer observed, is that the American church anathematizes 
all limitation of freedom and idealizes the possibilities inherent in the existence of 
their religious liberty. But he urges that this is naive, since “The freedom of the church 
is not where it has possibilities, but only where the gospel really and in its own power, 
makes room for itself on earth, even and precisely when no such possibilities are 
offered to it. The essential freedom of the church in the world never arises from the 
world as grant (or the church forcing the world to ensure that provision of freedom), 
but from the word of God so unfolded within a particular concrete historical setting, 
that it “gains a hearing.” *^ The word of God interfaced with the world or within a 
particular world, gains a hearing and following and as such a real place is created for 
the church which is won. The word of God is always and continually the source of the 
church’s true freedom. If however the church relies on its place in the world by virtue 
of its formal historical grant of freedom, it “slips back into the world.”®^
The logical risk of the church in the American situation is secularization; an 
identification of the church with the world while the opposite setting in which no 
formal grant of freedom exists serves to resist that identification.
Freedom defined as possibility and freedom in reality are two different 
entities. The latter derives from the word of God alone. The inherent risk and 
temptation in institutional freedom is the sacrifice of essential freedom.
A particular political order may have built-in provisions to guarantee its 
relativity so that there is space for other expressions of individuality or collectivity, 
but in truth only the word of God judges, limits and relativizes political and cultural
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expressions of power and order. The church lives and is free by this word not once 
and for all time, but only as it is continually brought up against the world.
Section D 
“History”
HR. Niebuhr
In his book, The Kingdom o f God in America, H. Richard Niebuhr developed a 
theological paradigm for understanding the history of American Protestantism’s 
relationship to the new world. Building on insights he gained from Barth (and 
historical insights gained from Troeltsch) Niebuhr attempted to show that the 
challenge that faced Protestantism in colonial and republican America was to 
construct a new kind of connection between Christianity and society. From the 
begirming, America was moving toward separation of church and state with its 
concomitant to a religious pluralism and a secular public social sphere. Niebuhr 
summarizes the risks that were endemic to this new arrangement as “separatism,” * a 
term he uses to describe a Christianity-world dualism and “secularism,”  ^a term he 
uses to describe Christianity becoming uncritically identified with the world. He also 
mentions sectarianism as a risk.
The structure of Niebuhr’s thought is best seen by viewing it within the 
exigencies created by church-state separation. The end of the Erastian and 
Constantinian arrangements meant that Christianity and the world (understood as a * 
socio-political entity) became formally distinct. If the two entities were to be 
prevented from cleavage in America or reconnecting in a new kind of unity, a religio- 
national and cultural synthesis (religio vs. ecclesio-political) a third entity needed to 
be identified which, when interposed “between” them, created a new kind of 
connection which preserved distinction. Viewed methodologically, what Niebuhr did 
was to identify this third category and attribute to it a major role in the new world 
arrangement.
In attempting to understand American religious and political development, 
Niebuhr insisted that three entities needed to be understood in their relationship with 
each other. These three were the church(es), the world (i.e., the socio-political realm) 
and the Kingdom of God. By giving to the Kingdom of God a distinct place and 
meaning, Niebuhr provided Protestantism with a new way of understanding their
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involvement with modem society, historically and in the present. His approach also 
provided them with a realistic way to view the modem socio-cultural project. This is 
made clearer by discussing how Niebuhr understood the Kingdom of God and its 
dynamics.
The Kingdom of God, according to Niebuhr, designates the direct rule of God 
over the world in the exercise of His will and judgements. It is God’s saving, judging, 
destroying and redeeming power at work in the world. While this Kingdom’s presence 
had been largely hidden from people in past ages, “in Jesus Christ it was revealed in a 
convincing fashion and began a new career among men.”  ^According to Niebuhr, 
there are three characteristics which describe this work of God: vividness or primacy, 
neamess or immediacy and absoluteness."^
“Vividness” or “primacy” is best understood in contrast to mediatorial. In 
God’s dealings with humanity, God is free, sovereign and transcendent. At no time 
does God alter this way of being present, God does not deputize God’s power, 
prerogative or word. No individual, book, institution, religious, social or political 
body can claim to incamate God, speak directly for God or embody God’s will and 
purpose. God is not mystically or rationally lodged in nature or history. Neither is 
God’s power or prerogative officially lodged in the church. The Reformation, Niebuhr 
argued, was gripped by the conviction that God communicated Godself and His will. 
According to God’s own initiative and spirit, God speaks. Even though God uses 
scripture, the church, sundry events and judgements and supremely the Gospel of 
Jesus Christ, these do not function autonomously and independently. When God uses 
these, the individual hears God and her attention is focused past these to God.
The immediacy of the Kingdom of God is best understood in contrast to the 
idea that God’s rule belongs to the far off future or eternal realm. Kingdom is not 
equatable with God’s will once and for all recorded in a timeless static heaven. As 
Protestants became aware of God’s sovereignty and the immediate character of God’s 
word and power [power to justify and forgive for instance], they increasingly began to 
see their lives directly under God, his word, will and providence. With this awareness 
came an increased conviction of God’s direct rule over human affairs. God’s saving, 
judging and redeeming reign was occurring. The present, like the friture, was under 
the grip of the Kingdom of God. This led to great expectations and a sense of 
imminence.
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Absoluteness describes the finality and scope of the reign and will of God. 
There is no sphere in life that is exempt from God’s judging, saving, activity. 
Ecclesiastical, political, social and cultural formations like individuals are not 
autonomous. They are subject to the judgements and sovereign will of God. As such, 
they are relative and temporal. Only the Kingdom of God is absolute. Just as no sacred 
sphere exists which is able to claim identity with God, there is no secular sphere that 
lies outside of the redeeming will of God. The Kingdom of God is universal. The 
“absoluteness” of the Kingdom emphasizes that at all points, this Kingdom does not 
organize around and relativize itself according to the interests, plans and schemes of 
peoples and nations. Peoples and nations encounter the Kingdom of God and change 
their course.
When this working definition of the Kingdom of God is returned to the two 
fold problem which Niebuhr saw was endemic to America as a post-Constantinian, 
post-Erastian experiment [i.e. secularism and separatism], a different history between 
Christianity and the world becomes recognizable. In light of the Kingdom of God, 
Protestantism could not justly translate the separation (of society and church) into 
separatism. The entire thrust of the Kingdom of God is to draw all human 
formulations, individual and collective, under the judging redeeming will of God 
which is universal in its scope. The church serves this end as a witness. While it 
caimot claim to be the will and word of God on earth, it can and must point to God, to 
the finality of God’s grace, judgement and will. The church confronts individuals and 
institutions with the reality of this will and it attempts to formulate itself in light of it. 
To the extent that the church is faithful to its calling and identity, it exists not as the 
Kingdom of God, but for the Kingdom of God. In other words, for Niebuhr, as for 
Bonhoeffer, there is no holy sphere to which the church may lay claim. The sphere in 
which the messianic Kingdom of God has come and is coming is the world. When the 
church fails to fully reckon with the Kingdom of God as a divine worldly 
phenomenon, then the church tends to separate from the world and a world secularism 
results. When the church uncritically identifies a particular socio-cultural or political 
project with the Kingdom of God or confuses the values of these as the values of the 
Kingdom of God, then a Christian secularism results. In secularism, there is a 
surrender to culture,^ a collapse of distinction from the world on the part of 
Christianity. The idea of church as a distinct entity finds its importance with respect to
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secularism. “Church” is the way Christianity stays in contact with the greater socio­
cultural world without becoming identified with it. Functionally, “church” exists to 
guarantee Christianity’s differentiation as the grounds for a proper connection with the 
world. This will be developed a little later in this essay.
While not in so many words as were just phrased, Niebuhr wants the reader to 
discover with him the hermeneutic which explains and justifies Protestantism’s 
history and struggle in the new world. The separation of church and state that led to 
pluralism and sectarianism was not all “spots and jumps.”  ^ There has been a logic 
behind Christianity’s development in America. The key to understanding this logic is 
the Kingdom of God viewed as a dynamic at work in the world which the churches 
and religious movements serve.
If Protestants could claim more for themselves, they could rightly attempt to 
wed the world to themselves or separate from the world. If the church could claim to 
be the sphere in which God’s will and word was embodied, it could rightly tolerate a 
Christian vacuum in the world. Theoretically, the church could then be content with 
world secularism. If the church could claim to possess the will and word of God either 
by virtue of tradition or the Bible [that is, its understanding of the Bible], it could 
rightly be tempted to fill a hegemonic and authoritative role in the world. But Niebuhr 
is quick to point out that the logic of the Kingdom of God, which he argues is the 
seminal logic of Protestantism, forbids identifying even the Bible and its contents with 
God’s will and word.^ At all times and occasions, God remains in jurisdiction of his 
word. Only through the spirit is God’s word ultimately made known. And at all 
points, God leads those who encounter his word back to its original source - to 
Godself. When Protestants are true to their roots, they see the world in the grip of the 
Kingdom of God which Christ has brought and is bringing the world under. All 
individual, social, cultural and political entities which are organized in independence 
and opposition to God are subject to the crisis which the Kingdom of God brings into 
the world.
Rather than coming into the world through natural growth and development, 
the Kingdom of God gains control of this world through confrontation, crisis and 
God’s passion in Jesus Christ. It is not the revolution of science and reason over 
nature and ignorance or religion and morality over irréligion. The Kingdom is a 
struggle between divine and human will organized independently of God and
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organized in ways that are destructive of human community. Through Jesus Christ, 
divine love, grace and passionate Will collide with the perversity and destructiveness 
of human will. The nqw is then bom through repentance, death to self, through love, 
forgiveness and redemptive suffering that occurs because of God’s judgement. 
Through Jesus Christ, Niebuhr argues, God has introduced a revolution into the 
world. That revolution is the Kingdom of God.
Because the Kingdom of God has come and is coming, no political, cultural or 
ecclesial formulation is secure and stable in itself. Neither is it the role of Christianity 
to supply social stability through its institutional, religious or moral resources. 
Christianity’s task is to expose itself and the world around it to the coming Kingdom 
of God that requires a new kind of social, cultural, political and individual 
formulation.
The essence of American Protestantism, according to Niebuhr, is recognized 
in how they organized themselves ecclesiastically and politically. In both these 
spheres, their interest was to limit power and authority. This was not because they 
were believers in human freedom, but because they would not allow these institutions 
to usurp their boundaries so as to fimction at cross-purposes with the Kingdom of 
God. Niebuhr argues that the Protestant contribution to the republican movement, a 
contribution that preceded the Enlightenment contribution, sprang directly from the 
initial Reformation polemic against the medieval church.* This challenge was no mere 
reaction against the abuse of authority. The Reformers relativized the claims of the 
Medieval church by appealing to higher claims which they identified as the word of 
God. It was from this beginning that the idea of the Kingdom of God (i.e., the 
sovereignty of God) made its way into modem time. Through the Reformers, a 
revolutionaiy critical principgfwas introduced into the world. Protestant political- 
national and ecclesiological projects are efforts to transform a critical principle into a 
constructive one. The key to understanding American Protestants’ contribution to, and 
logic behind, the modem world is the idea of the limitation of power and authority in 
juxtaposition to the evangelical proclamation of the Kingdom of God as a Kingdom of 
grace. There is in Niebuhr’s exposition a synergism between these two but no 
synthesis.
That Protestantism contributed to the rise of the modem world is not in 
question for Niebuhr. Both in the sequence of historical events and in thought.
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Protestantism provided the basic resources necessary for an ecclesiastical and political 
transition. However, the point of contact which the Protestant logic has with modem 
ideas of individual and democratic freedom is not fundamentally idealistic. That is to 
say, the logic behind Protestantism’s “revolutionary principle” does not spring from 
the potential that freedom is thought to possess for human development and dignity.^
It is not motivated by premises which conclude that maximizing individual liberty 
increases individual creativity, scientific and technological advancement and 
economic prosperity. Rather, the Kingdom of God demands that ecclesiastical and 
political institutions be constmcted on a more provisional and relative basis. This is 
not so much a gesture of good will to the Kingdom of God; a making room for it. 
Individuals and institutions are called to reinvent themselves in such a way as to be 
compatible and function in concert with this present and coming reign. As such, the 
essential Protestant logic behind the new world has little interest in the transference of 
power from institutions to individuals as an end in itself. It is not enamoured with the 
possibilities that are thought to ensue from such a transaction in and of itself.
Niebuhr views America’s colonial and national history from this perspective. 
The evangelical awakenings in the middle eighteenth century and early nineteenth 
century sustained a dialectical relation to rigid ecclesiastical and political institutions. 
Evangelicalism emerged at a time when loyalties to these institutions were being and 
had been challenged. As these loyalties weakened or were forsaken, evangelical 
revivals called many to a new transcendent loyalty.
The power of these revivals and the fact that they were a widespread 
phenomena, gave Protestants a sense of ecumenicity and a sense that God’s Kingdom 
was coming in their midst and their time.^  ^In its early period, the Jonathan Edwards 
period, and early nineteenth century, the emphasis was on the coming Kingdom. They 
had seen its power and were more expectant of its full arrival.In the early nineteenth 
century, Niebuhr argues that evangelical Protestantism sought to expose their social 
and cultural world to the claims of the sovereignty of God. The problem that plagued 
their efforts was twofold. First they had an individualistic view of humanity. Their 
view of the individual and society lacked communal depth.*  ^They did not understand 
the interdependence of human existence and the impact of socio-cultural structures. 
Second, they increasingly came to confuse the Kingdom of God with the national and 
cultural entities that had evolved in the new world.
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Niebuhr argues that after the second Great Awakening, many Protestants lost 
the vivid awareness of the Kingdom of God. The idea of the Kingdom gradually lost 
its strange abrasive divine character. Instead of viewing the Kingdom as a 
transcendent critical yet gracious reality, it began to be seen in terms of a harmonious, 
sublime, peaceable and moral world in which the “brotherhood of man and the 
fatherhood of God” prevailed. This view involved “no discontinuities, no crises, no 
tragedies or sacrifices, no loss of all things, no cross and resurrection.”^^ After the 
Civil War, the idea of the Kingdom was increasingly robbed of its dialectical element.
It was a fulfillment of promise without judgement. It was thought to be growing out of 
a present so that no great crisis needed intervene between the order of grace and the 
order of glory. [It had a] one-sided view of progress, which saw the growth of the 
wheat but not of the tares, the gathering of the grain but not the burning of the chaff, 
this liberalism was indeed naively optimistic.” “A God without wrath brought men 
without sin into a Kingdom without judgement through the ministrations of a Christ I
without a cross.W hat happened was that an identity between earthly religious, social j
and political achievements and the Kingdom of God began to form in the minds of j
imany Protestants. This change Niebuhr attributes to corrosive effects of time on the i
good that follows in the train of the Kingdom of God. When the truth and power of 
the Kingdom of God is known and experienced at particular times, it brings change to 
individuals and society. Over time, these changes settle and become institutionalized 
and eventually began to be viewed as ends and,goods in themselves. It is much like 
the proverbial dog running along a stream with a piece of meat in its mouth. Upon 
seeing the reflection of the meat in the water, the dog becomes confused, drops the 
meat and lunges for the reflection. In fact, Niebuhr describes the situation in this light 
when he writes, “The contemplation of their own righteousness filled Americans with 
such lofty and enthusiastic sentiments that they readily identified it with the 
righteousness of God... Henceforth, the Kingdom of the Lord was a human possession 
not a permanent revolution.” *^ This analysis concurs with that provided by Winthrop 
Hudson, which was cited earlier.’^
As the nineteenth century progressed, American Protestantism became 
increasingly enamoured by the effects, i.e., the fruit that Christianity could and did 
produce. They became less anchored in the objective and transcendent realities behind 
those fruits. As a result, a false identity between Christianity and the new socio-
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political world which had emerged, occurred.
One of the consequences of this identity was how Christianity began to 
function in the new nation. As will be seen from the following discussion taken from 
Niebuhr’s Kingdom paradigm, this function resembles the categories employed in this 
thesis which are referred to as the regulative and integrative. Niebuhr’s logic is that 
Christianity, bereft of its dialectical relation to the world [a relation which is 
maintainable only by Christianity under the influence of the transcendent idea of the 
Kingdom of God], inevitably forms a direct unilateral relation to the world (or a 
dualistic relation). In this setting, it [Christianity] seeks to bring society directly into 
relation to itself, its laws and values, biblical morals - in short, its religion. It seeks to 
sustain a direct connection between the world and its religion or parts of its religion.
Niebuhr discerned this pattern in Protestantism as early as Lyman Beecher. Niebuhr 
writes:
“ The sovereign God of Lyman Beecher and his colleagues is an absentee 
monarch who declared his will in a remote past and caused it to be recorded in 
irrefrangible laws. To live under the sovereignty, as these church leaders seem 
to conceive it, is to live not in relation to divine being, but in obedience to law.
They would interpret the fall of an apple from the tree not as due to the 
attraction of the large mass for the small, but as an act in obedience to the law 
of gravity. At all events in religion, they define the decrees of God as ‘his 
determination to create a universe of free agents, to exist forever under the 
perfect laws of his moral government, perfectly administered..’. The sense of 
critical immediate relations between man and the Being of beings has been 
lost in the feeling that man is responsible for keeping certain laws. Moreover, 
these laws are conceived to have been once and for all established in nature 
and published in the Bible, so that the latter comes to be a book of statutes 
rather than an aid to the understanding of God’s living will. It is not only the 
Bible which mediates the moral government of God, for the religious j
institutions founded upon that statute book may claim to represent his j
sovereignty also.” °^ j
i
The problem with the idea that Protestantism was to sustain a direct religious |
relation to the particular socio-cultural world it shares is evident when particular j
moral issues are raised. A prime example is the temperance issue which Protestants j
championed both in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. Niebuhr, not unlike j
Perry Miller cited earlier,^  ^points out the synergism between temperance reform and a 
democratic industrial society. It imperiled its individualistic and productive axis.^  ^ |
When Protestantism brought to bear its influence against this evil, “men were not 1
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saved from the frustration, conflict and poverty of life which they sought to escape in 
the saloons; they were saved from w h isk e y H o w  could Protestantism do anything 
but save men from whiskey except if it turned from moral crusade to confronting them 
with the transcendent claims of grace and love that brings in its wake its own moral 
revolution, Niebuhr argues that unlike medieval Catholicism, Protestantism does not 
have within its religious logic a view of morality that can be easily exploited for social 
uses. Morality in the Protestant view is not a “matter of behaviour, but an affair of 
faith and love, neither of which was subject to man’s control.^ "^  When Protestantism’s 
seminal logic is adhered to, there can be no categorical precision in Protestantism’s 
moral life.”^^  Protestantism lacks the “qualities necessary for organizing the lay life.^  ^
“It offered no standard whereby men could make choices between relative goods and 
relative ends. It gave no scale of values whereby their interests could be harmonized 
and the higher be made subject to the control of the lower. The Catholic critic seemed 
unanswerable when he said that Protestantism led to moral anarchy.^^
The degeneration of Protestantism from a dialectical relation to society [i.e., 
Protestantism as instrument of witness to the Kingdom of God] to one of a direct 
relation of society [discernable by its reduction of religious authority to moral values 
and dogmas], inevitably renders it exploitable by social, economic and political 
powers and interests.^*
It was the same spirit, Niebuhr argues, that eventually characterized the later 
development of liberalism. For liberalism “it was not God who ruled but religion 
ruled a little and religion needed God for its support.Religion was remembered not 
as a prophetic and critical force in America’s past, but as an integral building block to 
the modem world order. As such, liberalism employed reason and apologetics to 
prove its pragmatic value in the building and maintenance of America.^® It attempted 
to establish its place by virtue of the fact that Protestantism hsitorically had played an 
important role in the birth of the nation and its liberal values. They insisted that there 
was a synergism between modernity and Protestant religion. This direct equation 
between Protestant religion and the success and health of the liberal social order is the 
substance of the regulative and integrative strategies sketched in the earlier chapters of 
this study. It is based on a historical memory that is almost correct. According to 
Niebuhr’s logic, without a vision of the tme Kingdom of God in America’s past and 
present, it is inevitable that some would come to view Protestantism’s connection to
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America as one of supplying religio-moral resources and authority. This perspective is
no doubt the source of many integrative and regulative strategies which continue to
mark Protestantism’s engagement with American society.
When the Kingdom of God is identified with a particular national and cultural
phenomenon, the church must bear a share of the blame. It is the dialectical character
of the gospel alone that guarantees that particular political, cultural or religious
development and ideals will be kept in critical perspective. When any of these begin
to be viewed as possessing independent values or having a historical perpetuity
because of the truths or “principles” they embody or because the providential
importance they are thought to have, it is likely a sign that the church has become too
closely identified with the world it shares. The Kingdom of God is always in a
dialectical tension with every sphere of human existence, and the church is Christ’s
chosen instrument of the Kingdom of God even though the church itself, like the
world, is under its critical and redemptive rule. Niebuhr realized the importance of the
interdependency of these three distinct entities. And he realized that the great problem
that had evolved in American Protestantism was that it had become too closely
identified with the modem institutions and values which Protestantism had played a
major role in bringing into existence. It is in this context that Niebuhr’s interest in and
renewal of the Church is to be understood. He recognized that building the distinctive
character, identity and life of the church was necessary if the church was to reclaim its
proper focus. American mainstream Protestantism was “orbiting around the modem
world and its values. If this fascination was to be broken, American Protestantism
must reclaim its ecclesial integrity. As already stressed, this reclamation of its proper
focus was not to be understood as a movement towards separatism but differentiation
from the world. This movement of differentiation could not be accomplished by
“cultic” means, that is to say, it could not be accomplished by focusing on the church,
its importance, its authority, its values, its beliefs, its communal life and its
uniqueness. The church, a particular or “parochial” phenomenon, is a proper response
to a universal reality which precedes and transcends it.^  ^When the church answers to
the gospel, it is formulated in a dialectical away fi“om and toward the world.
“To represent the church idea which follows from divine sovereignty solely in 
terms of an ecclesia called out fi*orn the world is historically and theologically 
impossible. The direction of life toward a God who loved the world, created 
and redeemed it, requires of his people retum to the world. The American
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churches were involved from the beginning in this fundamental dialectic of 
Christianity in which all their predecessors had participated.
“Devotion to the same sovereign God who calls his people out of the world 
requires of them service to and in the world. So Puritans, separatists and 
Quakers who had fled the corruptions of secularized Christianity needed in 
turn to flee from the perils of a celestialized or spiritualized faith. In various 
ways they sought to fulfill the double yet not dualistic purpose of the 
Christian calling.”^^
In its relation to the world, Niebuhr urges the church must retum to the 
question of how can it "be tme to itself: that is, its Head."^  ^ This question involves 
facing again what the church is not. "It is not the savior but the company of those 
who have found a savior.Therefore, the church’s posture is not "self sufficient 
secure in righteousness, but dependent on God..."^  ^ This clarity alone will spare it 
from entering into a relationship to the world, which would betray a messianic 
vocation of utopie proportions, as if its job was to save civilization, save the culture 
from its corruption, save the nation, save the values of capitalism or save society from 
its injustices and poverty.^^
This movement away from the world is described by Niebuhr as a turning of 
the church from the "temporal" toward the "etemal, so as to become fit again for its 
work in time."^’ Only a new withdrawal followed by a new aggression can save the 
church and restore to it the salt with which to savior society."^* These metaphors are 
more to be understood in terms of the need of the church for "silence and quiet,"^  ^
reflection on its own sources and calling in the context of the seductive familiarity and 
urgency of its world with its claims, needs, and ideals. "The church tied to culture 
which it sponsored suffers cormption with it.""^ ® This is the heart of the church's task, 
"the liberation of the church from the bondage to a cormpt civilization.""^* In other 
words, Niebuhr is urging that the battle, if not won in the first move, is largely pre­
determined. The church, once it achieves its proper differentiation (as long as that is 
not exploited for separatism), is in a position of strength with the world. This, he 
assures the reader, is a gracious occurence not to be understood as the reward of 
cultural monasticism. In fact, he is clear to say that this metaphorical purification, this 
monastic turn, is not ultimately completed apart from the world, but in connection to 
the world.
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Here is where Niebuhr’s insight into the nature of the church-world 
relationship deepens. He does not deny that the encounter of the church and world 
has an element of reciprocity. There is the instance where the church becomes 
anachronistic — out of touch with a changing world. In this it may reflect, for instance 
"dogmatism", "individualism", and medieval authoritarianism, while its era has 
moved on to scientific, collectivist, modernist, and humanitarian modes of thinking."*^  
But this adjustment remains peripheral to the substance of what is at stake in the 
church's relation to the world. It is the current form of sin in the world that provides 
the opportunity for renewed clarity, the contemporary shape of worldliness. The 
particular historically conditioned character of worldliness, provides the contextual 
setting for the church to rediscover and experience the power and relevance of its 
gospel. While the lust of the flesh, lust of the eyes, and the pride of life are perennial, 
their subtle formation in a particular time and socio-cultural setting are unique. 
Furthermore, this worldliness, precisely because of its cultural entrenchment, tends to 
domesticate the church to it as a benign given of social existence. It is obvious then 
that in its relationship to the world, the church may either save or lose its life."*^  If it 
simply turns against the world for its worldliness by turning away from it, it will lose 
itself. If it seeks to save itself through "relevant" involvement and participation in the 
world [that is, “relevance” by the world’s standards], it also will lose itself. Only 
when in its relatedness to the world, it finds the relevance of its gospel vis-a-vis the 
unique worldliness of its time, will it find itself/save itself. The church literally finds 
its life, the life of the gospel, in dialectical relation to the world. As such, the church 
and world are mutually "saved" in a dialectical relatedness. Furthermore, the 
important priority on differentiation which is so crucial to a valid dialectical 
relatedness, cannot take place only in the "wilderness", but is formed out of the 
encounter. Thus, "difference" is not created ex-nihilo, but is ultimately realized in 
interaction. Niebuhr is clear that it is the worldliness in culture and social institutions, 
not these in themselves, that is the problem in the world."*"* The point being that these 
have value and are, in a qualified sense, renewable for human and good ends.
Equally, the true sanctity of the church is not in itself, but rather on the account of the 
uniqueness of its gospel; not in its "orthodoxy," but its interfacing the claims of the 
gospel and the light of the gospel with a contemporary crisis of worldliness.
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Section E 
Biblical Resources 
The Implications of Paul's Epistle to the Galatians for Understanding 
Christianity’s Relationship to the World
When one reads Paul's letter to the Galatians, it is not readily apparent that it 
contains a theology that radically changed the basis of the people of God's relationship 
to the world as it was understood by many of the Jews and Jewish Christians at that 
time. The law or Torah controlled the character of this relationship. Since the 
Babylonian captivity the law had grown in significance becoming the primary 
socio-religious mechanism which functioned to maintain Judaism's identity. It did 
this by empowering a social cleavage with non-Jews. Law or Torah marked social 
boundaries through its power to attach purity-impurity status to many of life's habits, 
passages and articles, thus interrupting free social intercourse with non-Jewish people. 
In this way, the holiness of the Jewish people was ensured in a setting of geographical 
and cultural pluralism.
The force of this institution was not met head on by the fledgling Christian 
development, but only as it came to cause tensions in their emerging communities. 
Christianity in this regard was not a Jewish reform movement. Early on the Apostolic 
leaders were forced to confront the issue of Gentile participation in the ever-widening 
messianic fellowship because of the tensions and questions that arose through these 
communities experiencing the force of the Jewish purity taboo. Almost immediately 
compromises were put in place in order to accommodate Gentiles. But even with 
compromise, tensions and confusion persisted.
It was this confusion that led Paul to mount a direct challenge on the law 
which gave separatism its force. Provoked by pastoral concerns, and the confusion 
among leaders in the church at large, he penned Galatians. The immediate aim of this 
letter was to safeguard the extra-nomistic basis of the Gentile Congregations Paul 
regarded as foundational to his special calling as missionary to the Gentiles. At issue 
in the crisis at Galatia was a universal or common versus a religio-ethnic basis of the 
new messianic people of God. But the consequence of relativizing Torah separatism 
was the displacement of the primary mechanism which protected the historic people 
of God from losing their identity under conditions of social, political and cultural 
encroachment. The effect of taboo was that of punctuating the differences between
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Jews and Gentiles, giving to those differences dividing significance.
Preservation of the religio-social identity was accomplished in this way by 
achieving insularity from the foreign element. The direction of movement was "away 
from" or separatistic, not only from the "evil" in an encroaching world, but its 
strangeness or difference. When Paul relativized the dividing significance of 
Jew-Gentile difference and the power of the law to enforce a social cleavage at given 
junctures, he was simultaneously and unavoidably introducing the new basis and new 
dynamics which would govern the church's relationship with its world. Exploiting the 
universal scope of the gospel, Paul was able to point to a common foundation in 
which human differences, religious and ethnic, in fact all historic and created 
particularities, ceased to have dividing relevance.
The effect of this "strategy" or doctrine, negatively speaking, was that ecclesia 
could no more survive by resorting to separative dynamic. In its own way, 
ecclesia—the people of God in second Temple Judaism—had exploited the importance 
of its unique difference to survive; it had "lived off" of the capital of the socially 
separative force empowered by Torah—a separation which concretized or 
"sacramentalized" their specialness or uniqueness. By relativizing that, ecclesia was 
forced to be in the world in a new way. In the new model that comes into view in the 
Galatian Epistle, church is not a statement of specialness, i.e. parochial uniqueness but 
the new messianic commonness between humans, one not derived from historical 
revolution or creation but messianically.
Rather than taking up separatistic and parochial posture with regards to the 
world, the new ecclesia was to assume an offensive inclusive and universalist posture. 
Its gospel declared to the world a new ground of unity and its fellowship attempted to 
form and express that unity. Implied in Galatians is the view that the world is not a 
unified reality. It is a divided realm. Implied in Paul's Galatians discourse is the truth 
in which created and historically developed differences are elevated as significant, as 
ultimate or absolute, thus stratifying and dividing humanity. Ecclesia exists in the 
world "polemically" offensively pulling the disparate pieces of this world into a new 
unity. Theoretically speaking, Paul's principles put the new ecclesia on a unitive and 
offensive course instead of the parochial, separative course it was on.
That law or torah increasingly came to be relied on to protect the integrity of 
Judaism's discrete identity in the face of cultural-political encroachment has been
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made clear by several key sociologists and theologians in recent years.* For the sake 
of brevity and directness it is necessary to commence this section with the Galatians’ 
problem.^
James D. G. Dunn, while not interested in a consistent sociological - 
anthropological explanation of Judah's use of Torah, does emphasize that Judah 
exploited the ritualistic aspects of its law. Their use of law, he implies, has to do with 
their need to "restore, reinforce or redirect identity" (a phrase quoted from Hans 
Mol).^ During times when Judah was threatened with assimilation into a greater 
cultural geopolitical entity, special attention and importance were given to 
circumcision, food laws and Sabbath observance. These in particular, and the Torah 
as a whole, were intensified as "boundaries". Boundaries are "characteristics which 
provide the group's self definition and mark it off from other groups"."* Their function 
is to "separate". Quoting Raisanen, Dunn says "works of the law are something that 
separates."^
In the Maccabean era, as well as in 1 C. E,, Dunn points out that Judeans were 
under special threat as a minority.^ Their possibility of remaining a discrete historical 
body of people in these circumstances was commensurate with their ability to put in 
place a socio-cultural buffer zone between themselves and a strange and foreign 
encroaching world, thereby, tightening their own unity and identity.
Law itself, Dunn notes, increasingly came to signify Judaism's special identity. 
By virtue of the fact that Israel was given the law, the people knew who they were. 
"The law was part and parcel of Israel's identity both as nation and religion."^ To 
relativize law was to tamper with that which provided for the identity of Judaism as 
the people of God. The law was critical for constituting the true people of God, both 
by virtue of its capacity to authorize taboo (thereby enforcing a degree of social 
separation from other peoples with whom they shared geographical space) and 
because it was to Israel alone that the law was given. The law signified and embodied 
their election or claim to unique religious significance.
That which enabled Judaism to survive the corrosive effects of being exposed 
to cross-cultural social and ideological currents without completely dissolving their 
identity was their unique capacity to enforce a religio-social insularity through 
recourse to Torah. "Israel cannot be harmed by its opponents so long as it is a people 
dwelling alone (Num. 23:9), "because in virtue of the distinction of their peculiar
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customs they do not mix with other to depart from the way of their fathers."*
Wayne Meeks makes the following observation which focuses the rationale in
this section's approach to Galatians:
"The Pauline school rejected circumcision and purity rule, thus giving up one 
of the most effective ways by which the Jewish community maintained its 
identity over against the pagan society in which it lived. This was the practical 
issue at dispute between Paul and his opponents in Galatia, which our 
preoccupation with Paul's theological and Midrashic arguments has perhaps 
obscui*ed. Would abolition of the symbolic boundaries between Jew and 
Gentile within the sect mean also lowering the boundaries between sect and 
world?"^
The following approaches Galatians in an attempt to open up the very insight 
that Meeks here has so perceptively stated.
What are the consequences of Paul's displacement of the socio-ecclesial role of 
the law for the church - world relation? In an effort to fairly arrive at this question 
two preliminary discussions are necessary. First, the immediate ecclesiological issue 
which provoked the letter of Galatians is described, namely, the claim that full 
inclusion into the messianic fellowship necessitates circumcision and keeping the law.
Second, the pivotal theological challenge Paul mounted against the law in Galatians is 
examined with special emphasis on the sociological significance of Paul’s 
“midrashic” arguments. After these two discussions the significance of Paul's |
argument for understanding the unique character of Christianity's relation to the world I
is explored. |
!The Galatians Problem i
What there is to be known about the problem in the Galatian churches from 
the Epistle of Galatians may be summarized as follows. A faction had arisen in the 
churches which was attempting to compel the believers to be circumcised in addition 
to or as a completion of their faith [6:12, 3:3]. It appears this claim was likely being 
promoted by one primary person [5:10b], but had spread to numerous others [4:17, 
1:17]. Because of this claim and the way it was being pressed on the believers it was 
causing division [4:17] as well as considerable animosity and dissension between 
them [5:15,20]. Evidently what fueled the dissension more than anything else was 
that those who had been actually circumcised assumed an air of preeminence above
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the rest of the believers. The fact that they bore the physical mark of the historical 
Jewish people, even though they had not also commenced to keep the Jewish law, set 
them apart from their brethren [6:12-13]. Clearly, they had become enamored with 
the significance of being historically identified with Judaism and Jerusalem [cf. 4:25,
2:14] [Le. "flesh" 6:12-13].
The sheer novelty and superficiality of this claim obviously struck Paul. He 
knew circumcision was merely the door for keeping the entire Jewish law [5:3, 3:10] 
and an outward change of the flesh meant nothing [5:6, 6:15]. This was a case of 
misplaced value [6:3]. That which possessed true value was a "new creation" [6:15]; 
it had to do with the Spirit, (not the flesh) [6:12,4:29, 5:16f]; it was proven by one’s 
own work [6:2-3] and was characterized by a life of "faith working through love"
[5:6].
Rather than merely a mild case of misguided zeal, Paul regarded the claim that 
a believer must be circumcised as a serious challenge to the gospel [1:6-9].
Circumcision essentially undercut the adequacy of the claim of Paul's Gospel that 
Gentiles of faith shared full and complete incorporation into the people of God 
[3:26-29]. Insofar as they had begun to look to circumcision, Paul asserts they had 
"fallen from grace" [5:4], become "bewitched," forgetting the central presentation of 
the crucified messiah [3:2] and hope that came with that [5:6], as well as the end it 
made of all grounds for human glorying [2:20, 6:12,14].
Paul makes it clear that the central issue of circumcision was the law; the law 
could not be taken in parts. With circumcision, the Galatians would be taking upon 
themselves the entire Jewish law requirement, placing themselves under full 
obligation to live like a Jew [5:3]. Paul names this as being "under" the law [4:21; cf 
3:23,4:5] and tantamount to a policy of "works" in tension with faith and the way of j
the Spirit [Gal. 3:2-10]. To make his point perfectly clear, he raised the question of 
how a person is justified, arguing that for both Jew and Gentile, it is solely a matter of 
faith [2:16,3:24].
This no-circumcision gospel and his Gentile mission, Paul insisted, came to 
him directly through a revelation of Jesus Christ [1:12,15,16] later to be affirmed by 
James, Cephas and John who also gave their blessing to his Gentile mission [2:1-10].
It is likely he was forced to make these facts clear because the Galatian troublemakers, 
in order to pave the way for their circumcision position, had called into question not
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only Paul's gospel, but the independent character of the Gentile mission [1:6-17].*®
The letter also provides a glimpse into the opposition and anxiety Paul had 
experienced on account of his position. He confesses he was fearful about whether 
his law-free mission to the Gentiles would be affirmed by the leaders at Jerusalem 
[2:2]. He recalled the pressure exerted on him in Jerusalem to have Titus circumcised 
and how they resisted these "false brethren's" efforts to bring them into bondage 
[2:3-5]. Perhaps most damaging to his position was his encounter with Cephas, 
whom he accuses of setting an example that in principle required Gentiles to "judaize" 
[2:14]. While the issue with Peter was not stated as one over circumcision, but table 
fellowship between believing Jews and Gentiles, the principal issue was similar in 
that believing Gentiles were not viewed as on even ground with their Jewish brethren 
of faith. In both the Jerusalem setting in which Titus’ uncircumsized status was 
challenged and the Antioch setting where Gentile believers eating with Jewish 
believers was challenged, Paul insisted that the "truth of the gospel" was at stake. He 
saw himself as the one standing up for the right of believing Gentiles to remain 
Gentiles [2:5,14].
Whatever the Antioch issue consisted of, like circumcision, it must have 
pertained to larger questions having to do with the role of law in constituting the 
people of God in the messianic era. This is evident because his recounting of this 
incident to the Galatians forms the foundation of his argument against the law. In this 
argument, which forms the body of his letter, he places the gospel in the shaipest 
possible antithesis to the law.
When Paul wrote his epistle to the Galatians over the issue of Gentile 
circumcision, he set forth a theology that challenged the law. Galatians theoretically 
displaced this institution on the authority of the gospel which, by virtue of its 
eschatological messianic prerogative, called all men and women into a new ecclesial 
unity. The main lines of Paul’s argument are presented in Chapter Two beginning 
with verse eleven continuing through the end of Chapter Three. Five transitions in his 
argument are discernible in these 39 verses. The following attempts to summarize 
these in five discussions.
314
1.
The Collision of Two Ecclesiologies in Antioch and Galatia:
The Sociological Setting of the Law-Gospel Polemic in Paul’s Epistle
“But when Cephas came to Antioch I opposed him to his face, because 
he stood condemned. For before certain men came from James, he ate with 
the Gentiles; but when they came he drew back and separated himself, fearing 
the circumcision party. And with him the rest of the Jews acted insincerely, so 
that even Barnabas was carried away by their insincerity. But when I saw that 
they were not straightforward about the truth of the gospel, I said to Cephas 
before them all, "If you, though a Jew, live like a Gentile and not like a Jew, 
how can you compel the Gentiles to live like Jews?" We ourselves, who are 
Jews by birth and not Gentile sinners, yet who know that a man is not justified 
by the works of the law but through faith in Jesus Christ, even we have 
believed in Christ Jesus, in order to be justified by faith in Christ, and not by 
works of the law, because by works of the law shall no one be justified. But if, 
in our endeavor to be justified in Christ, we ourselves were found to be 
sinners, is Christ then an agent of sin? Certainly not! But if I build up again 
those things which I tore down, then I prove myself a transgressor. For I 
through the law died to the law, that I might live to God. I have been crucified 
with Christ; it is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me; and the life I 
now live in the flesh I live by faith in the Son of God, who loved me and gave 
himself for me. I do not nullify the grace of God; for if justification were 
through the law, then Christ died to no purpose.” Galatians 2:11-21 **
The Antioch event recorded in Chapter Two had far-reaching consequences. 
The fact that Paul's theological attack commences inside a retelling of his Antioch 
encounter with Peter, suggests the fundamental relatedness of the two issues, i.e. table 
fellowship and circumcision. The entire thrust in the letter was to retum the Galatian 
believers to the gospel that he preached to them. He commended it alone as the basis 
of their fellowship. Only in this way would the Galatian church be secure; i.e. forming 
within themselves the Evangelical principle of their freedom.
The recounting of the incident in Antioch serves to press to the forefront the 
principal issue that was foundational to the Galatian problem. Peter is not simply 
presented as in the wrong and Paul in the right in this incident. This would set up the 
context for a serious questioning of Paul, since Peter's authority as an Apostle was 
beyond question. Peter rather is depicted as inconsistent. Only in the context of 
outside (Jerusalem/James visitors) does he separate from common table with the 
Galatian Gentiles. Outside of the presence of "brethren from James," Apostle Peter 
supports and participates in a community where Jew and Gentile fellowship without
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regard to traditional Jewish taboo.
Paul's part in the story both serves to highlight his individuated history 
regarding his integrity to gospel as the missionary to the Gentiles^ and it elevates the 
law-free basis of fellowship that is being challenged at Antioch and Galatia. The 
intensity of this letter may be due in part to the degree to which Paul is standing alone 
in this situation. There appears to exist significant confusion about the relationship 
between Jewish believers and Gentile believers at this juncture in the history of the 
messianic development.
Not only James [and the brethren who had come to Antioch from Jerusalem] 
were still asking for a level of ongoing significance to the law's power to structure a 
degree of separatism, but Peter and Barnabas were also confused. The Galatian 
believers were themselves being deeply affected by other "conservative" forces. If the 
fellowship of Jew and Gentile was to survive its fledgling beginning, a 
radical-principled basis for it must be set forth.
This letter is a radical frontal attack against making anything but the gospel the 
basis of the church. The gospel alone is made to be at stake. In this epistle, Paul 
brings the law into absolute polarity with the gospel. The situation has pushed Paul to 
the point where he launches an all out attack on the law. His letter, if read by a Jew, 
could only stir the deepest emotions. The law, he insists, is eschatologically dated.
The messianic age and the age of the Torah are made discontinuous.
The fact that Paul's argument against circumcision begins inside the telling of 
the Antioch issue is significant.*  ^ In other words, the lesson Paul draws out of the 
Antioch issue is the foundation upon which he builds his anti-circumcision argument. 
The problem in Antioch is the relationship of Jewish believers and Gentile believers, a 
relationship having to do with the basis of fellowship. The question by Paul's account 
can be stated as one of whether to judaize or not to judaize. To judaize essentially 
implies that Gentiles must become Jews. Thereby, faith plus becoming ritually 
constituted a Jew forms the basis of complete unencumbered fellowship, including 
actually eating at the same table.
It is likely that a policy of measured Jewish believer Gentile (uncircumsized) 
believer fellowship existed even in the minds and practice of some of the more 
conservative spirits in the movement. Circumcision symbolizes a ritual purification 
which separates the male from the world and incorporates him into the holy people of
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Yahweh. Paul's intention is to disclose a common basis of fellowship for Jewish 
believers and uncircumsized Gentile believers, to show the Galatians that Jews and 
Gentiles exist in an equal unified relationship in the messianic calling of the people of 
God.
Appealing to the gospel, transposed in conceptual terms of how a person is 
justified (or "righteoused" as E.P. Sanders translates) before God, he cast Jew and 
Gentile up against this transcendent juridical screen [Galatians 2:16]. His strategy is 
to bring clarity about earthly human relationships (fellowship) by focusing the basis of 
one's relationship to God. A person is "righteoused" before God through faith in Jesus 
Christ. Paul is working from the premise that no one who believes the gospel disputes 
this. Believing Jews and believing Gentiles share common ground because Jesus 
Christ has provided, by his death on the cross, their justification. To insert any 
distinguishing Jewish-Torah criteria into the basis of fellowship is "works", and to 
persist on insisting on measures of inequality within a fellowship because of 
distinguishing characteristics also reflects a work's justification conclusion.*^
The relationship between believing Jew and believing Gentile, a relation 
having to do with the basis of fellowship, is transposed into a question of one's 
relationship with God. Circumcision by implication is held up as a work of the law, 
which when given dividing or inclusive social significance contradicts what is 
commonly held (i.e. the apostolic gospel) that all persons are justified by faith in Jesus 
Christ.*"* Paul's logic is that once the basis of one's relation to God is clarified 
everything else is addenda, it all comes into right perspective. How God justifies—this 
is the heart of Paul's argument.
If a person's right relation to God rests on faith in Jesus Christ alone (the 
common Apostolic claim), then to insist that the practice of circumcision influences 
one's right relation within the "people of God" amounts to a contradiction of the 
gospel. That would mean in Paul's logic that one was justified by works and Christ 
died in vain.*^  When one approaches the horizontal question (ecclesial fellowship) by 
way of the priority of the theological question how one is justified (via Christ’s death 
on the cross), then the confusion disappears.
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2.
Circumcision: Path of Blessing, Making One a True Son of Abraham or
“Works of Law” and the Way of the “Flesh”
Paul Polemicizes the Old Ecclesiology
Oh foolish Galatians! Who has bewitched you, before whose eyes 
Jesus Christ was publicly portrayed as crucified? Let me ask you only this:
Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law, or by hearing with faith? Are 
you so foolish? Having begun with the Spirit, are you now ending with the 
flesh? Did you experience so many things in vain?-if it really is in vain. Does 
he who supplies the Spirit to you and works miracles among you do so by 
works of the law, or by hearing with faith? ,
Thus Abraham "believed God, and it was reckoned to him as 
righteousness. So you see that it is men of faith who are the sons of Abraham. 
And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the Gentiles by faith, 
preached the gospel beforehand to Abraham, saying, "In you shall all the 
nations be blessed." So then, those who are men of faith are blessed with 
Abraham who had faith. Galatians 3:1-9
In these verses, Paul emphasizes the importance of faith. Faith, as in being 
righteoused by faith, signifies the common ground of those gathered through the 
messianic calling. Contextually it stands in tension with parochial privilege correlated 
to Jewish identity and Torah. It may have been that the Galatian "heretics" 
understood something of the constitutive significance of circumcision and other holy 
observances of Judaism and thought that alliance with these placed one securely and 
fully inside the boundaries of the covenantal blessing of Judaism or they may have 
simply believed that nomos had an intrinsic power to mediate God's blessing? In 
either distinction the common ground of unity of the messianic calling was 
compromised.*^ Paul's polemical logic in these verses is to remind them how God's 
blessing came in the first instance through the preaching of the gospel of the crucified 
Jesus. With faith, in the wake of it, they received blessing, the spirit, miracles and 
experiences of God's presence among and for them. His intent is to place in relief 
their current pursuit of privilege and blessing with their original beginning and to 
remind them of the vividness with which the crucified Jesus was portrayed to them.
He places them in this dichotomy and asks in effect, "which way will you have it?" 
The first way you started with—that of faith and spirit, or the second which is the way 
of works and reliance on the flesh.
Here "flesh" embodies the rhetorical polemic against reliance on the
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continuing significance of physical Jewish identification. Even one’s identity with 
Abraham is not after the flesh. When one understands how God’s blessing was 
conferred on Abraham, then a physical identification with Abraham means nothing. 
God's blessing was conferred on Abraham after Abraham heard God's promise and 
believed and God blessed him (verse 9). On account of his faith, God reckoned him as 
righteous (verse 6). In this Abraham is portrayed as the prototypical father of all who 
following his example would also believe. The true children of Abraham are those of 
faith.
In turning to Abraham, the theological argument deepens. Tying the new 
common way of faith to Abraham is a device to argue faith's universalism. Obviously 
Abraham is not one figure among others. He is the primary historical figure of the 
way of God's blessing. Through Abraham, Paul elevated the faith ground of ecclesia 
to decisive significance. But the connection with Abraham is spiritual and 
eschatological. The messianic community is not "fleshly" or that is to say ethnically 
and religiously configurated, but a spiritual one.*^
\
3.
In Pursuit of a Blessing That Turns Out To Be A Curse:
Paul Deepens His Polemic Against the Law
For all who rely on works of the law are under a curse; for it is written, 
"Cursed be every one who does not abide by all things written in the book of 
the law, and do them." Now it is evident that no man is justified before God 
by the law; for "He who through faith is righteous shall live"; but the law does 
not rest on faith, for "He who does them shall live by them." Christ redeemed 
us firom the curse of the law, having become a curse for us-for it is written, 
"Cursed be every one who hangs on a tree" - that in Christ Jesus the blessing 
of Abraham might come upon the Gentiles, that we might receive the promise 
of the Spirit through faith. Galatians 3:10-14
In these verses, Paul begins to give serious attention to the role and problem of 
the law. For the Galatian troublemakers, circumcision and other Jewish observances 
were seen as necessary to complete the blessing begun by their conversion to Christ. 
These legal actions were likely viewed for their role in defining the person within the 
covenantal boundaries where God's full election and blessing was thought to reside. 
Paul turns potential blessing into curse, the very opposite of their expectation. The 
equation of law with curse, rather than blessing is no doubt experienced by them as a
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contradiction to their ideas. By this letter their lives are framed as on the threshold of 
being cursed. Paul interprets their exclusive actions into that of a works blessing 
equation they are caught up in. Then he proceeds to argue that the law could never 
confer the coveted blessing of God, that came through Abraham and is available 
through Jesus Christ. Law and gospel here are placed in a parallelism both as to the 
present messianic age and the past. Appealing to Habbakak 2:4 and the Abrahamic 
story, he insists that God released a blessing on humanity quite apart from works of 
the law in an entirely different way. Blessing and curse have different 
origins-histories-destinations. As for the law its jurisdiction is that of curse, a curse 
claim Jesus had exhausted releasing blessing in its place.
What Paul is doing is scandalizing the judaizers who are advocating 
circumcision by polemicizing their actions as "works." In actual fact it is unlikely 
they understand their actions in such a light. They probably never regarded 
circumcision (and Sabbath day observance) as activities they were performing in order 
to acquire individual acceptance before a righteous God. By their very character these 
mark off or distinguish the holy people of God. Circumcision, something that is done 
to a male, is an act of incorporation or alignment into the historic ethnic people of 
God. For the Galatian troublemakers, this step completed what was begun by faith, 
effectively fusing the messianic development to the religio-ethnic particularities that 
constituted one a Jew. In both circumcision and Sabbath observance it is the 
significance these possess for who one is and is not. They mark one's identity within 
the boundary of a historically vested religio-ethnic community, ostensibly conferring 
rights and privileges. It is Paul who places on these observances the interpretation 
"works", because standing in the light of the dawning of the messianic age with its 
gospel such observances for a gentile can only be interpreted in this harsh light.**
They are in tension with the direct universalization of God's frill blessing through the 
messiah.
Furthermore, these verses may be read in the light of curse theology in 
currency at the time. Curse theology was codified around the time of the exile and 
came to explain the exile. Henceforth, Judah's fortunes were bound to this 
explanation for all time. To the extent foreign power intruded on their 
religio-political autonomy, to that extent they saw themselves under the power of this 
curse of God. Paul's break from sectarian Judaism involves the conviction that the
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curse of the law could not be broken by careful practice of the law, i.e. taboo piety.
This represents a disjuncture with renewal movement theology. Paul ’’knows" 
(i.e. his christological conversion in contrast with his pharisaic outlook) how the 
blessing was not going to come. There is a built in pessimism about the law reflected 
in Paul’s argument, which may be heard in light of his own conversion, a conversion 
which is not only to Christ but away from another resolution he was once invested in. 
[cf. "the life I now live’’—Galatians 2:20]. He saw himself living in the beginning of 
the eschatological messianic blessing (i.e. spirit) and looked with confidence for its 
consummation at the parousia (Galatians 5:6).
In contrast, the pre-Christian Pharisee Paul pinned his hopes on the integrity of 
Judaism, or a remnant of Judaism, consisting of their resistance to disintegration 
through fidelity to the separateness and identity commanded by Torah.
What is surprising in Paul’s thought, and represents an abrupt cleavage with 
other views within Judaism, is the "extra nomistic" way the curse is overcome. Christ 
alone exhausts the curse on Israel after a life of fidelity to law and then, by virtue of 
his own messianic prerogative, releases blessing directly into the world apart from 
Torah. This messianic privilege in Paul's paradigm stands in partial but dramatic 
relief to contemporary patterns of thought. Most importantly it must be seen for its 
antithesis to the contemporary strategies which pinned the removal of the curse to an 
intensified Torah separatism. This may account for the explosive collision between a 
nascent Christian development still influenced by the pharisaic renewal theology and a 
Gentile law-free Christian development. [Cf. Acts 15:5.]
.4
Downsizing and Relativizing the Law:
Paul Completely Dismantles the Foundation of the Old Ecclesiology
To give a human example, brethren: no one annuls even a man’s will, 
or adds to it, once it has been ratified. Now the promises were made to 
Abraham and to his offspring. It does not say, "And to offsprings," referring 
to many; but, referring to one, "And to your offspring," which is Christ. This 
is what I mean: the law, which came four hundred and thirty years afterward, 
does not annul a covenant previously ratified by God, so as to make the 
promise void. For if the inheritance is by the law, it is no longer by promise; 
but God gave it to Abraham by the promise.
Why then the law? It was added because of transgressions, till the 
offspring should come to whom the promise has been made; and it was
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ordained by angels through an intermediary. Now an intermediary implies 
more than one; but God is one.
Is the law then against the promises of God? Certainly not; for if a law 
had been given which could make alive, then righteousness would indeed be 
by the law. But the scripture consigned all things to sin, that what was 
promised to faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe.
Now before faith came, we were confined under the law, kept under 
restraint until faith should be revealed. So that the law was our custodian until 
Christ came, that we might be justified by faith. But now that faith has come, 
we are no longer under a custodian; Galatians 3:15-25
It is helpful for the larger purposes of this study to keep in mind what Paul is 
doing by what he is saying. This is especially so as his argument deepens and is 
extended. Circumcision of Gentile believers, the problem of the Galatian church(es), 
and the inability of Jewish believers and Gentile believers to participate together in 
table fellowship betray a deeper confusion and blindness as to the common ground of 
Jew-Gentile fellowship that has come into existence with the advent of the messianic 
age. Standing in the full light of the gospel, Paul first argues for the reality of 
common ground based on the theological precedent of how God justifies. In this, 
ecclesiology is determined by soteriology rather than law. Through the thick of Paul’s 
theological argument until it climaxes in 3:26 to 4:7, he consistently maintains the 
soteriological priority of his argument. In other words, he maintains the discussion’s 
focus around the question of how an individual is righteoused with God and corollary 
questions germane to that interest. It is within that setting he accomplishes the 
relativity of law and its transitory role. Only after satisfying himself with the 
completeness of his argument in this justification context does he proceed to his 
climax and address the original issue, asserting in sweeping emphatic terms a 
common ground of unity between Jew and Gentile.
The purpose in verses 15 to 25 is to prove that the function of the law is of a 
transitory penultimate nature, having nothing intrinsically to do with the realization of 
God's blessing. Historically, the function of keeping the law was tied to the law’s 
capacity to mark the boundaries between the holy people of Yahweh and the 
world—who is inside the sphere of special covenantal blessing and who is outside. In 
verses 15-18, Paul’s argument is to separate law from covenant. Here he 
demonstrates that God's blessing to the Gentiles was originally communicated through 
promise, a promise made long ago when God spoke directly to Abraham. As such
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blessing is vouchsafed by promise and finds its fulfillment in and through messiah 
Jesus. Law came after the promise, Paul argues. Law is of a different genus than 
promise (i.e. it has a different vocation or purpose). Furthermore, law came 
mediatorially, indirectly. For all these reasons it is discredited as the ground from 
which God's blessing comes to reach human beings. The fact that law comes after 
promise argues for the preference of the older and begs the question of God changing 
God's course and word or oath.
Furthermore, law and promise are depicted as antithetical. Law in principle 
does not confer blessing and inheritance but because of its imperative character, it 
created debt and introduced a history of transgression and curse. Perhaps most 
damning is the mediatorial character of the Law. Law came through angels and was 
mediated via Moses, but "God is one," that is to say, God deals directly, does not 
parcel God's power off firom or in distinction from God's self so as to set up an 
autonomous or partly autonomous sphere of authority.
From this point the argument moves to a question which is necessitated by the 
claims made. A contextual paraphrase of 3:19 "why the law" might read, "If the law 
and covenant are totally separate and the blessing comes through promise then why 
was the law given?" To this question Paul works out an answer that has several 
images. First he plainly says the reason the law was given was because of 
transgression (verse 19).
If one follows K. Stendahl's warning about reading Paul out of our 
"introspective conscience of the West", then it is possible to hear this explanation in a 
more corporate historical note. This phrase most likely refers to the transgression of 
Judah and is consistent with the redaction of the law by the "Deuteronomist." Law 
functions over against apostasy and transgression to prevent the disintegration of the 
people of God. Law gains its character by defining boundaries.
This is best understood by the word trespass. Here it is apparent that the 
nuances are subtle. If law has the power to define boundaries is it not, fundamentally 
speaking, that which frames Israel or constitutes Israel? Paul’s answer is that the 
entire arrangement was penultimate, not to be confused as defining the context in and 
through which God’s blessing was to be realized. It was a temporary set-up until the 
promise had run its course of time to its fulfillment. This explanation of the law’s role 
in relation to transgression is bound up with Paul's eschatological argument. He
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depicts law as a stopgap measure, an emergency adjunct until the breaking of the 
messianic time.
Paul's depiction of the law here is not the Lutheran second use of the law, 
which afflicts the conscience, preparing the individual for Christ's forgiveness. It is 
best described along the lines of the history of redemption view. Between the promise 
and its fulfillment in the Messiah the law is temporarily imposed to discipline Israel.
In Galatians, Paul does not develop a teaching about the law magnifying sin or 
making clear sin. What Paul is concentrating on here in these verses is the temporary 
administrative role of the law to impose discipline and restraint on Israel. It never 
conferred life, blessing, the status of sons/daughters or inheritance. God keeps direct 
control of these.
Having separated Israel's tradition into law and covenant and giving the 
covenant the ultimate valuation, Paul is now confronted with the task of sculpting a 
new role for law. Because he is thoroughly Jewish he cannot dispense with it as a 
mistake or make it into a purely human institution. Neither can he give it a place in 
the present and future economy of the people of God. That would back him into 
separatistic trouble. From that standpoint one might hear Paul say, "Well, it's from 
God, but remember it is not directly from God (Moses and angels in between). It has 
a role to play but that is a temporary role. What is this role? Well, it's rather like a 
custodian, i.e. one who keeps a person in custody for a time, or it's rather like a 
pedagogues, whom a father puts over his children to discipline them until they grow 
up. It was brought in because of "transgression." One can see from these images that 
the law is not an end in itself, it merely functions as a keeper. The scripture 
(gramma), he says in one passing comment, assures that all are under sin and the law 
cannot change that. It does not impart righteousness or life. It may be said that Paul 
finds the new role for law in relation to sin, transgression and curse and subjects it to a 
history of redemption scheme in which the coming of the Messiah removes the curse 
and brings righteousness, thus ending the law's administration.
The Christological Basis of Paul’s Ecclesiology
...for in Christ Jesus you are all sons of God, through faith. For as 
many of you as were baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither 
Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female;
324
for you are all one in Christ Jesus. And if you are Christ's, then you are
Abraham's offspring, heirs according to promise. Galatians 3:26-29
The institution of the law and the placing of the people of God under its 
jurisdiction is not denied by Paul. Rather he interprets this institution giving it a 
particular non-soteriological function for a limited time. During its jurisdiction the 
power of curse prevailed while the promised blessing awaited a future fulfillment.
The privilege, thought by the Galatian "trouble makers" to be conferred by virtue of 
one's ritual attachment to that religious institution, was shown to be no privilege. As 
such the division that it structured had no theological justification; no enduring basis. 
It did not set a parochial or religious precedent for Jews. The division it of necessity 
structured served the need created by the absence of the messianic time.
God arranged the Jews "under" this institution, Torah, and "kept" them by it. 
As such it was a heteronomous mechanism that marked out their boundaries. But it 
did not exist to confer upon them the eschatological blessing of God. The least 
suggestion or implication that this institution mediates divine blessing overthrows 
Paul's universalism and legitimizes the Jew-Gentile separation, or necessitates 
Gentiles "judaize" the very thing he was contending against. For this reason, Paul 
negates the supposed soteriological power of the law. Law did not and cannot, by its 
nature, function to confer life, blessing, inheritance, sonship. Spirit [however, the 
soteriological benefit is identified]. The intent of his argument is to "relocate" that 
benefit definitively in one "non-parochial" place.
Jesus is the universalizer of the blessing of God. In and through Messiah 
Jesus the promised blessing of God is extended to all. This is the logic of Paul's 
universalism. It starts first with evangelical theological claims vis-à-vis individuals 
regarding how God justifies and then proceeds to make ecclesiological conclusions, 
namely, that there exists no basis to structure inequality or compromise unity in the 
eschatological people of God. Messiah Jesus is the agent for the unity and inclusivity 
of Jew and Gentile. Believers are one in him.
In fact, having laid the ground for the resolution of the immediate problem of 
Jew-Gentile separatism he applies it further to class and gender. This is the evidence 
his argument has reached its climax, the fact that he has achieved the messianic 
principle of unity and that he is able to apply that principle expansively to the original
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problem and beyond it. In the new messianic configuration of the people of God, 
unity must not be compromised by ethno-religious claims nor any other claims (class, 
gender). "All" one in God through messiah Jesus - this is Paul's gospel. This is the 
foundation of the messianic community. To structure any inequality within it or to 
insist on any parochial claims within it is to "deny the truth of the gospel." Galatians 
2:14.
Conclusion
The Implications of Paul’s New Ecclesiology for Reunderstanding the
Church-World Relation
There existed in the Galatian congregations a threat to the non-Torah 
Evangelical unity that Paul had grounded them in. In responding to this threat he 
plumbed the theological basis of the messianic calling's unity, the gospel transposed 
as justification by faith. It is this basis that discloses what sustains the church's 
differentiation from the world. What gives the church its internal unity 
simultaneously creates its disjuncture from the larger socio-cultural world. While 
Paul is not concerned with the latter, it is substantive to the former. The internal basis 
of the messianic calling's unity, the gospel or justification by faith unifies by doing 
two things. It negates all claims upon which humans structure division and inequality, 
while making a positive claim about a new basis of unity effected by the messiah; new 
by virtue of time, i.e. eschatological fulfillment, not theological principle.
The dividing significance attached to religio-ethnic particularities, by virtue of 
their supposed importance to signify and set apart, the people of God, while the 
precise setting of the problem is no different in principle to any historical or created 
particularity elevated to disequalizing or dividing significance in the messianic 
fellowship. The Messiah first (via the cross) destroys or negates all pretensions to 
ultimacy attached to these and puts humans on a common footing. The 
"righteousness" which the cross is brought into tension with in Galatians is clearly 
associative rather than existentially earned, correlative to the supposed status value of 
religion, class, wealth, ethnicity, gender, or any other basis. Faith is the opposite of 
works! Understood negatively, faith is to cease fi-om giving distinguishing 
characteristics dividing or disequalizing socio-ecclesial significance. Understood 
positively, the messiah unites to the one God on a common basis. In this.
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righteousness is not eliminated but the basis of one’s righteousness "before God"
(3:11) is through God’s messiah (i.e. it is God who justifies [3:8]). As such one's 
status as a full child of God is secured by God on a basis outside of oneself, a basis 
commonly accessible to all. The "strategy" of this unity is one which calls a person 
into community through a basis that forms the new messianic universalism, 
relativizing particularities that normally structure division while simultaneously 
conferring a familial relationship with the one God (3:26,4:6,7).^°
That which marks the messianic calling off fi*om the greater socio-cultural 
world is this peculiar unity (more precisely, community built on transcendent unity). 
The burden that is placed on the Galatian churches is to reflect this unity; to formulate 
themselves according to the "truth of the gospel." The world, insofar as it is 
implicated in this letter is not a unified reality. In it the dividing significance of 
religion, class, gender, wealth, ethnicity persist. Whereas the way the Hassidim^  ^
protected its discrete identity from an encroaching socio-cultural world by intensifying 
the socially separative force inherent in Torah purity, the messianic development 
characteristic of Paul exploited the salvific claim of the Apostolic gospel to forge a 
unity that transcended religio-ethnic differences as well as other socially elevated 
barriers. Its native impulse was toward building a new kind of social inclusivity. It 
manifested itself in a divided world by virtue of the fact that it denied the basic law of 
togetherness organized around the significance of a shared difference. As such the 
early church was especially attractive to those who had least "to lose" in religious 
social station (I Cor 1:18ff).
The source which the messianic calling drew on to formalize its unity can be 
seen either as a desacralizing source or another "parochializing" source. Parochial here 
indicates the attributing special power and prerogative to a particular group. Viewed 
firom a sociology of religion analysis, it is difficult to escape the latter judgment. But 
viewed from within the logic and claims of the messianic community's gospel, the 
former judgment is unavoidable. The ecclesia existed in its world as a desacralizing 
phenomenon in tension with all religious claims, social conventions, and cultural 
standards which sanctioned the elevation of particular historical or created 
differences. The eschatological arrival of the messiah forced to the forefiront a 
universal theological claim. The theological character of the gospel is that element 
which negates human claims which structure division. One unique indivisible and
j
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invisible God, qualitatively distinct from human reality is the ultimate source and 
protection of the basis for human unity from its corruption (i.e. its religious or social 
transmutation into another basis which divides humans).
The severity with which Paul attacks law is of course not due to its moral 
character or an individual’s interest in keeping it. Neither is Paul bent on dislodging 
Jewish believers from adhering to its ritual. Rather, it is the elevation of the status of 
the law so that it functions to mediate a God blessing. God, Paul argues, is one, that is 
to say, God does not deputize God’s power [3:20]. If God did, it would empower a 
division between humans. The gospel as such, in tension with law, reclaims God's 
prerogative, so that "God's Godness is not corrupted." Gospel, and the messianic 
ecclesia as the counterpart of the gospel does not enter into the world as another 
division arrogating to itself new religious prerogative in competition with other 
claims. Rather, it announces the arrival of the time in which all religious, social, 
cultural claims once considered determinative are made relative.
Jesus as the Messiah negates the uncommon ground humans and groups have 
raised above their fellows and provides common ground. As such Jesus Christ is not 
viewed as a new basis to structure division and the ecclesia as a new religious force 
creating another human social division. Precisely because messianic unity is 
theological, Jesus is not a "parochializing," that is to say, a sectarian agent. The cross 
ensures that humans cannot attach to who they are, in and of themselves individually 
or collectively, degrees of ultimate or determinative significance. "God forbid that I 
should glory save in the cross through which the world is crucified unto me and I unto 
the world" (6:14). As such the cross ensures that God be God. Individuals and 
groups cannot simply attach themselves to the honor or prerogative of a special 
relation to this one God and thus enjoy a parochially shared claim.
The universal versus parochial significance of the messiah is further 
recognizable by the source of its claim. The cross is proclaimed as public news, a 
factual event which was seen to transpose itself out of the mere dimensions of the 
mundane so as to self-evidently possess soteriological and eschatological import (3:1; 
5:6). It is this “factual” event that the church gathers around as evidence that a new 
day has arrived and is arriving. The implications suggest that rather than an ideology 
supporting a social revolution against the pressures of injustice and inequalities due to 
social stratification the church takes up an offensive posture toward its world. Over
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against attacking and attempting to reform a given world armed and legitimized by a 
supporting ideology, the ecclesia proclaims the "factuality" of the eschatological dawn 
of a new unity and begins to embody it. Potentially this creates its own crisis and 
tension both individually and socially.
The messianic solution, in contrast with revolution, is ecclesial. By 
proclaiming and embodying the arrival of this new humanity (cf. churches first fruits) iIthe ecclesia is able to say to its world, the old is on its way out, the new has come. j
Theoretically this gives to ecclesia the social high ground. Rather than putting forth j
another private or parochial claim, therefore further dividing the world, it proclaims ]
the arrival of the messianic era and the new unity of humanity. Its distinguishing |
element in the world is both its peculiar character of witnessing to the arrival of the |
!eschaton, and its peculiar unity—the penultimate embodiment of a universal unity. j
In the messianic ecclesia, under Paul's persuasion [viewed in contrast to the ]IHassidim model of ecclesia], the "safety mechanism" that separated ecclesia from its |
Iworld was eliminated. The church could no more survive through a retractive, |idivisive or separative posture, exploiting its exclusive eliteness or specialness over j
against the common lot of humanity. It could not sacralize itself. At least it could not j
Ifollow this course and claim to be the church known to the Apostle Paul. j
By negating the dividing significance of religio-ethnic difference and |
Iproclaiming a new basis of unity, the Gentile messianic ecclesia was formed in the |
world in a new way. It existed in its world offensively pulling persons from all the I
disparate social entities into the common (universal) messianic unity which had made |
its eschatological debut. In this way the ecclesia was "saved from being absorbed |
idealistically and ideologically into its world (i.e. saved commensurate with its 
eschatological and messianic awareness). Furthermore, it was saved from a I
problematic retreat from its world into a holy enclave. It not only lacked a religious ]
mechanism for retreat its gospel represents an offensive engagement with the world. It I
was also saved from an ecclesial triumphalism or arrogance. All it could do and must I
do is obey the gospel. The gospel proclaimed the fact and source of humanity's unity. |
The church was not the solution in itself. Its common form witnesses to an
expectation. ;
In this way, the church's relation to its given world is potent. It draws its !
identity and script, not from its capacity to be relevant to a given world, but from its I
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confidence about the arrival and soon to be consummated new age characterized by a 
new world order. This allows it to escape from the problem of taking the world too 
seriously and requires the world to take it seriously. It exists in its world with a 
non-anxious presence. On the news-eschatological element rides the church's capacity 
to overcome the temptation to be, on the one hand, reactive-pessimistic about its 
world, leading to separation from the world or control over it, or on the other hand, to 
become naively idealistic about the socio-cultural development of the world, thereby 
becoming absorbed into it. As such the gospel allows the ecclesia to exist in such a 
way as to empower a creative tension with its world.
Section A Endnotes
1. Alan S. Gurman and David P. Kniskem, ed. Handbook o f Family Therapy, Chapter 5, 
Edwin H. Friedman, DD, “Bowen, Theory and Therapy” (New York: Brunner and Magel, 
1991), p. 144
2. Ibid., p. 139.
3. Ibid., p. 141.
4. Ibid., p. 140.
5. Ibid., p. 141.
6. Ibid.
7. See Edwin H. Friedman, “Feedback and Change, Pain and Responsibility,” Generation to 
Generation (New York: Guilford Press, 1986), pp. 46-48.
8. Handbook o f Family Theraby, p. 135, cf. p. 166.
9. Ibid., p. 136.
10. Ibid., p. 137.
11.Ibid., p. 141.
Section B Endnotes
330
1.Paul Tillich, The Protestant Era, ed. and trans., James Luther Adams (London: Nisbet & 
Co., LTD, 1948, repr., abridged edition, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1957), 207
2. See for instance Harold P. Nebelsick, Theology and Science in Mutual Modification, 
(Belfast: Christian Journals Limited, 1981).
3.Karl Barth, “Panorama of a Century,” Address given at the meeting of the 
Goethegesellschafi in Hannover, January 8,1957 quoted in The Humanity o f God, trans. John 
Newton Thomas and Thomas Wieser, (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1960) p. 20.
4. Ibid., 18
5. Ibid., 18
6. Ibid., 19
7. Ibid., 20,19
8. Ibid., 19-20
9. Ibid., 19
10. Ibid., 20
11. Ibid. 20
12. Ibid., 20
13. Ibid., 19
14. Ibid., 19
15. Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth, His Life From Letters and Autobiographical Texts, 
Translated by John Bowden, (Fortress Press: Philadelphia, Pa., 1975), p. 111.
16. Karl Barth, “Panorama of a Century,” 23
17. Karl Barth, From Rousseau to Ritschl from 19’^  Century Protestant Theology, being the 
translation of eleven chapters of "Die Protestantische Theologie hn 19. Jahrhundert", trans. 
Brian Cozens, in The Library of Philosophy and Theology, ed. John McIntyre and Alasdair 
MacIntyre, (London: SCM Press, Ltd., 1959), 14.
18. Emil Brunner, The Word and the World, (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 
1931), 115.
19. Ibid, 114.
20. Robert W. Jenson, "Karl Barth" in The Modern Theologians: An Introduction to 
Christian Theology in the Twentieth Century, ed., David F. Ford (London and New York: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989). 29.
331
21. Karl Barth, "Evangelical Theology in the Nineteenth Century" in The Humanity o f God, 
trans. John Newton Thomas and Thomas Wieser (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1960), 16.
22. Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine o f the Church, Faith and Consummation 
Dogmatics, vol. Ill, trans. David Cairns and T.H.L. Parker (Philadelphia: The Westminster 
Press, 1962), 212.
23. Harold P. Nebelsick, Theology and Science in Mutual Modification, 83
24. Ibid. 83.
25. Between about 1918 to 1933, Barth's early dialectic was formed and promoted. The 
primary documents this early construction may be found in are his articles in Zwischen den 
Zeiten; his book, Resurrection o f the Dead, translated by H.J. Stenny (London, 1933); in the 
three essays of 1920 contained in The Word o f God and the Word ofMan, and in the 
Barth-Thumeysen Correspondence 1914-1925 found in Revolutionary Theology in the 
Making, (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1964). See also Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An 
Introduction to His Early Theology, 1910-1931, (London: SCM Press, 1962) and James M. 
Robinson, ed.. The Beginnings o f Dialectical Theology, vol. 1, Part I, trans. Keith R. 
Robinson, Part II, trans. Louis De Grazia and Keith R. Crim (Richmond, Virginia: John Knox 
Press, 1968). Bruce McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectectical Theology 
Its Genesis and Development, (Clarendon Press:Oxford 1995).
26. McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectial Theology, : Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 11-13,21, 22.
27. See Barth and Gogarten’s response to Tillich's idea of paradox in the section "The Debate 
on the Concept of Paradox" in James M. Robinson, The Beginnings o f Dialectical Theology, 
133-162. (Cf. p. 148-150.)
28. Barth, Humanity o f God, 41.
29. Eberhard Jungel, Karl Barth: A Theological Legacy, trans. Garrett E. Paul (Philadelphia: 
The Westminster Press, 1986), 28.
30. Karl Barth, “Epistle to the Romans, Forward to the Second Edit ion,” in Robinson, ed.. 
The Beginnings o f Dialectical Theology, p. 94.
31. Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. from 6th ed. by Edwyn C. Hoskyns 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1933; Oxford University Press paperback, 1968), 10.
32. See Barth, "The Strange New World Within the Bible,". in The Word o f God and the 
Word o f Man, trans. Douglas Horton (USA: The Pilgrim Press, 1928), 28-50.
33. This observation of Brunner was made in the context of the very early first edition of 
Romans, while Barth was still immersed in the religious idealism of liberalism. See Emil 
Brunner, "The Epistle to the Romans by Karl Barth: An Up-to-Date, Unmodem Paraphrase," 
in Robinson, ed.. The Beginnings o f Dialectical Theology, 65-66.
34. Karl Barth, "Foreword to the Second Edition," in Robinson, ed.. The Beginnings o f 
Dialectical Theology, 95.
332
35. "If I have a 'system,’ then it consists in my keeping in mind as constantly as possible what 
Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative difference' between time and eternity, in its 
negative and its positive meaning. 'God is in heaven, and thou on earth.' The relationship of 
this God to this man, the relationship of this man to this God, is for me the theme of the 
Bible... When I now approach a text like the Letter to the Romans, I do it with the 
provisional assumption that when Paul formed his concepts he had the both plain and 
immeasurable meaning of that relationship at least as clearly in mind as I have when I now 
busy myself with the attentive rethinking of his concepts." Ibid., 94.
36. Ibid., 94-96.
37. Karl Barth, "Foreword to the Second Edition," in Robinson, ed.. The Beginnings o f 
Dialectical Theology, 91.
38. Ibid.
39. Karl Barth, "Epistle to the Romans", in Robinson, ed.. The Beginnings o f Dialectical 
Theology, 93.
40. McCormack, p. 222.
41. At no point can God be simply and definitely introduced into the realm of the actual, 
even within the realm of this Evangelical resolution. It is this that is behind Barth's inflation 
of the doctrine of the word of God in revelation as a radicalization of the Reformers' recovery 
of the preaching of the word and the response of faith.
42. The setting of this lecture is sketched in Eberhard Busch's biography of Barth with 
fragments of the presentation quoted. Later it was published in full as Chapter VIII in The !
Word o f God and the Word o f Man. |
43. Barth, Word o f God, 282. I
!
44. Ibid., 280,281. |
45. Ibid., 281. See also Karl Barth, "Past and Future: Friedrich Naumann and Christoph i
Blumhardt," in Robinson, ed.. Beginnings o f Dialectical Theology, 35-45. it
46. Barth, The Word o f God and the Word o f Man, 283. j
I
47. Ibid., 205.
48. Bruce McCormack has shown that Barth's dialectical formulation passed through four j
stages of development en route to its maturity. He is not the first to argue that Barth î
fundamentally never abandoned the dialectical framework of his thought. It is more proper to I
say he perfected it over time. McCormack, Karl Barth’s Critically Realistic Dialectical \
Theology, \1-13 0X10.21,22. I
49. R. H. Roberts, "Barth's Doctrine of Time: Its Nature and Implications, " in Karl Barth: I
Studies o f His Theological Method, ed. S.W. Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), 96. 1
333
50. Bruce McCormack’s important study has shown Barth's dialectical framework of thought, 
went through four stages of development ,from 1915 forward. For a summary see Bruce 
McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development, 1909-1936, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
51. Alasdair I. C. Heron, Century o f Protestant Theology, (Cambridge: The Lutterworth 
Press,1980), 83.
52. At issue in Barth and Bultmann's parting of the ways is this "clarification" on faith. The 
early dialectic the way it was stated allowed for that commerce as Barth recalled. "For 
Bultmann, 'faith' and 'faith' again was at the centre of his interest in my book and his approval 
of it. He thought that what I had said about 'faith' would easily fit into a sequence with what 
Schleiermacher, Otto and Troeltsch had discussed under the title of'religion'." Quoted in 
Busch, Karl Barth, 136. The "mature" Barth, as Heron points out, radicalized Calvin's 
analogia fidei (over against analogia entis), so that "the whole character of faith is that it 
does not rest on itself, nor on what can be seen as an extension of itself, but what is quite 
other than itself, by which its own emptiness is filled." Ibid., 87. See Karl Barth, "Faith and 
its Object," in Church Dogmatics IV: The Doctrine o f Reconciliation, part one, ed., G. W. 
Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956).
53. Robert W. Jenson, "Karl Barth," in Modern Theologians: An Introduction to Christian, 
Theology in the Twentieth Century, vol. 1, ed., David F. Ford (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Inc.,
1989), 33.
54. Only little by little did Barth come to recognize that Protestantism was captive to the 
bourgeoisie, individualistic and anthropocentric culture and that his own theology derived 
mainly from Herrmann (a student of Schleiermacher) was a complicating factor.
The first elementary step in reclaiming Protestantism's critical distance did not arise 
from resources within Protestantism itself. Only after bourgeois culture itself reached a crisis 
(due to the fact that its own principles had reached maturity and produced alarming 
socioeconomic conditions) did Protestantism's own participation in that ethos begin to come 
under scrutiny. Protestantism's initial critique of liberal cidture organized around individual 
autonomy was first indebted to secular socialist theorists, adding only the additional element 
that with structural change individual spiritual change was also necessary. Bruce L. 
McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 78ff especially 83, 84.
When Barth and Eduard Thumeysen were confronted with the problems of their 
parishioners in the towns of Safenwil and Leutwil in the Aargau region of northern 
Switzerland they began to question both bourgeoisie culture and Protestantism's absence of a 
socialistic ethic. It was their exposure to the plight of many wage-earning factory workers in 
their parishes that forced them to entertain a socialistic critique. "Barth even thought that his 
later theology had its roots in his ministry at that time. It grew out of my own situation where 
I had to instruct, preach and do a little pastoral work.'" Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth: His Life 
From Letters and Autobiographical Texts, trans. John Bowden (Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1976), 61. Friedrich-Wilhelm Marquardt's work has at the very least brought to clarity the 
extent to which Barth's theology grew out of the social problems he encountered in his 
Safenwil pastorate. See "Socialism in the Theology o f Karl Barth", Karl Barth and Radical 
Politics, trans and ed. George Hunsinger (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1976) 47-76.
334
55. The church, he came to realize, was in perennial danger of losing itself and selling out it's 
Christ. At the Tambach lectures in 1919 he complained "of secularizing Christ for the 
umpteenth time, e.g. today for the sake of democracy, or pacifism, or the youth movement, or 
something of the sort—as yesterday it would have been for the sake of liberal culture or our 
countries." Busch, Karl Barth, 111.
56.Barth himself described the situation into which Protestantism had fallen, as one in which 
God had been reduced “to a pious notion, a mystical expression and symbol of a current 
alternating between man and man’s own heights or depths.” Karl Barth, Humanity o f God 
(London: Collins, 1961) p. 40.
57. Karl Barth, Community, State and Church, trans. By A.M. Hall, G. Ronald Howe, Ronald 
Gregor Smith (Gloucester Mass: Peter Smith, 1968) p. 156
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., p. 161
60. _____, Church Dogmatics, vol. 4 ,, ed., G.W. Bomiley and T. F. Torrance (Edinburgh: T
& T Clark, 1936-1969), 687,688.
61. See for instance. Ibid, Part I, 661, 662.
Section C Endnotes
1. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, trans. Neville Horton Smith, ed. Eberhard Bethge (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing), 1955), p. 189
2. Ibid., pp. 189,190
3. Ibid. pp. 188 and 189
4. Ibid. p. 189
5. Ibid., p. 189 
6.1bid.,p. 189
7. Ibid., pp. 189 and 190 
8.1bid.,p. 190
9. Ibid., p. 193
10. Ibid., p. 194
11. Ibid., p. 194
12. Ibid., p. 195
13. Ibid., p. 195
335
14. Ibid., p. 198
15. Ibid., p. 199
16. Ibid., p. 200
17. Ibid., p. 204
18. Ibid., p. 200
19. Ibid., p. 200
20. Ibid., p. 201
21. Ibid., p. 201
22. Ibid., p. 201
23. Ibid., p. 202
24. Ibid. p. 206
25. Ibid., p. 206
26. Ibid., p. 204
27. Ibid., p. 204
28. Ibid., pp. 205,206
29. Ibid., p. 200
30. Ibid. p 354
31. Ibid., p. 354
32. Ibid., p. 354
33. Ibid., p. 355
34. Ibid., p. 356
35. Ibid., p. 356
36. Ibid., p. 355
37. Ibid., p. 355
38. Ibid., p. 356
39. Ibid., p. 355
40. Ibid., p. 355
41. Ibid., p. 355
42. Ibid., p. 356
43. Ibid., p. 357
44. Ibid., p. 356
45. Ibid., p. 356
46. Ibid., p. 356
47. Ibid., p. 356
48. Ibid., p. 357
49. Ibid., p. 357. See also p. 358
50. Ibid., cf. p. 357 
51.Ibid., p. 357 
52.1bid., p. 357 
53.1bid. p. 357 
54.1bid., p. 358 
55.1bid., of. p. 359 and p. 360 
56.1bid.
57. Ibid., p. 360
58. Ibid., p. 360
59. Ibid., p. 361
60. Ibid. p. 360
61. Ibid. p. 361
62. Ibid., p. 361 
63.Ibid., p. 362 
64.1bid., p. 523 
65.Ibid
66. Ibid., of. p. 523 with p. 470 (second visit to America)
67. Ibid., p. 524
336
337
68. Ibid., p. 524
69. Ibid., p. 524
Section D Endnotes
1. H. Richard Niebuhr, The Kingdom o f God In America (Middleton, Conn.: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1988; First Publication by Harper & Row, 1937), see pp. 41-43, 72,73.
2. See Chapter V, p. 165 ff.
3. P. 88.
4. See Kingdom o f God In America, p. 27. In actual usage, Niebuhr’s three terms tend to 
blend in with each other and are not used consistently.
5. See Paul Ramsey, ed., Faith and Ethics, Chapter 10, “The Kingdom of God in America 
and the Task of the Church” by Robert Michaelson, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 
1957), p. 287.
6. p. 3.
7. See pp. 60-63.
8. See pp. 39 ff, 65, 80.
9. See pp. 77-79; also p. 98.
10. See pp. 99,100 and 126.
11. See The Kingdom o f God in American, Chapter IV.
12. Ibid.
13. Seep. 130.
14. See p. 151.
15. See The kingdom o f God in America, Chapters IV and V.
16. Ibid., p. 191.
17. Ibid., p. 193.
18. P. 179.
19. See Chapter Four, Section A, this thesis.
20. The Kingdom o f God in America, pp. 173. 174.
21. See Chapter 3, Section B, this thesis.
22. The Kingdom o f God in America, p. 181.
23. Ibid, p. 181.
24. Ibid. p. 31.
25. Ibid. p. 32.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. p. 181.
29. Ibid., p.195.
30. Ibid., p. 196.
31. Ibid., compare p. 67 with p. 9.
32. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
33. Church Against the World, p. 592
34. Ibid., 592
35. Ibid., 592
36. Ibid., 592,593, 604.
37. Ibid., 597
38. Ibid., 599
39. Ibid., 599
40. Ibid., 599
41. Ibid., 599
42. Ibid., 596
43. Ibid., 596
44. Ibid., 599,600
338
Section Ë Endnotes
339
1. See for instance Mary Douglas. Purity and Danger, Hans Moi, Identity and the Sacred. 
James D G Dunn Jesus Paul and the Law', L. William Countryman, Dirt, Greed and Sex.
2. To satisfy myself, I surveyed the history of Judaism's use and reliance on the law from the 
exile to first century Jewish and Christian developments. I have bound this as a separate 
document and lodged it with St. Mary's library for the readers benefit. My conclusions 
generally parallel James D. G. Duim's position. See James D. G. Durm, Jesus, Paul and the 
Law: Studies in Mark and Galatians, (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox Press,
1990) chap. 8, "Works of the Law and the Curse of the Law", 216—"The Social Function of |
the Law". j
3. Ibid. 216 I
4. Ibid., 216 I5. Ibid. 1
I6. Ibid., 217 j
7. Ibid., 218 I18. Ibid., 217, 218 Ij9. Wayne Meeks, "Toward a Sociological Description of Pauline Christianity" in Approaches I
to Ancient Judaism: Theory and Practice, vol. II„ ed., William Scott Green (publisher/date !
missing: University of St. Andrews library no. BM 173.68), 33 |
10. On the traditional view that Paul's apostleship was called into question by the Galatian 1
heretics and that his response in Galatians, Chapters 1 and 2 record his defense against that D. |
J. Verseput argues otherwise.. He urges a more consistent sociological lens be used when j
reading these verses. "Paul apparently found it frequently necessary to defend himself against 
conservative forces which sought to restrain the Gentile mission within the bounds of the 
Torah covenant... he begins the rebuttal of his opponents' teaching with an autobiographical 
review which receives its persuasive force from his role as founder of the Galatian church.
Paul assures his readers that his ministry among Gentiles was independent of any essential 
contact or subordination to the Jewish community. That is, the Gentile mission was not an 
appendage of God's work among the covenant people of Israel with the result that the 
Gentiles must first Judaize to participate in salvation... thus briefly stated, Paul is not 
defending himself against personal attacks in Galatians 1 & 2, but is advancing an historical 
argument for the independence of the Gentile churches from the confines of the Torah. D.J.
Verseput, "Paul's Gentile Mission and the Jewish Christian Community: A Study in the 
Narrative in Galatians 1 & 2," New Testament Studies 39, no. 1 (Jan. 1993), 57-58.
11. Revised Standard Version.
12. Some scholars point out that Paul's autobiographical rehearsal of his speech to Peter 
proceeds from 2:14 through verse 21. See Markus Barth, "Jews and Gentiles: The Social 
Character of Justification in Paul," Journal o f Ecumenical Studies, 5 (1968), 246. Whether or 
not Paul actually intends for the Galatians to read much past verse 15 or 16 as an
340
autobiographical historical statement remains a question in my mind. It may be an 
impassioned statement to the Galatians of his position and experience made over against the 
Antioch issue and in light of the new Galatian issue.
13.Paul's use of the term "works" or "works of the law" for justification is likely a rhetorical 
device to scandalize those who are insisting on the ongoing significance of certain purity 
regulations for Gentile believers; purity regulations that historically functioned to maintain 
the people of Jahweh's separateness and to initiate one into the separated/holy people of God. 
As E.P. Sanders and James D.G. Dunn have stressed, Judaism's use of law (for purity or 
ethical purposes) is not by principle legalistic. But firom Paul's perspective, charging 
believers in the messiah with "works," who persist in attaching ecclesiological significance to 
these is not without "Evangelical" integrity in light of the dawn of the eschaton. The 
"legalism" as such that is named here may more properly be identified as "associative" rather 
than "ethical." As is well known, E. P. Sanders' positions, i.e. that first century Judaism was 
not legalistic and that Paul's critique of works proceeds from his Gospel assumptions, not 
from a legalistic matrix within Judaism or nascent Christianity may be found in his two 
books: Paul and Palestinian Judaism and Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People. James 
D.G. Dunn's similar position was first published in Jesus, Paul and the Law.
14. Commenting on the Antioch incident's significance in Paul's eyes, F.F. Bruce points to 
the intersection of the religions and the social: "In Christ, Paul believed and affirmed, there 
was 'neither Jew nor Greek' (Galatians 3:28), whatever distinctions might persist in the world 
at large. The middle wall of partition between them had been demolished by the wok of 
Christ; Paul would not stand idly by and see it rebuilt, whether as a religious or as a social 
barrier. The only logical reason for preserving it as a social barrier would be its continuing 
validity as a religious barrier, and to recognize such a continuing validity, even if it were only 
in outward behavior, would be to nullify the grace of God. If God's redeeming grace was to 
be received by faith, and not by conformity with the law of Moses, then it was available on 
equal terms to Jew and Gentile, and to make a distinction in practice between Jewish and 
Gentile believers, as Peter and the others were doing, was in practice to deny the gospel."
F.F. Bruce, Paul: Apostle of the Heart Set Free, (Grand Rapids: Wm. B, Eerdmans, 1977), 
178.
15. When the contextual problem of requiring Gentiles to Judaize is given the key 
hermeneutic then the last seven verses in Chapter 2 [15-21] may be understood as a tight unit 
which state emphatically (A) that believing Jews know that while they are Jews by nature, 
they are not justified because of their Jewish-Torah constituency [15-16], (B) that if they, the 
Jews, (or any believer) takes this non-Torah road to justification, then turns around and 
proceeds to give the law the power to define them or others as "siimers' then that would be as 
much as involving Christ into a scheme which leads people into sin. It would be to return to 
the law basis of viewing one's inclusion with God/people of God [17-18]. Paul himself 
disinvested in the law's prerogative to constitute him a Jew and therefore insure his right with 
God and standing within God's people [18-21].
16. This common Gospel platform of fellowship may be the historical edge of the term 
ecclesia which evidently came to the fore as a/the description of the church in the wake of the 
Hellenist missionary endeavors. Hengel reasons, "its detachment from Judaism then led this 
early Hellenistic community, following the LXX, to give itself the name ecclesia and in this 
way to proclaim its eschatologically conditioned difference from the Jewish synagogue 
communities. In the same way—in contrast say to the mission carried on by the school of
341
Hillel the proclamation of the Euaggelion took the proclamation of the Law." Martin Hengel, 
Between Jesus and Paul, trans. John Bowden (London:SCM Press, Ltd., 1983), 58.
17. Dunn, Jesus, Paul and the Law, 245,250.
18. Dunn attributes this phrase, "works of the Law" to research by B. Lohmeyer, which 
concluded it meant "service of the law". "It marked (in the Qumran sect, i.e. 'deeds of the 
Law') the community of the end days in its distinctiveness from outsiders..." Ibid., 220. 
Dunn's explanation, I believe, reflects the penchant of a NT scholar to account for all 
expressions through historical parallels. Paul's passionate rhetoric seems to me more 
plausible. "Works" like being "under" scandalizes those who are participants. It interprets 
their actions negatively.
19. Within historical Judaism it is no surprise that law and curse are intertwined. Paul's 
argument is not novel at that point. Even the conclusion that there was no inside resolution to 
the curse cycle was not entirely a departure from patterns consistent with Jewish thought, 
insofar as messianic expectations existed within renewal theology. Moreover, even the 
messiah's supreme fidelity to the law, depicted twice in this letter, fits fairly well within some 
streams of Jewish thought at the time. See N.T. Wright, The Climax o f the Covenant: Christ 
and the Law in Pauline Theology, (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 137-156.
20. 49. Addressing the nature of the church under discussion here as it came to be conceived 
and formed under Paul's leadership, Paul D. Hanson states, "In his Letter to the Galatians,
Paul sought to establish that the crucifixion of the Messiah was the eschatological event that 
erased all distinctions between Jews and Gentiles, for it inaugurated the age of freedom under 
God's grace transcending every human effort to erect restrictive barriers. Specifically in 
3:23-29 Paul addresses the question of membership and eligibility, and states emphatically 
that all distinctions had been erased, for salvations comes through faith...
"... In the eschatological concept of the 'new creation'-that is, the order of reality with 
which God brings to fulfillment the divine plan for creation by breaking down all human 
distinctions that had led to the exclusion of certain groups and individuals—we find the heart 
of Paul's notion of community...
"... Unfortunately, the challenge to be a community guided by the Spirit and 
fundamentally egalitarian in structure has rarely been heeded, leading to recurrent attempts to 
establish certain groups, whether defined by gender, race, or social status, as privileged and in 
possession of superior authority in the community of faith." Paul D. Hanson, The People 
Called: The Growth o f Community in the Bible (San Francisco :Harper & Row, 1986), 439, 
442,443.
21. S James D. G. Dunn, Jesus, Paul and the Law: Studies in Mark and Galatians
342
CONCLUSION
This study has argued that:
(1) Segments of mainstream Protestantism in the United States have and 
continue to be uncritically identified with its world;
(2) This identity is primarily betrayed by two patterns, “fixity” and “freedom,” 
defined as attempts to transpose Christianity into a religious form and connect it 
directly to society. As discussed, “fixity” represents a regulative strategy to form this 
connection and “fi*eedom”represents an integrative one. The former presents 
“Christianity” to society in a heteronomous religious form in partial tension to modem 
freedom under the pretext of saving liberal society by marking its proper religio-moral 
bounds. The latter presents “Christianity” to society in a religious form compatible to 
and supportive of autonomy and freedom;
(3) The gospel requires an ecclesial response which exists in a differentiated 
dialectical relation to the world.
The Conclusion first reviews the historical problem of American 
Protestantism’s uncritical identification with its world. Drawing from the net results 
of Chapters One through Six, eight factors are summarized which contributed to the 
problem. In the second and final section of the Conclusion, a constructive response to 
the problem is presented. Returning to the net results discussed in Chapter Seven, 
eight overlapping points are made. Each point embodies some aspect of the challenge 
with which American Protestants are confronted if they are to break the patterns of 
uncritical identification and forge a creative differentiated connection to their world.
Uncritical Identification:
Summarizing the Problem
The close identity between Protestantism and American society which 
expressed itself in the patterns described as “fixity” and “freedom” may be 
summarized as forming out of the following forces. While attempting to make the 
church a select society. New England Puritanism in the colonial period extended the 
range of its religion outside this ecclesial sphere for two purposes. First, it marked the 
religio-moral boundaries of society at large. Second, it made building a model society 
("city") an explicit mission of the church's calling. In both of these employments of
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religion, one can trace the beginning of a distinction between an ecclesial and a public 
Protestantism. Even so, in that colonial period, the established church was the 
primary institution around which society was organized and the goal of public religion 
was to direct individuals to God and build the Commonwealth to the glory God. 
Nevertheless, a precedent was set in this two fold “extra-ecclesial” employment of 
Christianity. It is certainly not the engagement of Christianity with society that is to be 
faulted. But because one of the main goals of the Puritans was to build a better society 
and because this goal was explicit, it posed a risk that it would take on a life of its 
own and that Christianity would come to see its social role as one of employing its 
religious resources to assist in the realization of this better society. The same may be 
said for the Puritans’ idea of establishing their society on a biblical constitution.
While their explicit aim was to orient every person in the district to the sovereign will 
of God, this practice was a short step from abstracting the moral resources and 
boundaries of Christianity from their true redemptive framework and using them to 
achieve public stability and cohesion.
During the formative period surrounding the time of die Revolution, when 
disestablishment was completed, the place of church over society was ended. 
However, while society was emancipated from the church so that it could supposedly 
find its own ends and goals, it was not quickly emancipated from an extension of 
Protestantism beyond its ecclesial sphere - "religious” or “public” Protestantism. 
While church was uniformly reduced in its social stature to that of a voluntary 
association, a plural form of Protestantism discovered its unity under the rubric 
evangelical. In this form, it maintained both cultural and formal influence over its 
world, marking out the acceptable social boundaries in conformity to its religious and 
moral values. The new republican unity of the former colonies and the new 
evangelical unity of Protestants, sustained a unique kind of relationship which 
eventually came to be largely characterized by complementarity.
In the new republic, society and Protestantism were both changing 
dramatically. The Enlightenment ideas behind 1776 suggested to the American 
imagination that their republican experiment possessed social and historical 
significance. In this the original Puritan dream for society came to be invested in the 
new nation. Society increasingly came to be viewed as an end in itself embodying 
“new” human ideals and values. Under the forces of the Second Great Awakening and
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the challenge presented by the new political era of liberal values, an Evangelical 
imagination was bom which called for a new kind of Protestantism - one essentially 
unified and reformed in its saving principle, thereby suited to be the complement of 
liberal society. As shown, this new Protestantism had wider horizons. It believed all 
could be saved and it was more confident. It had experienced the power of revival on 
the masses. It had even begun to believe the millennial kingdom was near because in 
their experience, that synergism between republican freedom and evangelical 
revivalism had begun to change the course of history. As shown in Chapters Three 
and Four, the secular imagination about America and the millennial imagination 
increasingly became identified.
The two sides of this uncritical identification were evident early on in the life 
of the republic. The rise and eventual predominance of Evangelicalism was an 
ambiguous good. While moderating sectarianism and proving the intrinsic vitality 
and potency of free religion to be a powerfid force in society relying on influence 
alone (without recourse to coercion or civil support), Evangelical pietism and 
revivalism rendered Protestantism more vulnerable to cultural and national captivity. 
As shown, these forces left Protestantism more permeable and malleable to laissez 
faire individualism and the more humanistic optimism that was bred into America 
through the Enlightenment, as it faced the task of transforming a native America into 
a modem nation. Protestantism became enamoured with the human possibility to 
change, and the uniqueness and sanctity of the individual experience of God. This 
focus enabled it to view itself less as a discrete ecclesial society with a given doctrinal 
stmcture and more as America’s religious counterpart. The elevation of the subjective 
side of the gospel, which includes the faith-experience, sanctification and personal 
change, became the bridge which facilitated an increasingly consistent commerce with 
modernity's values. Protestantism complemented modernity's goals and ideology 
about human-social change and development.
Evangelical religion was considered to be the spiritual complement to the 
political reorganization of society on liberal-republican values. Mainstream 
Protestantism shifted from an emphasis on external to internal authority 
complementing the political shift from subjects to citizens who were enfranchised 
with liberty and charged with its responsible exercise. Nineteenth century 
evangelicalism became republican religion. It seemed tailor-made for the emerging
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modem state/
At the same time, the "objective" side of Protestant faith, the biblical 
reference of truth, progressively came to be regarded as tme by Enlightenment 
rationalistic measurements of tmth, and therefore, normative for society at large. 
Protestants like Isaac Backus commenced their thinking on the premise that social 
morals and boundaries must be derived as assuredly by recourse to a 
Revelation-Biblical basis as by a rational natural basis, assuming as most in that 
period did, that no contradiction between them existed. Even though society was not 
to be under the institution "church," it was not free from the religious moorings made 
clear through scripture. While antebellum Protestantism, in terms of its religious 
institutions proper, came under the critique and limits insisted on by the 
Enlightenment and Baptist schools, the socio-cultural reach of their religio-moral 
values did not. These were to remain normative for America. After all, the republic 
was conceived by most mainstream Protestants as a ‘Christian’ republic.
The two aspects of evangelical Protestantism just reviewed (the 
subjective-experiential and the "objective" scriptural-normative) describe the 
theoretical basis for an optimistic and pessimistic enmeshment in the socio-cultural 
world of modernity. This is especially true as the promise and debt of a society 
organized around individual liberty came due.  ^ As America’s Enlightenment charter 
of liberty and rights became more consistently structured and the individualistic ethos 
became more dominant, the social-cultural configuration of America began to change. 
In time, society reflected the risks and the promise of the new ordering. The promise 
began to be realized with the extension of rights and liberties to a wider spectrum of 
individuals and peoples beyond white-landed males with a corresponding social 
mobility and advancement. The risk began to reveal itself when diminished cultural 
cohesion resulted from a marked increase in the pluralization and individualization of 
society. This, as discussed, is reflected in the breakdown in religio-moral consensus, 
extreme economic disparity and shrinking sociality. Increasingly, society became 
“parochialized.” The ethos of modernity bore finit in the proliferation of discrete 
groups with little or no underlying shared meanings. Society increasingly came to be 
characterized as a collective of autonomous individuals not bound by institutional 
interests and mores.
"Public" or "religious" Protestantism's relation to the modem world, gradually
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emerged in two overlapping forms. It has been naively optimistic. Protestantism also 
became anxious and pessimistic with regard to changes that were occurring in their 
fledgling modem world, especially changes in the spheres of religio-moral values, the 
configuration of family roles, and gender roles in society and changes which might 
threaten the autonomy of economic freedom and existing concentrations of wealth and 
privilege. These two directions which are called "Fixity" and "Freedom," correspond 
to the Church's captivity to cultural counterparts represented by those in society who 
are pessimistic and anxious about the course of modernity and those genuinely 
optimistic and idealistic about the possibilities of society organized on liberal values. 
Only toward the end of the nineteenth century did these bifurcate.
While both of these have possessed a measured critical element toward 
society, eventually their interests differed. The one form interfaced its religious 
resources with modernity's social project in support of the dominant Jeffersonian 
idealism. This required a modification or revision, such that the socio-ethical 
questions and issues generated by the organization of society on modem values, (i.e. 
justice, rights, liberty, and equality) became the paramount questions required from 
Protestantism. In its effort to integrate with modernity’s goals and needs,
Protestantism became more anthropocentric and ethically oriented. It met modernity 
from a position, not over the human social process, but under, alongside, and relative 
to it. It saw itself as integral to the success of modemity’s vision of socio-cultural 
advancement and the proper realization of its liberal and egalitarian values. As such, 
the biblical and dogmatic sources were revised relative to this posture and these 
interests. These sources were not framed in such a way that the human self 
encountered them as intrinsically authoritative but relative to modem individual and 
social values. A fundamental openness and malleability was required of 
Protestantism, regarding the use of its sources, so that it could be responsive to its 
times and the changes it presented. As shown, this relationship tended to erode the 
substantive difference of Protestantism,
The other form of "public" or "religious" Protestantism interfaced its religious 
resources with society in response to the perception that modemity did not have 
remaining within it that which would guarantee proper socio-moral boundaries. 
Morally, modemity was perceived as a runaway train. What it needed was religio- 
moral stability, fixity, "boundedness". Protestantism set about to provide this need for
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fixity, eventually in concert with other religious traditions. As shown in Chapter 4(c), 
Protestantism shaped its religious sources into a more authoritative moral form and 
reached for political leverage to reassert particular values as the foundation upon 
which individual liberty could be enjoyed. Like the more liberal Protestantism just 
described, a “relativization” of Protestantism occurred in this phenomenon, and it is 
this fact which discloses the substantive claim presented here, that Protestantism was 
being given a religious form in answer to social exigencies. In both manifestations of 
"public" Protestantism just described, there is an explicit correlation of Protestantism 
to modemity with a corresponding reshaping of its sources to meet the perceived 
need. Formally, this has been described here as Protestantism’s extension of itself 
beyond a discrete ecclesial form so as to be present to and connect with society in a 
religious form answerable to modemity’s new needs and goals. Materially, the 
problem has been presented as one in which Protestantism's tmth was abstracted and 
distorted in the process of rendering it relative to the modem situation. Both the 
formal and informal aspects of public Protestantism arose out of its close 
identification with America which commenced in colonial times and was transformed 
and deepened in the wake of the 1776 Revolution.
The problem of American Protestantism's identification with its world may be 
summarized in the following eight overlapping statements: (1) It has its roots in New 
England Puritanism’s theological universalism and determinism which required 
society on “earth” to be formally divided and visibly connected to the sovereignty of 
“heaven.” (2) The problem stems from colonial Puritanism’s early passion to prove 
their religion by building a better society and to use liberal principles in that 
construction. Eventually, this vision for a superior liberal society was carried over to 
the new republic, which was destined to become a pluralistic secular entity. 
Protestantism was one of the parents of modemity and as such, it was inevitable that 
they would become closely attached to it. Although in this scenario, as is often the 
case in modem times, the single parent eventually became organized around the child,
(3) The problem has its roots in the attempt to give Christianity a direct 
re/îg/ows-public formation. This was inaugurated in the colonial period and given 
national expression after disestablishment in the nineteenth century. The revivalism 
that came with the second Great Awakening propelled Protestantism to cultural 
dominance. By the second third of the nineteenth century, Protestantism’s cultural
348
predominance was so strong, that it was easy for it to conceive of and, to a degree, 
even establish its religio-moral tenets as the normative values and morals of the 
republic. The more dialectical engagement of religion with society represented by 
revivalism moved Protestantism to a new place and a new temptation -  a non- 
dialectical establishment of its religious values viewed as constituitive of the republic 
-  a “Christian republic.” (4) It has roots in those optimistic impulses and 
theological developments which increasingly came to understand the Protestant 
religion from the standpoint of its power to effect individual and social change.
Within this frame of reference, religion’s practical, experiential, subjective and 
socially relevant aspects came to be emphasized and given priority. This allowed 
Protestantism to view itself as integral and complementary to the new world. It 
provided them a religious point of contact with the republican project of valued. (5) 
The problem has its roots in a pessimistic view of human nature found in both 
Puritanism’s division between the righteous and the wicked and republicanism’s 
citizen elite. (6) It has roots in the growth of a rationalism, which on the one side, 
facilitated a critical revisionism rendering Christianity relative to modernity's values 
and goals; and on the other side, was enlisted to render Christianity more absolute and 
authoritative in answer to the new relativism. (7) The problem grows out of the 
pressures and attractions, which were endemic to the rise of the liberal modem world. 
These played a role in deepening Protestantism’s identification with the modem 
world. This was manifested in Protestantism’s attempt to both integrate its religious 
resources with modem freedom sharing its underlying optimism, and to mark the 
socio-moral limits of modem freedom as a complement necessary to offset the risk of 
socio-moral chaos inherent to freedom [i.e., to regulate the boundaries of freedom], 
(8) The problem is also a practical problem having to do with the difficulty of 
negotiating a tension between maintaining the ecclesial integrity of Christianity and 
the social-worldly engagement of Christianity. Increasingly, Protestantism’s interest in 
transforming the worldly secular realm was paid for by a weakening of the church as a 
discrete social world that embodied a different view and practice of reality.
From Identification to Differentiation
For Protestant bodies in the United States, this study suggests that escaping the 
pattems of uncritical identification and forming a proper differentiated connection to
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the world is linked to the following:
1. A “Revolutionary” Versus a Religious Understanding of the Christian
Gospel
The transposition of the gospel into religio-moral tenets and the attempt to join 
these to the individual or society is fundamentally a strategy to stabilize and improve 
the human condition.
The gospel, Barth and Niebuhr argued, is revolutionary. This revolution occurs 
when the human is brought into immediate relations to the Being of beings^ to God as 
Lord, judge and savior; to God who in Christ on the cross indicts, condemns, rejects 
and destroys humanity as she is only to save humanity by giving her a new order of 
being in the resurrected Christ that fills the new age. The religion of the gospel turns 
the believer away from religious strategies calculated to save and improve the old 
humanity and old age to the already secured new age and new humanity that has 
broken into this world. True religion is to live in the power of the new and reflect and 
conform to its image. The attempt to forge a direct connection between the individual 
or social order and the so-called eternal laws of God authoritatively written in nature, 
or the statutes and morals authoritatively written in the Bible thereby providing 
stabilizing and ordering principles which the autonomous citizen can appropriate, 
effectively negates the revolution of Jesus Christ. The revolution of Jesus Christ does 
not place religion on a lend lease basis to assist modem society or individuals to 
underwrite their autonomous venture so it or they will be successful. Rather, it 
explodes the myth of security and autonomy and turns one out to the only source of 
security the living God who meets all as Lord in severity and kindness. As Niebuhr 
pointed out, “God” and so-called authoritative moral, religious and ecclesiastical 
principles can be conflated into one entity and given a static quality. Society or the 
individual then is brought into a direct relation to these. When this occurs, the 
revolution of God as Lord ceases to exist.
In the radical language of his Romans //, Barth wrote that Jesus comes “... not 
to improve the flesh through morality, to transfigure it through art, to rationalize it 
through science, to overcome it through the Fata Morga of religion, but to proclaim 
the resurrection of the flesh, the new human being who recognizes herself in God 
because she is made in God’s image and in whom God recognizes Godself since God
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is her pattern.”''
Barth recognized that there existed a propensity to absolutize cultural 
conventions, familial, political and ecclesiastical institutions by grounding them in 
creation, natural law or the Bible. On these institutions there were often conferred a 
divine or eternal dignity and their persistence were often given religious soteriological 
importance and assistance. Barth recognized that the truth of the matter was that these 
institutions and conventions often structured evils and injustices and resisted 
revolution by ensuring a social stasis. This stasis was the seed bed for revolution.
Over against revolution, Barth urged the revolution of God in Jesus Christ. The 
revolution of God in Christ attempts neither to tear down the old structure or improve 
it. It proclaims the birth of a new order and the impotency, death and terminis of the 
old. [For Barth, Christianity from A to Z was eschatological]. The logic of the gospel 
understood in this way accomplishes what revolution cannot. It relativizes the 
importance and status of these institutions. What is needed, Barth insisted, is a 
“devastating undermining of the existing order.”  ^Summarizing Barth, Gorringe writes 
that this comes by depriving state, church, society, positive right, family, organized 
research - but also of course, revolutionary action, of their pathos.”  ^ “These things 
live off the credulity of those who have been nurtured upon vigorous sermons- 
delivered-on-the-field-of-battle, and solemn humbug of all sorts.”  ^“If you stir up 
revolution against them, their pathos is provided with fresh fodder. Depriving them of 
pathos starves them out.”* As Niebuhr pointed out, Protestantism in the United States 
has had two histories, one in which it has served the revolution of God, and the other 
in which it has served the interests and needs of modem society.
2. A “Self’ Defining Versus a Complementary Relation to Society
The emancipation of society from the dominance of the church and the 
simultaneous idealization of society as a secular autonomous future making 
phenomenon, set the stage for the temptation of the church to organize itself around I
the world. The world in this setting is the so-called larger, more important historical 
project that emerged in the wake of the 1776 Revolution -  the creation of liberal 
social order. The temptation was one of reinventing Christianity’s public role by 
discerning some lack or deficit in the secular project which it alone could fill; a sort of 
God of the gaps.
L
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The example of complementarity cited in the text was Protestantism’s 
temperance campaign. Whisky imperiled the individualistic productive axis of 
democratic industrial society. That Protestantism stepped forward to provide 
complementary help to society is evident by the fact that “men were not saved from 
the frustration, conflict and poverty of life which they sought to escape in saloons; 
they were saved from whiskey.” Bowen discerned that the willingness to place oneself 
in a complementary relation to others represents a failure to take up the challenge of 
defining oneself; that is, to be present to a situation in a way that has complete 
integrity to who one really is in themselves, not according to what others (or situation) 
seems to dictate or expect from them.
Transposed to a Christian setting, this is precisely the point Bonhoeffer made 
when he wrote: “Jesus concerns himself hardly at all with the solution of worldly 
problems.”  ^ “His word is not an answer to human questions and problems; it is the 
answer of God to the question of God to man. His word is essentially determined not 
from below but from above.” “The way of Jesus Christ... leads not from the world 
to God but from God to the world. This means that the essence of the gospel does not 
lie in the solution of human problems and the solution of human problems cannot be 
the essential task of the church.”'' “It [The Word] is not a solution but a 
redemption.”’^  The origin of this word does not arise out of a preoccupation with a 
human dilemma defined as the disunion of a world split between good and evil, but 
the “unity of the Son with the Father’s Will.”’^  This word lies “Beyond” all human 
problems’'’ and comes as a message of redemption. For Bonhoeffer, this does not 
mean that human problems are not given any resolution, but that resolution is found in 
a different “plane” or framework.’^  It is a matter not of the church being aloof from 
the world and its problems and evil. Rather, it is the point of departure from which 
these problems are encountered or addressed.’^
This resistance to complementarity is also what Barth brought to light when he 
showed that in the gospel of Jesus Christ, God chose his own form of being present to 
humanity. The resurrection of the crucified Jesus is God’s chosen meeting place with 
human beings. The church can do nothing other than seek to relate the world to the 
reality of Jesus Christ, not seek to relate Jesus Christ to the world.
When Niebuhr wrote the words describing liberalism which were to become 
renown, “A God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom without
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judgement through the ministrations of Christ without a cross.” The problem was not 
in the first place a doctrinal one. It was bom out of a Protestantism that had 
increasingly sought to maintain its public status by forging a religious complement to 
the modem rationalistic, autonomous world that was emerging.
3. A Realistic Versus Idealistic View of the Revolution of 1776
The Revolution of 1776 contained within it an idealism that was not only in 
tension with economic, political and ecclesiastical hierarchialism but with Christian 
soteriological and anthropological assumptions. The Enlightenment dream was one of 
attempting to give the values of individual liberty, equality, plurality and secularity 
(i.e., the direct affirmation of the value of the world as secular) a simple historical 
realization contingent only on citizen virtue and the use of reason. As shown, while 
Protestants in the eighteenth and nineteenth century did not envision such a republic 
(they wanted a Christian republic), this secular vision increasingly became the 
dominant public view with the slight modification that private piety helps support 
public virtue. The gospel, Bonhoeffer argued, does not support the Enlightenment 
optimism that these values have an independent absolute existence as etemal values 
grounded in creation. If this was the case, the Revolution of 1776 laid the building 
blocks for an ideal social human order. Protestants who remain differentiated from 
modemity, i.e., remain in touch with their distinctive Christian sourcing, will know 
that no such order can and will rise from such a foundation. Therefore they will resist 
the temptation to join their religion to the project.
In the new humanity bom out of the revolution of God in Christ, these values 
do exist, albeit in a qualified and modified fashion. From the standpoint of God, the 
autonomous free individual does not exist as such. God is shown to be in a 
relationship to the individual as Lord. In this framework, the individual is affirmed as 
valuable, not by virtue of creation [what she is in herself], but by grace [i.e., what God 
is in Godself]. In the same way, in the new humanity which is the creation of God in 
Christ, there is no such thing as independent humanity. Humanity is a collective 
conception in which all are bound together in a covenant of love and forgiveness.
The attempt to baptize the values of individual liberty, equality, plurality and 
the secular as absolute independent goods ends in relativism, individualism, pluralism 
(social fi-agmentation) and secularism.
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The temptation for Protestantism is on the one hand to forget the 
Enlightenment error of absolutizing values that are bred into the modem social 
experiment and become enamoured with this experiment as possessing future making 
significance. On the other hand, the temptation is that of attempting to absolutize 
conservative institutions and values [i.e., “family,” gender roles and moral 
“principles” as if the etemal was embedded in creation] and attempting to secure the 
modem world by formally connecting it to these.
4. An Intentional Versus an “Emotional” Relation to Society
Relations are formed through interaction with existing pressures and pulls.
The modem world which surrounds the churches exerts a pessimistic and optimistic 
“emotional” charge which tempts and pressures the churches. The pessimistic charge 
derives from the distortions created by modemity’s liberal ethic. This ethic fosters 
individualism and social fragmentation which create a cultural longing for 
authoritarianism and top-down strategies to reclaim socio-moral stability and 
unanimity. By the same principle, modemity creates a positive or optimistic charge. 
Modemity defines humanness along the lines of individual development and 
autonomy; the right to define oneself, one’s “values” and moral boundaries. This 
ethos eschews all religion that has the least taint or suspicion of heteronomy and 
accepts only that religion that supports autonomy and freedom.
The risk has been that Christian constituencies would be pulled into either this 
unfounded cultural optimism or the counter-cultural pessimism and shape their 
religion to be supportive of them instead of defining themselves in creative tension. 
Rightly understood, the gospel cannot be coopted for either of these. It cannot be 
reduced to authoritative religio-moral standards and it cannot be made into a religious 
experience for the realization of the free and autonomous individual or society. As 
shown, the objective and scriptural character of the Christian message wrongly 
understood can be exploited by transposing it into religio-moral tenets that are 
absolutely definable and authoritative. In this form, religion is easily exploitable by 
modem cultural forces seeking social stability. In a parallel manner, the subjective 
character of the Christian message can be exploited so as to create a bridge to an 
anthropocentric world enamoured with change and human development.
The gospel, Barth showed, certainly does not do away with the objective.
i
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thereby opening the door to relativism; neither does it do away with a subjective 
experience. Both subjective experiences of God and objective statements of God are 
referred to the cross and resurrection and derive their contents [limits and horizons] 
ultimately from that center in which God has chosen to reveal Godself definitively. As 
Barth points out, the cross-resurrection is both a revelation and hiding of God. In this 
“objective” form, God is not unambiguously and statically present. Through the 
gospel and the Spirit, God reveals Godself as God and Lord in such a way that the 
human is in the grasp and use of God, not the other way around.
5. Maintain Versus Surrender the Tension Between the Universality of 
the Gospel and the Particularity of the Church
The universal categories of the Kingdom of God which captured the 
imagination of the Puritans and nineteenth century evangelicals gave them their “this 
worldly” focus. The problem with their universalism was that they tended to idealize, 
if not equate, the “Kingdom of God in Christ” with their social, national, political or 
ecclesiastical endeavors while losing sight of the importance of the particularity of the 
church. The challenge for the church is to live in the critical tension that insists all 
human formulations to be under the gracious rule of God that has come near in Christ 
and the sober realization that no human formulation fully embodies that reality and 
can never be equated with it. If the church relinquishes the “this worldly” universal 
horizons of the gospel, it licenses a Christianity world separatism (i.e., a public- 
private dualism which agrees to the legitimate autonomy of a modem Enlightenment 
premised society and a private sphere for the reign of Christ). If it naively proposes a 
realization of the universal or proposes a stable union of the so-called principles of the 
universal to any human formulation, it is in tension with the advancement of the 
Kingdom of God in the world and forfeits the basis of its distinct particularity.
As shown, the temptation of Protestants to forge a direct connection between 
their religio-moral tenets and society, thereby making it “Christian,” has a long history 
in the United States. It began with Puritan efforts to abstract Christian religion from 
its ecclesial setting and introduce it directly into society to build it and maintain its 
order. The idea that America was a Christian nation received special attention in the 
wake of disestablishment when it appeared Protestantism faced a private versus public 
role. It was revived in the middle of this century by early right wing Christian political
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militants such as Carl Mcintire, Robert Welch and George Wallace. It became a major 
theme and campaign in the 1970's, 80's and early 90's by the Moral Majority, which 
was begun by the covert union of Jerry Falwell and Ronald Reagan Cabinet members 
and was perpetuated by Pat Robertson, Ralph Reed and the Christian Coalition. It has 
received a major apologetic by David Barton as well as Gary Baurer, author and 
director of the Family Research Institute and presidential hopeful for the year 2000.
This entire project for a “Christian” America stands under the censure of the 
gospel. It is, as Bonhoeffer pointed out, an effort to divide what God has joined 
together in Jesus Christ. It divides law and gospel; religio-moral imperative from 
grace, with the aim of binding liberal society to the former while reserving the latter 
for the fellowship of the saints.
The church, understood as a community and institution, is a particular 
response to the new universal human reality that has come into the open in Jesus 
Christ. All the church can properly do and must do is be faithful to the universal truth 
that precedes and transcends it. Its existence is summed up in the vocation of 
witnessing to this universal truth and conforming to it. Both of these involve mission 
and fellowship.
The church and the world are not ontologically different. Because of its belief 
in the gospel, the church witnesses to the world that (A) all humanity is in the grip of 
a messianic destiny brought into the open through Jesus and (B) that the world, like 
itself, must not organize itself in variance with this destiny.
The church can make no unique claims about itself, its prerogative regarding 
truth and religious authority in the world. It can never be more than a company of 
believers bearing witness to a truth they know only through the Spirit and the Apostles 
to be universal. If the church could claim more for itself, it could justify either 
separating from the “evil” world or presiding over the world as a bearer of religio- 
moral norms.
As shown, Paul rendered Christianity’s distinctivity vulnerable to the corrosive 
effects of the world when he challenged the universality of ecclesial claims uniquely 
tied to Judaism; holy men, holy places, holy times, holy rituals and holy foods. At 
times when Judaism was threatened by assimilation into an encroaching culture, it 
could and did exploit religious taboo to create social insularity, thereby protecting its 
integrity. The price it paid for this was an intensified parochialism, the seed bed for
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anti-Semitism, Christianity’s only proper resource to resist assimilation is to 
strengthen its particularity; a particularity that is built entirely from its response and 
witness to the universal that has made its debut in Christ. Any other path to building 
its particularity will conclude in a parochialism (that breeds dualism) or an 
ecclesiastical arrogance that breeds religious hegemony.
The post-Erastian, post-Constantinian period returns Christianity to the 
original challenge bom out of Pauline desacrilization. It must derive its integrity 
“spiritually” (versus the flesh, cf. Galatians 3:3) i.e., conformity to the universal faith 
of Abraham.
Both Niebuhr and Barth understood that the church and the world are not 
fundamentally different, only functionally different.
“Though it sounds paradoxical,” wrote H. Richard Niebuhr, “it seems 
nevertheless to be tme that the important difference between the Church and 
the world is that the church knows itself to be the ‘world’ before God while 
the world does not know this but thinks that it can be like God. Perhaps it’s 
better to say that the church consists of that portion of humanity which, 
knowing God, knows that man is not God and has made the decision before 
God that it will not play God but let God be Lord.”"'
Barth wrote that “the church is not set over against the world; it is the 
world conscious of its need, the place where the siclmess of the world comes 
to a head and therefore hope for all is included in hope for the church.”’*
As pointed out, Bonhoeffer equally argues for the church and the world’s 
underlying commonality derived from a redemption [versus creation] premise. This 
underlying unity radically applied, guarantees that the church will neither separate 
from or attempt to preside over the world, but remain alongside it as a witness to 
humanity's tme calling and destiny. Understood in its full radicality, this suggests that 
American Evangelicals need to shift their emphasis to what God has done for all 
humanity in Christ, not what He is doing for a select few; “what He is doing for me 
and can do for you if you choose to believe, repent and invite the Holy Spirit into your 
life.”
6. A Confessional Versus Apologetic Witness of the Church to the World
When Protestantism took upon itself the challenge of demonstrating to the 
world the empirical and rational logos of its faith, it was attempting to demonstrate
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that it shared common epistlemogical ground with the modem world that was 
emerging. By taking upon itself the task of communicating its convictions through 
apologetical argument, it was in effect assuming a part of the burden and 
responsibility for the reception of their message that did not belong to them. The irony 
is that this effort is rarely awarded by the world taking the church more seriously. 
Confession on the other hand, is a form of speech (or action) that is derived not from 
common ground, i.e., common warrants, but belief which stems from being grasped 
by the revelation of God [“I believe, therefore I speak”’^ ]. Such speech is arresting, 
disturbing and unwelcome. Because it is grounded in conviction, it creates an 
uneasiness in the other. Replying to Brunner who urged that the church meet 
communism with well developed arguments exposing its error, Barth insisted that no 
apologetical attack was called for. The church need only stay focused on its offensive 
vision and confess that in contrast to communism’s vision. If the time did come when 
communism needed confronting, Barth insisted that "... we shall then profit more 
from the first article of the Declaration of Barmen than from your knowledge of the 
objectiohableness of totalitarianism.” ®^
Discovering the power of a confessional relation to the world is one of the 
cures for “fixity” and “freedom.”
7. A Responsive Versus a Programmatic View of Social Change
As shown in this study, Protestantism in America has a long history of being 
enamoured with its role in social change. This is shown by the Puritan New England 
theocracy, nineteenth century evangelical social reforms, the social gospel movement 
and the Religious Right. The problem has been with their view of change. It has 
largely been programmatic.
Bowen has shown that the difference authentically embodied in the other who 
remains non-anxiously connected to a diseased situation, is the primary resource to 
affect (not effect) change. The presence of this connection is passionate love. 
Differentiation properly embodied is the presence of truth. It is when evil (i.e., sin or 
destructive pattems) is exposed to this formulation, that it is most likely to lose its 
power, since it does not possess an ontological permanence.
Niebuhr said that Barth salvaged the social gospel mission which could not be 
carried forward on the principles it espoused.^' The movement was activist and
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teleological and led no where but to a future of human making. Summarizing Barth, 
Niebuhr writes that the Kingdom of God utters a radical no “in response to man’s 
petition, ‘Let my kingdom of liberty, fraternity and equality come.’”^^
The first step of true change is a negative step, not a direct employment of 
power to effect change. Change is first and foremost conditioned on the presence of 
radical difference that contains within it a negation of the intrinsic validity of non- 
being [i.e., sin, evil, destructive patterns]. Exposing non-being as non-being is a 
dialectical possibility that is grounded in God’s act in Christ. The primary movement 
in historical change occurs when human formulations are exposed to the gospel and 
respond.
H.R. Niebuhr writes that
“The meaning of ‘Kingdom of God’ and ‘eschatology’ in Barthianism is to be 
understood, then from the point of view of the central doctrine that God acts, 
and first of all in this way, that God’s action is negative -  the denial of human 
action with its purposes. So approached, all the concepts of Christian theology 
have a purely negative content. Eternity is Not-Time; Kingdom of God is Not- 
Kingdom-of-man; Salvation is not-conservation...”
He goes on to address the proper sphere of human action.
“Christian action is to be understood not as parallel to divine action in the 
common striving after a common telos, nor as counter-action to God’s action, 
but as response to the divine activity which precedes, accompanies and awaits 
human action in history.^*
8. Secure its Place in the World Through the Relevance of the Word 
Versus the Relevance of Churchly Authority and Status
Bonhoeffer argues that the Church must seek to hear the word of God 
regarding the subtle formation of sin which is peculiar to a particular age. To ensure 
its place in society, it cannot rest on either its orthodox claims or on the merit of the 
practical benefits it renders to society. Neither can it rest on its right to exist, right 
understood as that grant ensured by liberal government that guarantees the freedom of 
a given religion to express itself and practice its faith. Rather, the church must go into 
the wilderness, as Niebuhr suggests (or to the “mountain” as Bonhoeffer writes) and 
wait on God and the gospel to hear with fresh clarity and relevance God’s word to its 
particular world. It is in this clarification and in a dialectical engagement of this clarity
359
with its world that the church establishes its place in the world. Religious freedom, 
Bonhoeffer is clear, is nothing in and of itself. The gospel alone guarantees the 
church’s relevance and place in the world by penetrating the lie of a given age.
Viewed in this light, the Religious Right’s attempt to “save America” by 
formally linking it to religio-moral standards is simply a cheap substitute, an 
unacceptable short cut which attempts to escape the discipline of the Spirit which 
requires the church to return to the gospel until it hears the truth with sufficient clarity 
that it is able to “save people from the world.” The Left is equally flawed. It has often 
chosen to talk in language of abstract liberty, equality and rights as if these were ends 
in themselves and led to human social betterment. The Religious Left has often 
presented itself to the world in a mock Constantinian form pontificating on what is 
right and wrong in society. As Franklin Littell has written, “We [U.S. Protestants] 
have even more councils of bishops, synods and assemblies that when they pass 
resolutions, sometimes sound as though they were members of the old House of Lords 
or Princes of the Realm. When they do speak, their words sound ‘moralistic’ -  that is, 
presumptive of a status, authority, and constituency that no longer obtains.” '^’
Concluding Remarks
The movement from problematic identification to the more vulnerable and 
tension filled relation to society described by the term differentiation, is of course a 
generation to generation, decade to decade challenge. Nevertheless, this study has 
shown that pattems of identification (“fixity” and “freedom”) are deeply rooted in 
segments of mainstream Protestantism in America. From the earliest colonial 
beginnings to the present, these pattems have been fostered and developed in one 
form or another. This fact urges forward the conclusion that much of Protestantism in 
the United States, conservative or liberal, still has not fully come to grips with the 
perpetuity of this historic problem or the change in direction that is needed.
Even so, it is likely that the problematic identity between Protestant bodies and 
America manifested in efforts to connect their religion to society through integrative 
and regulative strategies, have both reached their high water mark in this century. By 
1930's, Protestantism’s interest in integrating its religion into the unfolding 1776 
socio-cultural project organized around rational, democratic and individual values, 
had crested. The recent splitting of ideological and fiscal conservatives in the
360
Republican Party and the changing rhetoric of Ralph Reed, who began to soften the
militant position of the Christian Coalition, eventually to resign as director late in this
decade, sent a signal that the twenty-five year campaign to relink the United States to
nineteenth century religio-moral values, had also crested. The playing out of the
strength of these strategies, although they are not completely spent, suggests that the
time may be right for clarifying what a dialectical connection with society consists
and deepening and broadening support for it among Protestants. H. Richard Niebuhr
summarized this challenge when he wrote,
“How to be in the world and yet not of the world has always been the problem 
of the church... hence the church’s strategy always has a dual character and the 
dualism is in constant danger of being resolved into the monism of other 
worldliness or if this worldliness, into a more or less quiescent expectancy of a 
revolution beyond time or a mere reform program carried on in terms of the 
existent order.”^^
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